When the past speaks it always speaks as an oracle: only if you are an architect of the future and know the present will you understand it.

Friedrich Nietzsche, ‘On the Use and Abuse of History for Life’
http://www.mala.bc.ca/~Johnstoi/Nietzsche/history.htm

ABSTRACT. Philosophy of the future is a platform for rethinking the philosophy of education and policy futures in education. While policy futures may draw on the techniques and methodologies of futures studies it is not reducible to this field, or to its siblings--futurology, scenario planning, foresight, or science fiction. I am much more inclined to see futures in an applied philosophical framework that is akin to what Foucault, after Nietzsche, calls ‘histories of the present’ which is driven by a genealogical investigation of value and guided by the epistemological question of how the historical awareness of our present circumstances affect what and how we know and can know.

1. Introduction

The title for the paper is filched from Brian Leiter’s (2004) *The Future for Philosophy* and draws explicitly on his ‘Introduction’ at least in two main respects. Leiter’s admirably clear thesis is that analytic philosophy in its postwar incantation following the ‘linguistic turn’ has taken two routes: Wittgensteinian quietism where philosophy, after the ‘end’ of philosophy, dissolves into a kind of therapy and Quinean naturalism where philosophy becomes on a par with science. While he recognizes and documents some defensive moves by those who wish to rescue analytic philosophy by identifying a distinctive method such as ‘conceptual analysis’ he also argues that these defensive moves (let’s call it the strategy ‘defensive modernism’) arrogate a much more modest status and role for conceptual analysis, so much so that it is hard to see the difference between it as a method and descriptive sociology.¹ Analytic philosophy ‘survives, if at all, as a certain *style* that emphasizes “logic”, “rigor”, and “argument”’ (p. 12). Yet Leiter gives much more
importance to the trend he calls Quinean naturalism and his Introduction and the collection suffers in that he does not explore carefully enough the strand he calls Wittgensteinian quietism but more on this a little later.\textsuperscript{2}

What his analysis does, however, is provide a ground for him to reassess the analytic-Continental divide. With the ‘dissolution’ of analytic philosophy into its two principal strands the distinction dissipates and, I would add, therefore, also dissolves its rhetorical and ideological representations and they way they have served various institutional, discursive and pedagogical purposes with regard to the contemporary place and status of philosophy. Leiter goes on to explain that where one side of the divide has ‘dissolved’ (my word), the other side has ‘become a meaningless category’ (p. 12). ‘Continental philosophy’ is a reductionist category: it is not one tradition but many (seven to nine separate traditions). Gutting (2005) usefully indicates that it may be the case that there is no fruitful analytic-Continental division in terms of ‘substantive doctrines’ yet it is possible to ‘draw a significant distinction between analytic and Continental philosophy in terms of their conceptions of experience and reason as standards of evaluation’ which he explains as follows:

Typically, analytic philosophy reads experience in terms of common-sense intuitions (often along with their developments and transformations in science) and understands reason in terms of formal logic. Continental philosophy, by contrast, typically sees experience as penetrating beyond the veneer of common-sense and science, and regards reason as more a matter of intellectual imagination than deductive rigor. In these terms, Continental philosophy still exists as a significant challenge to the increasing hegemony of analytic thought and, as such, deserved a hearing in this volume.

2. Futures of Philosophy of Education

Philosophers became preoccupied with images of the future only after they gave up hope of gaining knowledge of the eternal. Philosophy began as an attempt to escape into a world in which nothing would ever change. The first philosophers assumed that the difference between the flux of the past and the flux of the future would be negligible. Only as they began to take time seriously did their hopes for the future of this world gradually replace their desire for knowledge of another world.\textsuperscript{4}

So far we can draw out some possible Leiter consequences for the future for philosophy of education that follow from his analysis:

1. Analytic philosophy of education might be described in terms of the strands of Wittgensteinian ‘therapy’ and Quinean naturalism;

2. Analytic philosophy of education might also survive as a ‘style’ of philosophizing.³

With philosophy of education as developed by the so-called ‘London school’ we need to take into account the notion of ‘effective history’ and an inaugurating tradition that has its own powerful legacy. Leiter does also provide an account of the renewed significance of the history of philosophy which characterizes his own chapter and his discussion of the ‘masters of suspicion’ (Marx, Freud, and Nietzsche, after Ricoeur) although he does not discuss disciplinary histories or their effectivity.

We could also argue on the basis of the criticisms mentioned that:

3. Greater emphasis might be given to exploring the Wittgensteinian strand; and

4. Given that there are no convincing reasons for sustaining the old distinction between analytic and Continental philosophy, or rather for holding that it is a meaningful distinction to make nowadays, we ought (at least, descriptively) to admit that ‘Continental’ philosophy (or its strands), prima facie, provide possibilities for the future of philosophy of education (even although once the distinction has only historical significance it is not possible to characterize it as one tradition). Following Leiter we will have to admit several (7-9) traditions (and have to evaluate each one).

Already it is clear that more properly we ought to talk about futures (in the plural) rather than the future of philosophy of education. This point is of broader significance for it also takes us to the heart of Leiter’s project and to an objection that has to be confronted concerning the concept of the future which is treated unproblematically by Leiter, almost as though the future emerges as a condition of the past history of contemporary philosophy. In other words, Leiter does not give the notion of the future itself a philosophical treatment.
It was Nietzsche who said ‘The future influences the present just as much as the past’ and Paul Valery, the French poet and critic, who said ‘The future isn't what it used to be.’ In the past philosophers have attempted to lay down principles for a philosophy of the future: I am thinking not only of Nietzsche but also Feuerbach’s (1843) *Principles of Philosophy of the Future* and Bloch’s (1970) *A Philosophy of the Future*. My starting point is Nietzsche, Wittgenstein and Heidegger--‘prophets of postmodernity’ (as I call them)--who provide some ground on which to stand. Nietzsche, of the three, perhaps most explicitly addressed questions of the future. In a work that was to have been his second book, *On the Future of Our Educational Institutions*, portions of which appear in *Untimely Meditations*, he called for radical educational reform presented in the form of a prolonged narrative dialogue. *Beyond Good and Evil* was subtitled *A Prelude to a Philosophy of the Future* and he often talked of ‘philosophers of the future’ who have a specific task:

> All sciences are now under the obligation to prepare the ground for the future task of the philosopher, which is to solve the problem of value, to determine the true hierarchy of values.

In the Preface to *The Will to Power*, Nietzsche describes himself as the ‘perfect nihilist of Europe’ but one, at the same time, who had ‘lived through the whole of nihilism, to the end, leaving it behind, outside himself’ (p. 3). As he writes, again in the Preface, the title – *The Will to Power: Attempt at a Revaluation of all Values* – is formulated as a countermovement that will take the place of nihilism, but which at the same time logically and psychologically presupposes it in the sense that only after the advent of nihilism can we realize that nihilism is the logical extension of our values. Only after our experience of nihilism can we discover for the first time what these values really meant, and what real value they had. Only at that point, will we realize that we require new values.

Most of the standard works of reference begin with the Latin root *nihil* which means ‘nothing’, to emphasise that the word was first used by Friedrich Jacobi to negatively characterise transcendental idealism, and later by Ivan Turgenev in his novel *Father and Sons* (1862) to describe the character Bazarov, who accept no authority or doctrine that is not supported by proof.
Martin Heidegger (1991, orig. 1961), in the fourth volume of his major work *Nietzsche*, entitled *Nihilism*, based on a series of lectures given in 1940 and a treatise composed during the years 1944-46, indicates also that the first use of the word nihilism stems from Jacobi. Heidegger, then he also refers to Turgenev, thus:

Later the word nihilism came into vogue through Turgeniev as a name for the notion that only what is perceptible to our senses, that is, only beings that one experiences oneself, only these and nothing else are real and have being. Therefore, anything grounded on tradition, authority, or any other definitive value is negated (Heidegger, 1991, IV: 3).

Heidegger remarks that this view is normally called positivism and he proceeds to compare Jean Paul’s usage of the word in relation to romantic poetry to Dostoievsy’s usage of the term in his Foreword to his Pushkin Lectures, delivered in 1880, where he talks of the ‘typical negative Russian character … who denies Russia and himself’.

To Nietzsche, Heidegger remarks, the word nihilism means something more. He writes:

Nietzsche uses nihilism as the name for the historical movement that he was the first to recognize and that already governed the previous century while defining the century to come, the movement whose essential interpretation he concentrates in the terse sentence: ‘God is dead’ (Heidegger, 1991, IV: 4).

The prehistory of the concept, so to speak – that is, the use of the word and its history before it was given its definitive stamp by Nietzsche – is governed by the political context of late 19th century Russia. Thus, as the Catholic Encyclopaedia makes clear:

The nihilist they was formulated by Cernysevskij in his novel “Cto delat” (What shall be done, 1862-64), which forecast a new social order constructed on the ruins of the old. But essentially, Nihilism was a reaction against the abuses of Russian absolutism; it originated with the first secret political society in Russia founded by Pestel (1817), and its first effort was the military revolt of the Decembrists (14 Dec., 1825). Nicholas 1 crushed the uprising, sent its leaders to the scaffold and one hundred and sixteen participants to Siberia. The spread (1830) of certain philosophical doctrines (Hegel, Saint Simon, Fourier) brought numerous recruits to Nihilism, especially in the universities; and, in many of the cities, societies were organized to combat absolutism and introduce constitutional government (http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/110744a.htm).
Nihilism, in the modern context emerges in a political context, closely associated with Alexander Herzen (1812-70) and the anarchist Michael Bakunin (1814-76), who advocated the overthrow of the existing order in Old Russia. As the doctrine was picked up it became fused with anarchism and socialism, and eventually lost its political force by the late 1870s. The entry ‘Russian nihilism’ in *The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy* (1995: 702) provides the following account:

Russian nihilists urged the ‘annihilation’ – figurative and literal – of the past and present, i.e., of realized social and cultural values and of such values in process of realization, in the name of the future, i.e., for the sake of social and cultural values yet to be realized. Bakunin, as early as 1842, had stated the basic nihilist theme: ‘the negation of what exists … for the benefit of the future which does not yet exist’.

What is of interest here in relation to Nietzsche is both the orientation to the future and to the creation of new values. There is also a clear atheistic bent to some forms of Russian nihilism that predated Nietzsche.

4. Knowledge Cultures and Philosophy of Education

Knowledge cultures is an approach to philosophy of education that ties it to contemporary debates about knowledge and the value of knowledge, especially those accounts that draw on the concepts of ‘postindustrialism’, ‘postFordism’, ‘knowledge economy’, ‘creative economy’ and open source models of scientific communication, scholarship and science. In this paper I do not have the space to defend this broad approach to the philosophy of education as I need to be programmatic in setting out an agenda which is concerned not only with the idea of creating the future but also that is critical in an accepted sense. Such an approach needs to be non-deterministic especially in relation to technology, sensitive to cultural difference, and radically interdisciplinary. Most importantly, it needs to accept there is a logical as well as temporal asymmetry between the future and the past.

Philosophy of the future is a platform for rethinking the philosophy of education and policy futures in education. While policy futures may draw on the techniques and methodologies of futures studies it is not reducible to this field, or to its siblings—futurology, scenario planning, foresight, or science fiction. I am much more inclined to see futures in an applied philosophical framework
that is akin to what Foucault, after Nietzsche, calls ‘histories of the present’ which is driven by a genealogical investigation of value and guided by the epistemological question of how the historical awareness of our present circumstances affect what and how we know and can know. Consider ‘histories of the future’ a separate but parallel critical activity. It is an approach that I have attempted to develop and exemplify over the past few years through the establishment of journals and books series, and through various books and courses. In this brief paper I want to draw attention to one aspect of this program that I have called ‘Knowledge Cultures’ which I have addressed in terms of three specific aspects: ‘Open source, open access, and free science’ (see ‘Postscript’ in Peters & Besley, 2006). In Nietzsche’s terms I am trying to determine the true hierarchy of values in relation to knowledge futures, and, on some indicative evidence I want to assert the value of freedom to relation to the future of knowledge. ‘Freedom’ on the standard account has been defined as freedom from the dependence on the will of others—which is the classic statement by the tradition of nineteenth British liberalism stated first by Locke, then elaborated by Mill, Bentham, Green and others, and later adopted in the twentieth century by Hayek in his influential The Constitution of Liberty. This notion of liberty, which is at the heart of liberalism in both its Protestant and Catholic forms, is also historically tied to democracy and to the development free intellectual inquiry, the modern university and the value of openness. Academic freedoms, stemming from freedom of speech, refer to alleged rights of students, teachers and institutions to pursue the truth or persuade, without political suppression. The U.S. Supreme Court in Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 312; 1978 states that academic freedom means a university can ‘determine for itself on academic grounds: who may teach; what may be taught; how it should be taught; and who may be admitted to study.’ This is not the place to pursue the full genealogy of freedom in its academic forms, suffice to say:

- that today the value of freedom in relation to the distribution, access and exchange of knowledge is under threat at an historical moment that also provides unparalleled opportunities for the establishment of open global architectures;
- that the study of education should concern itself in a critical way with the historical forms of freedom and their development--of ex-
pression and of speech, of freedom to learn, and of freedom to publish; and,

- that the assertion and establishment of these freedoms take different historical forms and pose different technical, political and ethical problems for knowledge futures, including those of copyright, intellectual property, and plagiarism.

I make this last claim on the basis of an assumed materialism and historicism in regard to knowledge. The lesson I take from Marx, and from Nietzsche, Wittgenstein and Heidegger, is that knowledge and the value of knowledge is rooted in social relations. In order to investigate the genealogy of the value of knowledge in relation to its freedoms, its freedoms-to-come, and their educational significance we must critically examine its various emergent institutional and networked forms as well as the obstacles to them. This is an imperative for futures of education in general and also for a coherent and progressive programme of research and scholarship of philosophy of education.

In the practical context this program means an investigation of the value of openness and the mode of open production. Openness has emerged as an alternative mode of social production based on the growing and overlapping complexities of open source, open access, open archiving, open publishing and open science. It has become a leading source of innovation in the world global digital economy increasingly adopted by world governments, international agencies and multinationals as well as leading educational institutions. It is clear that the Free Software and ‘open source’ movements constitute a radical non-propertarian alternative to traditional methods of text production and distribution. This alternative non-proprietary method of cultural and knowledge exchange threatens traditional models and the legal and institutional means used to restrict creativity, innovation and the free exchange of ideas. In terms of a model of communication there has been a gradual shift from content to code in the openness, access, use, reuse and modification reflecting a radical personalization that has made these open characteristics and principles increasingly the basis of the cultural sphere. So open source and open access has been developed and applied in open publishing, open archiving, and open music constituting the hallmarks of ‘open culture.’ The values of freedom and openness are the meta-values that will determine knowledge cultures in the future and, therefore, also the production of knowledge.
NOTES


2. Gary Gutting (2005) makes this point by emphasizing that over half the contributors, including Cartwright, Chalmers, Goldman, Kim, Pettit, Railton, and Leiter himself, adopt naturalistic approaches, while the rest are neutral with the exception of Hurka’s defense of the autonomy of ethical theory. There ought to be more representatives of anti-naturalist philosophers. I would argue that the collection, as good as it is, suffers explicitly from the fact that there is little in the way of exploring the consequences of the Wittgensteinian strand, especially in the work of Stanley Cavell and the philosophers of the ‘new’ Wittgenstein (see Crary & Reed, 2000). Gutting also comments that the collection does not include work of either metaphysicians (a priori philosophizing) or Continental philosophers. It is with the Wittgensteinian strand (although not exclusively) that I identify (see, in particular, Peters & Marshall, 1999; Peters, Burbules & Smeyers, 2008 in which I explicitly address the ‘therapy’ theme; see also Saito & Standish, 2009).

3. I think this point needs to be amplified considerably. For Leiter, survival as a ‘style’ seems to be less of an option whereas for me it counts very substantially and especially for what I call ‘philosophy as pedagogy’ (see Peters, 1999). This matter of ‘conceptual analysis’ as a kind of style and kind of writing requires much more research especially it relation to guiding values of ‘clarity’ and the like (see my essay on Wittgenstein and therapy in Peters et al, 2007). We might also investigate the very interesting similarities and contrasts, say, between R.S. Peters appeals to Wittgenstein and conceptual analysis and Deleuze & Guattari’s (2000) role of philosophy as ‘concept creation’. In this regard also see Peters (2001; 2002).

4. Rorty argues: ‘Hans Blumenberg has suggested that philosophers began to lose interest in the eternal toward the end of the Middle Ages, and that the sixteenth century, the century of Bruno and Bacon, was the period in which philosophers began trying to take time seriously. Blumenberg is probably right, but this loss of interest only became fully self-conscious in the nineteenth century. This was the period in which Western philosophy, under the aegis of Hegel, developed detailed and explicit doubts not only about Platonist attempts to escape from time but about Kantian projects of discovering ahistorical conditions for the possibility of temporal phenomena. It was also the period in which it became possible, thanks to Darwin, for human beings to see themselves as continuous with the rest of nature - as temporal and contingent through and through, but none the worse for that. The combined influence of Hegel and Darwin moved philosophy away from the question “What are we?” to the question
“What might we try to become?” See also Leaman (2002) who asks ‘Where is philosophy going? Are we entering a post-philosophy millennium?’

5. Feuerbach writes: ‘The culmination of modern philosophy is the Hegelian philosophy. The historical necessity and justification of the new philosophy must therefore be derived mainly from a critique of Hegel’s.’ For his Principles of Philosophy of the Future (1843) see http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/feuerbach/works/future/. N.B. all websites mentioned are accessed September 17th & 18th 2006, unless otherwise stated.


9. See, for instance, The Catholic Encyclopaedia (http://www.new-advent.org/cathen/11074a.htm) and The Internet Encyclopaedia of Philosophy (http://www.utm.edu/research/iep/n/nihilism.htm). There is a different of interpretation here as the latter represents Bazarov’s position as “crude scientism” based upon “a creed of total negation”, while the former, more kindly and accurately, insists that “a Nihilist is one who bows to no authority and accepts no doctrine, however widespread, that is not supported by proof”, which is almost an exact translation from Turgenev’s novel. Turgenev’s novel was set against the social and political transformation of 19th century Russia. Bazarov’s nihilism symbolised the complete refusal on behalf of the intelligentsia to believe in the values of the past generation. For the full text online see (http://www.eldritchpress.org/ist/fas.htm).


11. This issue is fundamental to future studies and also my own take: is the ‘flow’ of time subjective? The philosophy of time has been dominated by disagreements between two views of the nature of temporal reality: one side argues, after John McTaggart, that there is an objective distinction between past, present and futures and the other side argues that there is an objective distinction between earlier and later but that the experience of the flow of time is an illusion. See e.g., http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/time-thermo/ and http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/time-experience/. Recently chaos theory has returned to Boltzmann’s problem to suggest that ‘dynamical chaos is the rule, not the exception, with our world, ... the past is fixed [but] the future remains open and we rediscover the arrow of time’ (Coveney and Highfield 1990, pp. 37-8) but see http://www.usyd.edu.au/time/price/preprints/ISST.html.

12. Foucault, following Heidegger, reconceptualise space and time in non-Cartesian terms. The Cartesian mathematical conceptualisation of space and time (as aggregates of points and instants respectively) is replaced by an experiential and ontological understanding of space and time.
Foucault goes beyond the traditional dichotomy to speak of these concepts relationally (‘spatial time’ and ‘temporal space’) and develops a spatialized history that can no longer be seen as an assemblage of events in linear sequence. He rejects both romantic and teleological history to conceptualise the present in terms of both past and future. As Deleuze (1988: 119) puts it “Thought thinks its own history (the past), but in order to free itself from what it thinks (the present), and be able finally to ‘think differently’ (the future)”.

13. See, for example, the journal Policy Futures in Education (established in 2003 with four issues a year) http://www.wwwords.co.uk/pfie/index.html (with issues on the knowledge economy, university futures, and Marxist futures); the book series, Educational Futures: Rethinking theory and practice http://www.sensepublishers.com/books/edfu/edfu.htm; the books, Futures of Critical Theory: Dreams of Difference (with Colin Lankshear and Mark Olssen) http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/tg/detail/-/074252860X/ref=ipr_g_1/002-46458472688829?v=glance&s=books and Edutopias: New Utopian Thinking in Education (with John Freeman-Moria) 2006; the courses--EdD at the University of Glasgow, with a core module called ‘Educational Futures’ (see for official course description http://www.gla.ac.uk:443/studying/pg/prospectus/course.cfm?id=48&referer=2 and http://www.gla.ac.uk/guide/eddoc/ for EdD homepage), and ‘Higher Education: Knowledge Futures’ at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign.

14. See Lessig’s (2001) The Future of Ideas and his homepage http://www.lessig.org/, which has useful links to Creative Commons, Electronic Frontier Foundation, Public Knowledge etc. Lessig makes the case for the value of freedom in relation to the future of ideas. As he remarks in his blurb:

The explosion of innovation we have seen in the environment of the Internet was not conjured from some new, previously unimagined technological magic; instead, it came from an ideal as old as the nation. Creativity flourished there because the Internet protected an innovation commons. The Internet’s very design built a neutral platform upon which the widest range of creators could experiment. The legal architecture surrounding it protected this free space so that culture and information—the ideas of our era—could flow freely and inspire an unprecedented breadth of expression. But this structural design is changing—both legally and technically. In this regard see also the work of Yochai Benkler at http://www.benkler.org/. He states his research interests in terms of two theoretical problems: Commons-based information production and exchange; and, Freedom, justice, and the organization of information production on nonproprietary principles.

15. The history of the concept of academic freedom, basically liberty of thought, while asserted by Socrates, has a recent modern history beginning with the founding of the University at Leiden in 1575 and contem-
poraneous with the rise of economic liberalism in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Thus, the liberal propertarian concept of freedom has a very complex relationship to the freedom of thought and speech, especially as it was established in relation to the medieval university.

16. This is interesting also in terms of Anthony Crosland’s (1956) *The Future of Socialism* and Jack Straw’s recent reflections on Crosland’s famous text, ‘The Future of Socialism: the new divide’, *New Statesman*, 18 September, 2006: 12-15 (see the free-to-view version at http://www.newstatesman.com/200609180016). Crosland’s *The Future of Socialism* has just been republished by Constable and Robinson (Sept, 2006) with a new Foreword by Gordon Brown. Straw writes of Brown and the new realities of globalization: ‘The international perspective is the second major difference between Crosland’s time and the present day. As Gordon Brown points out in his foreword to the new edition of Crosland's work, he was dealing with a “sheltered economy in a pre-global age of national economies”. In those days, when some in the party did look beyond our shores for a paradigm, it was to the east and not to the west.’ Straw focuses on restoring trust in politics and opportunities for direct democratic involvement at all levels. For further comment see Daniel Finkelstein’s ‘Brown’s Romantic Dead-End’ at http://www.timesonline.co.uk/article/0,,6-2334068,00.html and Dick Leonard’s ‘Would Crosland feel betrayed by Blair and Brown?’ at http://observer.guardian.co.uk/comment/story/0,,651341,00.html. Leonard was Parliamentary Private Secretary to Anthony Crosland in 1970-74.

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ABSTRACT. There are three possible positions that philosophy can occupy vis-à-vis first-order knowledge: either philosophy has no first-order concerns of its own; or philosophy has some residual (but dwindling) first-order concerns; or philosophy has first-order concerns that are ineliminable. On the first two conceptions of philosophy, metaphysics is impossible; only if philosophy has ineliminable first-order concerns can metaphysics find room to operate. This paper argues for the ineliminability of metaphysics and concludes that the task for a contemporary metaphysics is to avoid the lures of searching for an unattainable certainty, to resist a surrender of its legitimate territory to naturalism, and, resisting the blandishments of scepticism, to recover a confidence in the power of the human mind to ask and to answer questions about the nature, meaning and value of all that exists.

“Who lectures in the Hall of Arts today?,” asks Princess Ida, eponymous heroine of Gilbert & Sullivan’s comic opera. Lady Blanche, Professor of Philosophy, and Ida’s rival in academic politics, replies:

I, madam, on abstract Philosophy.
There I propose considering, at length,
Three points – the Is, the Might Be, and the Must.
Whether the Is, from being actual fact,
Is more important than the vague Might Be,
Or the Might Be, from taking wider scope,
Is for that reason greater than the Is:
And lastly, how the Is and Might Be stand
Compared with the inevitable Must.

This caricature of abstract philosophy, which is as much as to say metaphysics, amusing as it may be, is rather too close to the man-in-the-street’s prejudices for a metaphysician’s comfort. For many today, non-philosophers and philosophers alike, metaphysics is perceived as an intellectual curiosity that survives only in the sheltered environment of some academic backwaters. For these people, metaphysics has about as much intrinsic vali-
dity as the study of Etruscan vases or the sex life of the newt; they regard it as something mildly and eccentrically interesting but of no general concern. An educated person, they feel, would not be embarrassed to be ignorant of metaphysics in the way they would be if they were ignorant of science. This is partly to be explained by the progressive peripheralisation of philosophy as a whole, a peripheralisation which has taken place throughout the last 400 years or so, and which, in part at least, is a result of the ever-increasing centralisation of empirical science as the dominant type (and for some, the only type) of respectable knowledge in western society and in western-influenced societies.

There are three possible positions that philosophy can occupy vis-à-vis first-order knowledge. Either philosophy is an intrinsically second-order discipline with no first-order concerns of its own; or philosophy has some first order concerns but as these are gradually colonised by science it will eventually become second-order only; or philosophy has first-order concerns that are ineliminable. On the first two conceptions of philosophy, metaphysics is impossible; only if philosophy has ineliminable first-order concerns can metaphysics have room to operate. If science, mathematics and history can answer all possible questions there is no room for metaphysics. If, however, there are questions that cannot be answered by science, mathematics or history then metaphysics is, at least, possible.

Are there properly philosophical questions? Yes. For example, the status of science and its pronouncements are not a matter for science. Whether science is the ultimate form of knowledge, whether its accounts are the most basic available to us—these are not scientific questions, neither are they mathematical or historical questions; these are philosophical questions. To answer them is to do philosophy whether or not one perceives oneself or describes oneself as doing this or not. Even if one is a scientist or mathematician or historian, in asking and answering these questions, one is not doing this qua scientist, mathematician or historian. Of course, such questions regarding the status of science, or mathematics, or whatever, are second order questions, and there are few who have difficulty with philosophy’s posing of such questions.

What of first-order questions? Ethics, politics and aesthetics, or more generally all axiological concerns, are areas where philosophy asks, and answers, first order questions. Normativity
is the common feature of all these areas of inquiry and normativity is clearly a first-order phenomenon.

In addition to the second-order questions characteristic of the various “Philosophy ofs…”, and the first-order questions of axiology, there also appear to be questions that one can ask that, adapting John Post’s categorisation\(^1\), have to do with the nature and the meaning and the unity of all there is, which questions are not, I believe, reducible to scientific, mathematical or historical concerns. Furthermore, such questions are descriptive, not prescriptive, factual, not normative. This is the space in which, if it can exist at all, metaphysics lives and breathes.

1. Mathematics and metaphor

The Egyptians discovered and used mathematics for what would appear to have been almost purely pragmatic purposes. The Greeks, appropriating their mathematics, reflected on it, and discovered/invented the axiomatic method. This made a powerful, indeed overwhelming intellectual impression on Greek thinkers. From a small number of axioms one could generate, as a spider spins her web, an enormous and organised body of knowledge. This knowledge was demonstrable by virtue of its relation to the axioms and the whole, axioms and theorems, was intellectually transparent. It is not insignificant that the motto of Plato’s Academy was “Let no one ignorant of geometry enter here!”. Plato’s Forms, whatever their ultimate metaphysical status, are, I believe, derived from the notion of definition of terms that has its natural home in mathematics. It is significant that one of the few interlocutors in a Platonic dialogue who grasps the point that what Socrates is in search of is not a series of examples but a definition is Theaetetus, who is a mathematician. Socrates is inquiring into the nature of knowledge. He puts the question to Theaetetus and Theaetetus at first replies by giving a series of example of different kinds of knowledge. Socrates remarks “But the question you were asked, Theaetetus, was not, what are the objects of knowledge, nor yet how many sorts of knowledge there are. We did not want to count them, but to find out what the thing itself—knowledge—is.” Theaetetus, the mathematician, gets the point. “It appears easy now, Socrates, when you put it like that. The meaning of your question seems to be the same sort of thing as a point that came up when your namesake, Socrates here, and I were talking not long ago….Theodorus here was proving to us
something about square roots....The idea occurred to us, seeing that these square roots were evidently infinite in number, to try to arrive at a single collective term by which we could designate all these roots...” Socrates confirms the aptness of the mathematical model: “Take as a model your answer about the roots. Just as you found a single character to embrace all that multitude, so now try to find a single formula that applies to the many kinds of knowledge.”

The characteristics of mathematics most appealing to the Greeks were its certainty and its explanatory power. First, catch a small bunch of axioms. Then, using the heat of reason, cook up a vast structure that partakes of the same worthiness to be believed that belonged to the original axioms. This mouth-watering prospect made an enormous appeal to Plato and to the members of the Academy whose metaphysics is, I believe, a philosophical analogue to mathematics. It is worth recalling that Plato began his philosophical life influenced by the Pythagoreans: I believe that he ended his philosophical career similarly.

Plato’s student, Aristotle, provided a useful antidote to this mathematics-mania in the Nicomachean Ethics when he remarked that: “Our discussion will be adequate if it achieves clarity within the limits of the subject matter. For precision cannot be expected in the treatment of all subjects alike, any more than in all manufactured articles.... We must be content, then, in speaking of such subjects [what is noble, and just, and good] to indicate the truth roughly and in outline, and in speaking about things that hold good only as a general rule but not always to reach conclusions that are no better.... It is the mark of an educated man to look for precision in each class of things just so far as the nature of the subject admits; it is evidently equally foolish to accept probable reasoning from a mathematician as to demand strict demonstrations from a rhetorician.” It should be pointed out that Aristotle was expressing these reservations about the degree of precision to be expected primarily in relation to the normative investigations of ethics and politics and not necessarily in relation to metaphysics. Nevertheless, he was willing to accept from any field of inquiry the degree of precision it was capable of producing; whether he was correct in his estimation of the degree of precision available from the investigations of first philosophy remains to be seen.
So things stood balanced until modern times. With the breakdown of the medieval synthesis and the rise of modern science, the mathematical model re-emerged as the very type of explanation, of power, of clarity. It is not accidental that two of the three prototypical Rationalists—Descartes and Leibniz—were first class mathematicians, inventing/discovering, respectively, co-ordinate geometry and the calculus, and that the third Rationalist, Spinoza, set out his *Ethics* in geometrical style which was not just a stylistically charming idiosyncrasy but an acknowledgement of the central position of the mathematical model. Descartes, Leibniz and Spinoza are the progenitors of all modern metaphysics and their concerns—Descartes' with clarity and distinctness, Leibniz’s with generating a calculus for resolving all human disputes—show their obsession with the certainty that is characteristic of mathematics.

It is a moot point whether scepticism gives rise to a search for certainty, or whether the (failed) search for certainty gives rise to scepticism. Whether or which, the quest for certainty that is characteristic of modern philosophy has given rise to scepticism. If certainty is equated with knowledge and if certainty is not attainable, then only scepticism remains; mathematics gives rise to metaphor. Certainty and scepticism, like the Colonel's lady and Judy O'Grady, are sisters under the skin.

It's easy enough to see the connection between mathematics and certainty. Where does metaphor come in? Well, if you are unwilling to say what anything literally is, the only alternative to saying nothing is to say what it literally isn’t; and that is precisely what a metaphor is. Who, then, are our metaphoricians? For my purposes, let me take as a prime example, Richard Rorty. Rorty's ironic detachment is simply scepticism in disguise, a scepticism that not only dares speak its name but a scepticism that talks an awful lot. The Chess World Champion, Capablanca, complained in the 1920s that the possibilities of chess were exhausted when the truth was that it was Capablanca who was exhausted. Rorty's response to the difficulties faced by modern philosophy appears to be similarly a product of personal exhaustion. The expression of this despair may be elegant and charming but it is ultimately specious. It either collapses into nihilism or manages to preserve a core of genuine beliefs, which, however, are unearned, thus exhibiting all the advantages of theft over honest toil. Similarly, Derrida's deconstruction is a kind of
intellectual guerrilla warfare. You hide behind the bushes and fire on the enemy; but when fire is returned, like MacCavity the wonder cat, you're not there! Rorty and Derrida are mired in a miasma of metaphor where the literal is systematically denied and repressed, at least explicitly. But metaphor is parasitic upon the literal. If nothing simply is then there can be no shock, still less a revelation, in stating that A is B when A, in fact is not B. And the literal, even if expelled with a pitchfork, re-enters once vigilance has been relaxed and, as the horror movies teach us, you can't stay awake for ever!

2. What is first in First Philosophy

The question of being is commonly held to be the most central metaphysical question. What is it to be? Several answers to this question have been proposed, among others
1. To be is to perceive or be perceived
2. To be is to be the value of a variable
3. To be is to be the referent of whatever is required by our ordinary language
4. To be is to be whatever is required by scientific discourse
5. To be is to be relative
6. To be is not to not-be.
(Answer 6 is not as absurd as it may at first appear. Many are the intellectual contortions produced by the effort to understand negativity. Perhaps more can be learned from a joke than from more serious disquisitions. In the film Ninotchka Mervyn Douglas is trying to get a stony-faced Greta Garbo to laugh. He tries telling her some jokes. A man says to a waiter: “Bring me some coffee without cream.” The waiter disappears. After about 10 minutes he comes back and says “Sorry about the delay, sir. We don’t have any cream. Can I bring the coffee without milk.”? It doesn’t make Garbo laugh but it causes the chaps sitting at a nearby table, eavesdropping on the conversation, to fall to the floor with laughter.)

How, if we could, should we choose from, or add to, this list? The first thing to realise is that even metaphysics must start somewhere. Possible starting points aplenty have been suggested. These starting points are supposed to have some very special properties; self-evidence, incorrigibility, and so on. There are two kinds of criticism that can be levelled against such starting points: either they are (relatively) ungainsayable, because ‘thin’
and formal (for example, the principle of non-contradiction) but nothing very significant follows from them; or else they are ‘thick’ and material (for example: ‘All men are created equal’) but then they are very far from being ungainsayable.

It seems to me that one ineliminable starting point of every inquiry cannot but be the very act of inquiry itself. All men, by nature, desire to know and the expression of that desire is a question. Perhaps to be is to be the answer to a question.

Is this a variation on the strategy of the Cartesian cogito? In a way, yes, but with a difference. Aristotle made much of the principle of non-contradiction. Descartes made central the cogito ergo sum. For both Aristotle and Descartes their respective starting points give a firm point of departure; for both, the rejection of this point of departure involved a performative contradiction. The difference between their respective positions is this, that Descartes’ cogito represents a retreat to subjectivity while Aristotle’s principle of non-contradiction, involving as it does a commitment to language and communication, is inherently social. The Cartesian cogito leads to the solipsistic self but the act of inquiry, which is impossible without language, leads to a community of speakers. What more recent thinkers, such as Wittgenstein and Apel, add to Aristotle’s point is the insight that language is the property of no one individual but of the whole community of language users. Language is the repository of our common ‘intentions’ and is the property of the entire speech community, not the idiosyncratic plaything of individual speakers. “Human beings are essentially language-using animals, an idea shared by Aristotelianism and hermeneutics.”

Wittgenstein’s Private Language Argument has, I believe, definitively established the ineluctably social nature of language. “If you are not certain of any fact, you cannot be certain of the meaning of your words either.” One can see much of what Wittgenstein as doing in his later work in the Investigations and in the On Certainty as a polemic against the fundamentally mistaken assumptions of modern philosophy.

Take as an example the representational problem that has dogged modern philosophy. In the Early Modern period ideas were said to be the objects of knowledge. The so-called representational problem immediately arose. How do we know that the ideas that are supposed to be the direct objects of our knowledge actually correspond to anything? The answer is simple; we don’t and we can’t. In the Late Modern period language comes to occupy the place given to
ideas in the earlier dispensation. The same problem arises. Language now serves as a veil to conceal all else. In both cases, a barrier is erected between self and world. How to get past it? I believe that history has shown that if you erect this barrier you will never get past it. We might call this the Humpty-Dumpty problem: all the king’s horses and all the king’s men, couldn’t put Humpty together again. As Bernard Lonergan once remarked: “Empiricism is a bundle of blunders and its history is their successive clarification.”

Our inability to solve the representational problem is not a measure of its intellectual difficulty. It’s not as if it were a complex problem in differential calculus. The problem is caused by the very way in which certain assumptions are made; once made, the problems they cause become insoluble. The way out is not to try harder—it is to reset (or reject) the problem by questioning the assumptions.

3. Metaphysics and naturalism

Earlier, I suggested that the idea that there might be first-order concerns that belong intrinsically to the province of philosophy was not obviously absurd. However, the dominant intellectual ideology of the age, naturalism, is committed to the view that all that is can ultimately be accounted for in purely natural (read; scientific) terms. If naturalism is correct we can have here no abiding city for metaphysics. Under the constraints of space I can merely suggest some ideas for consideration.

First, let me state an important methodological point. Apart from the formal constraints on theories of consistency and coherence, and the material constraints of adequacy and coverage, there is also a self-referential constraint on theories, namely, that a theory must not render impossible the conditions of its own statement or the conditions of being maintained. So, to take an example, unless human beings are fundamentally free in their choices and decisions it’s not possible for statements to be meaningfully asserted, and that includes all statements, including the statement of strict determinism. Such a statement of a radical determinism is rendered referentially incoherent by its own content.

Hugh Lawson-Tancred reviewed Daniel Dennett’s book, *Freedom Evolves*, which one might reasonably expect from the title to be a demonstration of the evolution of freedom. At the end
of a very flattering review Lawson-Tancred says “Harder, of course, is to show that though everything is determined we still have choice….Of course, this only means that Dennett has not solved the deepest problem in moral philosophy.” Yes, but this is hardly a minor failing in a book which set out to do precisely that! Lawson-Tancred goes on to claim that what Dennett has done is to relocate “the popular discussion of selfhood, responsibility and control to its proper home in best-practice scientific psychology.” (Note the persuasive phrase ‘proper home’ applied to scientific psychology—this is naturalism with a vengeance.)

Does naturalism meet the self-referential constraint? Naturalism derives its plausibility from the progressive and inexorable elimination of folk-physics by the advances of modern science. From science, the method is extended to other areas such as, for example, the psychological realm in which it is held that folk-psychology (so-called), the psychology in which we describe and explain our everyday behaviour, is eliminable by the development of a scientific psychology. The parallel is not exact.

There can be a folk physics, an explanation of people’s everyday experience, which is potentially eliminable. What is not, however, eliminable is people’s experience of weight, resistance to movement, and so on. These are facts of experience that are not subject to scientific dissolution. Similarly, there could indeed be a folk psychology (indeed, the quasi-substantialist notion of the mind characteristic of much modern philosophy is a thesis of just such a refined folk psychology) but beliefs, thoughts, judgements, and so on, are also scientifically indissoluble. Unlike folk physics, however, the very attempt to assert the eliminability of our ordinary psychological experiences (and explanations) cannot be done without making use of that which is denied. This is where the parallel with physics breaks down.

Why should we accord naturalism the place of honour? Given its enthronement of science as the paradigm of human intellectual endeavour, naturalism, as science’s philosophical cheerleader, to some extents basks in its reflected glory. But naturalism is just one philosophical theory among others. It originates from within our human experience and so cannot, coherently, radically contradict that experience.

Where, then, do we start? From where we are; there are no other possibilities. And where we are is with people asking questions, answering them, arguing, explaining, describing, and so
on, all the multifarious things we do with language. This is not a mere starting point, a ladder that can be kicked away when we ascend to a higher level. We never escape from this realm. We may discard some questions, ask others, and so on, but the process of asking and answering questions, of reasoning, of persuading and being persuaded, of grasping insights, of affirming truth, is never, and can never, be abandoned or transcended without a descent into radical incoherence.

The task for a contemporary metaphysics is to resist the lures of an unattainable certainty and the blandishments of scepticism (under whatever name it may be currently masquerading), to avoid a surrender of its legitimate territory to naturalism, and to recover a confidence in the power of the human mind to ask and to answer questions about the nature, meaning and value of all that exists.

REFERENCES

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ABSTRACT. This paper concerns Part IV of Whitehead's treatise *Process and Reality*, in particular the chapters IV.II and IV.III. Most considerations in Part IV have to be seen as fundamental and profound, and not at all incomprehensible. We have to admit that some of the considerations have implications which on a first reading may look quite paradoxical (for example the idea that Democrit's atomism lies at the foundation of a Heraclitean dynamic), but this may be regarded as a special appeal. Part IV has to be considered as an independent text which has been inserted without proper adaptation.

1. INTRODUCTION

This paper\(^1\) concerns Part IV of Whitehead's treatise *Process and Reality*, in particular the chapters IV.II and IV.III. In Keeton (1986) one finds the following comment: *Part IV of Process and Reality usually causes readers of Whitehead great confusion. There is ample reason for this response. Whitehead, in fifty short pages, tries to clarify expressions of space-time relations with which he has wrestled for more than thirty years. The effort leaves much to be desired ...* (p.315). This rating seems to be shared by many commentators. But we hope to convince the reader that most considerations in Part IV have to be seen as fundamental and profound, and not at all incomprehensible. We have to admit that some of the considerations have implications which on a first reading may look quite paradoxical (for example the idea that Democrit's atomism lies at the foundation of a Heraclitean dynamic), but this may be regarded as a special appeal. Of course, there are obvious difficulties to incorporate Part IV into a unified scheme, this cannot be denied. One reason has to be seen in Whitehead's composition of *Process and Reality*: whereas the reader has been promised a systematic approach, he is confronted with a rather diffuse presentation of thoughts which resembles more musical forms than scientific explanations, with a

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\(^1\) This paper refers to a previous work or text.
lot of (even verbatim) repetitions, paraphrases, variations and so on.\textsuperscript{2} Another reason has to be mentioned, and this concerns just Part IV: one has to complain about its complete conceptional isolation inside the treatise. It is isolated in two different respects: first of all, the relevant notions of part IV such as “region” are not mentioned at all in the categorical scheme, and it seems to be troublesome to determine the proper relationship to those notions which are mentioned there. Secondly, one would expect to find a discussion of fundamental notions of the categorical scheme, such as “nexus” – however the decisive pages in Part IV hide this notion!

Obviously, Part IV has to be considered as an independent text which has been inserted without proper adaptation. Ford (p.181) assumes that sections IV.IV.2 and IV.IV.3 have been composed already in 1926 or 1927 after discussions with de Laguna, whereas section IV.IV.4 (“strains”) may have been written as one of the last sections. Ford: \textit{Since that doctrine depends upon a definition of straightness in terms of mere extensiveness ..., Whitehead felt it necessary to include in his metaphysical treatise the two mathematical chapters (namely IV.IV.2-3) designed to give a proper definition of straightness} (p.234). Note that Part IV follows earlier investigations of Whitehead (in particular, see PNK and CN), and a lot of formulations of these older texts are varied, but also specified and above all formalised, whereas the integration into the surrounding text remains quite unsatisfactory.

This conceptual isolation (an appreciated field of activity for many commentators – see for example the book of Ross and his discussion of the notion of perspective) has to be considered further. In particular, this has to be our main concern when we try to find the proper context for the notion of a “region”: this is one of the basic notions in Part IV, but does not play any role outside of Part IV\textsuperscript{3}. Altogether, one misses a systematic discussion of the interplay between the notions “region”, “standpoint”, and “perspective”. On the other hand, the categorical scheme contains the notion of a “nexus”; thus, as we have mentioned, one would expect that it occupies a central place in Part IV\textsuperscript{4}. But this is not the case.

In many respects, Part IV has to be seen as a foreign body inside the treatise, not only with respect to its conceptional isolation, but also looking at the abrupt change of presentation (with numbered definitions and assumptions). Of course, one may
be tempted to look for a parallelism between Parts III and IV (or even III, IV and V): that Part III outlines the biological, physiological and psychological aspects, whereas Part IV deals with the mathematical and physical ones (and Part V the theological side) – but actually this would contradict the universal character of the categorical scheme, which just does not allow such a separation.

Let us start to outline the content of Part IV and its significance for Whitehead’s theory. It will turn out that these considerations are quite central for the system. The word “process” in the title of the book emphasises the importance of the temporal development: time has to be considered as one of the fundamental notions of process philosophy. Also the subtitle “An essay in cosmology” should be taken seriously. The book was written on the basis of the scientific revolution created by Einstein’s relativity theory on the one hand, and quantum theory on the other hand: Both theories, each one on its own, have corrected misconceptions which had been established by the scientific developments in the Early Modern Times. The Newtonian point of view was based on an assumption which was not further discussed: the possibility of working with local coordinates using real numbers (with three space axes and, independently, one time axis), as well as with global linearity. Whitehead tries to put forward a world model which encompasses both relativity theory and quantum theory. For him it is important to dwell on the question how one is able to introduce coordinates (here the method of extensive abstraction has to be named), to deal with the relationship between discrete data and continuity, and finally to discuss the meaning of simultaneity. These are the topics which are discussed in Part IV. On the basis of these considerations one should look at the possibility of interaction and influence (or, in backward direction, feelings) – but one has to be aware that the latter topics have been dealt with already in Part III, independent of the space-time model in Part IV; only chapter IV.IV takes up the thread.

It has been stressed in the introduction of PR that Parts III and IV are the nucleus of the book: In the third and the fourth parts, the cosmological scheme is developed in terms of its own categorical notions, and without much regard to other systems of thought (PR vi). But one should compare this sentence which uses the key words “scheme” and “categorical” with the actual relationship between the categorical scheme (as outlined in chapter I.II) and the use of it in Parts III or IV, respectively.
**Extensive abstraction:** The essential key word for Part IV of PR (at least for the chapters IV.II and IV.III) is that of “extensive abstraction”. One may argue that it is quite hidden and occurs only as title of IV.II.III., but this is misleading. If one takes into account all the explicit references to earlier publications (PR 440, 453, 454, 455), and the relevance of the extensive abstraction in PNK as well as CN, one cannot overestimate its importance for Whitehead’s cosmology. In this point, it seems that all the commentaries do agree: a large amount of pages, even complete books (see the list of references) are devoted to this topic.

Let us add a short comment on the use of the words “abstract” and “abstraction” in philosophy: it was Boethius who started to use this concept for mathematical objects derived from physical entities.

**2. REGIONS AND CONNECTIVITY (IV.II.I and IV.II.II)**

We are going to sketch the essential arguments of sections IV.II.I and IV.II.II, but we will refrain from discussing assertions of more peripheral character (in particular all those formulations which bound the validity of some structure to the “present cosmic epoch” – whatever this means).

**2.1 THE TITLE: EXTENSIVE CONNECTION**

It seems to be obvious that Whitehead wants to establish the notion of “extensive connection” as a basis for the further considerations. Connectivity refers to a topological concept – un-connectedness means that there is a decomposition in several components. Modern topology distinguishes between a lot of different connectivity properties (connected, locally connected, path-wise connected, and so on); it would be worthwhile to incorporate this into a Whiteheadian system. According to Whitehead, the problems concerning the extensive connection are part of his discussion of the order of nature (see PR 148). “Order” may be interpreted here both as a general concept of colloquial as well as philosophical language, but also in the mathematical sense of dealing with ordered sets, with a hierarchic relation.

**Extension:** Here, we have to refer to the book “Ausdehnungslehre” (Theory of Extension) by Hermann Grassmann, published in 1844. A second edition appeared in 1861, but both editions did not find the attention which they would have deserved. This book
develops a general theory of vector spaces (vector algebra, vector analysis, tensor calculus, n-dimensional geometry). Already in his introduction to UA (1898), Whitehead referred to Grassmann as follows: It is the purpose of this work to present a thorough investigation of the various systems of Symbolic Reasoning allied to ordinary Algebra. The chief examples of such systems are Hamilton's Quaternions, Grassmann's Calculus of Extensions, and Boole's Symbolic Logic, and the structure of UA shows very clearly Whitehead's emphasis of interpreting algebra and geometry as being concerned with "extension", and this involves the whole context of the vector calculus - not only the (somewhat boring) theory of linear vector spaces, but the theory of vector fields and thus of (partial) differential equations and of dynamical systems. 

The Axiomatic Approach: Whitehead uses a kind of axiomatic presentation, with axioms and assumptions. But one should be surprised to see that he does not care to separate assertions which are plain assumptions from consequences which can be derived: Indeed, he formulates at the end: A sufficient number of assumptions, some provable, and some axiomatic have now been stated (PR 459). This is in sharp contrast to the classical procedure, say the setting of Euclidean geometry. There, a system of axioms is required to have the following three properties: consistency, completeness and minimality. The main property is clearly the consistency, since an inconsistent theory would be of no use at all. It is the aim of Whitehead's theory of extension to exhibit a system of axioms which has as model the physical world (but this he formulates only at the end) and we suppose that he definitely would like to present a complete system of axioms. The first paragraphs of section I provide some hints about the role the axioms play. Whitehead insists that they could be used in different settings. Also, he insists that he does not care about minimality.

2.2 SECTIONS IV.I.I.I AND IV.II.II.

The basic notions here are "region" and "connectedness", and the various possible relations between regions are illustrated by a sort of Venn diagrams. Of course, one should be aware (and Whitehead stresses this repeatedly) that this may be misleading. In particular, such diagrams usually concern point sets, whereas in the setting of the book, points will be introduced much later, namely as abstractive elements. Also, the pictures
used visualise 2-dimensional sets, whereas already any space-time description needs four dimensions. In addition the various directions appear to be indistinguishable in contrast to the obvious differences between space and time axes.

As we have mentioned, there are just two basic concepts, that of a region and the connectedness relation. It should be stressed that one of the axioms (the assumption 2) asserts that any two regions A and B are mediately connected: there is always a region C such that both A and B are connected with C.

Not only the pictorial illustrations, but also the language used has a set-theoretical flavour: the relations discussed are called inclusion and overlapping, there are dissections of regions, and so on. We will come back to this setting later (under the heading Mereology), when we review the process of introducing points as abstractive elements. It seems to us that the concept of “tangentially” inclusion (definition 8) requires special care, since the use of the word “tangent” may suggest that some kind of linearization is already available – but this does not seem to be the case. The difference between tangentially and non-tangentially inclusions concerns the behaviour at the boundary (whatever this means).

Consistency: It has been noted by some commentaries that the system of axioms as presented by Whitehead has some incompatibilities: for example, assumption 4 asserts that no region is even mediately connected with itself, but this contradicts the usual interpretation of definition 1. Thus, the system of axioms, if taken serious, has to be revised – but apparently, no-one cares.

2.3 WHAT ARE REGIONS?

Looking at Chapters IV.II and IV.III of PR one may be surprised to find the notion of a “region” used abruptly without any further explanation, as a notion inside a system of axioms which gets its meaning just by these axioms: The term “region” will be used for the relata which are involved in the scheme of “extensive connection” (PR 449). Such an approach may be appreciated in mathematics, but even in mathematics one would like to know from the start possible applications. Let us recall what Whitehead has in mind: the application of this theory of extension to the existing physical world (PR 459), but one has to wait quite a while to find corresponding hints. It is section IV.III.IV which starts to discuss the physical relevance. There, in paragraph 4, we find the
decisive key word: Any actual entity yields a region, namely its “standpoint”. The reluctance to provide hints for the interpretation is new in PR (and may be unintentional); the previous presentations are much more readable by dealing directly with “events”. Actually, at the beginning of Part IV one finds more detailed information: IV.I.I asserts that any actual entity is attached to a space-time region, but the thread of thought is a little clumsy: Whitehead starts with the temporal coordination: The actual entity is the enjoyment of a certain quantum of physical time, then he invokes the keyword “standpoint”: The quantum is that standpoint in the extensive continuum which is consonant with the subjective aim in its original derivation from God. But one has to wait until the next paragraph for the coordination in space: There is a spatial element in the quantum as well as a temporal element. Thus the quantum is an extensive region. Here we get what we were looking for: the actual entity is assigned a quantum and this is a region in space-time. The formulation “quantum” seems to stress the unity or uniformity of the corresponding region. Of course, subsequently, such a region can be analysed, and thus is divisible, but in itself it is undivided.

The assignment of a region to an actual entity (or a nexus): This assignment is said to be “blind” (PR 440), since it concerns only the space-time features of the atoms, but not any interpretation or valuation (it is the blindness which does not differ between billiard balls and bullets, between sinus curves and Beethoven’s music, between bits and the information transmitted): To quote Whitehead again, when he refers to actual entities and nexus: Both types are correlated by their common extensiveness (PR 439). But it seems difficult to trace more properties of this assignment, whereas this concerns an important topic. As we have mentioned, this problem is newly-created in PR, since the earlier presentations deal directly with events instead of the now introduced regions. A rather innocent reason for the change of terminology could be the axiomatic approach in PR (so that the different wordings correspond to the different levels), but still the questions remain. In particular, let us repeat: Is an actual entity (or a nexus) uniquely determined by its space-time extension? What about schizophrenia? Or the difference between the two cultures at a given university? Or the x-ray of a thorax: one event – or two, but the same region. The second question concerns the surjectivity: starting with any region – is this the region of an
actual entity (or at least a nexus)? The discussion of section IV will yield more insight into the structure of Whitehead’s regions.

**Connectivity.** As we have mentioned, there are the two basic notions, that of a region and connectivity. The search for a physical interpretation for connectivity is even more difficult. There are two complementary concepts of “overlap” and of “external connection” and both can be reduced to the inclusion relation. Section IV.I.II (p.436-438) provides some explanation for this, since Whitehead speaks explicitly about “subregions”\(^\text{13}\). In addition, inclusions are considered when he deals with the **perspective of one subregion from the other** (PR 440f). One finds some notes concerning the external relationship at least of ovals, see IV.III.IV (p.468-470), but there under the assumption of a contact surface in space. This discussion concerns the continuous transfer of energy, using the following neighbouring relation: *Let two actual occasions be termed “contiguous” when the regions constituting their “standpoints” are externally connected.* (p.469).\(^\text{14}\)

Note that often the external connection is implicitly assumed to be temporal, between antecedent actual occasion, and later actual occasion.

**Verification of the axioms.** If a system of axioms is given and a presumptive model for it (as in the case we consider), one has to verify that the assumptions hold. This is the point where one would like to see a minimal set of axioms, but this is not known. Thus one would need to check all 20 assumptions – was this ever tried? Where could problems arise? For example, for assumption 2: There are two partial assertions, none seems to be obvious: First, there is the assertion that *no region is connected with all other regions.* And the second: *Any two regions are mediately connected* (in the strong sense of definition 1: using just one intermediate region!). Note also part of the assumption 9: *Every region includes a pair of regions which are not connected with each other* (a kind of separation axiom). Such assumptions may look rather innocent at first glance, but seem to be quite restrictive: several topologies considered by mathematicians, when dealing with spaces arising in nature, do not satisfy such requirements\(^\text{15}\). On the other hand, we should also note the following: several assumptions deal with the existence of subregions. However, none asserts that any region A contains a region B which is non-tangentially included in A (something which seems to be desperately needed in section IV.II.III). Another desideratum: inclusions are
needed in order to obtain refinements, and we deal with regions which are (at least) four-dimensional. Thus one needs refinements in all possible directions: after all Whitehead wants abstractive elements which converge to points.

3. EXTENSIVE ABSTRACTION (IV.II.III)

Starting point of the considerations is the conviction that all actual entities are extended in space and in time: that the points in space and in time which are used in the mathematical description of scientific data are obtained by a process of abstraction. The purpose of the method of extensive abstraction is to recover this process.

3.1 EXAMPLES

Let us discuss some examples in detail. We start with the death of Caesar: what first comes to my mind is: all nature within the Roman senate house during the death of Julius Caesar (TSM, p.59), but of course one will focus the attention to Caesar himself and to Brutus, to the knife entering the body ... But even if one tries to localise the event in space and in time, using smaller and smaller units, one will obtain a precise time-point only as a limit. Or consider a lightning: is it instantaneous? Of course not! One may be able to encircle the event in space as in time, to sharpen the focus, but still there will be duration and spatial extension.

The language used to describe such events is often misleading, at least for scientifically trained people, who are used to deal with functions which provide specific values for points in space-time. But this is the abstraction: the actual event needs time-duration as well as ... its full spatial dimension (RM, p.91). Finally, let us remark that the idea of simple location is criticised by Whitehead himself in SMW as mistaking the abstract for the concrete.

Refinement of perception is very common, in daily life as well as in the history of science. There is the use of eyeglasses, of telescopes and microscopes, the magnification of pictures. We are now used to bits and bytes, to grinds and pixels, to digital data, thus to refinement processes which have a final target: smallest units which cannot be divided further. But note that this depends just on the respective industrial standard, the pixels of a
picture may be derived from some higher resolution photo, the music may be remastered by 20-bit technique and so on.  

### 3.2 ABSTRACTIVE SETS

We will not repeat the formal definitions of an abstractive set and its related notions. It may be sufficient to point out that here one deals with a sequence (or set) of nested regions. Let us recall that a classical way for constructing the set of real numbers starting from the rationals is to consider sequences of nested intervals with lengths converging to zero. Whitehead uses the same recipe in higher dimension (say in dimension 4, in case we consider the regions as entities in space-time, or in arbitrarily large dimension, if we consider events with the full information they carry). Whereas in the one-dimensional case the sequences of nested intervals produce the points on the real line (or better: they "are" representatives of these points), the higher-dimensional analogues produce the points of space-time, but also segments of lines, of surfaces, and so on. If we could interpret regions as sets of points, then we could just take the corresponding set-theoretical intersections. However, this can be done only as an after-thought as soon as points become available. As we know, only via the method of extensive abstraction we may deal with points. It is definition 21 which yields a set of points \( P(A) \), for any given region \( A \): the set of points situated in the region.

**The covering relation.** The main way for comparing different abstractive sets is the covering relation (introduced in definition 11): it yields an incidence relation for the corresponding geometrical elements and, equivalently, the inclusion relation for the corresponding point-sets.

**Prime geometrical elements.** Starting with definition 16, Whitehead discusses properties of abstractive sets which are invariant under equivalence. There is a long-standing tradition in mathematics to try to build up objects from smallest units – they are called primes or irreducibles or indecomposables (the number theory of the integers and related rings considers prime numbers and prime ideals, in algebraic geometry one writes algebraic sets as union of a finite number of irreducible sets). This is the background of Whitehead's considerations concerning prime geometrical elements.
A short comparison of the different versions of the method of extensive abstraction in the books PNK, CN and PR, as well as de Laguna’s approach, seems to be necessary. Let us start with PNK and CN, where Whitehead uses a two-fold procedure, considering first the time, then the space. The first procedure aims at an isolation of a time coordinate: he wants to construct a duration (but still with a kind of extension in time). Abstractive sets are used, working with unbounded sets. This has been strongly criticised by de Laguna. The second procedure then uses the method of extensive abstraction, starting with events. Here Whitehead insists that one should work with bounded regions (or better, with limited events). The presentation in CN is less formal compared to PR, there is no explicit mentioning of definitions, assumptions or proofs, but otherwise quite similar, and Whitehead acknowledges in PR those deviations which he feels are essential. He also stresses that the axiomatic approach given in PR is influenced by de Laguna. In particular, he gives credit to de Laguna for the idea to replace the concept of “inclusion” by “connectivity”, and there he distinguishes between “overlapping” and “external connectedness”. Note that the connectivity theory allows to consider tangentially as well as non-tangentially inclusions. Stimulated by the earlier approaches of Whitehead, de Laguna himself has put forward a theory of space: he restricts to spatial extensions and starts with bounded 3-dimensional regions.

Now to PR: First of all, the former attempt to separate time and space has been abandoned – a very important and prospective decision. But there is also the more technical change which has already been mentioned: taking into account objections of de Laguna, Whitehead allows only non-tangentially inclusion when dealing with abstractive sets. What is the difference, and what kind of imagination is lying behind it? Whitehead wants an abstractive set to be seen as to converge to a set of inner points – to points which are relevant to all the regions involved. If we would allow tangentially inclusions, then the abstractive set may converge to boundary points. Also, abstractive sets without any overlaps may converge to the same geometrical element. And this is not what Whitehead wants: the convergence procedure
should yield as a result geometrical elements which are inherent in the regions involved.

3.4 OTHER APPROACHES

As we have outlined, Whitehead's method of extensive abstraction generalises the construction of the real numbers by using sequences of nested intervals. Other possibilities for creating the real numbers are known. The Dedekind cuts deal with unbounded subsets of the rational numbers (in some sense this may be compared with the introduction of durations in PNK and CN). And there are the Cauchy-sequences, but such an approach would be alien to Whitehead's setting, since it requires that some space-time points are already given.

Given any topological space, the knowledge of the “open” sets allows to reconstruct the points of the total space, provided some separation axiom (the so-called Frechet axiom) is satisfied: then the points correspond to the minimal non-empty closed subsets. The idea to work with topological spaces not taking into account points but dealing only with the system of what should be the open sets is usually attributed to Lesniewski. There is the famous article by Menger: *Topology without points* (1940), and many other mathematicians have dealt with this setting which is usually referred to as “mereology” (see for example the survey by Peter Simons (1991)). We should also mention the Proceedings of a 1969 Oberwolfach conference with the title *The Study of Time* (edited by Fraser, Haber, Müller (1972)); several of the contributions discuss the relationship between instants in time and time intervals.

3.5 GRÜNBAUMS’S CRITICISM

Grünbaum has considered Whitehead’s theory of extension several times. In particular let us look at his 1953 paper in the British Journal of Philosophy, and his 1962 review of the book of Palter. Beth (1954) summarises Grünbaum’s objections as follows: (i) *Even if the existence of denumerable actual infinite is somehow certifiable by sense awareness, sense awareness cannot suggest the idea of a super-denumerable collection of percep-tible regions, which is needed in order to avoid Zeno's paradox of plurality*, (ii) *that the convergence of Whitehead's classes is ambiguous*, and (iii) *that these classes do not belong to the domain of*
sense awareness. With respect to the last two assertions, we feel that there is no real dissent to what Whitehead writes. But it seems necessary to discuss in detail the first argument, the comprehension of infinite sets of data. We first should recall the different levels of infinity, at least the distinction between denumerable and super-denumerable infinite sets as introduced by Cantor, since Grünbaum's objection is based on this difference.

Many parts of mathematics (for example analysis) deal with sets which are infinite. Since Cantor it is customary to distinguish infinite sets according to their cardinality: Two sets S, S' are said to have the same cardinality provided there exists a bijection between the elements of S and of S'; a set S is said to be “denumerable” (or to have cardinality aleph zero) provided it has the same cardinality as the set \( \mathbb{N} \) of all natural numbers, and “super-denumerable” provided it is infinite and not denumerable. An easy argument shows that the power set \( \mathcal{P}(S) \) of a set S never has the same cardinality as S, this shows that \( \mathcal{P}(\mathbb{N}) \) is super-denumerable. Also, it is easy to see that the set \( \mathbb{R} \) of all real numbers is super-denumerable, the same is true already for any interval \([a,b]\). On the other hand, the set \( \mathbb{Q} \) of all rational numbers is denumerable – this seems to be surprising: after all, \( \mathbb{Q} \) is a dense subset of \( \mathbb{R} \).

Let us return to Grünbaum, who stresses the following: Empiricists from Aristotle to Hume have maintained that infinitum actu non datur, but he adds: Let us suppose for the argument that contrary to that tradition, the existence of a denumerable actual infinite were somehow certifiable by sense awareness so that the meaning of aleph zero could still be given a sensationalist pedigree. It would then nevertheless be true that the very notion of actually infinite classes having a cardinality exceeding aleph zero would inexorably defy encompassment by the sensory imagination. For the set-theoretical meaning of super-denumerability eludes all logically possible sensory exemplification, since any collection of non-overlapping three-dimensional regions of space is at most denumerably infinite (cf. G. Cantor, Math. Ann. 1882, 20, 117). In order to analyse these considerations, let us begin with the last argument starting with “since”. Cantor's assertion is correct, but has nothing to do with the problem considered here. Actually, it helps to understand the situation! The deceptive word used is “non-overlapping”: Clearly, the topological spaces which are of interest here (such as \( \mathbb{R} \) or the usual manifolds considered
in cosmology) have a denumerable topological basis, so that any family of pairwise disjoint open sets has to be at most denumerable. The super-denumerability of $\mathbb{R}$ (and of corresponding manifolds) has nothing to do with the global structure of $\mathbb{R}$, but is a purely local phenomenon: For example, it is easy to see that $\mathbb{R}$ can be covered by a denumerable number of bounded intervals, say the intervals $[n,n+1]$, and it is each of these intervals which is super-denumerable!

The reader should be reminded that this argument is supposed to criticise Whitehead’s method of extensive abstraction. But looking at this method, one observes that super-denumerable sets of regions are never used! On the contrary, Whitehead’s abstractive sets are denumerable sequences, and it will even be sufficient to assume that one starts with only a denumerable set of regions (recall that the nested interval construction of $\mathbb{R}$ starts with intervals with rational boundary numbers, thus with a denumerable set of intervals).

Now we could end the discussion, but we use the opportunity to scrutinise what finite determination of sensory imagination could mean. Recall that according to Grünbaum, the only data which may be certifiable by sense awareness are finite or denumerably infinite ones. We strongly disagree! It seems obvious that anyone is able to “see” an interval such as $[0,1]$, without even being aware that mathematicians would characterise this as a typical super-denumerable set. In many respects, this super-denumerable interval is easier to visualise than the subset of all the rational numbers in $[0,1]$ (and this subset is denumerable). It may be reasonable here to draw the attention to computer graphic programs and the difference between pixel description and vector graphics, or to the general problem of digitalisation of data. The question to describe the finite nature of sense data is an important one, but has nothing to do with denumerability.

A further question has to be added: if one assumes the finite nature of sense data, one may ask in which way and to what extend refinements are possible. Of course, here we are back at the process of extensive abstraction! Now Grünbaum asserts that extensive abstraction is not a sense datum. But Whitehead himself writes: ... the restless modern search for increased accuracy of observation and for increased detailed explanation is based upon unquestioning faith in the reign of Law. Apart from such faith, the enterprise of science is foolish, hopeless. (AI, p. 135). Here is
another quote: *The method is merely the systematisation of the instinctive procedure of habitual experience.* (PNK, p. 76).

It seems to be of interest to see what kind of alternative Grünbaum may have in mind when he criticises Whitehead. Note that he does not object the use of real numbers in mathematics or physics when describing space-time phenomena. In the same way as Whitehead, he considers the set $\mathbb{R}$ of real numbers as an abstraction, but he just conceals the way to obtain them. Any construction of the real numbers has to be based on some sort of denumerable convergence. Since one has to obtain not only the points but also a corresponding topology, Whitehead’s mereological approach seems to be most efficient.

### 3.6 THE BOUNDARY OF A REGION.

We have mentioned already that definition 21 allows to attach to any region $A$ a point set $P(A)$, namely the set of points *situated in the region*; Whitehead calls it the *volume* of the region. Similarly, definition 22 attaches to the region $A$ its boundary $O(A)$: this is the set of all points $x$ which are not situated in $A$, but such that any region $B$ with $x$ situated in $B$ overlaps $A$; Whitehead calls it the *surface* of the region.

It seems to be necessary to have a detailed look at the assumptions 29–31. They are usually not taken into account, but show very clearly the strict restrictions for what Whitehead allows to be called a “region”. What is asserted here? First of all, that the sets $P(A)$ correspond bijectively to the regions $A$. In particular, this implies that for any region $A$, there have to exist regions $B$ with $B$ non-tangentially included into $A$ (since $A$ must belong to some abstractive set). Secondly: also the sets $O(A)$ correspond bijectively to the regions $A$: every region is uniquely determined by its boundary. These seem to be the relevant parts of assumption 29. Assumption 30 then asserts that $P(A)$ is path-connected. Correspondingly, assumption 31 yields the same assertion for $O(A)$, namely that also the boundary of a region is path-connected. These assumptions suggest that Whitehead wants that for any region $A$, the set $P(A)$ to be open in its closure – a quite reasonable wish. But we also see that Whitehead feels that regions should not have internal holes (the existence of internal holes in $A$ would contradict the connectivity of $O(A)$). Another problem has to be mentioned: The assertion that $O(A)$ uniquely determines $A$ sounds rather innocent, but actually it is a very
strong global restriction! In order to see this, consider the two-dimensional analogue setting of a sphere and take as regions just circular discs. For large circular discs, say with boundary a great circle, the boundary no longer determines its interior.

It seems that Whitehead never tried to provide any explanation for assumption 29; indeed it even seems that this assumption does not correspond at all to his clearly formulated rejection of punctual determination! In our interpretation, assumption 29 wants to assert that punctual constructions (abstractions) provide well-formed shapes: If the regions have well-formed boundaries (and assumption 29 has to be read in this way), then one can use these boundaries in order to develop an exact calculus. Note that modern mathematics provides several approaches in order to avoid the use of well-formed boundaries: to neglect sets of measure zero, to work with stochastic differential equations, to deal with fractal boundaries, or see the fuzzy set theory. Already the formulation of the axioms of topology, using neighbourhood systems instead of open sets, is a first attempt to put aside the structure of boundaries. The possibility of rough boundaries has to be seen as one of the main features of a Whiteheadian cosmology. There is a corresponding formulation of Whitehead himself: *Events appear as indefinite entities without clear demarcations* (PNK 73), see also (CN 59).

4. FLAT LOCI (IV.III)

This chapter contains a lot of considerations which are quite obsolete by now. Whitehead tries to describe a kind of differential structure on the space-time manifold in terms of set-theoretical topology. This could be of value. However, his insistence on flatness should remind the reader on all the vain attempts to prove that earth is a disk ...

Palter\textsuperscript{28} reports that Whitehead tried to convince Einstein that space-time cannot be curved, for philosophical reasons! For example, Whitehead wants that any two points in space time are connected by a uniquely determined line.

There are good reasons that this chapter usually is not mentioned at all in the literature. But some of the ideas may still be of interest.
4.1 SECTION IV.III.I.

This section has to be seen as a bridge passage. Its last paragraph provides the final touch to the considerations of Chapter IV.II, specifying again the ontological character of a point (or of any other geometrical element obtained by extensive abstraction): it is a nexus of actual entities. This comes not as a surprise, since it articulates the procedure of obtaining geometrical elements: as a set of regions with specified properties. We are just told that geometrical elements are what they are.

4.2 SECTIONS IV.III.II AND IV.III.III.

We have seen in IV.II.III that for any pair of points, there are a lot of segments with these endpoints. Now Whitehead wants to single out a unique such segments which he calls linear: it is supposed to be straight and flat.

In order to do so, he introduces the concept of an ovate class of regions. By definition, this is a subset of the set of all regions with very concise intersection properties (both with respect to intersections among each other, as well as for intersections with arbitrary regions). If an ovate class of region is given, its elements are called ovals. Then, in section IV.III.III, the first assumption postulates the existence of such an ovate class (with the somewhat strange addendum “in the extensive continuum of the present epoch”). Whitehead guesses (it seems probable, PR 462) that there should be only one such class.

If one considers the n-dimensional real space $\mathbb{R}^n$ (and clearly it is this space which is the standard model for dealing with extensive connection), then the set of convex open subsets is such an ovate class of regions. Let us recall that a subset of $\mathbb{R}^n$ is said to be convex, provided it contains with every pair of points a,b also the line segment between a and b.

Some of the conditions on an ovate class concern the existence of abstractive sets which contain only ovals. This set of conditions is thus called the abstractive group of axioms. We will not discuss these axioms in detail, but let us draw the attention to assumption 2 (PR 465). It seems to be of great importance for Whitehead and he includes a formal proof in the style of a mathematical text. Assumption 2 asserts that certain abstractive sets of ovals are equivalent (thus they yield the same geometrical elements), namely those which are prime with respect to covering a
fixed set \( P_1, \ldots, P_m \) of points. In case \( m = 2 \), one will obtain in this way a straight (or line) segment with endpoints \( P_1 \) and \( P_2 \), for \( m = 3 \) a triangle, for \( m = 4 \) a tetrahedron (definitions 5, 7, 9). The further definitions provide the corresponding global notions (of a line, a plane, a flat 3-dimensional subspace, respectively). Here, a warning seems to be necessary: Let us consider the analogue 2-dimensional case of a 2-sphere \( S \) (in contrast to the flat 2-dimensional real space \( \mathbb{R}^2 \)). Given a pair of points \( P_1 \) and \( P_2 \) on \( S \), there will exist a unique shortest path between \( P_1 \) and \( P_2 \) on \( S \) only in case the points are not antipodes! In case \( P_1 \) and \( P_2 \) are antipodes, there is a whole family of shortest paths between these points (all being halves of great circles) and none of them can be distinguished by a characteristic property. This already indicates that the assumption that an ovate class of region exists, presupposes some flatness hypothesis.

4.3 SECTION IV.III.IV.

This section contains some explanations concerning the concept of external connection. First, Whitehead deals with the problem in which way different regions may touch each other: the discussion is restricted to ovals, and deals mainly with contact in time (the objectification of the antecedent occasion in the later occasion, PR 468, the corresponding actual entities being called contiguous). The further parts of this section as well as all of section IV.III.V is devoted to the cosmological interpretation which was missing until now. For the division of space-time in space and time coordinates, one has to wait until Chapter IV.IV, a chapter which is devoted to the so-called strains. But at least the contact in time is discussed at this stage. Such a contact is related to the transfer, say, of energy or information. Whitehead does not want to exclude the possibility of distant effects, but stresses that there seems to be a lot of evidence that all the forces function via direct contact along a sequence of intermediate regions: through a route of successive quanta of extensiveness. These quanta of extensiveness are the basic regions of successive contiguous occasions (PR 468).

Unfortunately, the further distinction between immediate objectification for the mental pole and the mediate objectification for the physical pole sounds quite mystical. But perhaps the following interpretation may help: The prehension of encoded information (language, music,...) allows to jump over neighbouring en-
tities, and thus yields an immediate objectification in a situation in which otherwise only mediate objectification would be possible.

4.4 VECTOR FIELDS

Let us focus the attention to the final two paragraphs of section IV.III.V, which highlight a new keyword, that of a vector. As we have mentioned before, in order to understand the references to vectors in the framework of Whitehead's philosophy, it is not sufficient to have a single vector space and its elements (the vectors) in mind. But one has to envision vector fields as they arise say in the theory of differential equations, or when dealing with dynamical systems. If one agrees that Chapter IV.III tries to present an approach to cosmology in the spirit of what now would be called differential geometry, then our interpretation fits this intention very well. Note that differential geometry and vector fields are explicitly mentioned at the end of Chapter IV.IV (PR 507) only.

Vector fields are something very natural and very basic: one attaches to every point of a manifold a vector (thus a direction and a number, namely the length of the vector); everybody is familiar with such a presentation, say looking at a weather chart with the vectors indicating the wind direction and its force, or looking at a marine chart indicating the current, and so on. Unfortunately, the mathematics needed to deal with them is somewhat intricate, thus they are not commonly included in the ordinary school curriculum. Actually, such vector fields are discussed in high school, but only outside of mathematics, say in geography, in physics (for example: magnetic fields), or in biology. Vector fields are by now one of the most important tools for a mathematical description of processes as they are considered in science as well as in economy. Mathematical models of dynamical systems use differential equations and the corresponding phase diagrams. One of the aims of such a presentation is to provide predictions (for the weather, for shares and bonds, for the gravitational force, ...) Note that such differential equation models are based on the assumption that the corresponding forces are of local nature.

It should be stressed that Whitehead's theory of prehension, as presented in Part III of PR, has to be interpreted in terms of vector fields, too. All the interactions between actual entities as discussed in the genetic analysis have to be seen in this way.
4.5 SECTION IV.III.V: RECAPITULATION

The first four paragraphs indicate the position of the theory of extension in the full context of *Process and Reality*, thus it seems worthwhile to look at them in detail. Whitehead stresses the relational character of his theory. In contrast to the Cartesian view of physical bodies and their attributes, Whitehead insists on the fundamental importance of the relations *within* actual entities and *between* them. These relations are described in terms of the theory of extension, those within an actual entity via the notion of inclusion, and those between actual entities via overlap and via external connectivity. Thus we see that it is the topology of the set of regions which is the basis of the organistic philosophy of Whitehead. One finds a more detailed description of these two kinds of relations elsewhere: For the relation of external connection (at least in respect to time) one has to refer to Chapter IV.IV (*strains*), whereas the inclusion scheme, which is relevant for the genetic process, has been discussed in Part III (*The Theory of Prehension*).

The last two paragraphs argue against the division between matter and empty space. The vector interpretation is based on the importance of action and flow, Heraklit’s dictum “everything flows” is translated into the formulation *all things are vectors*. Note that in this way the flow has a kind of quantum characteristic. Flow has to be considered as a nexus of actual entities, namely a nexus of successive actual entities.

4.6 ACTUAL ENTITIES

The actual entities have to be seen as the final units, and it is of importance to accept that they have an extension in space-time. There is a final footnote in Chapter IV which seems to be a source for great confusion: Whitehead calls his theory a *doctrine of “microscopic atomic occasions”* (PR 508)\(^30\). The reader may wonder why the actual entities are not just labelled *atomic*, but *microscopic atomic*: Where do we find hints about the use of the word “microscopic”\(^3\)? The index lists the pages 75, 196, 254, 326, 327 – all concern the history of philosophy, whereas the systematic parts (with the exception of this final footnote of Part IV) do not invoke such an idea. Let us see in which way the relationship between macroscopic and microscopic view is discussed (see PR 75): Whitehead considers the process of concrescence, and here
he distinguishes between the initial status or facts (the macro-
scopic view) and the final status or facts (the microscopic view).
The subjective unity of the actual entity (and this is the final fact,
thus the microscopic view) requires to see the concrescence, the
standpoint of the actual entity (its region) as a unit, as a quantum.
As Whitehead often writes: *divisible, but undivided.*

The footnote in question concerns a dispute with North-
rop, thus it is necessary to consult his corresponding texts. But a
translation of what Northrop calls a macroscopic atom into the
categorical scheme of Whitehead provides clarification: Northrop
considers a person and its development in time, or the solar
system or also a molecule, always with all their changes ... But in
the terminology of Whitehead, these are not actual entities, but
nexuus\(^{31}\) of actual entities! The identification of a person over the
years has to be considered as an idea, an eternal object, but not
as reality.

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NOTES
1. This paper first has appeared in volume II of Handbook of
Whiteheadian Process Thought (edited by Michel Weber and Will Desmond),
Ontos Verlag (2007), 131-148 under the title: Extensions in PR Part IV. It is
an abridged version of a text written in 2001 for the Whitehead colloquium at
the University of Bielefeld. The original version (in German) is available at:
http://www.math.uni-bielefeld.de/birep/phil/pr4.pdf
The detailed discussion of some of the axioms in PR has been omitted and
we have removed illustrations which were intended to provide an illumination
of the considerations, since we fear that they may be misleading. One may
consult the original text for a review of some standard mathematical notions,
in particular basic concepts of set theory, of the foundation of set-theoretical
topology (including the notion of a manifold), as well as a discussion of the
relationship between algebra and geometry.
The author is grateful to the participants of the Bielefeld Whitehead colloquium, in particular to Jürgen Frese, and to Philipp Fahr, for providing help during the preparation of the paper.

2. And unfortunately, there are quite a lot of commentaries which follow the same principle: to repeat and concatenate fixed formulations in various permutations – formulations which are often in themselves not digestible at all: What one obtains is just Whitehead’s text send through a meet mincing machine. Even the musicality is lost in this way. Such minced meet is served for example by Hammersmith, Palter, and Ross; chopped meet by Sherburne.

3. Whereas the “regions” considered in Part IV are related to space-time, one finds outside of Part IV formulations such as “spatial region” (PR 98, 185) or “regions in space” (PR 124) – but then one deals with abstractions which are definitely not “regions” in the sense of Part IV.

4. See PR 461, where it is asserted that points (and more generally geometric elements) are nexuus. Note that a nexus is a set of actual entities which form a unit, for example via spatial coincidence or via temporal succession – there always is a corresponding extensive quantum, thus a region – but this is mentioned there only parenthetically.

5. Hampe claims in “Wahrnehmung der Organismen”, that Whitehead’s notion of a vector differs from the “exact mathematical notion”, but he seems to have in mind only the naive vectors of school mathematics! Our interpretation of section IV.III.V will outline in more detail the necessary vision of vector fields. This will turn out to be an essential ingredient in order to understand Whitehead’s use of vectors.

6. Consistency means that one cannot derive a self-contradiction, or, phrasing it differently, that there exists a model which satisfies all the axioms. Completeness asserts that there can be at most one model. Minimality means that no axiom is a consequence of the remaining ones and therefore could be deleted. In modern mathematics, the use of a system of axioms has a quite different character: First of all, one usually drops the requirement of completeness, thus allowing the possibility of a wealth of models (see for example the axiomatization of group theory: the models are the groups, all satisfy the axioms, but there are many non-isomorphic ones). Also, the requirement of minimality is not considered as being really important: it may be helpful to use a small number of axioms, but if in doubt one prefers to work with a meaningful system of axioms, even if it is redundant.

7. Palter (p. 107) writes: In terms of standard mathematical conceptions, regions seem to be purely topological in character. But he adds: Whitehead never says explicitly that his regions are closed, but it is a reasonable inference from the properties he does attribute to regions .... This is in sharp contrast to definition 21, which asserts that all points which belong to a region (“situated” in a region) are inner points, so that regions are open, and thus in general not closed!

8. The notion of a “region” has been used already in UA, but only with respect to space: first as a “portion of space”, with the further expla-
nation “not necessarily a continuous portion”, but later rather specific for linear or affine subspaces.

9. More generally, one may consider the regions as the space-time abstractions of events, where an event is a nexus of actual occasions, **interrelated in some determinate fashion in one extensive quantum** (PR 113) – here the last four words “in one extensive quantum” should be emphasised.

10. The difference between „event“ and „region“ will be discussed later in more detail. Here we quote Palter (1960) who writes: *It seems clear that Whitehead intends regions (the relata of extensive connection) to be formally almost identical with events (the relata of extensions). It is impossible to demonstrate this formal identity between regions and events because Whitehead never lays down a complete set of axioms for either concept.* (p.109) and: *The sole formal difference between regions and events which is explicitly mentioned by Whitehead, is the fact that regions are limited in extend, or bounded, whereas events may be (as in the case of durations) unbounded.* (p.110)

11. The pair of notions „standpoint“ and „perspective“ has to be considered as a unit. In the philosophical tradition, it describes the relationship between the perceiving subject and its perceptions, see already Boethius, but in particular the Monodology of Leibniz (§ 57, and § 60). This pair is used quite often by Whitehead. Chapter II of Part II (with the relevant title *The Extensive Continuum* starts with considerations such as *The world of contemporary actual entities ... is objectified for us as “realitas objectiva”, illustrating bare extension with its various parts discriminated by differences of sense data. ... Our direct perception of the contemporary world is thus reduced to extension, defining (i) our own geometrical perspectives, and (ii) possibilities of mutual perspective or other contemporary entities inter se, and (iii) possibilities for division.* (PR 93f). See also: *An act of experience has an objective scheme of extensive order by reason of the double fact that its own perspective standpoint of an actual entity has extensive content, and that the other actual entities are objectified with the retention of their extensive relationships.* (PR 105). Finally, let us quote PR 321 (in Chapter X with the title *Process*): *Objectification is an operation of ... abstraction. ... This fact ... is sometimes termed the perspective of the actual world from the standpoint of that concrescence. Each actual occasion defines its own actual world from which it originates.* Note that there is the additional assertion: *No two occasions can have identical actual worlds.* If we are allowed to replace the words „actual worlds“ by „regions“, then this provides a confirmation for that the assignment of a region to an actual entity has to be seen as an injective map.

12. Also the commentaries do not help. One of them, Christian (1959), could be praised for formulating very clear questions – but some of the answers given by him are quite absurd. He formulates the following theses:
1. An actual entity is extensive.
2. The region of an actual occasion is definite.
3. The regions of actual occasions form an extensive plenum.
4. No two actual occasions have the same region.
5. The regions of any actual occasions are non-overlapping.
6. Not all the regions that are relata for extensive connection are regions of actual occasions.

(See p. 77 for the first five formulations, the last one is mentioned on p. 89).

Now the first three assertions are unquestionable, and the assertions 4 and 6 have been discussed already. Surprising, and in sharp contrast to Whitehead’s text, is thesis 5, since without overlapping and without inclusion (note that inclusions are special cases of overlaps, thus according to Christian also excluded), there cannot be any extensive abstraction – one of the key themes of Whitehead, in particular also of PR. In contrast to the earlier books, the extensive abstraction as presented in PR concerns properly space-time (whereas in PNK and in CN Whitehead tried to isolate the time component first), but this seems to be the only deviation. Christian uses the insufficiently described relationship between events and regions in order to claim a complete break between the conceptions: ... in the earlier writings events not only may include or extend over other events, they always do include some other events and are included by still other events. ... Therefore a proposition analogous to proposition 5, framed in terms of events as described in the earlier writings, would be clearly false. (pp. 93-94). As a justification of his interpretation he states: It is not required by the general theory of extensions that all relations defined in that theory apply to the regions of actual entities ... In our opinion, such a change of concepts would have been stressed by Whitehead! The theory presented by Christian, concerning actual and possible standpoints (with overlaps occurring only for the possible ones) has no roots in Whitehead’s text. What he obtains in this way is a world of entities lying one besides the other, just touching each other and forming a kind of tiling of the universe – in contrast to Whitehead’s explicit assertion that the view of a covering by non-overlapping units is just a “logical construct” (PR 508).

It should be added that Palter also wants to see a similar change of concepts (very nearly a reversal): in his early writings there is no doctrine of minimum events; in fact the method of extensive abstraction there explicitly repudiates the idea of either minimum or maximum events. (p. 112). We wonder where he finds “minimal events” in PR! A possible reason for these tiling interpretations seem to be pictorial illustrations as shown in Palter (p.142), which show an actual entity as the crossing square of a duration and a strain. These kinds of illustrations have indeed been used by Whitehead, see Hocking’s notes of the Harvard lectures 1924-25 (appendix 1 of Ford, p.282-285), but note that these are local, not global presentations. In this connection, Palter also uses a quote from AI which considers neighbouring relations between actual entities – but he does not take into account the context of the quote: It belongs to a part entitled The Grouping of Occasions and concerns a selection of actual entities, not the much more involved complete system.
13. This terminology is not at all used in Chapters IV.II and IV.III.
14. It seems that the reader is required to know beforehand what externally connected could mean.
15. As a typical example, take the Zariski topology which plays a decisive role in algebraic geometry.
16. Note that some interpreters are unhappy about that, for example Ross: It is interesting that Whitehead never considers the possibility that standpoints may not at all be extensive in even a generalized sense (p.179).
17. For a general discussion of the measurement of perception, we may refer to R. Efron: The Measurement of Perceptual Durations. In: Fraser-Haber-Müller (1972), p. 207 ff.
18. To be precise, we have to stress that different abstractive sets may produce the same geometrical element, in the same way as different sequences of nested intervals may converge to the same point. The equivalence relation needed here is introduced in definition 12. Palter has stressed that this means that the so defined geometrical elements (in particular, for example, points) are highly complicated entities, namely equivalence classes of sequences of regions.
19. It should be mentioned that for any pair of regions belonging to an abstractive set, one of them is non-tangentially included in the other. This requirement is made in order to enforce that the intersections considered may not be empty (even if the point set P(A) corresponding to a given region A is considered as an open set).
20. The assumptions 29-31 are very restrictive and imply that the geometrical elements constructed by means of extensive abstraction have quite special shapes: a circle cannot be constructed, in contrast to circular arcs.
21. This means: a set (the “total space”) is given, together with a set of distinguished subsets satisfying suitable axioms; the distinguished subsets are called “open” sets, their complements are the “closed” sets.
22. If one wants to obtain the points as the intersection of a countable sequence of open sets, then a further axiom, the first countability axiom, is required.
23. He developed this idea in his book “Foundation of general set theory I” (Moskow 1916) and in “Foundation of Mathematics” (1927 – 1931).
24. A.N. Prior: The Notion of the Present, C.L.Hamblin: Instants and Intervals, M. v. Capek: The Fiction of Instants. E.Cassirer: On the Reality of Becoming. W. Mays: Whitehead and the Philosophy of Time. Besides Mays, also v. Capek explicitly mentions Whitehead. Of interest seems to be the paper by Hamblin – not only with respect to his final remark: Is was drawn to my attention during the Oberwolfach conference by H.A.C. Dobbs that the definition of instants from intervals in set-theoretical terms has previously been discussed by A.G. Walker in [7] (p.331) . The paper [7] has the title Durees et instants and has appeared in 1947 in “Revue des cours scientifiques”. Maybe Hamblin should have looked at Whitehead!
25. In his review Beth also writes: *Though the author’s conclusions are probably correct, argument (i) does not seem fully convincing on account of the Skolem-Lowenheim paradox*. This paradox asserts that in elementary logic, references to super-denumerable sets are not really daunting, since any given model can be replaced by a similar one which uses only denumerable sets. We do not see in which way a reference to the Skolem-Lowenheim paradox is really relevant for the problem in question.

26. This is the set of all subsets of S.

27. On the contrary, Palter (1960) for example claims that such considerations are missing in PR! He writes: *Whitehead may wish to exclude regions with “holes” as he excludes events with “holes” in his earlier works; but this is by no means certain, since his later theory of extensions (and here Palter means PR) is deliberately more general than his earlier theory* (p.146).

28. *Whitehead had long discussions with Einstein and repeatedly attempted to convince him that on metaphysical grounds the attempt must be made to get along without the assumption of a curvature of space. Einstein, however, was not inclined to give up a theory, against which neither logical nor experimental reasons could be cited, nor considerations of simplicity and beauty. Whitehead's metaphysics did not seem quite plausible to him.* (P.Frank: Einstein, His Life and Times, p.189)

29. Note the following: the decision whether or not a given region A is an oval cannot be made by looking at A alone – one needs to know the complete ovate class.

30. In a first reading, this remark must be seen as a bomb which may destroy the whole categorical scheme! And note that it occurs on the final lines of Part IV (and thereafter, there is only God).

31. It should be noted that Whitehead himself sometimes is tempted to smear the difference between such nexus and the actual entities themselves, see for example PR 439.

CONȚINUȚUL REVELAȚIEI PROPOZIȚIONALE¹

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ABSTRACT. Revelation may be either of God or by God of propositions. Christian orthodoxy has with various degrees of emphasis and qualification claimed that the Christian Bible is true, because its writing was inspired by God; and that it contains in propositional form the crucial elements of the Christian revelation. I wish to apply philosophical understanding of meaning to inquire what it would be like for the Bible to be true. It will turn out that the answer depends on whether the Bible is one book or many, and on who is its author and its intended audience.

Revelația poate fi fie a lui Dumnezeu (de pildă, în persoana lui Iisus Hristos), fie de către Dumnezeu (de pildă, prin cuvintele lui Iisus) a propozițiilor. Creștinismul este tradițional angajat spre revelația de ambele tipuri. În acest articol mă ocup doar de revelația de al doilea tip, și anume cea propozițională.

I

Ortodoxia creștină a susținut, la niveluri variate de accentuare și competență, că Biblia creștină este reală deoarece redactarea ei a fost inspirată de Dumnezeu, și că ea conține în formă propozițională elemente cruciale ale revelației creștine. Doresc să întrebuițez aceptiunea filosofică a înțelesului pentru a vedea ce presupune ca Biblia să fie reală. Va rezulta că răspunsul depinde de faptul dacă Biblia este o singură carte sau sunt mai multe, de cine este autorul ei și de publicul vizat.

Adevărul aparține esențialmente propozițiilor instanțiate – adică anumitor rostiri în anumite situații sau inscripțiilor ce fac parte din anumite lucrări. Ceea ce afirmă o propoziție de tipul dat „Regele este bătrân“ sau „Larry este un elefant“ cu privire la rostirea sau inscripția ei într-un anumit text depinde crucial de factori externi de două tipuri. Mai întâi, și în mod evident, înțelesul său depinde de regulile limbajului în care ea a fost rostită – regulile sintactice și cele semantice ce furnizează sensurile normale (adică, sensurile textuale și altele stabilite) ale cuvintelor individuale, și înțelesul normal al modului în care ele interacționează spre a oferi un înțeles
întregului. Dar, în al doilea rând, înțelesul propoziției instanțiate depinde de contextul în care ea apare. În „context” includ contextul textual (propozițiile din vecinătate ale lucrării sau exprimării), contextul social (care a rostit-o sau a scris-o, când și cu care) și contextul cultural (credințele societății în care propoziția a fost scrisă și convențiile sale de gen). Să analizăm propoziția scrisă „Regele este bătrân”. Când și unde ea a fost scrisă face parte din contextul social; contextul cultural al momentului și locului astfel selectat include care anume genuri literare erau disponibile atunci – ele pot include critica literară, alegoria și prezentarea factuală simplă. Dacă critica literară era atunci disponibilă și propozițiile din vecinătate includ cuvinte precum „Shakespeare” și „Regele Lear”, atunci propoziția este un comentariu asupra unei piese, „Regele Lear”, iar ea este adevărată dacă regele din acea piesă este înfățișat acolo ca fiind bătrân. Dacă, pe de altă parte, propozițiile din vecinătate sunt descripții simple ale unei structuri politice, atunci genul este prezentarea factuală. În acest caz, contextul cultural, inclusiv credințele curente cu privire la cine era rege atunci, va determina finalmente la cine se referă propoziția, care va fi adevărată dacă acel rege este bătrân.

Există de obicei un sens al cuvintelor, și în consecință un înțeles al propoziției-tip pe care ele o compun, pe care cuvintele și propoziția sunt presupuse a-l avea, în absența contraindicărilor din context. Numesc acest sens textual, și acest înțeles, normal. Dar contextul poate sugera și alte înțelesuri posibile printre cele stabilite ca fiind cele corecte. Sau contextul poate sugera că niciun sens stabilit nu este corect și ne poate determina să considerăm un cuvânt sau mai multe în sens metaforic. Dacă propoziția este în mod evident irelevantă sau inconsistentă în raport cu propozițiile din vecinătate, sau cu credințele împărtășite de scriitor și de public, atunci nu putem presupune că acel înțeles este înțelesul ei. Să presupunem că spun în privința unei persoane pe care o cunosc, precum toată lumea, ca fiind Jane Smith, „lat-o pe Margaret Thatcher”, ceea ce nu poate fi luat textual. Similar, contextul literar poate arăta că propoziția aparține unui gen despre care contextul cultural ne spune că trebuie să ne așteptăm că multe dintre propozițiile sale să fie metaforice. Nu citim o propoziție din Călătoria pelerinului de Bunyan textual, asta fiindcă ea este o propoziție de genul unei povestiri alegorice.

Genurile diferă în multe moduri, dar mai presus de toate ele diferă în privința faptului dacă propozițiile lor au valoare de
adevăr, și dacă, și cum, valoarea de adevăr a întregii lucrări este o funcție a valorii de adevăr a propozițiilor componente. Lucrările de ficțiune nesubstanțială nu au valoare de adevăr, iar propoziția din Documentele Clubului Pickwick de Dickens, „Dl. Pickwick a mers la Norwich”, nu este nici adevărată, nici falsă. Prin contrast, un articol dintr-un ziar este adevărat sau fals, sau mai degrabă este adevărat în măsura în care fiecare dintre propozițiile sale componente este adevărată. Întregul este pe deplin adevărat dacă toate propozițiile sale componente sunt adevărate. Dar există genuri ale căror lucrări se poate spune că sunt integral adevărate sau false, dar a căror valoare de adevăr nu este o asemenea funcție simplă a valorilor de adevăr ale propozițiilor componente. Un poem sau o fabulă moralizatoare pot urmări să ne arate valoarea unui mod de viață prin nararea unei povestiri. Adevărul său nu depinde de corectitudinea detaliilor povestirii, ci de faptul dacă modul de viață recomandat este într-adevăr unul bun.

Când o propoziție metaforică aparține unui gen în care asemenea propoziții sunt obișnuite, pot exista convenții ale genului care determină cum înțelesul metaforic este o funcție a înțelesului textual (de pildă, un set de alegorii folosite în mod obișnuit). Dacă ea nu aparține unui asemenea gen, o prefață la acea lucrare poate explica care sunt convențiile sale. Sau e posibil să fie necesar să ne dăm singuri seama care este înțelesul metaforic. În acest sens, căutăm trăsături distinctive ce se crede în mod current că aparțin obiectelor, activităților sau a orice altceva este denotat de cuvînte în sensurile lor normale, și considerăm cuvinte care în mod obișnuit se referă la obiecte etc. pentru a ne referi la trăsături sau altă. Dacă unul dintre aceste moduri de interpretare a propoziției o face pe aceasta să fie o entitate naturală de formulat în context, atunci acesta este înțelesul său. În exemplul meu, trebuie să căutăm trăsături asociate în mod obișnuit cu Margaret Thatcher, astfel încât atribuirea acestora la Jane Smith să fie adecvată în contextul conversației. Dacă conversația a tratat faptul că Jane afirmă întotdeauna că modul de a rezolva lucrurile este de a introduce forțele pieței, astfel încât cei care o fac cel mai mult obțin cea mai mare răsplata bănească (context literar), atunci adreșându-ne cu „lat-o pe Margaret Thatcher” lui Jane (context social), dată fiind crede că ea comună că Margaret Thatcher susține perspectiva citată (context cultural), rezultă că înțelesul propoziției este că Jane e precum Margaret Thatcher încrucișat împărtășește acea viziune.
Contextul unei propoziții e posibil să nu fie pe deplin cunoscut contemporanilor unui scriitor, iar din acest motiv ei pot eșua în a înțelege propoziția, dar înțelesul său este ceea ce (ei având aceleași presupuneri culturale ca și vorbitorul) ei ar considera că este dacă ar cunoaște realmente contextul său. Un poem scris despre un tărâm pe care poetul l-a văzut, însă noi nu, poate folosi metare al căror sens va fi doar asemănător pentru cei care cunosc tărâmul. Într-adevăr, dacă nu cunoaștem tărâmul, nu putem înțelege că poemul vorbește despre el. Înainte de a înțelege poemul trebuie să cunoaștem contextul, iar asta presupune identificarea credințelor care ar fi generate prin familiarizarea cu tărâmul.

Este o consecință a dependenței înțelesului de context asupra căreia am atras atenția că în cazul în care analizăm o propoziție sau o poziție mai amplă dintr-o scriere și o plasăm într-un context diferit înțelesul său se va schimba. Deoarece ea poate dobândi un nou context literar (va avea în vecinătate propoziții distinctive), un nou context social (autorul noii lucrări își atribuie porțiunea de text și o folosește spre a se adresa unei noi audiențe), și chiar un nou context cultural (autorul cel nou și publicul său au alte credințe, iar genurile disponibile autorilor s-au schimbat).

Iată câteva exemple. Un autor poate prelua o propoziție sau un poem binecunoscute care i se par potrivite pentru a exprima o idee concisă destul de diferită de cea pentru care propoziția sau poemul au fost întrebuiințate inițial. Poetul latin Lucrețiu a comentat într-un vers celebru relele provocate de religie: „Tantum religio potuit suadere malorum“ (Religia i-a condus pe oameni spre nelegiuri). În cursul unei discuții despre Bosnia actuală pot rosti aceeași propoziție-tip, dar comentariul meu este că nelegiurile din Bosnia actuală sunt produsul fanaticismului religios, iar Lucrețiu nu asta a vrut să spună. Într-o ceremonie de încoronare a unui rege sau de instalare a unui judecător, oficialul care prezidează poate folosi un paragraf vechi de secole când se adresează candidatului și îl recomandă un mod de urmare a prerogativelor. Ceea ce spune oficialul diferă de ceea ce a spus ultimul oficial care a folosit paragraful, tocmai fiindcă diferă candidatul. În secolele anterioare, plagiatul nu era tratat atât de serios precum se face astăzi. Pe-atunci, un cronicar ce prezenta o bătălie pur și simplu relua relatarea unui alt cronicar pe care-l admira, chiar dacă aceasta viza o altă bătălie. Dar înțelesul se schimbă întrucât bătălia, generalii și soldații sunt alții. Sau finalmente să analizăm un volum alcătuit din articolele sale la care un autor adaugă o prefață spunând că nu mai crede
ceva scris într-un articol și că doresțte ceva scris într-un alt articol să fie înțeles în lumina altor lucruri pe care le-a scris. Prefața modifică înțelesul articolelor ca parte a cărții din înțelesul pe care-l aveau în sine. În prezentarea cărții, autorul nu conferă articolelor înțelesul pe care le-ar avea singure.

II

Să aplicăm acum aceste rezultate la Biblia creștină. Biblia este o carte amplă, alcătuită din multe lucrări mai mici, interrelaționate și alcătuite pornind de la scrieri mai scurte, fiecare cu un context literar, social și cultural distincte la fiecare stadiu al producereklor lor și al folosirii lor ulterioare. Întelesul oricărei propoziții din Biblie va depinde deci de porțiunea mai extinsă căreia se crede că i aparține, precum și de autor, și de publicul vizat pentru acea porțiune. Deocamdată voi formula presupunerea că „autorul” fiecărei paragrame sau fiecărei cărți este autorul (sau autori, sau compilatori) pe care critica istorică seculară îl (îi) recunoaște ca atare.

Începem prin a ne întoarce la porțiunile mai mici, elementele de poezie, narațiune și prorocie din care lucrările ce alcătuiesc Biblia au fost reuniite, porțiuni ce nu conțin elemente mai mici, cu existență proprie în vorbire sau scriere. Critica formală ne-a atras atenția asupra acestor porțiuni mai mici. Contextul literar al fiecărei propoziții este atunci porțiunea din vecinătate, contextul social, autorul porțiunii și publicul său, contextul cultural, credințele lor și genurile ce le-au fost familiare. Care sunt porțiunile și care este contextul lor sunt chestiuni pe care specialiștii trebuie să le investigheze, iar rezultatele sunt adesea nesigură și îndelung disputate. Dar să luăm un singur exemplu simplu cu privire la cum contextul porțiunii mici forțează înțelesul său asupra unei propoziții. Să considerăm Isaiah 7.14: „O tânără va concepe și va purta un fiu, iar numele său va fi Immanuel (adică, Dumnezeu ne are în pază)“. Specialiștii ne spun că această frază aparține unei porțiuni (7.7-17) ce înregistrează circumstanțele acestei rostiri, o profeție adresată de Isaiah regelui Ahaz (context literar), scrisă de Isaiah sau de un discipol (context social), pe un fundal de variate credințe despre semnificația numelor și a profeției (context cultural). Acel context oferă apoi propoziției înțelesul că regina (sau poate soția lui Isaiah) va purta un fiu, care va simboliza prezența lui Dumnezeu alături de poporul său oprimat și de rege. Dacă 7.14 este gândit ca parte din 7.7-17, atunci înseamnă că asta este. Dar compilatorii au pus por-
țiiunele laolaltă în porțiuni mai mari, adăugându-se versuri de legătură până ce avem fragmente întregi, precum sursele J, E, D și P din Pentateuch, ce au continuitate și unitate. Acestea au fost re-unite în Cărțile Vechiului și Noului Testament, precum le cunoaștem. Argumentele mele anterioare sugerează că plasând material vechi într-un context nou pot rezulta modificări semnificative ale înțelesului. Astfel, specialiștii în Noul Testament au încercat să arate înțelesul parabolelor lui Isus precum a fost inițial oferit de Isus și să le pună în contrast cu ceea ce scriitorii Evangheliei le foloseau să arate, înțelesul lor ca elemente dintr-o secțiune a Evangheliei ce se ocupă cu anumite probleme de interes pentru Biserica primară, al cărei autor este, de pildă, Sf. Luca. Când, precum se face adesea, o Evanghelie furnizează o interpretare explicită a unei parabile, asta este ceea ce parabola vizează ca parte a acelei Evanghelii, indiferent de ce ar fi putut însemna luată distinct. Pentru un exemplu la o scară mai mare, să observăm cum întregul mesaj al Cărtii Ecleziastului este schimbat prin adăugarea anumitor versuri, îndeosebi la sfârșit (12.13 n.), care vizează să rezume mesajul său dar îi conferă realmente o poziție absolută nouă. O lucrare sceptică devine o carte centrată pe Dumnezeu, întrucât dacă considerăm noile propoziții ca făcând parte din aceeași carte, trebuie să interpretăm propozițiile anterioare într-un mod consistent cu ele. Și, în mod similar, înțelesul din II Esdras este schimbat radical prin adăugarea unei introduceri și a unei concluzii – ambele creștine.

III

Ce se întâmplă când toate cărțile sunt reunită în Biblia creștină? Biserica creștină a avut nevoie de patru secole pentru a alcătui canonul Scripturii sale. Iar ceea ce s-a spus despre canonul răspândit nu a fost că el este adevărat, ci că el a fost „inspirat“ de Dumnezeu. El a fost autorul fundamental al Bibliei, depășind idiosincrașii stilului scriitorilor umani. Aceștia se pot referi la ei înșiși ca „Eu“, dar mesajul a fost al lui. Acum temeiurile pentru a presupune că Dumnezeu este autorul fundamental al Bibliei trebuie să fie ceva consonant cu faptul că Biserica fondată de Hristos, demonstrat ca profetul lui Dumnezeu prin miracolele sale și prin Învierie, a stabilit că Dumnezeu este autorul fundamental. Articolul meu nu urmărește să demonstreze dacă funcționează un asemenea argument, ci, presupunând că Dumnezeu este autorul funda-
mental, și astfel că Biblia este vehiculul revelației propoziționale – cum urmează să determinăm ce vrea aceasta să spună? Noul context ne oferă acum înțelesuri absolut diferite cu privire la unele versuri.

Contextul literar al fiecărei propoziții este acum întreaga Biblie. Întrucât propozițiile au un autor comun, ele trebuie interpretate ca fiind consistente între ele. Contextul social este că Dumnezeu e autorul ei, iar publicul vizat trebuie să fie Biserica multor secole. Contextul cultural este dat de credințele pe care Dumnezeu le împărtășește publicului său. Acum, firește, Biserica din perioada de început avea unele credințe false cu privire la probleme științifice și istorice importante, referitor la care Biserica din ultima perioadă, să sperăm, și-a modificat poziția. Exemplul cu tărâmul, de mai devreme, sugerează că, în acel caz, credințele împărtășite de Biserica recentă sunt cele relevante. Dar cărui gen aparține Biblia? Nu unuia absolut familiar. În acest caz, care sunt regulile pentru îndepărtarea multor inconsistente aparent interne, pentru considerarea unor aspecte ca fiind istorice și a altora drept metaforice?

Trebuie să avem o prefață. Și dacă nu o prefață în același volum, un scurt ghid (de același autor), care să apară la fel ca Biblia, oferind dezambiguizări și văzut public de audiența vizată ca procedând astfel. Un asemenea ghid ar fi o extensie a lucrării originale. Iar acestea fiind spuse, există, firește, un asemenea ghid. Crezurile Bisericii și alte materiale de orientare publică tradițională sunt considerate ca fiind centrale pentru mesajul evanghelic. Dacă *imprimatur*-ul (bun de tipar) Bisericii arată în vreun fel că Dumnezeu este autorul Sfintei Scripturi, el arată *a fortiori* că Dumnezeu este autorul învățăturii centrale și, mai presus de toate, al Crezurilor, al căror gen ca enunțuri precise de adevăr doctrinar este evident, și devotamentul față de care a fost considerat ca fiind mult mai important la un stadiu anterior al istoriei Bisericii decât confirmarea autorității Sfintei Scripturi. Biblia creștină precum a fost răspândită de Biserică trebuie deci interpretată în lumina învățăturii centrale a Bisericii ca o Evanghelie creștină. Dată fiind înțelegerea acestui aspect, contextul (acum incluzând învățătura creștină centrală) determină părțile să ia o formă comună și ne constrângă să interpretăm o parte ca istorie, o parte ca metaforă, iar o parte ca având un adevăr ce nu este dependent de cel al propozițiilor ce le compun.

Pasajele care sunt considerate de sine stătătoare ca porțiuni scrise de un autor uman ar putea fi o istorie eronată sau o
învățătură morală falsă, dovedindu-se a avea înțeleseuri destul de diferite când sunt luate ca secțiuni ale unei Biblii creștine al cărei autor este Dumnezeu. Geneza 1 (Creătia ce a durat 7 zile) și Geneza 11, 1–9 (Povestea Turnului Babel), considerate ca porțiuni de sine stătătoare ce au ca autori pe israeliții timpurii urmează a fi poate întrepretate (deși am anumite îndoieli cu privire la această interpretare) ca o istorie falsă. Dar, ca parte a unei Biblii ce-l are ca autor pe Dumnezeu, Geneza nu poate fi astfel interpretată, deoarece Dumnezeu știe, de asemenea și Biserica modernă pentru care a scris, că lumea nu a început după șapte zile. Iar Geneza 11 nu poate fi astfel interpretată, întrucât Dumnezeu știe, ca și noi, că limbajele umane s-au dezvoltat într-o perioadă mult mai lungă și în multe locuri distincte. Astfel că trebuie să considerăm ambele pașaje în sensuri atât de apropiate de cel textual, care este compatibil cu noul context al cunoașterii noastre științifice și istorice. Interpretiez discuția Genezei 1 cu privire la „zile” ca fiind una despre lungi perioade de timp, iar capitolul ca spunându-ne că a existat o evoluție graduală, sprijinită de Dumnezeu, a universului și a vieții, ce se încheie cu apariția oamenilor. Și interpretiez Geneza 11 ca fiind o parabolă despre diviziunea umană ca fiind determinată, și permisă de Dumnezeu spre determinare, prin trufie umană. Dar profiția lui Isaiah pentru Ahaz? Isaiah 7.14 face acum parte din aceeași carte ca Matei 1.22 n., care spune că nașterea lui lisus a fost o împlinire a cuvintelor lui Isaiah, iar aceste cuvinte sunt acum citate în Matei dintr-o traducere greacă a limbii ebraice, în care termenul ebraic pentru „tânăra” este tradus παρθενός („feocioară”). Întrucât nu există vreun temei pentru a considera Matei 1.22 n. într-un alt sens decât cel textual, reiese că cuvintele lui Isaiah au constituit o profiție a nașterii virgine a lui lisus, chiar dacă, desigur, Isaiah e posibil să nu fi știut asta.

Trebuie să admit că atunci când am tras aceste concluzii din considerații pur filosofice cu privire la modul adecvat de interpretare a Sfintei Scripturi, ele mi s-au părtuit implauzibile din două temeuri. Ele au avut drept urmare că autorii umani nu au înțeles întotdeauna pe deplin ce au fost inspirați să scrie. Și părea cam neobișnuit că idei care, după mine, ar fi putut fi exprimate mult mai simplu au fost exprimate într-un asemenea mod denaturant. Dar apoi m-am apucat să studiez istoria interpretării biblice și am ajuns să-mi dau seama că viziunile mele despre cum Dumnezeu ar trebui să inspire și care sunt cele mai potrivite genuri literare pentru idei sunt absolute mărginite. Dumnezeu oferă suficientă inspirație
către autorii umani ai Bibliei pentru ca aceştia să noteze aspecte cu mult adevărat în ele, dar nu, luate în context restrâns, pe deplin adevărâte. Având întreaga Biblie suntem privilegiaţi să selectăm întregul adevăr care apare în contextul total. Și nu este plauzibil să sugerăm că o metodă de inspirație în care noi, generațiile de mai târziu, avem un rol în interpretarea lucrării inspirate este o metodă bună de inspirație? Este o perspectivă absolut bibliocă și patrastică că profetiile umani au adesea doar o idee limitată a înțelesului a ceea ce ei prezic – „Am auzit, dar nu am înțeles“ a scris autorul de la început Daniel în privința viziunii pe care o înregistra în cartea sa. Iar Irineu a scris: „Fiecare profetie este, pentru oameni, [plină de] enigme și ambiguități. Dar când a sosit timpul, iar predicția lor s-a împlinit, atunci profetiile au o expunere clară și sigură.“

Iar în privința celui de-al doilea aspect prezentat de mine, lumea veche avea genuri pentru exprimarea adevărului care sunt mult depărtate de ale noastre. Alegoria îndeosebi era ceva ce le apărea foarte firească. Am aflat din studiul meu asupra istoriei interpretării biblice că regulile mele de interpretare a textelor generate de considerații filosofice pur și simplu sunt cele avansate în mod obișnuit de-a lungul perioadei patristice și medievale. Origen afirmă regulile sale de interpretare bibliocă în De Principiis 4.3, și ele sunt ca și ale mele – interpretăm textual când putem, dar nu când o interpretarea textuală este inconsistentă cu ceea ce știm despre știință și istorie, și cu ceea ce știm ca elementele centrale ale credinței creștine. De aici, Origen ne spune că pasajele de început din Geneză, o bună parte din detalii ale legislației sacrifical de a lui Le-viticus, profetiile lui Ezekiel despre Tyre și Sidon etc., toate trebuie considerate alegorice. Capitolul se deschide într-adevăr cu fraza:

Ce om înțelege că prima, a doua și a treia zi, și seara, și dimineața au existat fără soare, lună și stele?

scurtcircuitată prin demersul de a spune că Dumnezeu nu poate fi autorul său fundamental, întrucât ea afirmă că istorie că lumea a luat ființă în șase zile, ceea ce nu este adevărat. Întrucât dacă ea afirmă realmente că depinde de cine a scris-o, și dacă Dumnezeu a scris-o, cu siguranță ea nu spune asta.

REFERINȚE BIBLIOGRAFICE


ABSTRACT. Wittgensteinian quietism can be seen as a rejection of two opposing approaches to metaphysical theorising. Conceptual realism, on the one hand, sees our concept scheme as being one particular view on some super-conceptual or god-eye view of reality. Conceptual idealism, on the other hand, rejects this conceptual relativism: nothing can exist that doesn't fall under some possible concept, one which could be brought within our conceptual repertoire. Both these approaches assume some connection between our concepts and the nature of ‘reality’ (in some metaphysically significant sense), that is rejected by quietism. While this paper does not argue for quietism with respect to philosophical theorising in general, it attempts to show how a quietist approach might be appropriate for a particular area of philosophical discourse. It illustrates the application of a quietist analysis with respect to the notions of ‘qualia’ and subjectivity, and tries to show how this approach is distinct from mere elimination of the disputed concepts.

Wittgenstein has been accused of holding a view of language and thought that amounted to a kind of idealism. Encouraged by the transcendental idealism evident in the *Tractatus*, Bernard Williams influentially argued that a commitment to a linguistic idealism can be found in his mature thought: Wittgenstein was concerned to show the limits of sense by ‘moving around reflexively inside our view of things and sensing when one began to be near the edge by the increasing incomprehensibility of things regarded from whatever way-out point of view one had moved to’. The idea is that Wittgenstein is an idealist in subscribing to the following principle: what the world is for us is shown by the fact that some things and not others make sense.

The ‘for us’ in this principle would seem to make it reasonably innocuous. But Williams is suggesting a world view without peers: ‘Under the Idealist interpretation, it is not a question of our recognising that we are one lot in the world among others, and (in principle at least) coming to understand and explain how
our language conditions our view of the world, while that for others conditions theirs differently. Rather, what the world is for us is shown by ... the fact some things and not others make sense.'

I have argued elsewhere that this interpretation, while having some textual basis, is mistaken. Wittgenstein does reject an opposing kind of realism, which we might call ‘conceptual realism’. This is the view that the validity of our concepts ultimately depends on being justified by some kind of super-conceptual reality or god-eye view of the universe. In his extensive discussion of private language, for instance, Wittgenstein rejects the idea that our ordinary concepts are somehow justified by an immediate contact with experience. Instead, Wittgenstein concludes that our concepts are not justified at all. A conceptual scheme (or ‘grammar’) cannot be sensibly thought of as being ‘true’ or ‘false’, since those concepts only apply to judgement made within a particular conceptual scheme. Grammar, on this view, is essentially arbitrary. The philosophical project of specifying the reality that justifies a grammar cannot be completed, for in the end all we can describe is reality as it is conceived by a particular grammar. The reality that we call upon to justify our grammar must be described, and this description is made possible by a certain grammar. But then it too stands in need of justification.

While this conception of language can be taken as a rejection of conceptual realism, it also rejects the opposite view, which we can call conceptual idealism. Williams claimed of Wittgenstein that he rejected both ‘our recognising that we are one lot in the world among others’, and ‘(in principle at least) coming to understand and explain how our language conditions our view of the world’. The above argument does seem to reject the second part of this conjunct, but far from rejecting the first, the same views on the arbitrary nature of grammar invite a radical relativism.

Conceptual idealism can be thought of as a dependence claim between our conceptual scheme, in some general sense, and what can exist: for something to be possible it must fall under some possible concept. Conceptual realism, in embracing a radical conceptual relativism, denies this. It sees our conceptual scheme as one possible view of some independent reality.
Wittgenstein’s position, then, rejects two different approaches to metaphysics. Against the realist, he rejects the idea that our concepts have any philosophical justification external to them. The very independence of this reality makes it unavailable to us. But he also rejects the idea that our conceptual scheme is special in any philosophically significant sense, which would allow us to approach metaphysics as an internal analysis of that conceptual scheme. The resulting position is quietist.

I do not want to argue here for Wittgensteinian quietism as a general approach to philosophy. It might be argued that Wittgenstein made some substantial assumptions, at least about the nature of language, if not about the nature of philosophy. Wittgenstein worked hard over many years on developing what he considered a perspicuous representation of language. The very fact that developing this understanding took so much of his time shows the enormity of the task, and therein lies the difficulty. For language is a large and complex phenomenon, and it is difficult to represent it with one metaphor that is not as subtle and ambiguous as language itself. The endless possibilities suggested by the idea of a ‘language-game’ are evidence of that – a point that Wittgenstein made use of to discourage over-generalising in philosophy. So the difficulty in accepting Wittgenstein’s views with respect to philosophy come to this: that it is hard to see that language always works in a way so as to exclude the possibility of drawing substantial philosophical theories from it. It is hard to accept that quietism holds in general.

Despite Wittgenstein’s high-handed pronouncements on philosophy, it is evident that he was clearly aware of this problem. He treated each piece of philosophical nonsense individually and thoroughly. Not that he completed this task. Certain areas of discourse were barely covered by his work, most notably ethics and aesthetics. Even if quietism were the only correct approach to philosophy in general, it would be an endless task to show it. But that is no reason to reject quietism, applied in a piecemeal fashion, to particular philosophical problems. By way of illustration, I want to demonstrate how quietism might be correct for at least one particular area of discourse. And the first step in this direction will be to show that neither conceptual realism nor conceptual idealism can provide satisfying accounts of that area. Such a demonstration would at least illustrate the conflict between concep-
tual realism and conceptual idealism, and show how quietism can provide a cogent alternative.

I have in mind three related lines of thought that tempt us, as philosophers, to utter nonsense. Wittgenstein himself returned again and again to the nature of subjectivity and its relation to language and objectivity. It is the connection between these lines of thought that I want to stress here. If I am right in thinking that the connection between them is significant, then the philosophical treatment of one should provide insight into the correct treatment of the other two. And this connection can best be made, I believe, by considering these philosophical problems in the context of the debate between conceptual idealism and conceptual realism.

1. Philosophy and subjectivity

The first line of thought is simple, but perplexing. It is an argument that has been used to propound a doctrine of idealism. The argument takes the form of an exercise in conceivability. We are asked to imagine a world (or some part of it) that is presented to no subject whatsoever. But one necessarily finds oneself as subject in or of that world. Hence, the argument concludes, a world without a subject is impossible.

It is a mistake to take this argument to prove that minds are a necessary part of the world. When I imagine anything, I, as imagining subject, am not necessarily part of what is imagined. Indeed, it seems that in a certain sense of 'me', it is difficult to see that I could be part of what is imagined. For nothing in my imagination corresponds to me. Of course, I can imagine being one of the characters in the scene that I imagine. Usually (though not necessarily) this will take the form of conjuring up conscious states that bear some similarity to the states I suppose I would be in if I were in the imagined situation. These states will typically be in some way visual in nature (I imagine how thing would appear to me visually) but may include other sense modalities and perhaps the emotions that the images invoke in me. Although the situation is simulated, if ones imaginative powers are strong enough, the simulation can be extremely vivid. The emotions one evokes in oneself may be very real. However distinct the act of imagining is from the act of perceiving one will always be in some set of mental states that are very real. One does not imagine that one imagines. Likewise, one would like to say something similar about the subject. Though I imagine myself in a foreign place, I do not ima-
gine myself. Every part of what I can imagine I can imagine otherwise. The content of my imaginative act can always be changed. But that it is I who imagines remains constant. Even if I imagine being someone other than M. D., it remains true that I imagine that I am someone other than M. D. Throughout the imaginative act, I am myself.

This last point may form part of the realist’s reply to the idealist. If the content of my imaginative act is given by what is imagined, then I form no part of that content. Hence, while I cannot abstract myself from my imagination (since it is I who does the imagining), I can substract myself. Even if, as Peacocke would have it, to imagine a tree is to imagine being in some conscious state that would normally be caused by the presence of a tree, it does not follow that what one is imagining is a tree being perceived. The perceiver is not part of what is imagined.

Nevertheless, even if this point is conceded, the argument for idealism still has some power. It still seems to contain some philosophical truth, even if that truth is not the doctrine of material idealism. Part of this ‘truth’ is contained in the thought that a subject, if not present in my imaginative act, is somehow presupposed by any imaginative act. The world as it is imagined, perceived or known, is a world for a subject. The world as it is conceived is the world for a subject. The concept of world and the concept of subject are interwoven. But what is this subject that is presupposed? Two answers suggest themselves. But these two answers, while both are tempting to the point of being self-evident, also seem mutually exclusive to the modern philosopher.

The first answer has already been suggested by the discussion so far. It is that whatever the subject that is presupposed by the ‘world’ is, it is not part of that world. Whatever world I imagine, the subject that is necessarily ineliminable from the act of imagination is never part of what is imagined. The point could be made in a Humean spirit: whatever part of my imagination or experience I assess, none of it turns out to be the subject. But Kant thought of the matter differently. It is not that a thorough phenomenological search comes up empty, but rather that we know in advance that the subject will not be found in experience. Kant thought of the subject as the synthetic unity of apperception. It is the ‘I think’ that can accompany all my thoughts and intuitions. Such a transcendental subject cannot usefully be described as a substance, for (to put the matter in Kantian terms) the category of
substance applies only within experience. But then what is left of this concept of a subject? The sober minded philosopher – especially the conceptual idealist – might argue that it is merely an idea, one that is ripe for elimination. On this view the subject is a construct, corresponding to an idea that has no real referent. Just as the ‘I’ is no part of the imagination or experience, so it is no part of the world.

The second answer is that, quite clearly and obviously, I am the subject. This is worrying enough for the proponent of the argument for idealism. The argument, if it works, proves not idealism but solipsism, for I cannot imagine something that is not imagined or perceived by me. But suppose now that we reject the argument for (material) idealism on the basis outlined above. We granted that a subject is presupposed, but argued that such a subject is merely a presupposition to the idea of imagining anything. It is not part of the world, but an idea that is related to the idea of a world. But am I merely an idea? Does the idea of a subject in the context of the imaginative act not refer to me? It is easy to feel sympathy with Descartes’ thought that if anything is certain it is that I exist as a thinking substance. (We really do feel this sympathy).

This brings us to the second line of thought that I would like to discuss. As we noted previously, the argument, rather than taking us neatly to the doctrine of idealism as intended by Schopenhauer and Berkley, has driven us to the unhappy position of solipsism. But what kind of solipsism have we arrived at? It is not the obviously nonsensical solipsism that has it that all substance is dependent on my ego. For my ego is, if it exists at all, a substance. A substance is a part of the world, and very much a contingent part of it. I can easily imagine a world without substances. Yet in doing so, I do not disappear. The subject that was presupposed in my idea of a world, we must conclude, is not part of the world.

We are immediately reminded of the solipsism of the *Tractatus*, which one might call ‘transcendental’. By ‘transcendental’ I mean precisely that which is presupposed by the idea of experience and the world. Wittgenstein himself excluded that which is presupposed from being part of the world, for that which is part of the world is contingent, and could be otherwise (*Tractatus* 5.634). Hence the ‘metaphysical subject’ is a ‘limit – not a part of the world’ (5.641).
The problem with this is that it leaves completely mysterious what this metaphysical or transcendental subject is. For the early Wittgenstein it is part of that which makes itself manifest, but cannot be said. And the subject enjoys this ineffable status because it is presupposed by the notions of language and possibility. Put another way, we cannot give content to the notion of the transcendental subject, since it is that which is presupposed by the idea of content. But this just seems to be nonsense. How can we use a concept to which we cannot give content?

We have reached the idea of transcendental solipsism by considering the argument from imagination for idealism. The early Wittgenstein did not put these thoughts in terms of imaginative acts. For him, a possibility was given by representability. The link is easy to make, however, since for Wittgenstein to think (use language) is to picture a state of affairs. We can thus understand Wittgenstein’s reasons for introducing the metaphysical subject in §5.6 by considering the way our current line of thinking has led us to solipsism. I cannot imagine any proposition that is not a proposition in my language. So the limits of my language are the limits of the world (that which can be described in language).

I have argued elsewhere\(^\text{14}\) that Wittgenstein does not argue from the privacy of language and experience to his transcendental solipsism. But it does not follow that Wittgenstein did not hold some view akin to the privacy of language view at the time of the \textit{Tractatus}. At one point, he seemed to hold that we can learn to use words by a kind of private examination of the phenomena referred to\(^\text{15}\). (The very view that he later attacked so rigorously in the private language argument.) And even if one does not argue from privacy to solipsism, one could well argue the other way. Whatever the differences between ‘empirical’ and ‘transcendental’ solipsism, it is the essence of solipsism that the subject (in whatever sense the ‘subject’ is understood) has a unique relation to the world. One can describe this uniqueness in terms of the objects that the subject’s language is supposed to refer to. The subject is taken to have direct contact with those objects in a way that is beyond the descriptive powers of language. Objects can be named but not described. (And since this naming relation is presupposed by language, it cannot be further analysed within language). The link between privacy and the notion of a simple object is this: a simple object can only be named, not described. The object does not fall under any public concept,
since it has no structure to distinguish it from any other object. The concept it falls under can only be understood by the user of its name, who is in direct contact with its self-intimating nature.

The third idea that I wish to discuss is the concept of essentially private experience. It is easy to sympathise with the view that the later Wittgenstein goes to so much effort to attack: that only I can know what my experience is like. It is likewise easy to sympathise with the view (though apparently easier for some philosophers than for others) that experience is made up (at least in part) of private, ineffable elements that correspond to the subjective qualitative feel of experience. Our ordinary descriptive language describes what our experience is of, not the experience itself. Even experiential terms, such as ‘dizziness’, do not seem to capture what it is like to feel dizzy in their public use. That knowledge, it would seem, is pre-linguistic, and can only be gained by having the experience. But could there be something that is pre-conceptual? If we can speak of it at all, then surely we can articulate what it is that we are speaking of. And then we have described that which was earlier supposed to be ineffable.

2. Subjectivity and the debate between conceptual idealism and conceptual realism

Like so many philosophical disputes, the problems discussed here concerning the subject and its relation to the world have been characterised by diametrically opposed views. Let us take some of the wide-ranging literature on ‘qualia’ and ‘sense-data’. The referents of these terms (that is to say, which entities are at issue in the first place) are, of course, the subject of much contention. The term ‘qualia’, as used by some philosophers, need not imply the disputed entities have (or are) private or ineffable properties. This is particularly true if the proponent of qualia holds that they are properties of things (objects) rather than minds. Nevertheless, much of the traditional dispute over qualia or sense-data can be considered to be relevant to the issues at hand. For a great deal of the debate about whether qualia exist (and what follows from this) hangs on whether or not qualia are describable in ordinary public language (whether they can be given physical or functional descriptions). To simplify matters I will henceforth use the term ‘qualia’ to refer to private, ineffable qualities. The question is whether such a concept is coherent enough to have any application.
The debate about the existence of qualia is an example of the form of dispute where one camp asserts the existence of some disputed entity, while the other position denies its existence. In such disputes, it is typical for some overarching doctrine to be at stake. In the case of qualia and the subject, the general philosophical thesis most generally taken to be at issue is physicalism. The anti-physicalist argues that some entity, such as qualia, ‘evidently’ exists, or can be shown to exist by simple reasoning, and that its description cannot be reduced to a physical level of discourse. The physicalist has the option of either arguing that the existence of the disputed entity is compatible with physicalism\(^{17}\), or (more often the case) that the disputed entity is not coherently defined and should thus be eliminated.

This seems to be the underlying form of most arguments about qualia, even when they are not explicitly put in these terms. By this I mean that this way of putting the matter best reflects the opposing intuitions that prevent the debate from being resolved. Let us take, for example, Jackson’s Knowledge Argument\(^{18}\). This does not obviously have the usual form of an argument about ineffable qualities or entities, but I think that it is driven by (and driving at) the same intuitions.

Mary is brought up in a completely black-and-white environment, learning all her knowledge from textbooks and a black-and-white television set. She is a most diligent and gifted student, and she finally absorbs all the knowledge that can be taught in this way. She gains, that is, all the propositional knowledge there is to gain. In particular she demonstrates a remarkable grasp of neurophysiology, especially in the area of colour perception. According to Jackson, she thereby gains all the knowledge that the physical sciences afford on these matters. So what happens when she leaves the room and experiences red for the first time? Does she learn something new? The anti-physicalist claims that she obviously does. She learns the *what-it’s-like* to experience red. But, by hypothesis, she already knew all that the physical sciences had to teach. So there are more facts to be known than those covered by the physical sciences, and physicalism is false.

There are two standard responses to this line of argument. Firstly, it has been argued that what Mary gains when she leaves captivity and sees a ripe tomato for the first time is not some piece of knowledge but a recognitional capacity. She gains
the ability to recognise (the experience of seeing) red. The second response is to flat refuse to acknowledge that it is clear that Mary would gain any knowledge or even ability by her new experience. Seeing red for the first time, she will instantly recognise it as the experience of perceiving a red object, because it will be just as her studies and research had predicted. We do not know what it is like to have all the physical knowledge, so we are wrong to assume that it would not include the what-it's-like of experiencing red.

But I do not think that the pro-qualia philosopher need blush at these objections. Neither of them will do much to undermine the intuitions that are fostered by someone who already takes qualia seriously. And by qualia I mean precisely that which is private to the individual, for it is privacy that makes the concept of a particular quale resistant to description by the physical sciences. Since there is no (complete) public description of the experience of seeing red, Mary could not have learned what it is like to see red without actually seeing red for herself.

On the other hand, the proponent of qualia is not going to make much headway in converting the opposition to his cause. The physicalist will continue to miss the anti-physicalist point so long as she does not share the same intuitions about private objects. Indeed, her best response can be put like this: either the entity you are talking about can be adequately described and defined, in which case there is no a priori reason to suggest that it cannot be incorporated into a completed physics, or your concept is confused, and should be disregarded. Time and again however, this second horn is going to be rejected by the anti-physicalist. For it is exactly his point that there is something that resists complete and adequate description. Something that is beyond the reach of the net that language casts. And if it is beyond the net of language, if there is something that cannot be described, then there cannot be a theory that reduces such phenomena to physical entities. If we cannot specify what is to be reduced or explained, we cannot articulate a theory that reduces or explains it.

Arguments about qualia and subjectivity are not always put in these terms, but I think that this issue underlies a great deal of the debate. If I am right about this then we can view this debate as a subclass of the conceptual realist – conceptual idealist debate. It is no coincidence that the guardians of an irreducible sub-
jectivity (such as Nagel) are also the strongest proponents of conceptual realism\textsuperscript{19}. The philosophers that argue for the elimination of qualia are not always so forthright in their corresponding support for conceptual idealism\textsuperscript{20}, but implicit in their arguments is the assumption that if a supposed entity cannot be adequately defined then the concept one is attempting to use is empty. To be a general \textit{a priori} defence of physicalism this response must hold that there could be no entity that is beyond physical description (\textit{a fortiori}, there is no entity beyond all description). To assume a completed physics is possible, and that it would amount to a theory of everything, implies that conceptual idealism is correct\textsuperscript{21}. Whether or not the eliminators and ‘quiners’\textsuperscript{22} of qualia could be pushed to these strongly conceptual idealist standpoints, they do have a problem in common with the conceptual idealist. They seem to be denying something that really does seem undeniable, even if we cannot say what that undeniable thing is.

I reflect on my experience of looking at a ripe lemon. I notice the unmistakable lemon shape, and recognise its colour immediately as yellow. Not that it is uniform in colour, or even all yellow. At each end there is evidence of an unripe green, and all over it is covered with dimples that are for the most part darker in colour than the general appearance of vibrant yellow. The lemon is illuminated with white light from the window, casting a range of hues. Towards the light it is speckled with white flicks that outline the dimples on its surface. On the upper side the same effect is produced in a more diffuse manner by the light reflected from the cream walls. Underneath and to the right it is shrouded in grey.

What have I described? My experience of seeing a lemon? Certainly. I have described the way the lemon appears to me. And in doing so I have used concepts with which you are familiar: lemon, yellow, ripeness, light, and so on. But what of the way it appears to me? Have I described that, or merely gestured at it? What of this particular patch of yellow here (just above the point of maximal intensity of the illuminating light)? Well, I could present you with a yellow sample, and tell you under which conditions to view that sample. But I do not want to describe the patch on the lemon, but the patch in ‘my image’ of the lemon; the way it looks to me alone. How can I know that it looks the same to you, even if you were seated in the same place, looking at the same lemon in the same light?
This line of thought makes it easy to sympathise with the realist’s contention that there is something there that evades description. But where? The only 'there' to point at is on the surface of the lemon. And surely we can match that with a colour chart. If there is some other patch, then we should say what it is. For the very fact that we are picking something out shows that we have a concept in mind. We do the following to find the mental patch of yellow: first we find the real patch on the lemon, and then we abstract. We always start with the patch that we can talk about, and then try to absorb the pure form of the experience. As if we could relax our mind and see ‘it’ without thinking – without the interference of conceptualisation. But if there is no thought, how can I know that the experiment has succeeded? How can I pull the non-conceptual experience back into my thoughts and draw conclusions from it? As the conceptual idealist is fond of reminding us, drawing conclusions is a matter of seeing rational relationships. To affect a judgement, something must already have conceptual form. But the conceptual realist is already crying foul. Surely you cannot mean to deny that there is something indescribable in experience!

This is where I think quietism can best be illustrated. Quietism is a philosophical approach that can arise from the rejection of the kind of philosophical dispute in question. It arises as a response to philosophical disputes that take the form of an opposition of doctrines that can be neither reconciled nor independently resolved in favour of one or the other. This is the form of the general debate between the conceptual realist and the conceptual idealist. The conceptual realist insisted that there could be concepts to which we could have no cognitive access, and the conceptual idealist points out that we cannot make sense of a concept that we cannot make sense of. The problem is that nothing can count as an example to resolve the dispute one way or the other without using the very point at issue to interpret the alleged example. There seems no independent way of resolving the issue.

The quietist insight is that where questions cannot be independently resolved, this indicates that the question itself may be misconstrued. Both arguments for and against qualia seem to be based on sound intuitions. The conceptual realist feels no qualms about talking about something that he cannot describe. After all, it seems so evidently there, part of the fabric of his expe-
rience. But the conceptual idealist feels just as justified in de-
manding a more complete articulation of the supposed entity. And this is precisely what the conceptual realist claims cannot be
given.

We can only resolve these conflicting intuitions if we give up an assumption that both the conceptual idealist and the con-
ceptual realist share. Both assume that the nature of our concepts reflect the nature of Reality in a metaphysically significant sense. For the conceptual idealist there is a necessary correspondence between concept and object, for the conceptual realist there is a contingent correspondence. But for both what is at stake is the true nature of Reality. And this is what makes our intuitions about qualia seem so inviolable. To deny qualia seems to deny some-
thing really there. But to talk of something that has no conceptual shape seems to depart from any coherent conception of reality.

The quietist can release this tension by questioning the concept of reality that is supposed to be at stake. Not that we want to question the ultimate reality of anything. But we can qu-
estion whether the kind of philosophical considerations in ques-
tion can provide us with any special insight into reality. The diffi-
culty disappears if we reassess both intuitions with more mode-
rate expectations of what they can show us.

The common assumption shared by conceptual idealism and conceptual realism is that there is some fundamental des-
cription of reality that somehow underlies or explains our ordinary conception of reality. There is a way things ‘really are’ in the sense of an ontologically more fundamental level. In questioning this assumption, the quietist is not being antirealist: he is not in the business of denying the reality of anything. But quietism de-
nies that we can identify some way of conceptualising the world that is fundamental in the sense of having some language inde-
pendent justification. Ultimately, all conceptual schemes stand without justification. In order to justify anything, we must already assume some conceptual scheme, for a justification must have conceptual form.

With the conceptual idealist the quietist agrees that we must respect the bounds of sense, and not try to point helplessly beyond them. Talk of qualia is nonsense. If there is some cohe-
rent entity that we can refer to at all, we can articulate it. There must be a grammar for the use of the term that refers to it\textsuperscript{24}.
But the quietist also has some points of agreement with the conceptual realist. While we cannot talk about entities that we do not have coherent concepts for (or even point to them – pointing, too, requires a concept), this does not mean that we have the only conceptual scheme available. Our concepts are limited by our interests and abilities. A creature with other interests and abilities would have different concepts, and perhaps they would not be accessible to us. If a lion could speak, we would not understand him. The difficulty is to prevent ourselves from taking this thought too far and to imagine that we can make sense (even partly) of some particular concept beyond our grasp, or some particular entity that we cannot fully conceptualise. And we cannot point to the reality beyond our interests and abilities. We can only talk about what we can talk about, and anything else cannot form part of our explanations or theories.

The conceptual idealist tells us that we have reached the limits of language. But what does that mean? The temptation is to believe that in seeing the limits, we have made some deep philosophical ‘discovery’. As if by excluding qualia from the world, we have seen the limits of the world, and thus learnt something of its true nature. But all we have done is found the point at which language breaks down. We have merely uncovered the fact that the term ‘qualia’ cannot have the use we imagined it to have: that we had a misconceived picture of its use in mind. Consequently, the concept of qualia cannot play the role in our explanations that we may have hoped it could. But we have not denied anything: the concept was not coherent enough to pick out anything to deny. To put the point in Wittgensteinian terms, we have merely rejected the grammar that tries to force itself upon us.

In excluding the term ‘qualia’ from sensible talk, we feel as if we had come up against a boundary on Reality itself, and thus discovered something of its essence. But reality has no boundaries. It is not a land of possibilities surrounded by impossibilities. It is simply a mistake to apply the concept of a limit to the world, as if there were some things that fell within the concept, and some things that were excluded. Reality is not an object. And examining the limits of language tells us nothing about the world. We can only ask, does this expression have real application, or is it useless? And if it is useless, this should merely return us to that which we can talk about.
Is there something that we cannot talk about? The matter is best put this way: something that we cannot talk about is as good as a nothing to us. And we can draw no conclusions from that which we cannot articulate. Something that has no conceptual form cannot enter into rational relations.

Now, how does all this relate to the debate about qualia? Recall that the problem arises from conflicting intuitions. The suggestion is that we treat those intuitions with a little more temperance. We have the feeling when contemplating our experience that there is something more than can be expressed. We even feel as if we can point to it inwardly. But the pointing will be meaningless unless we have some concept in mind, and then we have failed to point at something ineffable. The result is that we cannot talk about that which is beyond language – we cannot even assert or deny its existence. (We are reduced to the inarticulate groan). We are trying to grasp at that which is beyond grasping. So it should not surprise us that we are not satisfied. By the very nature of the task, we cannot succeed. And this fact releases us from the problem without denying anything – we have found nothing to deny. We return to where we started, confined within language, but the tension between the different intuitions has lost its power. For though we must admit that we can only speak and think about that which has conceptual form, in doing so we do not deny anything else.

Of course, we are left with a different kind of tension: the dissatisfaction that something requires more explanation. After all, this desire for explanation is often what motivates us to philosophize in the first place. But I think that once one has seen that a problem has no resolution (and we may need to remind ourselves of this fact) we will find the response that ‘nothing more can be said here’ more satisfying. It does not solve the problem, but brings it to rest.

How far it brings the problem to rest depends on how much philosophical humility one is willing to accept. The extent of the humility required by Wittgenstein can be illustrated by comparing this approach to the view that what we have come up against here is a question that we may simply not be smart enough to answer. But Wittgenstein’s aim is to show that it is not merely a failure of intelligence or imagination: when we examine the way language works, we are supposed to come to the
realisation that there was not even a coherent question to ask in the first place\textsuperscript{28}.

This, of course, is the method that Wittgenstein used against the philosophical problems of meaning in the\textit{Investigations}. Recall Wittgenstein’s treatment of meaning scepticism in the\textit{Investigations}. Once we raise certain philosophical worries about the concept of meaning, we become entangled in irresolvable problems and disputes. The problems can only be dealt with when we question the assumptions that bring them about in the first place. Wittgenstein’s answer to meaning scepticism is that we are looking for justification where there can be none. The nature of quietism is this: that our explanations must come to an end. There is no justification of our conceptual scheme, for to provide one we would have to point to some facts outside our conceptual scheme. But this we cannot do. Explanations must proceed within our conceptual resources.

3. Silence and the subject

The quietist point about the postulation of ineffable qualia was that it is as pointless as it is nonsensical. But so is the denial of qualia. Let us return to the problems of the subject discussed at the beginning of this chapter, and see if the same considerations cannot bear similar fruit.

First, considerations from imagination brought us both to the conclusion that there is an idea of a subject presupposed by the idea of a world, and that I am that subject. This is problematic since the idea of a subject that is presupposed cannot be part of the world, but I most certainly am. At least, if I am not, I do not know what I am.

Recall the predicament of transcendental solipsism. The transcendental subject is the idea that is presupposed by the idea of content. The idea of language or conceptual scheme always seems to be a language or conceptual scheme for a subject. Correspondingly, the ideas of content and the world presuppose the subject. But what is this subject? It remains inherently mysterious. It is presupposed by the conceptual scheme, but not included within it. It is the very possibility of language and the world. And this makes it strangely ineffable. Not within language, but implied by it.

Like the debate about qualia, this issue can be seen as an instance of the debate between conceptual idealism and con-
ceptual realism. The conceptual idealist, finding that nothing corresponds to the idea of a subject, is quick to exclude it from his ontology. But the conceptual realist objects that to do so is to deny the thing that Descartes found to be so indubitable: the thinking subject. Just because we find ourselves as subjects beyond our own full comprehension, there is no need to deny our own existence!

If we are to re-apply the same method as we did for qualia, we need to first identify some underlying assumption that was misconceived. While Wittgenstein derived his solipsism from considerations of language, we came to it from considerations of imaginability. We dissolved the problems of qualia by questioning our assumptions about the connection between language and the nature of reality. So perhaps we can apply the same scrutiny to the connection between imagination and the nature of reality implied in our reasoning to solipsism and the ineffability of the self. We assumed that if something is inconceivable, it is impossible. And by ‘impossible’ we meant that it is against the essence of the world itself. But we should have been more cautious. Perhaps it is better to say that if something is inconceivable in a particular conceptual scheme, it does not correspond to a concept in that conceptual scheme. And if it is not part of any conceptual scheme we can use then it is not a valid concept for us at all. But what we find imaginable depends, like our conceptual scheme, on our interests and abilities. Quietism holds that our conceptual scheme – and what we find to be imaginable – is not justified by the true nature of reality (would such a justification be imaginable?). Such a justification would not be available to us. And if this is so, we should not draw conclusions about the underlying nature of reality from what we find to be imaginable. Imagination does show us something: it shows us the limits of our conceptual scheme. And the fact that such considerations end up in contradictions and nonsense when we bring them to bear on the subject shows that our natural inclinations take us beyond sensible explanation.

When we imagine or observe anything, we do so from a certain point of view that is in some sense subjective. But giving scientific or philosophical explanations requires an objectivity that the imaginative or conscious act lacks. We must, therefore (to borrow an idea from Williams), subtract ourselves from that which is imagined or observed. And that means abstracting from how it feels or seems to some more objective model of the events and
objects involved. It should not surprise us, then, that this process fails to for the notion of subjectivity itself – for that is precisely what we must subtract in order to come to an objective understanding.

In stating this, I have made use of some concepts that hold a perfectly ordinary position within our conceptual scheme: the ‘subject of experience’, for instance, is a perfectly ordinary concept we use when providing explanations or describing how the world is. But we also see that this can be used as a limiting concept on the notion of objectivity, and this is where the temptation to nonsense becomes almost irresistible, for it is as if we get a glimpse of the reality beyond our limited view of things: the metaphysical subject as a limit of our conceptual scheme. For insofar as the subject falls within our conceptual scheme, we can articulate the concept further, and beyond that there is nothing more that can be said.

Note that this does not mean that we say that the metaphysical subject is something beyond explanation. Putting the matter that way pretends to talk about that which cannot be spoken of. It points beyond language to that which we cannot point at. Rather we should say that this ‘concept’, though natural enough, is ultimately incoherent. (And we may quiet our feelings of unease, and bring our thoughts back into sensible discourse, if we examine the way we actually use language in a Wittgensteinian spirit – how is the word ‘I’ actually used? In what contexts, and to achieve what ends? Such an investigation would reveal the limits of the concept of the subject.)

Again we strike the balance. On the one hand we do not speak of the subject as ‘something beyond explanation’. That philosophical line of reasoning is based on the misconception that there is a true conception of reality that underlies and justifies our conceptual scheme. We cannot point outside of our conceptual scheme at some particular (the subject) and say ‘that cannot be conceptualised’. But neither do we deny anything. We do not deny our intuitions about the subject, but confess that they are not well enough conceived to assert or deny. Any rendering of the feeling of solipsism – that I have a unique relation to the world – is bound to fail the intuition that inspires it. An intuition is just a feeling. As a feeling per se that we can talk about at all, it must, of course, have conceptual form. But that does not mean that there lies behind it some coherent insight into the nature of reality.
When we are doing philosophy, we must always return to that which we can talk about. And we remind ourselves that our explanations and justification must come to an end. Beyond those explanations, we deny nothing and assert nothing. Beyond language, there is only silence.

REFERENCES

2. Ibid.
5. ‘The rules of grammar cannot be justified by showing that their application makes a representation agree with reality. For this justification would itself have to describe what is represented. And if something can be said in the justification and is permitted by its grammar – why shouldn’t it also be permitted by the grammar that I am trying to justify? Why shouldn’t both forms of expression have the same freedom? And how could what the one says restrict what the other can say?’ Philosophical Grammar, pp. 184–185. (See also Zettel, §320).
8. His views on what it is to imagine something can be summed up with the following General Hypothesis he puts forward: (H) to imagine something is always at least to imagine, from the inside, being in some conscious state. See Christopher Peacocke, “Imagination, Experience, and Possibility: A Berkeleian View Defended” , in Essays on Berkeley, ed. J. Foster and Robinson, H., Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1995.
10. This simplifies Kant’s view somewhat. He claimed in his ‘Critique of the First Paralogism of Pure Psychology’ that we must necessarily regard ourselves as substance, but concludes that we should ‘recognise that this concept signifies a substance only in idea, not in reality.’ [A 351]
11. One might argue (as Schopenhauer does) that this ‘I’ is identical with the thing-in-itself, but this leaves the subject as something inherently mysterious, beyond our ability to make judgements or say anything about it.
12. Unless, of course, one tries to use this argument to show that the substance of my ego is not contingent – which is precisely the solipsist’s point. I assume for this argument that such a crude form of solipsism is not a tempting alternative.

14. Ibid.


16. Of course it is open to the anti-physicalist to argue that qualia admit of public descriptions that resist physical or functional reduction, but I don’t think anyone does this.

17. E.g. Shoemaker argues that qualia exist, in that inverted spectrums are a logical possibility, but that they are nevertheless compatible with functionalism. See ‘Functionalism and Qualia’, *Philosophical Studies*, 1975.


20. Though Davidson is. See his dismissal of sense data in “On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme”, in *Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986. Of course, Davidson would not have described himself as an ‘idealist’, but the views he expresses in that paper fit the doctrine I am calling conceptual idealism. The short form of his argument is this: ‘nothing, it may be said, could count as evidence that some form of activity could not be interpreted in our language that was not at the same time evidence that that form of activity was not speech behaviour’ (p.185). He therefore rejects conceptual relativism, and the idea of a limit on our ‘conceptual scheme’.

21. If one assumes that physics can provide a theory of everything, one thereby commits oneself to the idea that everything can be described and brought under the concepts of physics. Whether one is committed to the idea that there can be interesting metaphysical explanations (and thus conceptual idealism) depends on what status one grants to physical explanations. (But assuming completeness is already a metaphysical commitment.)

22. A term derived from Dennett’s invention of the verb ‘to quine’, which means to reject some idea on the basis that it is too confused to salvage from it a philosophically respectable concept.


24. It is not enough to point out the grammar of the word ‘qualia’ as it is used in philosophy papers and seminars, of course. The question is whether this picks anything out. The proponent of qualia would do better to demonstrate the grammar of a particular quale-referring term, but if he wants to maintain ineffability or privacy, it seems that is precisely what he cannot do.

26. So is there *nothing* that we cannot talk about? The question could be taken to be a question about the use of the word ‘nothing’ and its relation to the concept of (our) language. Whatever the word ‘nothing’ means, it is also a part of our language. We can understand its meaning better by examining the way it is used – in what circumstances it is used. (‘There is nothing in this box’, ‘Nothing can be done here’) I think once we gain a better understanding of this word, we will feel less confident of using it to make grandiose philosophical pronouncements. We return each time to ordinary language.


28. Although personally I am tempted to concede this much to the realist: when one considers one’s conscious experience, and fails to articulate its nature, one can’t help feeling that one has come up against a very real limitation of our understanding, rather than simply the temptation to utter nonsense.

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ABSTRACT. This paper discusses cases of engineered knowledge. These involve a devious speaker making use of a hearer’s prejudiced ways of thinking in order to transmit knowledge to them. Such hearers acquire testimonial knowledge but their thoughts are not justified. Knowledge does not therefore entail justification: one can know that \( p \) without having a justified belief that \( p \). The traditional tripartite analysis of knowledge should therefore be rejected, as should the ‘knowledge first’ epistemologies of Timothy Williamson (2000) and Alexander Bird (2007). All of these accounts either assume or argue that knowledge entails justification — it does not.

In this paper I argue both that the traditional analysis of knowledge should be rejected and that the ‘knowledge first’ epistemologies of Timothy Williamson (2000) and Alexander Bird (2007) are flawed. All of these accounts either assume or argue that knowledge entails justification — it does not: one can know that \( p \) without having a justified belief that \( p \).

1. The Knowledge Entails Justification Claim

According to the traditional analysis, knowledge is justified true belief. The most discussed problem for such an analysis concerns Gettier’s examples of alleged justified true beliefs that do not amount to knowledge. His 1963 paper is a good candidate for being the research paper with the highest interest index; this is calculated by dividing the number of words written about a paper by the number of words in the original. Gettier’s short paper has not only elicited hundreds of lengthy replies but it also to some extent dominated epistemological debate in the late twentieth century. Many of the responses to Gettier involve the construction of more and more elaborate analyses of knowledge that can stand up to ever evolving and ingenious counterexamples. This whole industry has been coined “Gettierology” and there is now, I think, almost a sense of embarrassment that so much
effort was put into the construction of such complex yet unsuccessful analyses, and the project is not looked on too seriously in some quarters. It is generally conceded that a successful analysis has not been found and, to put it more pessimistically, that the type of philosophical research produced in reaction to Gettier is “degenerate”. I, however, do not focus as Gettier did on whether justification, truth, and belief are together sufficient for knowledge, but on the question of whether justification is necessary for knowledge. I claim that it is not and in claiming this I am at odds, not only with the traditional analysis but also, with the post-Gettier epistemologies of Bird and Williamson.

Their work should be seen as post-Gettier because they are not involved in trying to formulate a richer notion of justification, one that the thinkers in Gettier cases do not attain, or a further epistemic factor X to supplement the traditional analysis in order that JTB + X = K in all cases. They are not involved in such enterprises because they claim that knowledge is not analysable in terms of belief. In response to Gettierology’s lack of success Williamson has advocated rejecting analysis. He argues instead that belief and justification can be explained in terms of knowledge, thus reversing the traditional order of explanation. To believe that \( p \) is to treat \( p \) as something that you know, and to have a justified belief is to have a belief that is supported by evidence, with evidence consisting in knowledge (K=E).

Alexander Bird also has an account in which knowledge is “prime”, i.e. his account of justification relies on the more fundamental epistemic property of knowledge.

If in world \( w_1 \) S has mental states M and then forms a judgment, that judgment is justified if and only if there is some world \( w_2 \) where, with the same mental states M, S forms a corresponding judgment and that judgment yields knowledge. (Bird, 2007, 2)

Bird talks here of justified judging but his account also applies to belief since a thinker is justified in believing that \( p \) if she is justified in judging that \( p \). He asks us to consider cases in which we would like to say that a thinker has justification even though she does not have knowledge. What is the explanation for this? Her thoughts are not the problem — they are justified — it is rather that extraneous factors out in the world have not been kind. Her beliefs may not be true, or her justified true beliefs may be Gettiered. Her thinking, though, is commendable; “justification” is a term that confers approbation on a thinker’s cognitive proce-
dures and this is deserved because there is a nearby possible world in which someone with such thoughts would have knowledge. This would be a world where her beliefs are true and where the circumstances do not constitute a Gettier case.

Bird’s account is externalist since a thinker does not have to be capable of reflecting on why her beliefs are justified — on, that is, the existence of knowledge in nearby worlds. His account of justification also depends on a Williamson-inspired externalist account of knowledge. Knowledge, for them both, is a mental state and the content of mental states is in part constituted by the external world. However, Bird also stresses an important internalist aspect of his account, and that is the claim that justification supervenes on the mental: a thinker’s belief is justified if he has the same mental history as a thinker in a nearby world who has justification for that same belief. Justification is seen to depend on our internal mental life because thinkers with the same mental history have the same level of justification for their thoughts. An externalist account that is in accord with this internalist claim is attractive since the advantages of externalism are combined with some of the undoubtedly intuitive aspects of internalism.

It is important to note that all three approaches agree that knowledge entails justification. The traditional analysis claims that justified true belief is necessary and sufficient for knowledge, and the necessity claim underlies the suggested entailment. Williamson rejects any such analysis but seems to accept that if one knows that \( p \), then one always believes that \( p \). One also always has knowledge-based evidence for such belief and thus justification. This same entailment also falls out of Bird’s account. Someone who knows that \( p \) also has justification because there is always a very nearby world in which someone with the same mental history has knowledge: this one — the actual world. “[S]ince a justified judgment [or belief] is one that could have been knowledge; a judgment that actually is knowledge is a fortiori justified.” (Bird, 2007, 24)

In this paper, though, I show that there are cases of knowledge in which a thinker’s beliefs are not justified. Knowledge does not entail justification and thus all three approaches are mistaken. My main example is taken from Shakespeare’s play, Othello.
2. Desdemona’s Handkerchief

Iago, the villain of the piece, seeks revenge on a rival employee, Cassio. In order to achieve this he tricks Othello, Cassio’s master, into thinking that Cassio is having an affair with Othello’s wife, Desdemona. His plan involves the use of a very important handkerchief, Othello’s first gift to his wife, and the drama of the play revolves around this love-token. Iago uses the handkerchief to fire Othello’s jealousy of Cassio; Othello’s crippling and ultimately tragic jealousy being the main theme of the play. Emilia (Iago’s wife and Desdemona’s maid) finds the handkerchief after Desdemona unwittingly drops it and passes it on to Iago. He now has the ammunition he needs. He lies to Othello that Desdemona and Cassio are lovers, and that:

… such a handkerchief —
I am sure it was your wife’s — did I today
See Cassio wipe his beard with. (Act 3, Scene 3)

This may not be true but Othello nevertheless comes to believe (and to know) that Desdemona is no longer in possession of his gift. This true belief is not acquired by accident. Iago intends his speech act — albeit a lie — to convey to Othello the knowledge that Desdemona does not have the handkerchief. He is successful in this and thus Othello now knows that Desdemona’s handkerchief is missing. This is a key claim with respect to my argument. Iago lies, uttering a proposition with the content that Cassio has wiped his beard with a handkerchief that looks like Desdemona’s, and, on hearing this, Othello comes to believe and to know the proposition that Desdemona’s handkerchief is not in her possession. Iago may ultimately be trying to make Othello acquire the false belief that his wife is unfaithful but, for this to be possible, Othello must first come to have the true belief that Desdemona does not have the handkerchief.

Later in the play Iago turns the screw once more. He plants the handkerchief in Cassio’s room where Cassio finds it and takes a liking to it. Iago’s lies concerning the fictitious affair between Cassio and Desdemona now lead Othello to truly believe that Cassio is in possession of Desdemona’s handkerchief. And, as before, we should see this as a case of knowledge. Othello does not come to believe the proposition that Cassio has Desdemona’s handkerchief by accident; it is, rather, Iago’s intention that
this is believed and through his nefarious activities and devious testimony he is able to transmit this knowledge to Othello.

There are two key features of these examples. First, there is some kind of cognitive failure on the part of the knower. Othello’s thinking is not justified because his jealousy borders on the pathological. Almost anything would suggest to Othello that Desdemona is unfaithful.

…Trifles light as air
Are to the jealous confirmations strong
As proofs of holy writ. (Act 3, Scene 3)

Such thinking is not epistemically commendable and therefore not justified. It could perhaps be claimed, though, that even though Othello’s thoughts are driven by jealousy, he is justified in thinking that the handkerchief is missing given that this can be inferred from the testimony of his usually reliable ensign. This suggestion is not however persuasive when considering a variation on Shakespeare’s scenario. Iago could have said that he had seen Cassio wiping his beard with a fancy handkerchief and, given Othello’s jealousy, such a trifle would still be taken to indicate that Desdemona does not have hers. This latter claim is not derivable via sound deductive, inductive or abductive reasoning from that concerning the fancy handkerchief since there are lots of fancy handkerchiefs in Cyprus.

Second, even though such jealousy constitutes a cognitive failing, knowledge is still acquired in these cases. This may require a little more explanation. Firstly it is important that Othello’s belief is not inferential: he does not reason from the premise that Cassio possesses his wife’s handkerchief. This would be a false belief and reasoning grounded in such belief cannot lead to knowledge. This is because Othello’s true conclusion about the whereabouts of Desdemona’s handkerchief would be lucky given that it is derived from such a false premise, and lucky true beliefs cannot amount to knowledge. Othello does not reason that her handkerchief is missing; rather, given his intense jealousy, he just hears Iago’s ‘trifle’ in this way. Thus the forcing hand of Iago is crucial to the claim that knowledge is acquired. Iago has knowledge to transmit and he intends his speech act to enable this to occur. Othello’s true beliefs are not therefore acquired by accident; Iago believes that Othello’s jealousy will be fired by his report and
thus his awareness of Othello’s mind allows him to transmit this knowledge concerning the handkerchief to his master.

There are similarities here to certain familiar cases where lies or falsehoods are used to pass on knowledge to an audience. Science in schools, for example, is taught with examples that do not reflect the facts — atoms are not like miniature solar systems — yet students come to acquire related scientific knowledge by way of such examples (knowledge, say, of the bonding properties of atoms). Knowledge is acquired here, not mere true belief, since the teacher possesses this knowledge and she intends her speech act to transmit this knowledge to her students. There is, though, an important difference between this case and the scenario from Othello. Whatever one’s favoured account of justification, it is very plausible that the science student is doing nothing epistemically wrong in accepting what her teacher says; her thoughts concerning atoms are therefore justified. My argument here requires that there is some kind of cognitive shortcoming on the part of the subject, one which entails that his thoughts are not justified, and in the cases discussed this is manifest in pathological jealousy and sexism.

I am not claiming that knowledge is acquired in all cases where a hearer acquires a true belief and where it is the speaker’s intention for the hearer to acquire that belief. Gettier-type cases could be constructed where these conditions are satisfied but where knowledge is not acquired. In any such cases, though, the hearer will come to acquire knowledge via a lucky, unintended, deviant causal chain of testimony; in lago’s case, though, the testimonial link between him and Othello operates how Iago intends it to.

It should therefore be accepted that Othello acquires knowledge even though his thoughts concerning the handkerchief are not justified. There is a recipe for concocting such counterexamples to the claim that knowledge entails justification. We need a thinker with a certain kind of cognitive failing and a suitably motivated and devious speaker. I shall describe such cases as involving “engineered knowledge”. Here’s another example. Jill knows that Jack is sexist and she wants him to know that her driving instructor is terrible. The instructor is male but Jack would never believe that a man could be a bad teacher or a bad driver. Thus in describing her lessons Jill says that “she [the teacher] doesn’t seem to know what she’s doing”; Jill knows what Jack is
likely to accept as true. This has the desired effect: Jack comes to believe and to know that Jill’s instructor is poor. He does not arrive at this belief via inference; given his sexism he just *hears* that this is so. His belief is true and, given Jill’s intention, it is not acquired by accident; it therefore amounts to knowledge. It is not however justified given that Jack’s thinking is driven by ungrounded prejudice.

3. The Impact of Engineered Knowledge on the Justification Entailment Claim

(i) The Traditional Analysis

Cases of engineered knowledge entail that the traditional analysis must be rejected since justification is not necessary for such knowledge. This is also argued by Sartwell (1991) and Goldman (2002). Sartwell, however, claims that knowledge can be analysed as mere true belief and therefore that true belief *always* amounts to knowledge. This is not my claim, and there are various counterexamples to Sartwell’s analysis, those in which a thinker’s beliefs are true by accident. Sartwell has a response to some of these counterexamples. He would agree that I do not know that Italy will win the FIFA World Cup even if, knowing nothing about football, I arbitrarily decide to bet on them doing so (and they win). I do not have knowledge, though, not because I do not have justification, but because I do not even *believe* they will win. I may have placed money on this happening but this action is just based on a guess, and guesses do not possess the commitment necessary for belief. There are, however, various other counter-examples that do not involve guessing. I may believe that they will win because I am a committed numerologist and the dates of their fixtures spell out W-I-N-N-E-R in code. I therefore have a true belief, one to which I am strongly committed, but one that does not amount to knowledge.

As opposed to Sartwell my claim is only that there are certain scenarios in which justification is not required for knowledge, those in which chance is ruled out by the devious intentions of the speaker. This, however, must be put a little more carefully since, as Pritchard (2006) argues, some chance is compatible with knowledge. Iago does not rule out all luck or chance from the discussed scenario: in some sense it is lucky (for Iago) that Desdemona dropped the handkerchief enabling him to be able to use it for his devious purposes. This is what Pritchard calls content epistemic luck since it
is lucky that the relevant proposition is true. It is also lucky that Othello is so jealous and therefore that he is apt to be manipulated in this way by Iago. This would perhaps fall under Pritchard’s notion of doxastic epistemic luck that covers cases in which it is lucky that a thinker believes a certain proposition; Othello would not have done so if he was not so jealous. Veritic epistemic luck, however, is incompatible with knowledge; this is the kind of luck that is sometimes involved in correctly aligning a thinker’s beliefs with the world even though the thinker herself should not be seen as responsible for her true beliefs. Gettier cases exploit this kind of luck and this is one of the two varieties of luck that underlies the epistemological mantra that luck is anathema to knowledge. It is veritic luck that Iago successfully removes from the scenario discussed. Given the way that Othello thinks, the fact that the handkerchief is missing, and Iago’s comments, it is not lucky that Othello comes to have the relevant true belief.

Goldman argues that to know that \( p \) is simply to possess the information that \( p \), where having this information only entails having true belief. One way in which his account differs from that of Sartwell is that he also thinks that there is a stronger sense of “knowledge” that does entail justification (and true belief, and a de-Gettierizer). Again, though, there is a raft of counterexamples to the claim that the possession of information amounts to knowledge (even taken in a weak sense). Such possession can be veritically lucky. As said, though, Othello’s possession of the correct information concerning the handkerchief is not lucky and this is because of Iago’s hand in its transmission. And, as argued above, this entails that the traditional analysis of knowledge should be rejected because in order to have knowledge the speaker need not have justification for his beliefs.

(ii) Bird’s ‘Justified Judging’ Account of Knowledge

My examples also have an impact on the knowledge first epistemologies that I have sketched. On Bird’s account, if someone in a nearby possible world with the same mental history as me can come to have knowledge that \( p \), then my belief that \( p \) is justified. Justification is determined by the mental states of a thinker and by whether such mental states could lead to knowledge if the world were kinder, and whether I have knowledge is partly determined by extraneous factors out in the world. In the scenario at which we have looked, Othello’s having knowledge is
partly determined by the world: by the handkerchief having been lost and by Iago’s intervention. The mental aspects of this case, however — those that are supposed to be maintaining the internalist aspect of justification — do not play the epistemic role that Bird suggests. It is, in fact, the mental history of Othello that rules out ascribing epistemic justification to his thoughts. According to Bird, cognitive failures on the part of the thinker may lead to his thoughts not being justified, and if the world is not kind then he may not have knowledge. My cases are interesting in that they involve failure on the part of the thinker, but it is precisely this failure — and the speaker’s knowledge of this failing — that leads to knowledge.

Bird discusses thinkers who have faulty inference procedures and those who suffer from mental illness. He is right to say that such thinkers do not have justified beliefs and this is because “the proper function of the concept of justification, [is] to provide a certain kind of positive evaluation. The praiseworthiness of an action or belief is related to the praiseworthiness of the agent or subject.” (Bird, 2007, 27) Saying that a belief is justified is a way of saying something epistemically positive about a thinker who has that belief even if knowledge eludes them. This positive assessment can be given because there is someone in a nearby possible world with the same mental history who does achieve knowledge. This is not so in the case of those with mental illness; their thinking cannot therefore be praised. Such thinkers may nevertheless be blameless for their shortcomings because they are not capable of properly ordering their thoughts and “[e]pistemic culpability extends only as far as one’s control over one’s mental life.” (Ibid. 27) It can be debated whether Othello’s jealousy is pathological enough to be out of his control and whether he is therefore to blame for his jealousy-driven conclusions. Either way the claim is still that Othello’s thoughts are not justified, both on my account and consonant with Bird’s emphasis on the link between justification and the praiseworthiness of belief. I have argued, however, that this is inconsistent with the claim that knowledge entails justification.

One response that Bird could make would be to argue that Othello’s beliefs are justified. Bird, like Williamson, is an externalist with respect to knowledge and justification — although, as we have seen, he also aims to abide by the internalist intuition that justification supervenes on the mental — and his externalism
could perhaps be used to show how Othello’s thinking is justified and how the entailment claim can therefore be maintained. According to Bird’s account justification is conferred on Othello’s belief because, through Iago’s intervention, this belief amounts to knowledge (to knowledge, that is, in a very nearby world — Othello’s own). And to avoid the unintuitive consequence that pathologically jealous thinking is justified, it could be claimed that Othello’s belief is justified not by his reasoning alone, but by the overall process engineered by Iago. It is this process that results in knowledge and this process that therefore provides the justification for Othello’s thoughts.

There are, though, two problems with this suggested line. First, in such cases the concept of justification is now divorced from considerations concerning the praiseworthiness of the subject. Bird claims that “[t]he proper function of the concept of justification [is] to provide a certain kind of positive evaluation”, and perhaps there is a sense in which the cognitive process overseen by Iago is to be epistemically commended because it results in knowledge (even though it is ethically suspect). However, Bird continues: “[t]he praiseworthiness of an action or belief is related to the praiseworthiness of the agent or subject”, and “[p]raise is used to reinforce their dispositions and ways of doing things.” (ibid. 27) This is not so with respect to the case in hand. Even if the overall process is epistemically commendable, the thoughts of the subject Othello are not, and his dispositions and ways of doing things should not be reinforced. Tension arises here because integral to Bird’s account is the claim that justified beliefs only fall short of knowledge because of the unhelpfulness of extraneous factors in the world; the justifiedness of such beliefs can still however be praised because this is due to the internal mental history of a thinker, a mental history that is the same as that of a subject who does have knowledge in a nearby world. As said, though, in cases of engineered knowledge it is this internal component that intuitively rules out justification even though it can be used by a devious manipulator to lead to knowledge. Othello’s jealousy is instrumental in him coming to have knowledge but it is not in itself praiseworthy; and my focus here is on epistemic praiseworthiness (his thinking may also of course not be morally praiseworthy). On Bird’s account, therefore, Othello’s belief cannot be seen as justified since it is his thinking that is relevant to
the concept of justification and not the overall scenario engineered by Iago.

A second problem can be illustrated by turning to a reliabilist version of Bird’s account. (Note that Bird claims that his account is compatible with various epistemologies including reliabilism even though it is primarily intended to supplement Williamson’s theory of knowledge.) Reliabilists argue that knowledge amounts to the possession of beliefs that are produced by reliable psychological processes, and reliability is cashed out in terms of processes having a high probability of producing beliefs that are true, or in terms of processes that produce beliefs that are safe, or sensitive. A belief is safe if the thinker would not have held this belief had it not been true; and a belief is sensitive if, had it been false, then the thinker would not have held that belief in most nearby worlds. A reliabilist could therefore claim that Iago initiates a cognitive process in Othello’s mind that reliably leads to true, safe or sensitive beliefs in the kinds of circumstances in which Iago is seen to engineer knowledge. The manipulation of jealous reasoning can be a reliable route to true belief and it is this process that underlies both Othello’s knowledge and the justification of his beliefs.

Such a reliabilist account, though, cannot be seen to provide justification for the thoughts of Othello, or for those of sexist Jack in the driving lesson scenario of section 2. Iago does make use of a certain psychological process in Othello’s mind and in the case described this leads to Othello having a true belief. It is, however, the kind of process that takes as input linguistic or perceptual representations of Desdemona and gives as output beliefs about her infidelity. Similarly Jill makes use of a psychological process in Jack that takes as input representations of women and gives as output beliefs concerning their inferiority. Such psychological processes, though, are not reliable: the kinds of processes made use of in both the *Othello* and driving lesson scenarios do not tend to produce beliefs that are true, safe or sensitive unless there is an Iago or a Jill to engineer the situation. Reliabilists cannot therefore account for the justified beliefs held by thinkers who possess engineered knowledge. The psychological processes of such thinkers are not to be praised — as they must be if their thinking is justified — and one way of seeing why this is so is by noting that such thinking is not reliable.
The source of the problem here for reliabilists is that testimonial knowledge is social: it involves both a giver and a receiver, and an epistemology that only focuses on the cognitive mechanisms of one of these thinkers may not be able to account for the sometimes significant epistemic role of the other protagonist. Reliabilism focuses on the psychological processes of the receiver — in the case of spoken testimony, the hearer — but in cases of engineered knowledge the scheming and thus the psychological processes of the speaker are epistemically crucial. Iago’s knowledge of Othello’s mind and his intention to deceive are necessary for the transmission of knowledge in the discussed scenario. Veritic luck is only ruled out when these are operative. With this social aspect of testimony in mind, perhaps a purer form of externalism could be suggested. The relevant psychological processes do not have to be limited to those that are physically internal to the hearer. There is a wider process here, one that involves the cognitive mechanisms of Othello and Iago, and the interaction of these thinkers with certain kinds of situations in the world. This wider social mechanism could be reliable — it could have the epistemic virtue of leading to true, safe or sensitive belief — and it could therefore be this mechanism that justifies Othello’s belief about the handkerchief.

Goldman (1999, 130n.) suggests two kinds of reliabilist account of testimonial justification, those that are intrapersonal and those that are transpersonal. Intrapersonal accounts are those that only focus on the psychological mechanisms of the hearer. Transpersonal ones, though, involve those of the hearer and the speaker. The examples he offers in support of transpersonal reliabilism are cases in which the hearer’s cognition is reliable yet the speaker’s is not; the speaker may pass on a belief that she acquired via an unreliable psychological process. According to a transpersonal account the resultant hearer’s belief would therefore be unjustified because it is acquired from a speaker whose thinking is not reliable. This form of reliabilism is tempting because it accords with an intuitive account of the transmission of epistemic properties: testimony cannot generate new epistemic properties — it can only pass on whatever the speaker’s thoughts already possess, be that justification, warrant or knowledge.

However, this kind of account is of no help with my examples of engineered knowledge. In these the speaker’s psycho-
logical processes are reliable but the hearer’s are not, and thus the hearer’s beliefs would come out as unjustified. Here, though, we have been looking at a possible response to my argument which claims that the thinkers in question do have justified beliefs and thus that the justification entailment claim can be maintained. Intrapersonal accounts cannot play such a role because thinking that is jealousy-driven or sexist, for example, is not reliable. And we have now seen how transpersonal accounts also fail because the suggested reliability and justifiedness of this type of testimonial exchange is undermined by the unreliability of one of the protagonists, and in the case of engineered knowledge this is the hearer. To maintain the justifying role of the suggested social mechanism, the emphasis must be taken off individual thinkers. The question of whether this process is reliable must not be answered by looking individually at the hearer or the speaker, nor by looking cumulatively at their thinking (i.e. by claiming that both the hearer and the speaker individually have reliable beliefs). What is needed is an account in which justification is based on the reliability of the social interaction between speaker and hearer, and, in cases of engineered knowledge, this interaction can be reliable even if the hearer’s psychological processes are in some way faulty. I shall not, though, pursue such an account here.

3. Williamson’s Knowledge First Epistemology

Lastly let us return to Williamson. He also seems to accept the claim that knowledge entails justification although I shall argue that he is in a better position than both the traditionalist and Bird to account for the discussed scenarios. First, there is no theoretical need for him to make any such entailment claim. Being opposed to the analysis of knowledge he should be happy to accept that knowledge need not always be explanatorily tied to justification or to belief. And in places he is rather equivocal about knowledge entailing belief. Radford (1966) discusses a history quiz in which a person gets all the right answers even though she claims to be guessing. He suggests that such a person knows the answers yet does not believe that they are correct: they know that $p$ without believing that $p$. Interestingly when discussing this case Williamson says “it is not an obvious misuse of language to classify her as knowing that the battle of Agincourt was in 1415 without believing that it was.” (Williamson, 2000, 42) If this can be known without being believed then the question of whether such a
belief is justified does not arise. It is therefore not obvious that knowledge entails justification.

Second, he can be at least agnostic about these entailment claims because they could be dropped without damage to the distinctive features of his epistemology: the claims that knowledge is prime and that K=E. My examples of engineered knowledge, though, should turn any such agnosticism into a straight rejection of the entailment claim that we have been looking at here. Bird, himself committed to entailment, argues that Williamson should only claim that “knowledge that \( p \) entails that if the subject believes that \( p \), then that belief is justified” (Bird, 2007, 4n) (given Williamson’s agnosticism with respect to whether knowledge entails belief). My claim is that the justification entailment claim should be given up altogether.

Further, Williamson’s account may have the resources to explain why there is not justification in the cases I have described. According to him a thinker’s beliefs are justified if she has evidence in support of them, but only if such evidence consists in knowledge. However, the evidence for Othello’s belief about the handkerchief is the claim that Cassio has been seen wiping his beard with it. This is false and so therefore cannot constitute knowledge or, on Williamson’s account, justification. Similarly the evidence Jack has for his belief about Jill’s driving instructor does not constitute knowledge. Jack does not have testimonial knowledge that “she doesn’t know what she’s doing” because this is not true; the driving instructor is male and not female. Such testimonial ‘evidence’ cannot then provide justification for Jack’s belief. Williamson’s account is therefore compatible with such cases of non-justified true belief that nevertheless amount to knowledge.

Williamson refreshingly attempts to distance epistemology from the traditional analysis of knowledge and Gettierology; however, he remains committed to epistemological uniformity: all knowledge entails justified true belief, and all cases of justification and belief are explanatorily tied to knowledge. My examples of engineered knowledge show that the former does not hold, and they should point Williamson towards an even more radical rejection of the traditional analysis. Knowledge cannot be analysed in terms of justified true belief, nor do all cases of knowledge involve justification.\[^{11}\]
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1. See Stich (1999, 3): “On the few occasions when I have taught the ‘analysis of knowledge’ literature to undergraduates, it has been painfully clear that most of my students had a hard time taking the project seriously...They could recognise the force of the increasing arcane counterexamples that fill the literature, and they occasionally produced new counterexamples of their own. But they could not, for the life of them, see why anybody would want to do this. It was a source of ill-concealed amazement to these students that grown men and women would indulge in this exercise and think it important — and still greater amazement that others would pay them to do it!” For a recent overview of the debate see Lycan (2006, 148–168) and for a comprehensive survey of the early years of Gettierology see Shope (1983).

2. Traditionally knowledge is seen as a hybrid state consisting of the internal mental state of justified belief and the external truth-condition.

3. Such internalism, however, is not driven by the deontological or epistemic factors that usually define the epistemological internalist position. As said, a thinker is not aware of the existence of his counterparts in nearby worlds and thus of their justificatory role with respect to his beliefs. They do not therefore give him any reason to think his beliefs are true, or confer any responsibility on him to hold them.

4. Such supervenience on the mental would usually be seen to militate against an externalist account of justification. Williamson and Bird, though, are cognitive externalists and so any such supervenience is compatible with externalism since the mental is in part constituted by relations to the external world.

5. I discuss this example elsewhere in relation to the claim that knowledge can be acquired via mendacious testimony (see Author’s Article 2007).

6. Although, even given that Iago is usually reliable, it is not very plausible that this is a justified inference given the pathological nature of Othello’s jealousy and Desdemona’s fidelity.

7. The other is reflective epistemic luck: this applies to cases where it appears to be lucky from the subject’s perspective that certain of her beliefs are true. Internalists focus on this kind of luck; externalists, however, claim that such luck is irrelevant to whether a thinker has knowledge and they focus instead on veritic epistemic luck.


9. For (more sophisticated) safety and sensitivity accounts see Sosa (2000 / 2002) and Nozick (1981, 167–288). We can see that safety and sensitivity are distinct by considering plausible cases of knowledge that involve beliefs that are safe yet not sensitive. See Sosa (1999, 145–6): when I drop my trash bag down the refuge chute I know it will get to the bottom. However, were it to get snagged on a nail on the way down (a highly unlikely occurrence), I would still believe that it had made it to the bottom — my belief
is therefore insensitive. It is, however, safe: in most nearby worlds I only come to believe the bag is at the bottom when it is. Also see Pritchard (2006, 157–161) for a comparison of sensitivity and safety.

10. Cf. Kusch: he has a generative account of testimony in which “[t]estimony is not just a means of transmission of complete items of knowledge from and to an individual. Testimony is almost always generative of knowledge.” (2002, 12) Lackey (1999) also discusses an example in which the hearer acquires knowledge that the speaker does not possess (a pupil who learns the theory of evolution from a teacher who is a creationist).

11. Thanks to Alexander Bird for helpful comments.

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ABSTRACT. Various objections have been raised against the thesis of semantic innateness - the view that all (or most) of our concepts are innate - and the arguments in its favor. Its main contemporary advocate, Jerry Fodor, no longer adheres to this radical view. Yet the issue is still alive. The objections have not been very persuasive, and Fodor's own response to his argument is both controversial and involves a high price. This paper first explicates this view, exposes its radical nature, and presents Fodor's argument in its favor. Some aspects of the view of syntactic innateness are also discussed, mainly in order to highlight some features of semantic innateness. Then new objections against both the view and the argument are presented.

1

Arguments and evidence for the innateness of many features of the human mind have been proposed by philosophers and other researchers ever since Plato's days. Plato has suggested that all of our knowledge is innate; Descartes argues for the innateness of ideas; Leibniz has agreed with this view and added that many of the "principles" that we know - what we would probably call "propositions" - are innate. The innateness issue has received a strong impetus due to the work of Chomsky, who offered several arguments to the effect that what he refers to as "universal grammar" - the body of syntactic rules which, according to him, are shared by all human natural languages - is innate (see, e.g., Chomsky 1965, 1966, 1975, and 1980). Other modern researchers (e.g., Baillargion) have argued that the knowledge of object constancy is innate. An extreme innatist (or "nativist") view was argued for By Fodor, who, in many respects, has been influenced by Chomsky. Fodor, however, was not satisfied with arguing that syntax is innate. Rather, according to him semantics, we may say, is innate as well. That is, most (sometimes he even said "all", but this did not seem to be his considered view, as we shall see) of our concepts are innate. Fodor thus seemed to revive the old rationalist view about the innateness of ideas.
Fodor's "semantic innatism" (as I will call this thesis) has been very controversial. Many philosophers and researchers who strongly believe in the truth of Chomsky’s syntactic innatism view the Fodorian thesis as absurd. And some philosophers (e.g., P.S. Churchland, 1980) take it to be the reductio ad absurdum of Fodor’s representational theory of the mind (though it is far from being clear whether the representational theory indeed entails semantic innatism - see Sterelny 1983). It is one thing to accept that the structure or form of our language (and thought) is innate, and hence predetermined; it is another thing to accept that the material - the building blocks of which our sentences and thoughts are made - is. Pre-theoretically, it seems evident that the concepts I possess (or at least most of them) are learned by me. Indeed, it is plausible that my innate nature constrains the kinds of concepts I am able to acquire, exactly as the innate nature of my dog makes it impossible for him to acquire, say, philosophical concepts. But the path from this claim to the claim that the concepts I do acquire are innate is quite long. The intuitive differences between syntactic innatism and semantic innatism are accompanied by another difference, and a very significant one, namely that the minimal sense in which concepts can seriously be said to be innate is much more demanding. Any interesting non-trivial form of semantic innatism, as we shall see, is very demanding. So semantic innatism, and especially a sweeping semantic innatism such as Fodor’s, is a very radical view. This paper is concerned with this radical view. I will try to explicate this view and Fodor’s argument for it, and criticize both the view and the argument. I will also discuss some aspects of the view of syntactic innatism, mainly in order to highlight some features of semantic innatism. My plan is the following. In section II I will discuss the sense of the claim that concepts are innate. In section III I will examine various claims to the effect that the idea of semantic innatism is absurd. In section IV I will discuss some characteristics of this thesis by comparing it to the thesis of syntactic innatism. In section V I will critically examine Fodor’s argument for semantic innatism.

Various objections have been raised against the thesis of semantic innatism and the arguments in its favor (and I will refer below to some of these objections), and Fodor himself no longer adheres to this radical thesis (see Fodor 1998). Yet the issue is still alive. The objections have not been very persuasive (for criticism of the main objections see, e.g., Laurence and Margolis 2002), Fodor’s own response to his argument is both controversial and involves a
high price, and as Laurence (2006) writes, "the logic of Fodor's argument continues to influence cognitive scientists who reject Fodor's conclusion but struggle to understand how the mind can develop a rich system out of a more impoverished one." For these reasons, the tasks undertaken in this paper seem to be worthy of pursuing.

2

A person's constitution certainly constrains her knowledge and capacities. Expose two people that are different enough in brain constitution to identical stimuli, and they may end up even more different. In particular, some such cases result in differences in knowledge and capacities, and among these are some that result in differences in syntactic and semantic knowledge and capacities. In a pretty uninteresting sense, then, it is evident that some knowledge is innate - in the sense of being constrained by (innate) constitution. This claim is compatible with the claim that learning mechanisms need not be innate, and even that they can be learned. But our constitution constrains of course what learning mechanisms we can come to have, so it constrains (either directly or indirectly) what we can come to know. This reasoning cannot of course lead to discovering what parts of our knowledge are due to our innate constitution, and it is neutral even about whether any learning mechanism is innate. But the assumption that something is learned plausibly (that is, taking for granted that learning requires some mechanism and leaving aside strange hypotheses about the origin of learning mechanisms) leads to the conclusion that at least one learning mechanism is innate (see Block 1980, p. 279).

This sense of "innateness" – being constrained by the person's constitution - is a pretty minimal sense, and it seems that nobody denies that some knowledge is innate in this sense. Even John Locke, the great opponent of the innateness of knowledge, admitted that we have mechanisms of induction and abstraction, which constrain our knowledge. On the other hand, our constitution fails to determine much of our knowledge. Expose two identical people to different stimuli, and they will end up different. In particular, in some of these cases they will end up knowing different things, e.g. different languages. So certainly, some aspects of knowledge are innate and some are not, and the serious controversy over innateness is not a controversy over whether there is innate knowledge, or over whether everything we know is innate; it is rather a controversy
over what is innate. As Garfield says, "The interesting questions then all concern exactly what is innate, to what degree it counts as knowledge, and what is learned, and to what degrees its content and structure are determined by innately specified cognitive structures." (Garfield 1994, p. 367)

But what does it mean to say that some human characteristics are innate, and specifically, what does it mean to say that concepts are innate? As a rough approximation we may say that a feature or aspect of knowledge is innate if it is determined by our genes. This characteristic faces a difficulty, however, since as Block, for example, points out, in an important sense all human characteristics are caused both by genes and by the environment, for with respect to any such characteristic a genetic difference would have produced an individual without this characteristic and the same difference could have been produced by some environmental difference, e.g. in the womb environment (Block 1980, p. 281). All human characteristics, according to this view, are a joint product of our genes and the environment.

But consider syntactic innatism. What is innate according to this view is not our actual mastering of the syntax of a specific language - this is certainly a joint product. What is said to be innate is, rather, the specific body of syntactic rules called "universal grammar". This body of rules is supposed to be the genetic contribution to our mastery of syntax, and we may understand this claim as taking universal grammar to be a specific function from linguistic stimuli to the actual acquired syntax. Such a view is certainly a substantial nativist view in spite of the fact that according to it universal grammar is only an abstraction from actual acquired systems of syntactic rules, for the innate function in question - a function that is supposed to be independent of external stimuli - is also supposed to be realized in the brain. If it is, we may say that it is a human characteristic that is determined exclusively by our genes; it is not a joint product of our genes and the environment. A sense is thus given to the claim that human characteristics may be innate.

But syntax innatists usually mean an additional thing by saying that universal grammar is the relevant genetic contribution. They also mean that the rules of universal grammar are represented in our minds/brains as rules; that in some sense we have propositional knowledge of them (see, e.g., Chomsky 1965, pp. 27 and 58; Chomsky 1980 p. 225). Universal grammar, which is discovered as an abstraction from actual acquired systems of syntactic rules, is
thus endowed with the status of a real concrete psychological feature. Certainly, one can accept that there is universal grammar, and even that it must have an exhaustive genetic explanation,\(^8\) without accepting the claim that it resides - as grammar, as a body of rules - in our minds/brains. Not only the legitimacy of the inference from the former claim to the latter claim is far from evident; so is the assumption that the latter makes sense. But I am not going to dwell on this point, since my main concern is with semantic innatism. Let me now examine the situation with respect to this latter view.

Consider a few possible ways to characterize semantic innatism. The claim that we have a general innate ability or disposition to come to possess some concepts and not others is too weak to be considered a real nativist theory. This claim does not imply the thesis that each and every (primitive) concept is innate. (It is consistent, for example, with the view that it is our "general intelligence" that determines which concepts we can come to possess, a view which is very far from the innatist views about language, according to which the there are "exclusively linguistic" innate characteristics that are responsible for our linguistic capacities.)

Another possible characterization of semantic innatism appeals to the idea of an abstract feature of human semantics - some "universal semantics", parallel to the syntactic universal grammar. But this idea makes no sense. All human concepts cannot reasonably be said to share any abstract non-trivial feature, so neither such universal semantics nor its realization in the brain can be said to be innate.

The claim that the concepts themselves reside in the mind due to our genetic constitution is problematic, for it isn't clear how concepts reside in the mind while not being used. We saw that a thesis of semantic innatism should be stronger than the one that argues for the innateness of general ability or disposition. We may say that such a thesis should be individualistic. But semantic innatists can appeal to the view that specific abilities are innate - one ability for each and every concept. And if they are not satisfied with the notion of innate abilities, they may say that the innate characteristics are those brain characteristics that are responsible for our having the abilities to use the relevant concepts. What is important is that they must commit themselves to a one-to-one correlation between innate brain features of a specific set and innate concepts. This notion of semantic innateness is a minimalist one in that it does not imply anything about the nature of the relevant brain feature. It is
purely extensional. Semantic innatism in this sense is consistent with the fact that environmental stimuli play a role in determining which concepts are actually available to us, for the relevant features are responsible only to the abilities. Such a feature can be said to be activated when the corresponding concept is "triggered" by the environmental stimuli.

I hope that the minimalist notion of semantic innatism I have just suggested is plausible. I will later argue, however, that the thesis of semantic innatism in even this minimal sense is implausible.

3

Fodor's claim is that almost all of our concepts are innate. He allows for complex concepts to be learned, but most of our concepts according to him are not complex (see Fodor 1975 and 1981), hence the vast majority of the concepts we possess are unlearned and hence they are innate. I will discuss Fodor's argument for this strong conclusion later. Now I wish to examine the claim that this conclusion is absurd. There are various versions to this claim, and all of them are intended to suggest that Fodor's conclusion is an empirical absurdity, and not a logical absurdity. In other words, the claim is that this conclusion is highly implausible. Some of those who claim for the absurdity (or high implausibility) of Fodor's innateness thesis attempt to show that the very idea of such a sweeping innateness is absurd; other point out the absurdity of the assumption that some specific concepts are innate. Let's start with complaints of the first, general, kind.

According to Patricia Churchland, Fodor's nativism implies an essentially static view of human knowledge. "[I]t fails utterly to account for, and is apparently inconsistent with, the fact that development in science has given birth to concepts undreamt of in the philosophy of our forbears (Churchland 1980, pp. 160-61). However, by no means should we view this consequence as problematic to Fodor's approach. For he does not (and need not) deny that scientific changes which involve conceptual changes occur. What he denies is that we can learn new concepts. He gives another explanation to what seems to be the learning of new concepts. His nativist theory aims to account for the same facts that are described by Churchland as conceptual learning or conceptual changes - these facts being, more or less, our coming to master the use (or the new use, as the case may be) of some scientific expressions. Roughly, what happens in such cases according to Fodor is that the relevant
"slumberous" mentalese concept is "triggered" into operation by the relevant environmental facts. So the dynamics that is involved in acquiring new concepts, although it is not explained as a dynamics of concept possession (that is, as learning), is not denied but rather explained. I only mention Fodor's explanation in a nutshell, since my aim is not to defend it. Later I will argue that Fodor's model of acquiring concepts fails. But one cannot object to this model by merely asserting that human concept possession is dynamic, since what is at issue here is whether this dynamics cannot but be explained as a dynamics of concept learning.

Fodor can deal in a similar way with the claim of Clark (1994) that his semantic innatism is implausible since it is inconsistent with influential theorizing in developmental psychology. Again, the facts about how infants acquire concepts that developmental psychology reveals are not denied by a nativist like Fodor. He only attempts to give them another explanation (in terms of concept "triggering"), one which also takes into account the undeniable role that being exposed to environmental stimuli play in this process. One may claim that this explanation doesn't work, but one cannot object to Fodor's thesis simply by assuming that the facts in question constitute evidence for conceptual learning in the non-nativist sense. In his reply to Piaget's comments on his "Fixation of Belief and Concept Acquisition" (Fodor 1980), Fodor indeed characterizes his theory in this spirit. He admits that "It is obviously also true that there must be some sense in which our conceptual repertoire is responsive to our experiences... What that implies, it seems to me, is that a theory of the conceptual plasticity of organisms must be a theory of how the environment selects among the innately specified concepts. It is not a theory of how you acquire concepts, but a theory of how the environment determines which parts of the conceptual mechanism in principle available to you are in fact exploited." (p. 151)

The second kind of "absurdity objections" concerns claims to the effect that it is implausible to believe that some specific concepts are innate and not learned. Among these concepts we can find "carburetor", "Bureaucrat", "quantum potential" (Putnam 1988, p. 15), "xylophone" (Sterelny 1990, p. 162), "gene", "neutrino", "video-camera" and "Bachelor" (Devitt and Sterelny 1987). The view that the innateness of the concepts in question is absurd seems to many to be self-evident and is rarely argued for. Why is it absurd? What some of Fodor's critics seem to have in mind is that these concepts were acquired by people (by the human race, we may say) at a late
stage - that nobody possessed them a few hundreds years ago. In this case, this objection shares the logic of the objections concerning scientific conceptual change and developmental psychology, and it could be answered similarly. Another possible rationale for the absurdity suspicion is based on evolutionary considerations. It seems to be implausible that the evolutionary processes have provided us with such concepts. Devitt and Sterelny (1987) point out this suspicion without suggesting an argument. Putnam argues that our concepts depend on our physical and social environment in a way that evolution (which was completed, for our brains, about 30,000 years ago), could not foresee. In order to have endowed us with a stock that includes such concepts, evolution had to anticipate all the contingencies of future physical and cultural environments, and obviously this is impossible. (Putnam 1988, p. 14) Thus presented, this objection seems to depend on Putnam's own theory of meaning, that assigns an important role in the determination of the meaning of our concepts to physical and sociological elements (see Putnam 1975, and Putnam 1988 chapter 2). I do not want to get into the details of Putnam's theory. I think that Putnam's objection can be interpreted also in a way that does not depend on his theory of meaning. According to this alternative interpretation, the future contingencies that evolution cannot plausibly be taken to anticipate are that we will ever need to use such concepts as "carburetor" or "neutrino", for evolution cannot plausibly be taken to anticipate that there will be things like carburetors or that there will be theories that employ concepts like "neutrino". Whether or not this is what Putnam (or any other critic of Fodor's innatism) has in mind, this objection should be addressed. It certainly seems strange that evolution can have such foreknowledge.

But what can this talk of evolutionary foreknowledge mean? Strictly speaking, evolution of course does not anticipate anything - not only the need to use "cultural" concepts like "carburetor" or "neutrino", but also the need to use "natural" concepts like "apple" (or even the need to eat apples). Natural selection functions only "backward", in the sense that it selects characteristics that proved themselves - in the past, of course - as useful from an evolutionary point of view. So the evolutionary-anticipation objection concerning "carburetor" and "neutrino" cannot stand as it (literally) is.

Now evolution may be said to anticipate in the sense that what it selects will prove itself as evolutionary advantageous also in the future. So one who claims that it is implausible for evolution to
anticipate the contingencies that concern the "cultural" concepts in question can perhaps mean that since at the time when the evolution of our brains was completed there was no such past-success of using those concepts, evolution could not foresee the future-success. The nativist might reply that evolution need not foresee this, since of course evolution does not select concepts individually (a possibility that presupposes that for each concept there is a corresponding gene). So the evolution of our possessing modern "cultural" concepts can be explained in spite of their lacking a history of successful use: it can be a by-product of our possessing other concepts (or, for that matter, of any other selected trait). But recall that according to semantic innatism, a specific brain feature corresponds to each and every concept we possess, so what we are asked to accept according to the present suggestion is that each and every such brain feature that gives rise to the possession of any of the huge number of our modern concepts is only a by-product. I take it that this result is highly implausible. It amounts to there being an accidental harmony between, e.g., features of many artifacts to which we apply concepts, on the one hand, and innate features of our brains, on the other hand. (The harmony is accidental since the brain features are by-products.)

Alternatively, we can say that evolution is responsible for our having a general ability to possess concepts, or some such abilities (that is, that there are families of concepts such that the ability to possess the members of each family has an independent evolutionary source). This suggestion sounds much more plausible, yet the problem is that it is not compatible with a serious semantic innatism, as I construe this thesis. For if the innate ability to possess concepts is general (in some degree of generality) and it does not, by itself, distinguish among individual concepts, we cannot say that each and every individual concept is innate. Even empiricists can live with such "innateness". But if the innateness thesis is committed to a one-to-one correlation between the relevant innate brain features and the concepts we possess, it cannot escape the charge of being highly implausible from an evolutionary perspective.

So I think that the claim that modern concepts are innate in a serious sense is indeed a biological absurdity. But further, a similar reasoning applies also to "natural" concepts such as "apple". For the assumption that even these concepts are selected by natural selection individually is implausible, since it implies that the number of successful genetic changes is bigger than the huge num-
number of natural concepts we possess. So again, we may appeal either to a mysterious pre-established harmony, or to the anti-nativist suggestion of general abilities. Either way, the nativist position seems to be in trouble. And note, again, that the absurdity with which I charge semantic innatism applies to it even in its minimalist sense of a one-to-one correlation between the relevant innate brain features and the concepts we possess.

Fodor could have avoided the absurdity pointed out here by claiming that most of our concepts are composed of a limited group of semantically primitive concepts, while only the latter are innate. Yet he does not endorse this option but argues for a very sweeping innatism. The first part of Fodor’s argument aims at showing that truly primitive concepts are innate. The second part of his argument aims at showing that most of the concepts we possess are semantically primitive. Together we get the result that most of our concepts are innate. The conclusion of the first part does not seem to be subject to the biological absurdity accusation. But in part V I shall try to show that this part of the argument is unsound.

4

Before examining Fodor’s argument for semantic innatism, I would like to discuss some further (mutually related) characteristics of this thesis, by comparing it to the thesis of syntactic innatism. Fodor’s thesis of course implies that there are constraints on the concepts we can possess: we can possess only those concepts which are innate or which are constructions of innate concepts. So according to it we can only possess a sub-set of all logically possible concepts. Now is the thesis of syntactic innatism similar to semantic innatism in this respect? It is similar in that the set of grammars consistent with universal grammar forms only a sub-set of the logically possible grammars, and in that the innate universal grammar imposes constraints on our linguistic abilities. But the constraints in both cases are of different sorts. It is not that we cannot acquire languages with different grammar (“non-UG languages”). We can. The point is that we cannot acquire them as easily as we acquire natural languages, that we cannot acquire them as our initial languages, etc. So the possibility of non-UG languages and thus the syntactic constraints imposed on us (that there are possible languages we cannot learn as initial languages) can be shown by constructing artificial non-UG languages. Of course, it is an empi-
tical matter whether such languages are not learned as easily as natural languages, and I do not mean to suggest that the argument from the ease of learning to innateness (see Chomsky 1966) is sound, but we can at least form an idea of what a non-UG –language, and hence (according to the thesis), a non-innate language, is like.

This does not hold true of semantic innatism. The possibility of non-innate concepts and thus the semantic constraints imposed on us cannot be shown, and we cannot form an idea of what non-innate concepts are like. For ex hypothesi, we cannot possess such concepts. Similarly, the thesis of semantic innatism has no predictive power: we cannot even express a claim to the effect that a certain possible concept cannot be possessed by human beings. And there is no way to characterize the set of innate concepts: there is no "deep structure" common to them all, as there is a deep structure common to all natural languages, according to syntax innatists. This last point is of course closely related to the fact that the thesis of semantic innatism is committed to a one-to-one correlation between the relevant innate brain features and the concepts we possess. Syntactic innatism is not committed to such a correlation. Rather, according to it one innate body of syntactic rules is compatible with many languages with different "surface" grammars. It is not the actual surface syntax of a natural language that is supposed to be innate.

There is an important sense, I conclude, in which semantic innatism, unlike syntactic innatism, lacks empirical content.

A specific point, related, I think, to this issue, is that an argument like that of the poverty of stimulus (see Chomsky 1966 and 1975), which has been developed for showing that syntax is innate, is inapplicable to the case of semantic innatism. The reasoning is, roughly, that children learn the syntax of their first language in spite of the fact that the linguistic data to which they are exposed are too poor for enabling them to learn it. Being exposed to data which are compatible with an infinite number of syntactic rules, children manage to learn the right rule. Many examples of this phenomenon are pointed out by linguists. The nativist explanation for them is that the child "selects" among the various possible rules those that are consistent with her innate syntax. The environmental stimuli only "trigger" the innately specified syntax. Now there is no such poverty of stimulus in the case of semantic innatism. Indeed, there is indeterminacy regarding learning to which features of a si-
tuation words refer to, as Quine is famous of showing (see Quine 1960). But the fact that we nevertheless manage to learn the meanings of words cannot be accounted for by the claim that the relevant concept is innate, since we can (and do) acquire other concepts that apply to the same situations, so innateness is not what can explain our "choice". This difference between syntactic innatism and semantic innatism is related to the basic difference between them, namely that according to the former only some of the humanly possible grammars - those we can acquire - are innate (or, more precisely, reflect the innate universal grammar), whereas according to the latter all of the concepts we can learn (or, more precisely, all the semantically primitive concepts, which are the relevant ones) are innate. The assumption that all of the concepts we can possess are innate cannot explain why in specific situations we acquire one concept rather than another.

We saw that in an important sense semantic innatism, unlike syntactic innatism, lacks empirical content. In the previous section we saw that semantic innatism is highly implausible from an evolutionary point of view. In light of these facts, we should expect to find deficiencies in arguments that purport to establish this thesis. Let us now turn to Fodor's argument.

5

In this section I will examine Fodor's argument for semantic innatism. The basic argument appears (with some differences) in four of Fodor's works (1975, 1980, 1981 and 1998). I will concentrate on what I referred to as the first part of the argument, the one that aims at showing that all truly semantically primitive concepts are innate. Concepts which are not semantically primitive according to Fodor are mostly technical concepts introduced by stipulative definitions.

One possible way to characterize what this argument shows is to say that according to it concept learning (or, more precisely, the process that seems to be concept learning) presupposes innate concepts. That is, according to Fodor, the process that underlies our coming to possess a concept presupposes the innateness of this concept itself. Fodor discusses only one kind of such processes – processes that involve the formation and confirmation of hypotheses of a specific sort, and these processes are said to presuppose innateness. So his argument (to which I will turn shortly) crucially depends on the assumption that those processes are in
fact the processes in which we come to actually possess semantically primitive concepts. Fodor does not provide a direct argument for this assumption, but only claims that there is no plausible alternative ("only one such theory has ever been proposed" - Fodor 1981, p. 267). He speaks of the lack of alternatives for theories of concept-learning, while learning according to him is a rational-causal (as opposed to brute causal) mental process, a process that involves the exercise of the rational or intellectual faculties of the mind. But it is important to note that the issue is not whether there are alternative theories of concept-learning in this specific sense (and which do not presuppose innateness). The issue is whether there are plausible theories according to which our being exposed to the relevant stimuli (typically - to the relevant features of environmental items) - plays a role in the process in which concepts become available to us (and these theories do not presuppose innateness). If there are, declaring them not to be theories of learning would not of course support Fodor's case. I will consider one such theory below.

The processes Fodor accounts for are the processes of learning the meanings of words in natural languages. What really interests him (or anyhow what should interest him as far as the present issue is concerned) is learning the meanings of words of our first language. For if we acquire (new) concepts at all, we acquire them in learning our first language. If this learning presupposes the innateness of the relevant concepts, then indeed we don't acquire (new) concepts at all, and all of our concepts (to the exclusion of some technical concepts) are innate. So let us now look at Fodor's reasons for the claim that the learning process in question presupposes innateness.

Fodor describes this process as a process of the formation and confirmation of hypotheses concerning what the meanings of the words in question are. The hypothesis for the meaning of a predicate $P$ suggests a "true-rule" for $P$, a rule of the form:

'\( P_y \) is true iff $G_x$.'

Now in order to form such a hypothesis, the subject must already possess the concept that is expressed by $G$. But if the hypothesis is true, $G$ must be co-extensional with $P$. Thus, in order to learn what $P$ means the subject must already possess a concept which is co-extensional with $P$. So this process (in which the subject learns that the meaning of $P$ is such and such) cannot be a process in which the concept expressed by $P$ is learned - the subject must
already possess this concept. And when \( P \) is a predicate in the subject’s first language (so that the subject knows no predicate co-extensional with it), this means that the subject has never learned this concept, and, for lack of other explanations for the subject’s possessing it, the concept must be innate. The subject only learns that this concept is expressed by this predicate – learning the meaning of the predicate is not learning the concept (see Fodor 1975, mainly pp. 80 ff. and also chapter 1, and Fodor 1981, mainly the first pages).

But for several independent reasons, Fodor’s Argument does not work. First, in order to learn a concept the subject need not form a hypothesis with a co-extensive predicate. She can form the hypothesis that \( P \) applies to such or such environmental items. We may grant that forming such a hypothesis presupposes having a representation of the relevant items, but such a representation need not be linguistic-like. It can, for example, be a perceptual representation. Perceptual representations are caused by events in the environment, and there is no difficulty to assume that they are caused by events in the environment even on that occasion in which the subject learns the concepts of properties that they represent. And certainly, perceptual representations need not be innate: you don't have to have a token of a representation of the type you token in a perceptual situation, nor do you have to have some neural (one-to-one) correlate of it, prior to the perceptual situation. Nobody denies that the various neural correlates of the instantiations of perceptual representations are a joint product of our neural mechanisms and the impingements on our neural mechanisms. So it seems that learning concepts by means of the true-rules hypotheses does not presuppose that concepts – or representations of other kinds – are innate.

Now this alternative to Fodor’s supposedly only way in which concepts can be learned faces a natural objection: how can subjects associate predicates with the "correct" features of the situation based on perceptual (say, pictorial) rich representations, ones that are obviously much more coarse-grained than most of our concepts? But Fodor cannot raise this question as an objection to the alternative sketched above to his picture of concept learning, because to the extent that there is no good reply to this question, it undermines his own position as well. For Fodor, who does not deny that we learn what words mean (that knowledge of what words mean is not innate), accepts, of course (and who doesn't?), that per-
ception is typically involved in learning what words mean. And then he has to explain how we can apply the concept to the correct feature. So this objection does not provide us with a reason to prefer Fodor's account over the suggested alternative to it.\textsuperscript{20}

But it is not only that there is a plausible alternative for Fodor's model of concept acquisition which Blocks his argument. Further, his model seems problematic. One way to realize the difficulty in Fodor's model is this. To the question "How do we acquire knowledge of the meanings of words?", Fodor replies that we acquire this knowledge by learning that this word has the extension of this concept: that the word applies to the same items to which the concept applies.\textsuperscript{21} He is thus presupposing that learning the word is mediated by the concept. There is, however, a more parsimonious alternative, which Fodor ignores: that we learn that the word applies to such and such items, and thus learn the concept. Moreover, if Fodor insists that we can only recognize to which items a word applies if we already possess a concept that applies to the same items, then he is committed to a mysterious linkage between the word and the concept: how can we know that we should "translate" the word to this concept if we cannot independently recognize to which items the word applies?

Due to the difficulties that Fodor's model faces, there is no reason to accept the alleged nativist implication of this model. Further, in light of the fact that there is an alternative to it, the argument that presupposes the correctness of this model is undermined even if these difficulties are ignored. Bearing in mind also the evolutionary implausibility of semantic innatism, a particularly strong case has to be made in order to convince us that this thesis is (probably) true. It seems that Fodor has failed to carry this burden.

NOTES

1. Chomsky may be taken to be committed to the view that at least some concepts are innate - see note 7 below. Fodor understands Chomsky in this way (Fodor 1981, p. 258).

2. I use the term "acquire" in a sense which does not beg the question against semantic innatism. That is, "acquire" in this sense is not the same as "learn". Sometimes, though not always, Fodor also uses "acquire" in this sense (see, e.g., Fodor 1981, p. 266). Fodor agrees that there is a sense in which we can be said to acquire (innate) concepts - to move to a stage in which they are available to us. The environment is said to "trigger" the concepts.
3. This price is twofold. First, Fodor’s response gives up the idea that there is a cognitive-rational explanation for concept acquisition (there is only a causal-neural explanation). Second, and more striking, this response involves the anti-realistic principle that most of the properties expressed by our concepts are constituted in part by our concepts. For criticism of Fodor’s response see Laurence and Margolis 2002 and Stainton and Viger 2000.

4. Laurence mentions Niyogi’s and Snedeker’s book (forthcoming) as an example of such a struggle.

5. One aspect of the modern controversy over innateness concerns the nature and, we may say, the quantity, of our learning mechanisms: it is about whether there is one general learning mechanism or some specific ones, and in particular, whether there is a specific mechanism for language learning. This issue is closely related to the issue of modularity vs. general intelligence (see Chomsky 1969, Putnam 1967 and 1980, and Fodor 1983). It is possible to characterize many of the specific debates concerning innateness as debates concerning the generality or specificity of the innate.

6. This latter experiment would not of course convince Plato that not everything we know is innate, since he would not accept the claim (that seems to us to be empirical) that the two persons differ in knowledge. In the present framework, such views are put aside.

7. In some other places, though, Chomsky does not seem to be committed to this strong nativist view. To the extent that he is committed to this view, he is committed also to the view at that least some concepts (the constituents of the propositions in question) are innate.

8. Perhaps the assumption that all natural languages share interesting syntactic features may be accounted for non-genetically: Putnam (1967) suggests that this assumption may be explained by appealing to a common ancestral language.

9. Recall that I use "acquiring" in a sense different from that of "learning" (see note 2).

10. Here Fodor uses "acquire" in the sense of "learn".

11. If the objection were crucially dependent on this view of Putnam’s, Fodor could appeal to his "narrow content" theory (see Fodor 1987), and claim that even if Putnam is right, still the narrow element of meaning can be innate.

12. And of course, as Goodman (1971) points out, the claim that such a language cannot be acquired as a first language cannot be tested empirically.

13. The distinction between the surface structure of a sentence and its deep structure is due to Chomsky 1965.

14. Note that Fodor (see 1981, p. 258) asserts that the issue is empirical.

15. It should now be understandable why the findings of developmental psychology and the history of science (see section III) are irrelevant to the truth of semantic innatism.
16. Again, I do not suggest that this argument succeeds in establishing its purported conclusion in the case of syntax. The details are very important for deciding on the matter in each case. It is crucial for the defenders of the argument to show, inter alia, that the rules we learn are not simpler or more efficient than the alternatives. See a specific controversy over such questions between Putnam and Chomsky (Putnam 1967, Chomsky 1969). My present point is that, regardless of whether an argument of this form can be made to work with respect to syntax, such an argument cannot be made to work with respect to semantics.

17. This is how Samet and Flanagan (1989) characterize Fodor's conception of learning. They argue against Fodor that the common use of "learning" by philosophers and psychologists is wider than his use. But this is completely irrelevant to the controversy over innateness, as my following remarks suggest.

18. This way of characterizing the issue excludes processes of acquiring concepts such as swallowing a pill (see Fodor's Latin pill example - Fodor 1975, p. 37).

19. Of course, this is true only generally, for it is possible that the first (or even the only) words which express some of our concepts are in a language other than our first language. But this subtlety does not affect the points to be made. The relevance (in general) of first language to the issue of semantic innatism is another similarity between this issue and the issue of syntactic innatism.

20. Note that in the present framework the question at hand boils down to the question of how we often come to form the correct hypotheses regarding what predicates mean (there seems to be no pressing problem concerning how such hypotheses are corroborated). We need not discuss Fodor's opinion on this issue, since whatever the correct reply to it is, it can be incorporated into the account suggested here for the meaning-learning hypotheses exactly as it can be incorporated into Fodor's account. So this issue cannot vindicate Fodor's argument for innatism.

21. In his discussion of innateness Fodor usually speaks of meaning in terms of extension, but the soundness of his argument does not depend on whether meaning talk can be exhausted in terms of extension, or does it have an additional component.

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ABSTRACT: My aim here is to determine whether in Plato's early dialogues—Meno, Phaedo, Euthyphro—there is enough evidence to suggest the presence of his theory of Forms. While the theory of recollection (anamnesis) is present in both Meno and Phaedo, the conventional wisdom is that we only find the Forms in the latter. But is there enough evidence to support the view that the theory of Forms is present in the Meno too? Recollection must be of something; is this something the Forms? If anamnesis does not remind us of the Forms in the Meno, what then does it remind us of? What role would anamnesis play here? I believe there is also evidence to suggest presence of the Forms in the Euthyphro, a dialogue chronologically prior to the Meno. If this is correct, it seems the Forms must be present in the Meno as well.

Is the theory of Forms present in the Meno? Two of the most prominent Platonic scholars of the last half century—W.D. Ross and W.K.C. Guthrie—disagreed. Ross believed the Forms were present in the Phaedo but not in the Meno.¹

[W]hat is absent from the Meno is perhaps more striking than what is present in it; no attempt is made to connect the Ideas with the doctrine of anamnesis. There is no reference, explicit or implicit to the Ideas in the passage dealing with anamnesis [81a5-86b5]... for the establishing of a relation between the Ideas and anamnesis we have to look to the Phaedo, and in the Meno the theory of Ideas is carried no farther than in the earlier dialogues.²

Guthrie, however, found this position implausible. In the Phaedo, the doctrine of anamnesis “reminds” us of a transcendent equality; in the Meno it “reminds” us of transcendent geometrical truths. If it weren’t for these transcendent truths known to us in our pre-natal state, Plato’s doctrine of anamnesis would be nonsensical; for if anamnesis does not remind of us the Forms in the Meno, what then does it remind us of? What role would anamnesis play? Therefore, Guthrie thought the Forms must be present in the Meno too.
Here in an argument for anamnesis the moral forms [arete] are linked with the mathematical as objects of pre-natal knowledge. [Ross] has argued that this is not so in the Meno, and that the doctrine is promulgated there without a belief in transcendent Forms... This is incredible. The arguments are exactly similar. As in the Phaedo 'we' are reminded of absolute equality by the sight of approximately equal things, so the slave recalls an abstract, lasting truth of geometry through seeing visible lines, roughly drawn and soon to be obliterated. Moreover, the experiment would fail of its purpose unless virtue, like mathematics, was known to us in our pre-natal state... if a moral quality existing outside the sensible world, and seen by bodiless souls, is not a Form or Platonic Idea, it is difficult to see what is.3

But can we say with any assurance that because anamnesis is linked to the Forms in the Phaedo that it is also linked to the Forms in the Meno? Are there other aspects in these early dialogues that might suggest presence of the Forms?

Socrates introduces the doctrine of recollection4 in the Meno in order to rebut the eristic paradox presented by Meno.5 After four unsuccessful attempts to define arete, Meno, at the point of frustration (aporia), objects to Socrates' suggestion that they begin their search anew.

How will you look for it, Socrates, when you do not at all know what it is? How will you aim to search for something you do not know at all? If you should meet with it, how will you know that this is the thing that you did not know?7

Socrates, taken back by Meno's question, finds his reasoning unsound. When Meno asks why, Socrates offers an uncharacteristic response. He says he has heard priests and priestesses say that the human soul is immortal. It comes to an end and is reborn but never destroyed. Since the soul is immortal it has seen everything in this world and beyond and there is nothing that it has not learned. As such, the soul can recollect things that it once knew. The searching and learning that men do is simply as a whole, recollection.8

Unconvinced, Meno demands proof. Socrates claims he can demonstrate that Meno's uneducated slave is capable of recollecting (not learning) knowledge of geometry. If he can show that the slave is recollecting, Socrates believes their investigation into arete will have been worthwhile.9 Through his method of question
and answer (*elenchus*), Socrates and the slave try to solve a problem in geometry.

In the *Meno*, through Socratic *elenchus*, the slave comes to realize that he doesn’t know what he *thought* he knew. This much is typical of these early (Socratic) dialogues. The *Meno*, however, differs from other early dialogues. For Socrates’ *elenchus* takes the slave beyond what, in previous instances, would have been the end of the discussion.\(^{10}\) In other Socratic dialogues, e.g., the *Euthyphro*, the participants would exhaust a particular topic and the dialogue would end, often inconclusively. But in the *Meno*, Plato shows us that the *elenchus* need not always end in *aporia*. Here, the slave eventually arrives at the right answer, at which point Socrates insists that if asked enough times and in different ways, the slave will attain knowledge.\(^{11}\) But what *kind* of knowledge will he attain? Will he attain knowledge of the Forms?

This much seems clear: without the *elenchus*, *anamnesis* would be insufficient to answer Meno’s paradox. For even if one *once* knew what *arete* was, if one *now* lacks (or is incapable of) inquiry—if one does not employ the *elenchus*—then accessibility to what was once known is prevented. By bringing *elenchus* together with *anamnesis*, Socrates believes he has shown that inquiry into an unknown area is at least possible. Such an inquiry may, in the end, turn out to be fruitless—they may never arrive at an answer, but it is not impossible. Gail Fine supports this view and has argued that *elenchus* and *anamnesis* require one another in order to ultimately attain knowledge. In the *Meno*, Fine says, “Plato replies to the eristic paradox by reaffirming the powers of the *elenchus* and by vindicating Socrates’ ability to inquire through *elenchus*, in the absence of knowledge.”\(^{12}\)

The theory of recollection goes beyond Socrates, not by replacing the *elenchus* with an alternative route to knowledge, but by explaining how something he took for granted is possible. The theory of recollection is introduced to vindicate, not to vitiate, Socrates’ claim about the powers of *elenchus*.\(^{13}\)

So, according to Fine, *anamnesis* takes us beyond the historic Socrates—beyond the *elenchus*. What we find in the *Meno* is not an altogether new approach to knowledge; rather, it is a continuation of what Socrates began.

The doctrine of *anamnesis* is also important because it not only assumes the soul is immortal but reincarnated.
They [priests and priestesses] say that the human soul is immortal; at times it comes to an end, which they call dying, at times it is reborn, but it is never destroyed, and one must therefore live one’s life as piously as possible.\textsuperscript{14}

In both the \textit{Phaedo} and the \textit{Meno} Plato adopts this “ancient theory”\textsuperscript{15} proposed by Pythagoras and his followers. For Guthrie, it marked Plato’s point of departure from Socrates.

[O]ne might even claim to detect the very moment when Plato first deliberately goes beyond the historic Socrates to provide for his teaching a philosophical basis of his own. It would be at 81a [of the \textit{Meno}] where Socrates declares with unwonted solemnity that he can rebut the eristic denial that learning is possible by an appeal to religious beliefs.\textsuperscript{16}

\textit{Anamnesis} provides Plato with just the kind of theory needed to give a positive account of his mentor’s \textit{elenchus}. But implicit in the doctrine of recollection is the Pythagorean belief in reincarnation. It is reincarnation that makes Plato’s entire program possible.\textsuperscript{17}

For both Fine and Guthrie then, \textit{elenchus} coupled with \textit{anamnesis} means we should be capable of attaining knowledge. But does this mean knowledge of the Forms? I think it does. If \textit{anamnesis} does \textit{not} remind of us the Forms in the \textit{Meno}, what then could it possibly remind us of? Moreover, why would Plato include \textit{anamnesis} here if it were \textit{not} to remind us of the Forms? If we are not reminded of the Forms here, Plato’s doctrine of \textit{anamnesis} appears nonsensical.

Recall that Ross not only believed that “in the \textit{Meno} the theory of Ideas is carried no farther than in the earlier dialogues,”\textsuperscript{18} he also held that there was no Pythagorean influence that led Plato to his theory of Forms. What seems to have occurred, says Ross, is that Socrates’ constant inquiries as to “what virtue is” or “what courage is” eventually led Plato to recognize the existence of universals as a distinct class of entity. Accepting Ross’ analysis however, would lead us to the following conclusion: the only person to have had an impact on Plato’s philosophical development was Socrates. Ross dismissed \textit{any} notion of a Pythagorean influence due to our ignorance of the history of Pythagoreanism; since we cannot accurately date their intellectual development, to consider any affinity between Plato and the Pythagoreans, Ross reasoned, is inadmissible.\textsuperscript{19}
There is a kernel of truth to what Ross says. We do not have direct evidence to confirm that Plato was influenced by the Pythagoreans' doctrine of the immortality of the soul. However, his sweeping argument that there was no Pythagorean influence can be easily refuted if we look to Aristotle. In Book I of *Metaphysics*, Aristotle tells us that Plato assigned to the Forms the same function that the Pythagoreans attached to number:

For the multitude of things which have the same name as the Form exist by participation in it. Only the name 'participation' was new; for the Pythagoreans say that things exist by imitation of numbers, and Plato says they exist by participation, changing the name.\(^\text{20}\)

Aristotle also points out that later in life Plato identified the Forms with number too.\(^\text{21}\) Ross thought this didn't matter, because it failed to suggest that number-patterns had anything to do with the inception of the ideal theory. There is nothing in the early dialogues to suggest this, Ross says.\(^\text{22}\) So, to that extent he is correct; however, this is not the only evidence of the Forms one should look for in the early dialogues. There are other aspects in these early dialogues that might suggest presence of the Forms; in particular, the *Euthyphro*.\(^\text{23}\) Although contestable, I believe there is some evidence to suggest the Forms are present here too, albeit in a very early stage of development. As the *Euthyphro* is chronologically prior to the *Meno*, the Forms then must also occur in the *Meno*.

Euthyphro says he knows what piety is; in fact, he claims to be an expert about religious matters, one who possesses "accurate knowledge of all such things."\(^\text{24}\) Socrates asks him,

[w]hat kind of thing do you say godliness and ungodliness are, both as regards murder and other things; or is the pious not the same and like in every action, and the impious the opposite of all that is pious and like itself, and everything that is to be impious presents with us one form or appearance in so far as it is impious?\(^\text{25}\)

Euthyphro says that the pious is to prosecute wrongdoers no matter what their relation to you might be, e.g., even one's own father (St. 5d8-5e5). Not to do this, he says, is to commit impiety. But surely there are other things that are pious besides prosecuting your father for murder, says Socrates.\(^\text{26}\) Euthyphro agrees and proceeds to offer definition after definition of piety; each one meeting with an objection by Socrates.\(^\text{27}\) This is a classic example
of Socratic *elenchus*. Euthyphro thinks he knows something when, as it turns out, he does not. Socratic dialogues follow this sort of schemata: First, the respondent is confident about his understanding of some moral term. When he is asked to define it he replies without hesitation, but then he is quickly shown that his first attempt is only a particular instantiation, not the common characteristic, common to all and every use of the term at issue. He then sees Socrates’ point, tries to amend his definition by offering a general description, which again is usually amended, but even so, it’s still shown to be unsatisfactory. At this point the respondent is usually reduced to frustration, silence—*aporia*.

What is of interest here is what Socrates demands of Euthyphro. He wants the “form” of piety, a single definition; a standard (*paradigmata*) to judge all pious actions by. Socrates explicitly states that he wants to know whether acts are pious or impious by reason of a single “form.”

Bear in mind then that I did not bid you tell me one or two of the many pious actions but that form itself that makes all pious actions pious, for you agreed that all impious actions are impious and all pious actions pious through one form, or don’t you remember?28

We see a similar move in the *Meno*. At St. 74a-75a Meno provides several examples of what virtue is, e.g. justice, courage, moderation, wisdom, generosity. Socrates objects to all of these. He wants to know what is it that makes all of them virtue. What one thing covers them all? For example, if one were to ask: “What is shape?” and someone replied, “roundness” one might then ask, “Is roundness *shape, or a shape*?” The answer would of course be *a* shape, one of many. The analogy might be illustrated as follows:

![Diagram of Aggregates of Virtue and Shape](image)
Socrates wants not parts, but an all-encompassing definition of virtue. In the *Euthyphro*, it’s an all-encompassing definition of piety. What Socrates wants appears to be a proto-version of the Forms.

Recent scholarship however, takes a more cautious approach. For example, Thomas Brickhouse and Nick Smith resist this temptation to locate the Forms in the *Euthyphro*.

What Socrates may be thinking about this issue is never made clear in the *Euthyphro*, and so it seems most reasonable not to presuppose any specific theory about this issue in understanding Socrates’ line of questioning in this dialogue.

The strength of the argument that Socrates was *not* demanding the Forms in the *Euthyphro* turns on the fact that “several features of the ‘theory of Forms’ are not found here.” “Most importantly,” say Brickhouse and Smith, is “the idea that the Forms exist in some distinct timeless and changeless reality.” I think they are right about this, however, they also say,

[O]n the other hand, precisely because Socrates seems to allow that some thing might be *both* pious and impious—but the standard (the Form he seeks) of piety could not be both pious and impious—at least some anticipation of Plato’s more developed later theory, which distinguishes Forms from approximations of Forms, does seem to be present here in the *Euthyphro*.

It is this anticipatory role of the Forms I wish to consider.

Guthrie returns to the two passages that seem to anticipate the developed Forms of the middle dialogues in the *Euthyphro*, St. 5c7-d5 and St. 6d1-6d6. What does he think these passages tell us about the Forms? “In some sense,” he says, “they exist. [However] this is not argued but assumed.”

It would be unreasonable to suppose that Socrates repeatedly asked the question ‘What is the form?’ without believing that it was something real and not a figment of the imagination. Moreover, at 11a he says that to ask ‘What is the pious?’ is equivalent to asking for its being or essence (*ousia*).

Unfortunately, at this point our investigation becomes a rather pedantic entymological one. For while G.M.A. Grube translates Plato at St. 11a as having said, “[w]hen you were asked what piety is, you did not wish to make its *nature* clear to me,” Lane
Cooper translates the same line, “[w]hen you were asked to tell the nature of the holy, you did not wish to explain the essence of it.”

But whether we translate ousia as “nature” or “essence” it is important to see what both translators set it against. Grube and Cooper both contrast the ousia of piety with an “affect,” “quality,” or “attribute” of it. Is this evidence that the Forms of the middle dialogues are present here in the Euthyphro? I don't think so, but I do believe it highlights an early version of it is. Although the textual evidence is circumstantial, the germs of the Forms appear to be here. We need also consider where Plato goes from this point forward. It is clear that the Forms are present in the Phaedo. As a transitional dialogue, we should not expect to find in the Euthyphro the same mature writing style we find in Plato’s middle and later works. What we do find however, is the beginning of what would ultimately become the theory of Forms. I think it is fair to assume that what we find in the Euthyphro is an early doctrine of the theory of Forms. And if we find it in the Euthyphro we must also find it in the Meno.

All things considered, I think Plato did in fact rely on an early doctrine of the Forms in the Meno as well as the Pythagorean theory of the immortality of the soul. Moreover, I believe Plato did depart from his mentor but only insofar as he added the theory of anamnesis to the Socratic elenchus. In turn, these events ultimately led Plato to his most important contribution to philosophy, the theory of Forms. What we find in the Meno is perhaps the earliest attempt by Plato to provide a clear explication of this theory.

REFERENCES

1. Some scholars place the Meno chronologically prior to the Phaedo.
2. W.D. Ross, Plato’s Theory of Ideas (p.18) Furthermore, the method by which the slave attains the correct geometrical answer is purely an empirical one. Vlastos has some harsh criticisms against Ross with respect to this empirical suggestion. See Vlastos’ article, Anamnesis in the Meno.
4. Meno, Stephanus Note 81c.
5. Meno St 80d.
6. An intellectual impasse is aporia, which literally means “to be at a loss.”
7. St. 80 d3.
8. Meno St 81a-d.
9. However, whether Socrates shows this or whether he is asking leading questions of the slave is another matter I will not entertain here.
10. It is also different in that Socrates is thrust into the unfamiliar role of respondent while Meno takes on the role of questioner when he poses his paradox.
11. *Meno* St 85c7-d2.
15. *Phaedo* St 70c4.
17. It is also interesting to consider the events occurring in Plato's life immediately prior to writing the *Meno*. He embarked upon a trip to Italy in order to gather information on Pythagorean philosophy. If Plato’s trip occurred prior to his writing the *Meno* it is at least possible that the highly influential beliefs of the Pythagoreans played a role in his decision to tie *elenchus* and *anamnesis* together and, ultimately, hook them up to his theory of Forms.
18. W.D. Ross, *Plato’s Theory of Ideas*, p. 18. Furthermore, the method by which the slave attains the correct geometrical answer is purely an empirical one. Vlastos has some harsh criticisms against Ross with respect to this empirical suggestion. See Vlastos’ article, “Anamnesis in the Meno.”
19. Peter Gorman, in his book, *Pythagoras, A Life*, takes the exact opposite stance. After listing a few authors of antiquity he says, “no other ancient person was so often mentioned by posterity; yet some scholars have the temerity to state that we know nothing about Pythagoras!” p. 4.
23. If we assume that Plato was attempting to defend his mentor’s philosophical position against attacks that suggested the *elenchus* was negative (always ending in a state of *aporia*) and therefore limited in scope, then the Pythagoreans seem a legitimate place to begin. I think it is also significant that the example used in the *Meno* is a geometrical one. Surely the choice of geometry was not accidental in demonstrating recollection. Plato could have used an arithmetic example, but it is at least suggestive that the Pythagoreans were held in high regard for Plato.
24. *Euthyphro* St 5a1.
25. *Euthyphro* St. 5c7-d5.
26. *Euthyphro* St. 6d1-6d6.
27. Euthyphro offers the following definitions of piety: “What is dear to the gods is pious, what is not is impious” St. 7a. Euthyphro then suggests that what makes something pious (or right) is the fact that God commands it. To be pious, he says, cannot be the same thing as to be loved by the gods; it is loved by the gods because it is pious. This leads to a discussion of Divine
Command Theory (DCT) and the problem it elicits. Socrates asks Euthyphro whether piety a part of justice, is justice more extensive than piety? (St. 12c10-12d3). Might the pious might be a sub-class of the wider class of justice? Here he gets Euthyphro to agree and say that piety is part of the just that is concerned with service or “care” to the gods while the rest, Euthyphro maintains, deals with our duties or “cares” to our fellow men. Next, Euthyphro suggests a further refinement of his definition, insisting that “care” to the gods is the same kind of care that slaves render to their masters, indeed, it is a kind of “service to the gods” (St. 13d4-5).

28. *Euthyphro* St. 6d8.


31. Guthrie says the same thing, “The question...is not whether Socrates here speaks of piety as ‘in’ or ‘possessed by’ pious acts, but whether he also speaks of [piety] as existing outside them. Of this there is no trace.” *History of Greek Philosophy, Volume IV*, p. 117, the last emphasis is mine. Ross says something similar as well. Perhaps some kind of metaphysical dynamic is at work here, but “at this stage,” says Ross, “the relation of the Idea to the particular [should be] thought of simply as that of universal to particular; there is yet no mention of the failure of the particular to be a true instance of the Idea.” Ross, p. 17.


35. Ross also conducts an entymological investigation into key words and phrases that might suggest presence of the Forms in the *Euthyphro*. He notes that Plato uses both *idea* and *eidos* [5c7-d5 and 6d9-e6]. The roots of these words, Ross explains, both come from *idein*, “to see.” In his middle and late periods Plato regularly uses *eidos* to refer to the Forms, but here in the *Euthyphro* there seems to be no clear rule he follows in applying *idea* or *eidos*. For in the first instance of *form*, Plato uses *eidos*, in the second instance he uses *idea*. His use of either word seems quite arbitrary. Due to Plato’s arbitrary use of these words, Ross believes this is enough evidence to suggest the Forms are not present here. Interestingly, the evolution of both terms came to mean “visible form.” Although confident the idea of this “visible form” is not present here, Ross explains its development as follows: sight is the most informative of our senses, and it is not surprising that words which originally meant visible form should come to mean visible nature, and then to mean nature in general; nor that from meaning nature they should come to mean ‘class marked off by a nature from others.’ Ross, p. 14.

36. As Guthrie, Brickhouse and Smith all state, there is no evidence to suggest a separation between universals and particulars where universals enjoy a separate existence.
APPENDIX

Order of Platonic Dialogues (according to Ross)

N.B. The list is not exhaustive, it is only meant to throw some light on dialogues that might entail the Forms.

Birth of Plato, 429-427
Charmides
Laches
Euthyphro
Hippias Major
Meno
First visit to Sicily, 389-388
?Cratylus
Symposium, 385 or later
Phaedo
Republic
Phaedrus
Parmenides
Theaetetus, 369 or later
Second visit to Sicily, 367-366
Sophistes
Politicus
Third visit to Sicily, 361-360
Timaeus
Critias
Philebus
Seventh Letter, 353-352
Laws
Death of Plato, 348-347

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THE NOT-SO-STRANGE CASE OF THE ABSTRACT ENTITY WHO SMOKED A PIPE: A REPLY TO SAWYER

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ABSTRACT. Nathan Salmon has proposed that expressions such as ‘Sherlock Holmes’ refer to abstract objects in both their object fictional and meta-fictional occurrences, but that when they occur in meta-fictional occurrences we pretend that the object to which they refer is not an abstract object but a concrete one. In this paper, I defend Nathan Salmon’s account of fictional discourse from three objections that question the feasibility of pretending that a certain abstract object has a certain property.

1

People often use expressions such as ‘Sherlock Holmes’, which appear to refer to fictional entities, and they seem to make assertions about these objects such as (1) ‘Sherlock Holmes smokes a pipe’ and (2) ‘Sherlock Holmes was created by Arthur Conan Doyle’. Prima facie, speakers’ reference to fictional entities would seem incompatible with a widely accepted philosophical principle, which John Searle (1969) calls the Axiom of Existence. In Searle’s formulation, the Axiom of Existence states: ‘Whatever is referred to must exist’ (Searle 1969, p.77). The problem is that, if we take ‘existence’ to designate the mode of being that is proper of actual concrete objects such as George W. Bush and the tree in the garden, fictional entities such as Sherlock Holmes and Pegasus do not exist.

In the philosophical literature, it is possible to find a number of different strategies to reconcile the Axiom of Existence with speakers’ apparent reference to fictional entities. Unfortunately, none of these strategies is entirely satisfactory. In particular, there seem to be two kinds of sentences in which expressions that appear to refer to fictional entities occur. Here, I will call them, respectively, object-fictional and meta-fictional sentences. Roughly, object-fictional sentences, such as (1), are sentences that treat the fiction as fact; meta-fictional sentences, such as (2), are sentences that treat the fiction as fiction. Usually, the accounts that
deal satisfactorily with sentences of the first kind are not equally successful with sentences of the second kind and vice versa.

For example, some, following Kendall Walton (1973) and Gareth Evans (1982), hold that authors of fiction and their readers participate in an elaborate game of make-believe. In this game, authors pretend to assert object-fictional sentences such as (1) and their readers pretend to believe the sentences asserted by the author to be true. However, no one involved in the game actually believes object-fictional sentences to be true or takes the apparently referential expressions occurring in them to refer to anything.

Others, following Saul Kripke (1980) and Peter van Inwagen (1977), claim that the expression ‘Sherlock Holmes’ that occurs in (2) genuinely refers to an actual abstract artefact—a fictional character created by Arthur Conan Doyle towards the end of the 19th century. The expression ‘Sherlock Holmes’ that occurs in (1), on the other hand, fails to refer to anything. According to the followers of this account, the expression ‘Sherlock Holmes’ occurring in (1), unlike the one occurring in (2), is on a par with non-referring expressions such as ‘the present king of France’ or ‘the highest prime number’.

The critics of the first of these accounts feel that it does not do justice to our intuitions that, whereas it may well be the case that (1) is only pretended to be true, a sentence like (2) seems to be genuinely true—it seems to be literally the case that Conan Doyle created the Sherlock Holmes character at the end of the 19th century. The critics of the second of these accounts, on the other hand, feel that this asymmetry in the treatment of the occurrence of the expression ‘Sherlock Holmes’ in object fictional and meta-fictional sentences not only is distasteful but does not seem to do justice of some of our pre-theoretic intuitions that sentences such as (1) are not false in the same sense in which sentences such as (3) ‘Sherlock Holmes is an astronaut’ are and that sentences such as (1) and (3) are about the same object as sentence (2).

To avoid the most counterintuitive consequences of these two accounts, Nathan Salmon (1998) has put forward an elegant account of fictional entities, which seems to combine the advantages of both of them without sharing their disadvantages. According to Salmon’s account, the expression ‘Sherlock Holmes’ refers to the same object—an abstract artefact, a literary cha-
racter—in both its object-fictional and meta-fictional occurrences. However, whereas a sentence like (2) is literally true (as the abstract artefact Sherlock Holmes was indeed created by Arthur Conan Doyle at the end of the 19th century), a sentence like (1) is literally false, as abstract artefacts, having no mouths and no lungs, cannot smoke pipes. According to Salmon, however, Conan Doyle and his readers participate in an elaborate pretence in which they pretend that the abstract artefact to which ‘Sherlock Holmes’ refers is a brilliant detective who smokes a pipe.

If one accepts the account put forward by Salmon, she can explain the difference between object-fictional and meta-fictional sentences, without denying the intuitions that (2) is literally true (it predicates something true of the abstract object ‘Sherlock Holmes’ refers to), that (1) and (3) are not equally false (whereas they are both literally false, the former is pretended to be true), or the intuition that (1) and (2) are about the same object (an abstract artefact that was in fact created by Conan Doyle but which the readers pretend is a pipe-smoking detective).

In a paper published in *Philosophical Papers*, Sarah Sawyer (2002) has criticised the account proposed by Salmon. Sawyer’s argument against Salmon’s account can be construed as a dilemma concerning the notion of pretence employed by Salmon’s account. If, on the one hand, the pretence amounts to pretending that the abstract entity to which ‘Sherlock Holmes’ refers is a flesh-and-blood person, then, according to Sawyer, it is not clear how (or even whether) we can carry out this pretence. If, on the other hand, the pretence involved in Salmon’s account amounts to pretending that the ‘Sherlock Holmes’ refers to a flesh-and-blood man *rather than* referring to the abstract object to which it actually refers, then, claims Sawyer, the abstract object to which the expression actually refers becomes explanatorily redundant. Since I take the first interpretation of Salmon’s account to be the correct interpretation of Salmon’s account, in this paper, I will only focus on the first horn of the dilemma and argue that Sawyer’s arguments against this interpretation of Salmon’s account fail.

The first of Sawyer’s objection against the interpretation of Salmon’s account is that Salmon’s account blurs the distinction between two kinds of pretence. To illustrate the difference bet-
ween them Sawyer introduces the following example. A child can either pretend that the pencil she is holding in her hand is a magic wand or she can pretend that she has a magic wand in her hand even if she is not actually holding anything in her hand. According to Sawyer, what differentiates these two kinds of pretence is that, in the first case, the child pretends that a certain concrete object (i.e. a pencil) has a certain property it does not actually have (i.e. having magic powers) and the second case involves the child pretending there is something in her hand (i.e. a magic wand) rather than nothing.

Now, according to Sawyer, on Salmon’s account we would not be able to distinguish these two kinds of pretence as all cases of pretence of the second kind would turn out to be a case of the first kind—in both cases the child would be pretending that some object has some property it does not actually has. This objection seems however seems to be weak. First, it is not clear whether Salmon’s account is meant to apply to cases of pretence outside fiction. Second, it is not clear if the distinction between the two kinds of pretence Sawyer proposes is a fundamental distinction that an account of fictional discourse should do justice to. Third, on Salmon’s account, we would still seem to be able to distinguish between the two cases of pretence on the basis that in the first case the object is a concrete object (i.e. a pencil) while in the second case it is an abstract object.

Be that as it may, Sawyer herself does not seem to think that this is the most serious argument against the first interpretation of Salmon’s account. It is the following argument that she seems to think is the decisive one:

There is nothing peculiar about pretending that a proposition has a certain truth-value rather than the one it has—for instance, that the proposition that I’m on the beach in California is true rather than false. […] However, while such examples are straightforward and easy to come by, they do not seem to provide a good analogy for Salmon to appeal to. Try pretending that the following sentence expresses a true proposition: [(4) ‘The number two is a man who likes to play croquet’. It is not clear we have any idea how to do this. And yet Salmon’s second level of pretence is more closely modelled by the latter kind of example than by the former, more mundane kind. The idea that we could pretend that the proposition expressed by ‘Sherlock Holmes is a man’ is true seems to trade on something other than our ability to pretend that the proposition it expresses is true. (Sawyer 2002, p.192)
Trying to pretend that the number two is a man who likes to play croquet is admittedly strange, but, if Sawyer’s argument is to reveal a genuine philosophical problem rather than being just a rhetorical device that trades on the limits of our imagination, one should be able to pinpoint where the difficulty of pretending that the number two is a man who likes to play croquet exactly lies. Since Sawyer fails to do so, however we are left to speculate.

I take it that the alleged difficulty supposedly arises from the fact that, unlike the proposition expressed by the sentence (5) ‘I’m on a beach in California’, the propositions expressed by (1) and (4) are not only false but necessarily false. More precisely, it is metaphysically impossible for the propositions expressed by (1) (or (4) for what matters) to be true. In other words, there is no metaphysically possible world in which the referent of ‘Sherlock Holmes’ is a person and smokes a pipe.

If this is the correct interpretation of what Sawyer has in mind, her argument would seem to echo Kripke’s argument to the effect that, if ‘Sherlock Holmes’ is a rigid designator and it refers to an abstract artefact in the actual world, then it refers to an abstract artefact in all possible worlds (in which it refers at all) and therefore there is no possible world in which the proposition expressed by (1) is true as it is metaphysically impossible for an abstract entity to smoke.

If this interpretation of the difficulty hinted at by Sawyer is correct, then the alleged difficulty would stem from the fact that supposedly it is impossible to pretend that the propositions expressed by ‘$p$’ is true, if it is metaphysically impossible that $p$. This line of reasoning has some plausibility if one consider the case of a logical impossibility—it seems outright impossible to pretend that, say, my sweater is both blue and not blue all over. But the same does not seem to apply to the case of metaphysical impossibility. People seem to be able to pretend that what is metaphysically impossible is the case. For example, even if it is (supposedly) metaphysically impossible for a dog to be a horse, this does not seem to prevent children from engaging in the pretence that their dog is a horse. The metaphysical impossibility of their dog being a horse does not seem to stop them from carrying out this pretence.

In general, the fact that it is metaphysically impossible that $p$ does not seem to be an obstacle to pretending that it is true that $p$. It seems that all we need in order to pretend that it is true
that \( p \) is that \( p \) is *prima facie* conceivable for us (to use David Chalmer’s expression (Chalmers 2002)), where something can be *prima facie* conceivable for someone even if, on further reflection, it turns out to be impossible.

If there is a genuine philosophical problem with pretending that the proposition expressed by (1) is true, thus, the problem is not that (1) expresses a metaphysically impossible proposition, as that the metaphysical impossibility of (1) does not seem to be an obstacle to pretending that the proposition expressed by (1) is true. But, if this is not the problem, then Sawyer should specify where *exactly* is the difficulty in pretending that the abstract object Sherlock Holmes is a man and smokes a pipe or that the number two is a man who plays croquet.

3

I will now consider a third possible objection to Salmon’s account that seems to be in the neighbourhood of the ones suggested by Sawyer and show that even this objection is ineffective. It is tempting to suggest that whereas it may be possible to pretend that the proposition expressed by (6) ‘Sherlock Holmes is a detective’ is true it is not possible to pretend that (7) ‘Sherlock Holmes is not an astronaut’ is true. If Salmon is right, Sherlock Holmes is an abstract object and, since no abstract object is an astronaut, it is true that Sherlock Holmes is not one. Now, it seems tempting to suggest that one can pretend that ‘\( p \)’ is true only if they do not actually believe ‘\( p \)’ to be true. So, for example, if we found out that the child actually believes that there is a magic wand in her hand, we would no longer take her to be pretending that there is a magic wand in her hand. Analogously, how could we possibly pretend that ‘Sherlock Holmes is not an astronaut’ is true if we believe it to be true?

The solution to this puzzle for Salmon’s account, I suggest, is that (6) can be used to express two different propositions. Conan Doyle and his readers may believe one to be true while pretending that the other one is true. The first proposition is expressed more precisely by the sentence ‘Sherlock Holmes is not an astronaut but an abstract entity,’ the second one by the sentence ‘Sherlock Holmes is not an astronaut but a detective’. I take it that it is possible to believe the first proposition to be true while pretending that the second is true.
To conclude, Salmon’s account still seems to be one of the best and most elegant strategies to reconcile the Axiom of Existence with the speakers’ apparent reference to fictional entities while retaining most of our pre-theoretical intuitions about fictional and meta-fictional discourse.

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ABSTRACT. In this paper I argue that a period of time during which nothing changes in the world is impossible. I do this by exposing the conceptual dependence of time on change. My argument rests on a view of necessary conditions for the meaningfulness of expressions in language. I end up concluding that the meaningfulness of temporal expressions assumes change.

1

The dependence of change on time is obvious: There is no change without time. But does the contrary hold? Can there be time without change? That is, can there be a temporal reality in which nothing changes? And if not, can there be a limited period of time during which nothing changes? In a trivial sense, it is obvious that time assumes change: when the concept of change is applied to time itself, the claim that a time has passed without there occurring any change is contradictory. However, what concerns me in this discussion is the change of things in time, and not the change of time itself. It is also seems obvious that a period of time during which nothing could change is impossible, as the concept of time seems to entail the possibility of change. However, the question I shall address is whether there can be a period of time during which nothing in the world has changed, rather than whether there can be a period of time during which nothing can change. In this paper I put forward a proof for the impossibility of time without change, by displaying the conceptual dependence of time on change. More specifically I shall prove that the meaningfulness of temporal expressions assumes change, from which it follows that there cannot be any time without change.

The question of the dependence of time on change is only one aspect of the general question of the dependence of time on the things in time. This question was the focus of the famous debate between Newton and Leibniz, which was formulated in the terms of the relational versus the absolute conceptions of
time, that is, the question whether time is only a logical construction out of events and their temporal relations, or whether time is independent of anything in time. While I shall not address this question directly, a negative answer to the question whether can there be time without change seems to entail a refutation of the absolute conception of time. Another implication of a negative answer to the question whether there can be time without change is the impossibility of an empty time, that is, a time in which nothing changes. Thus, if time without change is impossible, it follows that if the universe has a beginning, then so does time; and if it can be proved that time cannot begin, then this implies that the universe cannot have a beginning either.

Claims for the dependence of time on change are not new in the history of philosophy. However, previous attempts usually focused on the impossibility of verifying claims for the existence of a period of time during which nothing changed (Notable philosophers in this tradition include Aristotle (Hussey 1993: 218b21-219a10) and Wittgenstein (Ambrose 1979: 13-15). These attempts therefore assumed, either explicitly or implicitly, a verificationist theory of truth or meaning. Furthermore, this line of thought not only relies on a controversial, if not refuted, theory of truth or meaning, but is also susceptible to Shoemaker's criticism, which demonstrated that in principle there could be evidence for the existence of periods of time during which nothing changed (Shoemaker 1969: 263-381). The argument I shall present in this paper, however, will not rely on any specific theory of meaning, but only on general considerations as to the necessary conditions for the meaningfulness of expressions in (any) language, and will therefore be immune to the difficulties of the traditional line of thought. That is, I shall not assume a verificationist theory of truth or meaning, and I shall not assume in advance that there can be no circumstances in which claims for the existence of periods of time during which nothing changed can be verified.

In the next section I shall offer an analysis of the necessary conditions for the meaningfulness of expressions in language, which I shall use in the discussion that follows. In section 3 I will offer a proof for the conceptual dependence of time on change, that is, that the meaningfulness of temporal expressions assumes change, by proving that a reality in which nothing changes is atemporal reality. In section 4 I will consider and refute three possible objections to my proof that a changeless reality is
atemporal reality. In section 5 I will explain the implication of this conclusion, and prove that it implies the impossibility of a limited period of time during which nothing changes.

2

In order to prove that the meaningfulness of temporal expressions assumes change, I shall not rely on any specific theory of meaning, but only on general considerations of the necessary conditions for the meaningfulness of expressions in (any) language. In the analysis that follows I shall rely only on the most basic and least controversial features of meaning, ones that can be embraced by any theory of meaning. Furthermore, I shall limit the discussion to the descriptive aspect of meaning, that is, to that aspect of language which enables us to use it to describe reality. (From now on I will simply use the term ‘meaning’ in order to refer to this descriptive aspect of meaning).

In accordance with that limitation, the meaning of any expression in language is taken to be exhausted by the function it serves in describing reality. Given the fact that reality is described by the use of propositions (that is, sentences in language which are either true or false), the meaning of any expression in language can only be the contribution it makes to the meaning of the propositions in which it appears. To this conclusion it is possible to add the connection between the descriptive aspect of the meaning of a proposition and its truth value, that is, the fact that this aspect of the meaning of a proposition determines, at least in part (with other possible determinants invoked by the different theories both of meaning and truth), the truth value of a proposition. Hence the meaning of any expression in language is defined by its contribution to the determination of the truth value of the propositions in which it appears.

The implication of this analysis is that a necessary condition for the meaningfulness of any expression in language is that this expression can contribute to a description of reality. The same conclusion can be formulated as the claim that a necessary condition for the meaningfulness of any expression in any language is that this expression can contribute to the meaning of the propositions in which it appears; or as the claim that a necessary condition for the meaningfulness of any expression in a language is that this expression can contribute to the determination of the truth value of the propositions in which it appears. With this (prima
facie trivial) claim I conclude my analysis of the necessary conditions for the meaningfulness of expressions in language.

I must stress at this point that I did not assume any specific theory of truth or meaning in the previous analysis, and that the final conclusion as to the necessary conditions for the meaningfulness of expressions in language is consistent with any theory of truth or meaning. Indeed, meaning in this discussion can be viewed a ‘black box’. All I am interested in this essay is what effect the occurrence of particular expression in a proposition has on the determination of the truth-value of that proposition. The knowledge of this effect I shall now use in order to determine whether the occurrence of an expression in a proposition does actually contribute to the meaning of that proposition. The question ‘what is meaning?’, therefore, is irrelevant to this discussion.

In light of the previous analysis, I shall now prove the dependence of time on change. I shall do so by showing the dependence of the meaningfulness of temporal expressions on change. I shall do this by proving that temporal expressions can serve no function in describing a changeless reality (by which I mean a reality in which nothing changes, rather than a reality in which there can be no change). As it is a necessary condition for the meaningfulness of any expression in any language that it can contribute to a description of reality, what I shall argue is that the meaningfulness of temporal expressions assumes change, and therefore that time assumes change.

Before turning to the argument, two preliminary remarks are in order. First, in order to prove that every temporal expression assumes change there is no need to examine each temporal expression separately; all that must be shown is that the two temporal relations, ‘before’ and ‘simultaneous with’, assume change. This suffices for proving that every temporal expression assumes change because these relations necessarily obtain between any two events in time: for any two events $x$ and $y$, either $x$ is before $y$, or $y$ is before $x$, or $x$ is simultaneous with $y$. In light of this fact, the collapse of these basic temporal distinctions (that is, the conclusion that in changeless reality there will be no such relations) implies the collapse of all other temporal distinctions.

It may be objected that this claim ignores the conceptual possibility of different temporal series, such that no temporal re-
lations obtain between them, or the conceptual possibility of a branching series, such that temporal relations does not necessarily obtain between any two events in this series. However, this possibility does not affect the present analysis, because in each series, or each branch, every event, or temporal part of event, has a temporal relation to every other event on this series, or branch, or even to temporal parts of the same event, and this assumption is sufficient for the purpose of the present analysis.

I should stress that this conclusion must be accepted even by proponents of the A-theory of time, who believe that the A-determinations of ‘past’, ‘present’, and ‘future’ are more basic than the B-relations of ‘before’ and ‘simultaneous with’, and that the B-relations are defined in terms of the A-determinations. The reason for this is that even if the A-determinations are more basic, the fact that they entail the B-relations means that the collapse of the B-relations indicates the collapse of the A-determinations. Thus, not only (according to the A-theory) can the B-relations be defined in terms of the A-determinations, but the existence of B-relations follows from simple A-determinations. For example, for every two events $x$ and $y$, from the assumption that $x$ is present and $y$ is present it follows that $x$ is simultaneous with $y$.\(^5\) In light of this fact, the collapse of the B-relations, that is, ‘before’ and ‘simultaneous with’, indicates the collapse of the A-determinations.\(^6\) It is also seems, on the other hand, that proponents of the B-theory of time, who believe that only B-relations are real, and that the A-determinations are merely subjective, must accept the claim that the collapse of the B-determinations entails the collapse of every other temporal distinction.

The second preliminary remark relates to the notion of an ‘event’. In the present discussion I will not rely on any consideration which relates to the ontological category of the entities between which the temporal relations obtain. There are two reasons for this restriction: Firstly, in natural language temporal relations are ascribed not only to events, but also to states of affairs and objects. Secondly, although further analysis may prove that temporal relations actually obtain only between events, I cannot assume this conclusion in the present discussion. The reason for this is that the concept of event appears to be conceptually tied to change, and therefore, given that assumption, the conclusion follows immediately that the temporal relations of ‘before’ and ‘si-
multaneous with’, and therefore time, assume change, as evident from the following simple argument:
1. The relations ‘before’ and ‘simultaneous with’ obtain only between events.
2. Event is a change.
   Therefore,
3. The relations ‘before’ and ‘simultaneous with’ do not obtain in changeless reality.

At this point I can turn to the proof of the conceptual dependence of time on change. This proof will be given by showing that temporal expressions, ‘before’ and ‘simultaneous with’, can serve no function in describing a changeless reality. This proof will take the form of a *reductio ad absurdum*. That is, I shall assume the existence of a temporal and changeless reality, and show that contrary to this assumption the temporal expressions of ‘before’ and ‘simultaneous with’ can serve no function in describing this reality. The implication of this conclusion is that a changeless reality is also atemporal. This conclusion will therefore prove that the meaningfulness of temporal expressions assumes change, and thus proves the conceptual dependence of time on change.

I shall assume, therefore, the existence of a temporal and changeless reality, and examine whether the temporal expressions, ‘before’ and ‘simultaneous with’, can serve any function in describing that reality. To begin with the expression ‘before’, it is clear that this expression serves no function in describing this reality. The consideration behind this claim is straightforward: The propositions in which the temporal expression ‘before’ appears are of the general form: ‘a is before b’. However, for any two events x and y, the proposition that x is before y is false. For, either these events simply do not occur, in which case the proposition is false, or these events do occur, in which case they are simultaneous (and not one before the other) and therefore the proposition is false. The explanation for the latter claim is that in a changeless reality an event cannot begin or end, and therefore every event must last through all time. Thus, all the events in the presumed reality are simultaneous, and any proposition that claims that one event is before another event in that reality must be false. The conclusion is thus that the temporal expression ‘before’ can serve no function in describing the assumed reality, as this temporal relation simply does not obtain in this reality.
Turning to the expression ‘simultaneous with’, it might at first seem that this expression does serve a function in describing the assumed reality. The reason is that in a changeless reality all events will last through all time. This entails that in this reality, for any two events \( x \) and \( y \), the proposition that \( x \) is simultaneous with \( y \) is presumably true. However, in order to determine whether the expression ‘simultaneous with’ can serve a function in describing this reality, it is not enough simply to examine whether this expression appears in propositions which describe this reality (that is, true propositions). What must also be examined is whether this expression actually contributes anything to the meaning of the propositions in which it appears. This is tested, according to my previous analysis, by examining whether this expression contributes to the determination of the truth-value of the propositions in which it appears.

The propositions in which the temporal expression ‘simultaneous with’ appears are of the following general form:

(1) \( a \) is simultaneous with \( b \).

What must be considered is whether the temporal expression, ‘simultaneous with’, contributes to the determination of the truth-value of proposition (1). This can be examined by comparing proposition (1) with the proposition which results from omitting the temporal determination from proposition (1). Obviously, the expression ‘simultaneous with’ cannot simply be omitted from proposition (1), because the result would not be a proposition. However, ignoring the temporal relation described by proposition (1), it follows from proposition (1) that events \( a \) and \( b \) occur. The result of omitting the temporal determination from proposition (1) is therefore described in the following proposition:

(2) \( a \) occurs and \( b \) occurs.

The contribution of the expression ‘simultaneous with’ to the determination of the truth-value of proposition (1) can now be examined by comparing its truth-value with the truth-value of proposition (2). The question is whether the addition of the temporal determination to proposition (2), which results in proposition (1), contributes to the determination of the truth-value of the resulting proposition.

Comparing the truth-values of propositions (1) and (2), it is obvious that the expression ‘simultaneous with’ does not contribute anything to the determination of the truth-value of proposition (1). This is evident from the fact that the addition of the
temporal determination of simultaneity to proposition (2) cannot change the original truth-value: either proposition (2) is false, in which case proposition (1) is also false (because proposition (2) follows from proposition (1)); or proposition (2) is true, in which case proposition (1) is also true, (because of the fact that in a changeless reality any two events are simultaneous, as they both exist all the time). The conclusion is therefore that the expression ‘simultaneous with’ fails to contribute to the determination of the truth-value of proposition (1), and so therefore also fails to contribute to its meaning. It can thus be concluded that the expression ‘simultaneous with’ serves no function in describing the assumed reality.

Some may argue that although in a changeless reality every event must last through all time, it is still possible to distinguish between different temporal parts of events. It therefore may seem that the expressions ‘before’ and ‘simultaneous with’ can find a use in describing the temporal relations which obtain between the temporal parts of events which occur in this reality. This suggestion, however, raises the difficulty of distinguishing between the different temporal parts of events in a changeless reality, given that there are no features that differ among these parts. It seems that it is only possible to distinguish different temporal parts of an event by referring directly to different positions in time. This assumes, however, an absolute conception of time, a possibility discussed in the next section.

The result of this analysis clearly shows that the temporal expressions ‘before’ and ‘simultaneous with’ serve no function in describing a changeless reality. It follows that in a changeless reality there are simply no temporal relations, and therefore that contrary to the initial assumption the presumed reality is an atemporal one. This implies that the meaningfulness of temporal expressions assumes change, thus demonstrating the conceptual dependence of time on change.

In this section I shall consider three possible objections to the argument presented in the previous section. The first objection doubts that the collapse of the B-relations entails the collapse of the A-determinations (that is, past, present, and future). Although I believe the consideration I presented earlier is decisive, some may find it unsatisfactory because it does not explain why
the A-determinations cannot contribute to the description of a changeless reality. What is required in order to meet this objection is to show that the same considerations that were used earlier for the analysis of the B-relations, can be applied to prove that the A-determinations can serve no function in describing the assumed temporal and changeless reality.

In the following analysis I shall relate only to the expression ‘in the past’, as exactly the same considerations apply to the expressions ‘in the present’ and ‘in the future’. The expression ‘in the past’ appears in propositions of the following general form: 1. a occurs in the past.

There are two options for understanding the determinations of past, present and future. According to the first option, the determinations of past, present and future are mutually exclusive, and therefore the determination of ‘past’ applies to durable events just in case they occurred in the past but do not occur in the present. According to this understanding of the determination ‘past’, in a changeless reality there are no past events, because in a changeless reality events cannot end, and are therefore all present events. On this understanding of the determination of ‘past’, the expression ‘in the past’ serves no function in describing a changeless reality. According to the second option of understanding the determinations of past, present and future, these determinations are not mutually exclusive, and therefore the determination of ‘past’ as not being excluded by the determination of ‘present’. According to this understanding, the determination of ‘past’ seems to apply to all the events that occur in a changeless reality. However, it can be shown that even given this understanding of the determination of ‘past’, the expression ‘in the past’ fails to contribute to the determination of the truth-value of proposition (1), and therefore serves no function in describing the assumed changeless reality.

In order to examine the contribution of the expression ‘in the past’ to the determination of the truth-value of proposition (1), its truth-value should be compared to the truth-value of the proposition that results from omitting the temporal determination from proposition (1), that is:

2. a occurs.

Comparing the truth-values of propositions (1) and (2) (which is not tensed), it is obvious that the appearance of the expression ‘in the past’ does not contribute to the determinations of
the truth-value of proposition (1). For, either a occurs or a does not occur. If a does not occur, then proposition (2) is false, and so is proposition (1), because proposition (2) follows from proposition (1). If a occurs, then proposition (2) is true, and because of the fact that in a changeless reality all events endure during all the time, proposition (1) is also true. It follows, therefore, that the addition of the temporal expression 'in the past' to proposition (2), which results in proposition (1), does contribute to the determination of the truth-value of the resulting proposition.

The expression 'in the past', I have argued, serves no function in describing the assumed changeless reality. Similar arguments can be made for the expressions 'in the present' and 'in the future'. What follows is that the determinations of past, present and simply do not apply to the assumed changeless reality. It can therefore be concluded that the meaningfulness of the determinations of past, present and future assume change.

The second objection I would like to consider is that it is not enough to show that temporal relations do not obtain in a changeless reality in order to prove that this reality is atemporal reality. According to this objection, in order to prove that temporal and changeless reality is impossible what must be shown is that the concept of duration serves no function in describing this reality. That is, what is required by this objection is to prove that expressions that ascribe duration can serve no function in describing a changeless reality. As I argued before, the collapse of the temporal relations of 'before' and 'simultaneous with' entails the collapse of every temporal distinction, including the concept of duration. This is clearly evident from the fact that claims about duration entail conclusions about temporal relations. For example, in the changeless reality under consideration, in which every event occurs all the time, all events are simultaneous. However, although I believe this consideration is decisive, it fails to explain why ascriptions of duration can serve no function in describing a changeless reality. In order to explain this implication, the same analysis that was presented in the previous cases must be applied to expressions that ascribe duration, to show why they can serve no function in describing a changeless reality.

Ascriptions of duration are made by the use of propositions of the following general form:

1. a occurs for $\Delta t$. 
In considering proposition (1) it must be remembered that in the assumed reality each event has no beginning or end. The question is therefore whether propositions that ascribed finite duration to such events would be true or false. If the ascription of duration is understood as implying that the event in question occurred exactly for the period of time of $\Delta t$, and no more, then all the propositions that ascribe finite durations are false in the assumed reality, and the temporal expressions of duration serve no function in describing that reality. If these ascriptions are understood as true, then it can be proved that such ascription, and ascriptions of eternal or indefinite duration, can serve no function in describing this reality, because they fail to contribute to the determination of the truth-value of the propositions in which they appear.

In order to examine the contribution of the expression that ascribes duration in proposition (1) to the determination of the truth-value of that proposition, the truth-value of proposition (1) should be compared to the truth-value of the proposition that results from omitting the ascription of the temporal duration, that is:

2. $a$ occurs.

Once more, comparison of the two propositions clearly shows that the ascription of the temporal duration does not contribute to the determination of truth-value of proposition (1). For either $a$ occurs or $a$ does not occur. If $a$ does not occur, then proposition (2) is false, and therefore proposition (1), which entails proposition (2), is also false. If $a$ occurs, then proposition (2) is true, and accordingly proposition (1) is also true. It follows therefore that the ascription of duration does not contribute to the determination of the truth-value of proposition (1). It can be concluded that expressions that ascribe duration can serve no function in describing a changeless reality. This conclusion entails that in the presumed reality events will not have any duration, contrary to our initial assumption.

The third and final objection I would like to consider is the most profound. Recall that in Section 3 an account was given of a failed attempt to establish the need for ascriptions of temporal relations in describing the assumed reality solely on the basis of the temporal relations that obtain between events in time, independently of their relation to time itself. However, according to the absolute conception of time, the temporal relations that obtain between events in time are the consequence of their positions in
absolute time. According to this criticism, therefore, the fact that
the argument presented in Section 3 ignored the temporal relations
that obtain between the events and positions in absolute

time is what accounts for the conclusion that the expressions ‘be-

fore’ and ‘simultaneous with’ serve no function in describing the

assumed changeless reality. The possibility of referring to diffe-

rent positions in absolute time, according to this criticism, offers

the possibility of describing the temporal relations that obtain

between different positions in time, and moreover between the
different positions and events in time. This possibility, therefore,
is

supposed to explain the need for the expressions ‘before’ and

‘simultaneous with’ in describing the assumed changeless reality.

As I already argued, the fact the expressions ‘before’ and

‘simultaneous with’ can serve no function in describing the events

in the assumed reality is decisive, and proves that no such rela-
tions obtain between these events. However, because examining

this suggestion can throw some light on the connection between
time and change, I shall accept this objection and prove that no
temporal relations can obtain between the events in the assumed

reality and absolute time. I shall ignore, for this purpose, the dif-
ficulty of referring to different positions in absolute time without
relying on the changes that occur in the world. I shall also ignore
the doubt whether the expressions ‘before’ and ‘simultaneous
with’ can serve any function in describing absolute time, and con-
centrate solely on the relations that are supposed to obtain be-
tween the events in the world and absolute time. I shall assume,
therefore, that different positions in absolute time can be referred
to by the use of the series of expressions $t_1, t_2, t_3, \ldots$, and that
temporal expressions do serve a function in describing the as-
sumed absolute time. I shall show that even given these assump-
tions, the expressions ‘before’ and ‘simultaneous with’ serve no
function in describing the temporal relations that presumably ob-
tain between the events in the assumed reality and the absolute
time.

In what follows I shall focus on the expression ‘before’, as
the same considerations apply to the expression ‘simultaneous
with’. The expression ‘before’, as used in order to describe the
presumed relations between the events in the assumed reality
and absolute time, appears in propositions of the following gene-
ral form:

1. a occurs before $t_n$. 

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In a changeless reality all events endure all the time, and are therefore simultaneous with every position in absolute time. For the expression ‘before’ to serve a function in describing the assumed reality, therefore, it must be understood as not excluding the possibility of event \( a \) being both before and simultaneous with \( t_n \). According to this understanding, I shall examine the contribution of the expression ‘before’ to the determination of the truth-value of proposition (1) by comparing this proposition to the proposition that results from omitting the temporal relation, that is:

2. \( a \) occurs.

Comparing the two propositions clearly shows that the temporal relation does not contribute to the determination of the truth-value of proposition (1). For either \( a \) occurs or \( a \) does not occur. If \( a \) does not occur, then proposition (2) is false, and therefore proposition (1), which entails proposition (2), is also false. If \( a \) occurs, then proposition (2) is true, and accordingly proposition (1) is also true, because in the presumed reality every event occurs all the time, and therefore occurs before any time. It follows that the ascription of duration does not contribute to the determination of the truth-value of proposition (1). It can be concluded, therefore, that the expression ‘before’ serves no function in describing the relations between the events and absolute time in the assumed changeless reality. The same considerations apply to the expression ‘simultaneous with’, which proves that no temporal relations obtain between the events and absolute time in the assumed reality.

It may be objected that this analysis ignores an important distinction which is necessary in describing the temporal relations that obtain between the events and absolute time in the assumed reality. It might be thought that distinguishing between the different temporal parts of each event supports the meaningfulness of the ascription of temporal relations to the event in this reality, as exemplified in the following proposition:

1. The temporal part \( t_n \) of \( a \) is before \( t_{n+1} \).

However, even given these distinctions, the ascription of the temporal relation to event \( a \) still does not contribute to the determination of the truth-value of proposition (1). This is proved by comparing proposition (1) to the proposition which results from separating the temporal distinctions from event \( a \), that is:

2. \( a \) occurs and \( t_n \) is before \( t_{n+1} \).
As it can be seen, proposition (2) follows from proposition (1), and includes not only the occurrence of event a, but also the temporal relation between t_n and t_{n+1}. The only difference between the two propositions is that proposition (2) separates between event a and the temporal distinctions, as if event a were outside absolute time. Comparing the truth-values of both propositions, it is again found that their truth-value is always the same in the assumed reality. For if proposition (2) is false, then so is proposition (1) which entails proposition (2). If, on the other hand, proposition (2) is true, then so is proposition (1). The reason for the latter claim is that if a occurs and t_n is before t_{n+1}, it follows that the temporal part t_n of a is before t_{n+1}. This again shows that the ascription of temporal determinations to event a does not contribute to the determinations of the truth-value of proposition (1).

The implication of the previous analysis is that even assuming the existence of an absolute time the temporal relations of ‘before’ and ‘simultaneous with’ cannot be applied to events in the assumed changeless reality. Hence, even assuming an absolute time, changeless events cannot be introduced into that assumed absolute time. This conclusion refutes the absolute conception of time, for it implies that temporal position is determined by the temporal relations that obtain between the events in time, rather than by the relation of these events to an absolute time.

The previous analysis clearly proves that the temporal expressions ‘before’ and ‘simultaneous with’ serve no function in describing the assumed temporal and changeless reality. It follows from this that, contrary to the initial assumption, such a reality is an atemporal one. This conclusion proves the impossibility of there being a temporal and changeless reality.

It is important to understand the implication of this conclusion. The previous analysis proved that the temporal expressions ‘before’ and ‘simultaneous with’ can serve no function in describing reality unless actual change is assumed. In light of the fact that a necessary condition for the meaningfulness of any expression in language is that the expression can contribute to a description of reality, it follows that the meaningfulness of the temporal expressions ‘before’ and ‘simultaneous with’ assumes change. Taking into account the fact that the collapse of the temporal relations ‘before’ and ‘simultaneous with’ entails the col-
lapse of every temporal distinction, it follows that time conceptually assumes change.

The question that remained to be answered is whether a limited period of time during which nothing changes is possible. The answer is that a limited period of time during which nothing changes is impossible, for the conclusion of the previous analysis is that without change temporal distinctions simply have no grasp on the things which are supposed to exist in time. This conclusion applies equally to the things which are supposed to exist in the changeless period of time: The changes that occur before the supposed period of time and the changed that occur after this supposed period of time are not sufficient for sustaining the existence of this period of time. This is so because the necessary conditions for a meaningful ascription of temporal distinctions simply fail to obtain in the supposed period of time.

It may be objected that when the considerations that were applied in the case if a changeless reality are applied in the case of a limited changeless period of time, the conclusion that follows is that temporal relation can serve a function in describing the changeless period of time. The argument may be made that my proof that temporal expressions can serve no function in describing a changeless reality relied on the fact that it follows from the assumption that in the assumed reality nothing changes that all events are simultaneous, and no event precede another. This is the reason why the ascription of temporal relations to events that occur in a changeless reality could not contribute to the meaning of propositions which claimed the occurrence of these events. However, similar conclusion does not follow if a limited changeless period of time is assumed. For, for any two events $x$ and $y$, which occur during the changeless period of time, it is impossible to conclude whether or not, for example, event $x$ precedes event $y$, in the sense that it begins before event $y$ (during the period of time in which changes do occur). It therefore may seem to follow that the ascription of temporal relations to the events that occur during the changeless period of time does contribute to the description of this period of time.

The first thing to note is that this objection clearly shows that temporal expressions do serve a function in describing the events that suppose to occur during the changeless period of time. However, this fact only proved what was never in dispute, that is, that temporal expressions do serve a function in describing a pe-
period of time during which such changes do occur. For, every event which occurs during the changeless period of time also occurs during the periods of time in which changeless do occur. This is due to that fact that its beginning and end are changes, and therefore must occur during the period of time during which changes do occur. Moreover, as it is these changes which are responsible for the temporal relations which obtain between these events, it only shows that temporal relations obtain (between these events) during the period of time during which changes do occur, and implies nothing that shows that temporal relations obtain during the changeless period of time.

Although I believe the considerations presented earlier are decisive, I believe further support can be given to the claim a limited period of time is impossible. I remind you that in order to determine whether a limited changeless period of time is possible what should be examined is whether temporal expressions can serve a function in describing a limited and changeless period of time. This question can be answered by examining whether the use of temporal expressions for describing the changeless period of time do contribute anything to the overall description of the temporal relations which do obtain in this reality (including the relations which obtain between the events which occur during the changeless period of time). If the answer is negative, it can be concluded that temporal expressions do not serve any function in describing a limited period of time, and therefore that a changeless period of time cannot be part of the history of any reality.

Hence, a changeless period of time cannot be part of the history of reality. This conclusion follows from the fact that the temporal relations which obtain between the events in this reality, including the relations which obtain between the events which occur during the changeless period of time, are determined exclusively by the changes which occur in this reality. For, as I argued in section 3, only the changes that occur before and after the supposed changeless period of time can account for the temporal relations which obtain between the events in this reality, including the events which occur during the changeless period of time. A complete description of the periods of time during which changes do occur therefore entails all the temporal relations which obtain in this reality. This implies that the use of temporal expressions for describing the changeless period of time cannot contribute to the overall description of the temporal relations which do obtain in
this reality. It therefore follows that temporal expressions can serve no function in describing a limited and changeless period of time, which implies that a limited changeless period of time is impossible.

NOTES

1. This may ultimately turn out be no restriction at all, as the application of the concept of change to time itself may be found meaningless. In this paper I shall not address this issue, although I believe that the conclusion of this paper may help to discredit the application of the concept of change to time itself.

2. Although it does not necessarily entails the relational conception of time, as there may be other possibilities.

3. This analysis is based on a model of conceptual analysis that I have explicated and defended elsewhere (Yehezkel 2005).

4. In light of the fact that the relations ‘before’ and ‘after’ are converse relations, that is, \( x \) is before \( y \) if and only if \( y \) is after \( x \), there is no need to examine them separately. It is also possible to define the temporal relation ‘simultaneous with’ as ‘not before and not after’. However, I shall not be content with the analysis of the relation ‘before’ and discuss the relation ‘simultaneous with’ separately, due to the different considerations required for the analysis of each relation.

5. This example is particularly relevant for the present discussion, because in a changeless reality any two events are supposed to be simultaneous.

6. Nevertheless, I shall later show how the same considerations, which show that the B-relations assume change, apply to the A-determinations.

7. Unless \( \Delta t=0 \). However, in this case proposition (1) should be understood as implying that \( a \) does not occur at all. In this case, therefore, the contribution of the ascription of duration to the determination of the truth-value of proposition (1) should be examined by comparison that proposition to the proposition ‘\( a \) does not occur’. This comparison again shows that the ascription of the duration fails to contribute to the determination of the truth-value of proposition (1), because the truth-value of the two propositions is always the same in the assumed reality.
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ON THE CATEGORIES OF EXPLANATION
IN PROCESS AND REALITY

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My time has not yet come, some are born posthumously. – One day or other institutions will be needed in which people live and teach as I understand living and teaching [...] (Nietzsche 1979, 69)

ABSTRACT. Why return to Whitehead today? What reasons could there be for disintering a philosophy many judge to have been well buried even in its day, overtaken by a wave of powerful rejections of all forms of speculative metaphysics? The answer is that Whitehead offers - and knew he offered - critical counters to the age supposed to have overtaken him. His philosophy is not so much outdated as prescient, or perhaps untimely, in that Nietzschean sense which seems ever more important in an age where philosophy and theory are asked to have answers and applications ‘in the moment’ and ‘on demand’. This article attempts to demonstrate that, through a series of critical ideas, Whitehead calls into question two key tenets of current theoretical approaches: first, that empirical science and the philosophies that underpin it have somehow passed beyond metaphysical presuppositions and into a blessed state of positivist explanatory neutrality; second, that theoretical innovations have no place unless subservient to well-determined empirical observations.

1. Misplaced concreteness

In a study of Whitehead’s remarks on philosophical and scientific explanation, it will be argued that his critiques of ‘misplaced concreteness’, of certain usages of common sense and of overly restricted definitions of the event still hold true today and deserve to be heard anew. Whitehead’s arguments resonate with current debates around post-structuralist theory and its relation to metaphysics understood as something to be openly criticized but also as an ineluctable condition for any kind of writing, perhaps any act at all.

This critical value of Whitehead’s work is, however, only part of its contemporary importance. He did not only seek to show the limitations of historical and burgeoning philosophical and scientific positions but also to take account of the good reasons for
those limits by incorporating them into a new speculative philosophy. This article therefore also argues that Whitehead offers a novel account of explanation that is worth consideration as a model that can be added to current forms of explanation as a corrective and as an expansion. It will be shown that the strength of his approach lies in its combination of a deep wariness of any form of metaphysical dogmatism with an inventive response to the need for concepts that allow us to extend our capacity to explain nature and events in a comprehensive manner that neither eschews values in favour of facts, nor facts in favour of one or other dogmatic view of the world. As Philip Rose has argued in his recent book on Whitehead, his philosophy brings together modern science and a return to metaphysics, rather than separating them or claiming priority for one or the other: ‘Thus, for example, Whitehead’s account of efficient causation and the patterns of inheritance or laws of nature to which they give rise, as well as the demand for empirical experimentation and observation which the emergent nature of those patterns demands, seems perfectly compatible both with the methods and the general claims of modern science.’ (Rose 2002, 91) Whitehead is not out of step with modern science, but neither is he enslaved to it, in the sense of seeing philosophy as a mere commentator on scientific theories and discoveries. The challenge he sets himself is instead to offer speculative metaphysics consistent with science yet also consistent with philosophical innovations seeking to explain revolutionary ideas in morals, theology, art and history. Philosophical explanation can then not be subsumed to scientific explanation. It must encompass it within a wider view. It is through this expansion allowed by metaphysical speculation seeking to remain consistent with science that Whitehead provides an alternative to modern day naturalism in philosophy.

The following passage shows Whitehead’s contemporary relevance as a conduit between a genealogical diagnosis of the hidden presuppositions of modern science and a search for a form of thought that maintains its experience-based scepticism. According to Whitehead, a commitment to metaphysical substance remains in accounts of explanation that seek pure objectivity:

Further, by an unfortunate application of the excellent maxim, that our conjectural explanation should always proceed by the utilization of a *vera causa*, whenever science or philosophy has ventured to extra-
polate beyond the limits of the immediate delivery of direct perception, a satisfactory explanation has always complied with the condition that substances with undifferentiated endurance of essential attributes be produced, and that activity be explained as the occasional modification of their accidental qualities and relations. (Process and Reality [PR] 77-8)

Traditional theories of explanation have insisted on the production of causes, yet according to Whitehead this laudable desire to seek real causes rather than unverifiable conjecture falls prey to the law of unintended consequences. An unverified presupposition remains in the search for causes through the form such a cause must take. It must be substantial, that is, endure for some time as is it. This self-identity must be thought of in terms of essential attributes. Any variation in the cause, which there must necessarily be as it takes effect, must be explained in terms of secondary or ‘accidental’ qualities and relations. For example, in order to explain a medical condition we seek its underlying cause. This cause, a genetic mutation for example, is taken to be a real independent substance. This independence allows for an essential definition of the cause, whereby the changes in the cause as it is included in wider processes (such as its inclusion in feedback loops or its dependence on a much wider set of facilitating conditions) can be abstracted from its essential causal role. This error in explanation is therefore connected to Whitehead’s important remarks about ‘misplaced concreteness’. When searching for explanations beyond what we perceive, we take solidity and concreteness (undifferentiated endurance) as the causes we must harmonize with.

Concreteness becomes a fallacy when enduring entities are abstracted from the processes they take place in. For Whitehead, those processes and their extended relations are real concreteness and any free-standing entity or distinction drawn within process reinforces a fallacy regarding concreteness and a misunderstanding about the nature of relations that are not external to concrete terms, but rather internal networks of different processes. Relations come first. They are processes. Any abstraction from them, or cut within them, though perhaps necessary, must remain an incomplete picture of reality. These points have far reaching effects on the concept of explanation. In order to take account of the critical role of Whitehead’s work on explanation, it is therefore necessary to distinguish explanation as developed within philosophies of process and explanation as developed in
contemporary philosophy of science. Here, this distinction will be presented through a link drawn between commons sense and fallacies of concreteness. It will be extended from these roots in common sense through a reflection on the role of abstraction in thought and philosophy. Then, in response to a possible criticism of dogmatism of Whitehead's philosophy, there will be a defense of the claim that his work offers a deeper and more productive account than those seeking to replicate an abstract form of scientific explanation. These defenses depend on accepting that no philosophy can be free of metaphysical presuppositions and finally escape the risk of a latent dogmatism, but that philosophies can be distinguished on how they address their own foundations and seek to avoid inherent flaws in their main principles, such as those implied by their definitions of explanation.

The fallacy of misplaced concreteness, described by Whitehead in *Science and the Modern World* [SMW], can be demonstrated in Descartes' argument from perceived change to unchanging essences in the *Meditations*. In searching for certainty to ward off skeptical doubt, Descartes situates doubt and error in the variation of the things we perceive and in the hold that flawed perception has on our ideas. For example, according to Descartes' arguments, we fall into error when we take any given perception of a block of wax as a final truth, since the block can lose and gain shape, odour and consistency. The smell of honey from beeswax cannot be essential since it can come to pass. The sense associated with that odour cannot be the primary source of certainty, since, with the idea of an essential odour, it has participated in error. Certainty must therefore lie in something that we deduce: the necessary extension of the wax, irrespective of all its other variations. This is a certainty of the mind, rather than of the senses; sensation may well provide the initial data, but reflection alone can provide true knowledge of extension as the essence of the wax. For Descartes, concreteness is therefore in the conception of extension, in the essence of extended substance as grasped in the mind. That this essence is better known through the mind is shown by the knowledge afforded of extension by mathematical knowledge; physical observation proves to be a poor source of certainty, when compared to mathematical deductions. This second shift, from extension to knowledge of its invariant properties, reinforces the fallacy. Abstract substance, deduced by abstracting from sensations, is not only that which is
taken to be genuinely concrete, but this concreteness is given invariant properties that our imprecise sensations fall away from. There is nothing concrete in that candle as your fingerprints mark its surface; its concreteness lies in the equation for its cylindrical shape and its place in our mathematical knowledge of extension.

For Whitehead, this concreteness is misplaced because the process of abstraction leads us away from real processes to ones that are ever further-removed from true concreteness, that is, from observable processes:

My point will be, that we are presenting ourselves with simplified editions of immediate matters of fact. When we examine the primary elements of these simplified editions, we shall find that they are in truth only to be justified as being elaborate logical constructions of a high degree of abstraction. Of course, as a point of individual psychology, we get at the ideas by the rough and ready method of suppressing what appear to be irrelevant details. But when we attempt to justify this suppression of irrelevance, we find that, though there are entities left corresponding to the entities we talk about, yet these entities are of a high degree of abstraction. (SMW, 68)

This process of abstraction is therefore not one that arrives at greater truth, if we understand truth, with Whitehead, to be some kind of adequacy and relevance to reality. Firstly, this is because the details we need to suppress are important parts of the ‘entities we talk about’ and, secondly, it is because the entities and distinctions we arrive at are mistaken accounts of what there is. In her *Penser avec Whitehead: une libre et sauvage création de concepts* Isabelle Stengers gives an extended and illuminating study of the development of the concept of abstraction in Whitehead’s work in relation to the role of abstraction in the natural sciences. His concept of extensive abstraction does not deny the importance of abstraction in the sciences, but rather shows the importance of retaining the context that has been abstracted from, for instance when the thickness implied by a duration is abstracted to a series of points (Stengers 2002, 70-71) or when an object is abstracted from a process in order to allow for recognition (Stengers 2002, 94-5). This worry about abstraction relates Whitehead’s work to Bergson’s in his *Essai sur les données immédiates de la conscience* (Bergson 1959) but Whitehead acknowledges the necessity and importance of abstraction in the sciences, where Bergson sees the geometric treatment of time as inconsistent with time understood as duration (Bergson 1959, 69).
Stengers stresses the risks involved in an overly quick association of Whitehead and Bergson, for instance on the concept of duration, since the holism of Whitehead’s position is not found in Bergson’s work, or not without difficulty, for example in his division between durational consciousness and nature, a division that can be surmounted but that is present at the inception of his theory (Stengers 2002, 72-3)

It is important to note Whitehead’s avoidance of the subject/object distinction here. The distinction is too steeped in the results of the abstractive and divisive processes that he wants to criticise. Instead, his point is that experience is of processes and a process. Irrelevant details are the signs of those processes of change; they are our way into relevance and they are ‘details’ only in the deep sense of markers of underlying organic processes. We should not seek out the essence of wax, but the relations between wax and heat, our ideas of wax and heat, our sensations of them, the infinite processes beyond these – up to and including the processes that allow all of them to appear. The first bead of sweat on the wax, or its honeyed scent, is not a detail when we search for the significance of the relations of the wax to heat and to bees as ongoing processes of mutual transformation. It is therefore important not to confuse Whitehead’s critique of misplaced concreteness with a critique of any situation and identification of objects or processes. For example, Robert Palter notes the difference between a so-called fallacy of location, that Whitehead is not opposed to, and the genuine fallacy of misplaced concreteness:

Now, in the first place, Whitehead himself never called simple location a fallacy; but, more important, Whitehead contends that simple-located objects (of the physical and scientific types) are essential for natural science, and in fact he formulates a precise definition for the location of such objects. The real error – an instance of the fallacy of misplaced concreteness – is to misconstrue these simply-located objects as the concrete elements in nature. (Palter 1960, 148)

The distinction drawn between elements in nature and the location of objects is important because it allows us to avoid the false conclusion that process philosophy cannot deal in objects and their locations because it replaces such objects by processes understood as relations independent of related objects. It may be necessary to refer to simply-located objects in the natural sciences, but this does not mean that such objects are the stuff of
the world. The key step is to accept that reference to simple-location is necessary but to separate this necessity from any inference about the essential nature of simply-located objects as concrete and primary. Instead, they are necessary illusions or partial accounts of a reality that denies their essential role as primary.

It is commonplace to criticise Whitehead’s style and its difficulty, but that is to miss that it is often elegant, with moments of great insight and poetry. It is also to miss his critique of the strong association between sets of words whose metaphysical implications have become so powerfully ingrained in our habits of thought that we can claim forms of neutrality and commonality for them. In fact, they are theory-laden straightjackets. Whitehead knew that only a linguistically creative metaphysics could break the hold of ancient habits disguised as a happy fit between everyday language and objectivity: ‘But all men enjoy flashes of insight beyond meanings already stabilised in etymology and grammar. Hence the role of literature, of the special sciences, and the role of philosophy – in their various ways engaged in finding linguistic expression for meanings as yet unexpressed.’ (Adventure of Ideas [AI], 263)

It is also important to note that Whitehead is not criticising abstraction per se, but its results when applied in a particular kind of abstractive process. Indeed, abstraction plays a crucial role in Whitehead’s philosophy, notably in terms of eternal objects, for example, in Chapter X of Science and the Modern World. He is critical of lop-sided and irreversible processes of abstraction. Firstly, in such cases, there is an abstraction towards an inviolable enduring entity (it is in this sense that the course is irreversible). Secondly, the term of the process is a higher truth from which others descend and against which they are in some way lacking (the result is therefore lop-sided). Thus, in Science and the Modern World (70) and in Process and Reality (63-4), he criticises the distinction, traceable to Descartes and to Locke, between primary substances (such as extended substance) and secondary qualities (such as odours and colours). Notwithstanding possible errors and inaccuracies in Whitehead’s interpretations of their texts, his point is that there is a case of the fallacy of misplaced concreteness when truth and certainty are located in the abstract primary substance. The problem in situating Whitehead’s relation to the philosophical tradition and his often rather hasty, perhaps even hackneyed interpretations of historical figures such
as Descartes, Hume or Locke is discussed by Stengers and accounted for partly through Whitehead’s mathematical background leading him to privilege problems over authors. The historical references are there to situate and illustrate problems rather than as interlocutors in an extended debate or as part of a hermeneutics of an idea or tradition (Stengers 2002, 96-7).

2. Metaphysics and common sense

Forms of monism and dualism produced by misplaced concreteness are the end-target for Whitehead’s argument in *Science and the Modern World*. His concern is to show how both forms impose fixity on the world. This happens, either, through the dualist independence of mind and matter – allowing mind to avoid the variations of matter. Or it is done through the monist privileging of mind or matter, as inclusive of the other, where the privileged term is invariant in some crucial aspect (in ideas and forms or in atoms and laws, for example):

Thereby, modern philosophy has been ruined. It has oscillated in a complex manner between three extremes. There are dualists, who accept matter and mind as on equal basis, and the two varieties of monists, those who put mind inside matter, and those who put matter inside mind. But this juggling with abstractions can never overcome the inherent confusion introduced by the ascription of misplaced concreteness to the scientific scheme of the seventeenth century. (SMW, 72)

Whitehead’s work can be seen as an attempt to rid philosophy of mistaken metaphysical assumptions that have become deeply ingrained due to the unquestioned and apparently uncontroversial assumption that truth lies in some form of invariance. The demand for this endurance in the face of a world of ever-shifting processes has led to a ‘ruination’ brought about by dualism and forms of monism that privilege any given enduring substance and its invariant properties (whether mind or body).

In *Process and Reality*, Whitehead’s critical and constructive turn to metaphysics is introduced as a struggle between two opposed kinds of common sense: common sense as a tendency to reproduce, in simplified form and as obvious and natural, deeply-engrained metaphysical presuppositions, and common sense as differently shared sensations of the processes that make and unmake us, for example, in the ‘withness’ of our bodies. Metaphysics should work with the latter and against the former.
The distinction allows for an explanation of an apparent contradiction between two famous passages of *Process and Reality*. The first occurs as part of the discussion of misplaced concreteness. Dependent on how we read ‘of’ in the following passage, it can be interpreted, either, as critical of common sense, or, as a demand to release it: ‘The primary advantage thus gained is that experience is not interrogated with the benumbing repression of common sense’ (9). In this first remark about common sense, my view is that it should be taken in negative terms as repressive, since common sense, understood as a common reflective capacity, carries limiting metaphysical presuppositions.

Whitehead’s point is that metaphysics should involve precise categorical schemes that are tested in relation to observation, where observation is not strictly scientific, but aesthetic and humane (in the Whiteheadian sense of a humane and civilized ‘withness of the body’ and creative language). Such schemes are not scientific theories; they are logically consistent schemes of metaphysical categories - what we think the world to be, how it evolves, how we should think about it, and what our values should be towards it – informed by past schemes, scientific theories and observation. This sense of creation and adventure is opposed to common sense as a reflection on a supposedly stable set of basic and neutral commonly held propositions.

In criticising the hold of the fallacy of misplaced concreteness, Whitehead is criticising a certain kind of metaphysical scheme. In developing his metaphysics of process, he is putting forward another that he thinks more resistant to failure in relation to observation. Thus, in the famous passage on common sense, the repression of true observation by a shared ‘common sense’ is made possible by metaphysical schema passed into unconscious dogma - a false common sense. Whitehead’s metaphysics is then not fixed for all time. It is speculative: a systematic and coherent schema tested through observation against current science, against the lessons of history, against other schema, against senses of life and of the withness of the body, against artistic and moral values. It is therefore wrong to think that his metaphysics can be dismissed as dogmatic because it is not falsifiable. On the contrary, one of his fundamental insights is that the notion of the error must be extended to the overt or hidden categorical schema underpinning any philosophy: ‘It is part of the special sciences to modify common sense. Philosophy is the welding of imagination
and common sense into restraint upon specialists, and also into an enlargement of their imagination.' (PR, 17)

For Whitehead, common sense is not to fall back onto apparently shared and straightforward concepts or values ('It is common sense that X is true, or a fact, or valuable'). Instead, it should be linked to observation, and to 'immediate experience' – as an experience that does not present a common set of facts, but a common way of experiencing. It should also be linked to imagination – as a creative experimental process. Common sense then takes on a different meaning in an association with novelty and creativity; it is no longer a common set of identifiable concepts, but a common sensual form of experience that invites new and shifting ideas. The form of experience is shared, as imagination and observation, but its content can be, and often is, extremely varied.

Observation is therefore not so much an observation 'of' given facts, but an observation 'with' changing processes. This shift in associations for common sense is crucial for understanding the progressive and hopeful aspect of Whitehead's philosophy. It is not that he is advocating an esoteric and elitist metaphysics. Quite the contrary: he is advocating the common power of an alliance of imagination, sense and creativity, balanced by a wise and historically well-informed and inclusive metaphysics. There is no concreteness in any of the components: they vary together. Concreteness is in these varying relations and how they are brought into a relatively stable focus. Solidity is only a production of a secondary process: the ascription of stable connections, in an actual situation against a doubly infinite background of ideas and infinite causal relations. Variation is not only in the experience as such, but in the relation between given generalisations and observation. This speculative and critical aspect of Whitehead's philosophy is very important because it does not wed him to any given scientific theory or general metaphysics, but rather to a scheme with the greatest potential for inclusion, restraint and enlargement.

I will highlight two strains of criticism of this return to speculative metaphysics (as opposed to metaphysics defined as an analytical and logical reflection on the identity of particular entities). The first can be gathered around what can be called the redundancy question: Why should we construct a speculative metaphysics when the sciences provide us with the superior, per-
haps the only, relatively secure knowledge of the world and of ourselves? A corollary to this argument is that it is, at best, a waste of time or, at worst, a deeply damaging fantasy to indulge in metaphysical speculation. The second criticism – call it the dogmatism attack - collects around the remark that a speculative philosophy must fix its terms in such a way as to depend upon and strengthen a fixed image of the world. A corollary to this point allied to the prior one is that metaphysics, in its distance from science, must fix, either, an over-simplified view of the world, or, one that maintains arcane entities supposed to be resistant to scientific scrutiny.

The following investigation of these criticisms will be in a precise context: Whitehead’s account of explanation. This is because, firstly, if we remain at a level of general commentary, it can easily be shown that Whitehead was acutely aware of these criticisms, indeed, that in fact he used them against his critics, for example, in *Adventures of Ideas*: ‘The history of European thought even to the present day has been tainted by a fatal misunderstanding. It may be termed The Dogmatic Fallacy. The error consists in the persuasion that we are capable of producing notions which are adequately defined in respect to the complexity of relationship required for their illustration in the real world.’ (AI 170)

In other words, we always require an imaginative extension of our scientific concepts and theories in order to connect them back to the complexity of immediate experience. Therefore, speculative metaphysics are necessary aspects of this extension – if we accept that there is no natural and neutral extension we can turn to, for example, in so-called ordinary language. This is a point made by, among others, Leemon B. McHenry in his response to Strawson’s criticisms of process philosophy and his arguments for the primacy of identity as put forward in *Individuals* (Strawson 1990). Identity should not be seen as prior to process due to its priority in ordinary language: ‘Whitehead would not wish to deny that the grosser enduring objects and their properties are the primary objects of discourse; but this, in itself, is no ultimate criterion for determining basic particulars. Whitehead therefore rejects Strawson’s connection of ontological points with identifiability.’ (McHenry 1992, 108) This point about identifiability is also relevant to explanation, since the insistence on identifiable entities in explanations, based on the explanatory role of language using enduring objects, prejudices the question of the real form of the matter to
be explained and of the relation between that matter and the explanation. The critique of process based on the necessity of well-defined individuals misses the stages of abstraction in Whitehead’s philosophy and the points at which they allow a return, but only a partial and incomplete return to such definition. The opposition is then not between identity and process, but between a position that sees identity as the necessary foundation for thought and philosophical enquiry and a position that posits identity as a necessary term within a reality that, as a whole, must be understood as process. The fact that you need to take a freeze frame photograph of a process in order to examine it does not mean that the process itself is constituted by a suite of such frames.

Secondly, the precise context allows for a better-informed discussion of the relation between Whitehead’s metaphysics and positivist philosophy of science. His work can be seen as a reflection on the role of philosophy in a scientific and technical age. It is very distant from many ways of thinking about that role in contemporary philosophy of science, since the latter tend to situate philosophy as learning from and refining the concepts of science, whereas Whitehead - as scientist, mathematician and logician - tends to focus on the limits and wider positive and negative implications of scientific approaches. In this, he is closer to the distinctions drawn by Heidegger, in *Being and Time*, and by Deleuze, in *Difference and Repetition*, between reality drawn up by particular scientific inheritances and legacies, and wider forms of existence and reality. This latter connection is drawn in detail by Isabelle Stengers in her *Penser avec Whitehead: une libre et sauvage creation de concepts*. The most relevant parts of her close analysis of the connection to this discussion of explanation lie in Whitehead’s and Deleuze’s shift from objects to events. So long as events are seen as the primary metaphysical concept then concreteness cannot be deduced from objects and their properties (Stengers 2002, 545).

3. The categories of explanation

In *Adventures of Ideas*, Whitehead makes an important distinction between forms of explanation, in the context of a critical, but also appreciative account of positivism. His widest point is that there must be something more than positivist description and the inclusion of descriptions under general laws that can only be based on fact and open to falsification through experiment.
The more precise distinction is between description and explanation: ‘Newton himself insisted upon the very point. He was not speculating: he was not explaining.’ (AI, 139)

According to Whitehead, explanation and speculation are necessary because mere description cannot escape metaphysical presuppositions and because those presuppositions limit thought, in particular, in its relation to values:

[Modern, i.e. positivist, scholars and science] canalize thought and observation within predetermined limits, based upon inadequate metaphysical assumptions dogmatically assumed […] They exclude from rationalistic thought more of the final values of existence. The intimate timidity of professionalised scholarship circumscribes reason by reducing its topics to triviality, for example, to bare sensa and to tautologies. It then frees itself from criticism by dogmatically handing over the remainder of experience to an animal faith or a religious mysticism, incapable of rationalization. (AI, 141)

These critical comments stand in contrast to the enthusiastic positivist reception of Whitehead’s collaboration with Russell in *Principia Mathematica*. They are also a reaction to the rise of positivism, with the Vienna Circle, and perhaps to its influence on Whitehead’s students and colleagues at Harvard (notably Quine, who was greatly influenced by his visit to members of the Vienna Circle, when touring Europe in 1932, a year before the publication of *Adventures of Ideas*). This reaction is interesting since, in addition to shared mathematical and logical roots, Whitehead and the Vienna Circle also share a profound influence by modern physics and Einstein on relativity, in particular.

Yet, even Whitehead’s earlier work on Einstein, in *The Concept of Nature* [CN], shows the beginning of his ideas on misplaced concreteness and moves towards a philosophy of process; for example, in the shift from substance to events:

Accordingly ‘substance,’ which is a correlative term to ‘predication,’ shares in the ambiguity [of whether predication is about things or events]. If we are to look for substance anywhere, I should find it in events which are in some sense the ultimate substance of nature. [CN, 19]

This move to events is important and carries through to *Process and Reality*. It distances Whitehead’s reception of modern physics from a positivist one because the event is always much more extended than the result of an experiment or a mapping on to a physical definition. Thus, though Whitehead offers
deep and insightful interpretations of Einstein’s work on relativity in relation to space-time, the resulting philosophy of the event is an extension of this relativity and idea of space-time, notably in terms of the concrete organic event, as opposed to concrete individuals implicated in the event (Stengers 2002, 66-7).

In The Concept of Nature, ‘discerned’ events are distinguished from structured sets of events. Discerned events are spatially and temporally bound selections within infinite structures. According to Whitehead, the discerned event (the result of an experiment, for example) must be related to the wider structure in a way that only a speculative and creative metaphysics can account for. This is because the wider structure is not a direct result of experiment or observation:

The disclosure in sense awareness of the structure of events classifies events into those which are discerned in respect to some further individual character and those which are not otherwise disclosed except as elements of the structure. These signified events must include events in the remote past as well as events in the future. [CN, 52]

An event is a cut within a wider set of potentialities (a term that appears later, in Science and the Modern World and Process and Reality). This means that events must both be thought-of as processes, because any event is a relation of transformation, and be thought-of as one of many potential chains of such processes. If it is taken as independent and in abstraction, as experiment is only a partial reflection of three wider series that it cannot give a relevant sense of: the individual (subjective) nature of its own selection; the wider particular series that it is cut out of; and the even wider set of potentialities.

When Whitehead turns to precise categories of explanation in Process and Reality, the distinction between discerned events and wider structures is reflected in the following category of explanation:

(vi) That each entity in the universe of a given concrescence can, so far as its own nature is concerned, be implicated in that concrescence in one or other of many modes; but, in fact it is implicated only in one mode: that the particular mode of implication is only rendered fully determinate by that concrescence, though it is conditioned by the correlate universe. This indetermination, rendered determinate in the real concrescence, is the meaning of ‘potentiality.’ It is a conditioned indetermination, and is therefore called a ‘real’ potentiality. (PR, 23)
Any entity must be explained in terms of how it comes to take its place within a wider set of processes (concrescence) that must itself be set by the explanation (determined in one mode). However, explanation must also take account of the wider set that also conditions it (the correlate universe) and that is itself conditioned.

It is very important to see what this category and its twin (category vii, on the potentiality of ideas or, more properly, ‘eternal objects’) commit Whitehead to:

a. Explanation is primarily in terms of processes that entities take their place in;
b. Any explanation is a selection or ‘relative’;
c. Explanation must take account of the wider set of events and processes that it selects from or cuts into;
d. An explanation must be aware of the determinations that it imposes on the wider set.

Explanation is about process, about a critical sense of the implications of a given angle or viewpoint and about a search for inclusiveness in terms of infinite potential extension of explanation.

However, it is equally important to note what this does not commit Whitehead to:

a. Explanation is not committed to particular types of process or entity. Different scientific accounts can be accommodated, but their process-like side must be emphasized, in terms of description and the emergence of the science;
b. There is no final objective view or account, but neither are there independent subjective ones;
c. There are no universal raw factual processes.

This account is therefore not in competition with science - except where science either claims that there are brute facts, or that explanation should be limited solely to objective description, or that the nature of the universe is primarily about identifiable enduring substances.

It could be objected, here, that science should be the sole arbiter of processes and their spatio-temporal extension. In other words, we can perform positive experiments on the past (carbon dating, for example) and on the future (testing probabilistic fore-
casting models, for example). This would miss Whitehead’s point. He is not concerned about distance in space and time, as a technical problem for scientific experiment and explanation, but in the necessary selection involved in discerning specific events against a backdrop of the structure of all events. This latter is a metaphysical problem about value, coherence and the definition and limits of experience. Why are some events to be considered irrelevant and others not? Why should an explanation abstract from history of ideas, hopes for the future, the creation of new concepts and forms of experience?

These questions should not be understood as demands for knowledge of distant and abstract entities. Rather, Whitehead is defending the view that there is more to thought than positivist knowledge. One argument for this extension lies in the necessary metaphysical presuppositions of positivism itself. In *Adventures of Ideas*, he makes this point by showing how trust in measuring apparatuses and their connection to a speculative model is essential to positivist description, for example, of the presence of a distant planet: ‘The speculative extension of laws, baseless on the Positivist theory, are the obvious issue of speculative metaphysical trust in the material permanences, such as telescopes, observatories, mountains, planets, which are behaving towards each other according to the necessities of the Universe, including theories of their own natures.’ (AI, 152)

Another way of reflecting this important supplementary aspect is through the speculative proposal of different kinds of explanation:

The point is that speculative extension beyond direct observation spells some trust in metaphysics, however vaguely these metaphysical notions might be entertained in explicit thought. Our metaphysical knowledge is slight, superficial, incomplete. Thus errors creep in. But, such as it is, metaphysical understanding guides imagination and purpose. Apart from metaphysical presupposition there can be no civilization. (AI, 152-3)

Our imagination and aims are part of any explanatory structure and only a metaphysical or speculative approach can show this.

So the distinction between explanation and description draws Whitehead’s account away from contemporary (late 20th and 21st Century) analyses of scientific explanation, since these fit his definition of description and are explicitly opposed to specu-
lation as a form of explanation. The contemporary theories are dominated by the desire to account for and analyse scientific explanation on either a causal or a probabilistic model – allied to the desire to limit definitions of correct explanation to the scientific model (for example, in Hempel’s seminal logical positivist approach to explanation in *Aspects of Scientific Explanation* – New York, Free Press, 1970).

Instead, some of the most important metaphysical categories in *Process and Reality* are devoted to a metaphysical definition of explanation. This description shares the spirit of the positivist desire for falsifiability, but on a much wider scale and in a looser manner than positivism. The test is not to be a clearly-defined experimental one, but an application to a series of forms of experience (scientific, aesthetic, moral). Instead of a search for anomalies, Whitehead searches for the best fit between the categories and observation in as wide a set of contexts as possible. The aim is not to restrict the contexts and practices within them, but to open them up. Where falsifiability is concerned with the truth of a given theory, Whitehead’s speculative metaphysics is concerned with avoiding limitation in metaphysics, whilst extending its relevance as far as possible. Thus, in his study of Whitehead’s categorical scheme – a study that shows the strong bridges that can be made between analytic philosophy and Whitehead - R. M. Martin insists on the provisional and open nature of the scheme:

The categorical scheme is put forward in a provisory way, to be improved upon by further reflection, better formulation, deeper insight, and discovery of further facts, scientific laws, and so on. Thus, it is not “dogmatically” contended that the items of the categorical scheme are “severally, clear, distinct and certain”. Such a contention would indeed be unfortunate, and has been abandoned for the most part even in mathematics. (Martin 1974, 2)

This provisional quality is at the heart of what Whitehead understands as the speculative nature of metaphysics, where the categories are always open to revision and to alteration in terms of scientific, philosophical, historical and existential discoveries, as well as critical reflection, novel intuitions and closer analysis. A similar point is made by Wolfe Mays in his studies of Whitehead’s metaphysics and science. To seek generality is not to abandon experimentation, on the contrary, any speculative generality stands and falls on empirical evidence: ‘A philosophical system,
then, needs to have a high degree of generality as well as wide empirical application.' (Mays 1977, 93) Generality and empirical application are then twinned in Whitehead's philosophy since his categories seek as great an extension as possible in the empirical sciences (physics and biology, in particular) but without limiting the categories to the entities proposed in those sciences. On the contrary, the point is to show how it is possible to remain consistent with the discoveries of those sciences yet with an extended and metaphysical set of categories.

However, in contrast to scientific accounts of explanation, the direction of Whitehead's account does not go from law or probability to observed fact, where the former are tested and survive or fall on the latter. Instead, accounts of actual entities in process (well-placed concreteness) are expanded towards known abstractions in order to explain them. So the account of concreteness must be capable of explaining why we have had given abstractions, how they arose, change and take on different roles. In that sense, his definition of explanation can be summed up as the relation of experience as observation to cultural and scientific history:

The explanatory purpose of philosophy is often misunderstood. Its business is to explain the emergence of the more abstract things from the more concrete things. It is a complete mistake to ask how concrete particular fact can be built up out of universals. The answer is 'In no way.' The true philosophic question is, How can concrete fact exhibit entities abstract from itself and yet participated in by its own nature. (PR, 20)

Whitehead's account of explanation must therefore evade limitations in terms of existence and identity; they cannot be held down to specific abstract entities, methods or forms, since this would exclude others. The point is to be able to explain all of them and to be able to relate them in terms of value and their differing roles in process. This means that it would be completely wrong to think that Whitehead is putting forward a theory in competition with science or one that is not falsifiable. On the contrary, he wants to define explanation so that it can include scientific abstraction and observation. Its criteria for failure are lack of inclusiveness and lack of coherence. Its core questions are not: Does this law and relation to fact explain this outcome? Or: Does this probabilistic distribution allied to these facts explain this outcome? The Whiteheadian question is: Does this explanation of
actual occurrences fit this open set of abstractions coherently and without exclusions?

Answers to the two critical questions from the previous section can now be given. Firstly, Whitehead’s metaphysical account of explanation is not redundant because it calls for explanations that cannot be given by science. Instead, there is a necessarily speculative frame and re-interpretation required, even for scientific explanations. This frame provides wider individualised explanations, as well as directions in terms of values. Examples of this kind of context would be the situating of a scientific explanation within the history of that science, within historical accounts of the differing values at play in the processes that the science taps into and within contemporary political movements in relation to hopes for a better world in the future. The opening sections of Adventures of Ideas, give examples of this kind of extension through a history of the struggle to eliminate slavery, where the dialectic between economic, political and social pressures is given a direction through emergent ideas of human freedom.

Secondly, Whitehead’s metaphysical explanation is not dogmatic. On the contrary, it is an attempt to demand of any explanation that it be overt about its dogmatic tendencies in explicitly describing its particular angle on a series of processes, in relation to the potential of others - in principle (but not in practice) all others. Furthermore, it is an attempt to insist that any explanation seek to avoid setting fixed entities at the heart of its implied metaphysics. This is not to set up a meta-level dogmatism, in the sense of illegitimately privileging process over identity and endurance; rather, it is to set the necessity of dealing with identity and endurance within process, not understood as a final description of the state of the world, but as a condition for ongoing forms of thought that do not fall back onto an image of the world as made up of this or that enduring substance. Dogmatism is a property of implied metaphysics – as much as it is a property of unscientific claims about nature.

4. Conclusion: nothing can be omitted

The phrase ‘nothing can be omitted’ occurs in Adventures of Ideas where Whitehead insists that, if we are to classify occasions of experience, nothing can be left out. In order to be able to appeal to every variety, we cannot work with a definition of ex-
planation that commits us to a narrow set, or to a particular approach (his target in the discussion is the priority given to introspection). Whitehead’s metaphysics rises to the challenge of omitting nothing, whilst accepting that some omission is necessary both because where we start can never be universal, and because how we then proceed involves necessary relations of greater and lesser determinacy. Moreover, in omitting nothing, we cannot afford to omit decisions about the values that direct the explanation, the values that it explains and its relevance to what we observe and what we experience (in all their varieties).

His critique of fallacious metaphysical presuppositions, that is, ones that settle on a particular point and see it as inviolable, is an important side to the demand to omit nothing. This is because any such settled point, such as misplaced concreteness, or a belief in particular kind of positive fact or data, or a particular way to knowledge, necessarily closes off an endless creative interaction with processes. But this does not mean that such processes need to be vague and ill-determined. Quite the contrary, in order to omit nothing we must have very precise tools – fashioned with a deep historical sense and an imagination that searches to introduce novelty, rather than mere repetition.

Those tools must remain speculative, in the sense where they are put up for testing against observation – historically and through experience. This is the case for Whitehead’s categories of explanation, where the categories are not necessary and independent of experience, but temporary and as open as possible. This philosophy of process deserves greater prominence in modern theories of explanation. It provides a counter to limited concepts of explanation, in terms of their scientific focus, in terms of what constitutes an explanation, and in terms of the form of explanation. This would allow for a return to what Whitehead calls a civilized approach, that is, a philosophical approach setting events and experiences in wider contexts that they interact with. The great merit of this setting is that history, and a humane drive towards a better future, are given greater prominence, but without having to depend on ideal or material entities independent of process:

The process is itself the actuality, and requires no antecedent static cabinet. Also the processes of the past, in their perishing, are themselves energizing as the complex origin of each novel occasion. The past is the reality at the base of each new actuality. The process is its
absorption into a new unity with ideals and with anticipation, by the opera-
tion of the creative Eros. (AI, 318)

NOTE

This is an extended and revised version of the article ‘The need for
metaphysics: on the categories of explanation in Process and Reality’ first
published in Theory, Culture and Society, Volume 25, Number 24, pp 77-90.
The revision responds to work done in Stengers 2002, Rose 2002, Mays
1977, Martin 1974 and McHenry 1992, as well as making connections to
Bergson and Deleuze more explicit than in the earlier short version.

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THE FRENCH ADMINISTRATIVE LANGUAGE
OF THE EUROPEAN UNION

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ABSTRACT. Orange contends that the French territorial architecture is quite original for several reasons. As Anderson puts it, the French administrative language of the EU has its origins in the French administrative register of the middle of the 20th century. Lavrijssen and de Visser write that national competition or regulatory authorities respectively have emerged as the main authorities in charge of the application and enforcement of the law. Cole and Jones examine the administrative reform process in France since the late 1980s: the key reforms undertaken have sought to delegate greater managerial autonomy to the ministerial fieldservice level. Kuhlmann and Fedele observe that, in the utility sector, municipal suppliers are almost everywhere in a minority position.

Orange contends that the French territorial architecture is quite original for several reasons. Its levels are numerous: the central power (or State), the régions, the départements, the inter-community structures and the town (or village) councils. The central power takes the name of State which makes it different from all the other public powers exercised by elected representatives at lower levels. Orange claims that the constitutional law guarantees the principle of the free administration of territorial authorities: the 2004 law of decentralization has introduced the principle of a coordinator, most of the time defined by the term leader (a position which can be acknowledged by contact to one of the communities by all the other actors in some projects). “Three territorial levels can be taken into account in order to analyze the changes in public action in France: (i) the national state level, that is the level of central and devolved public services controlled by ministries; (ii) the intermediate regional level, including régions and départements on an equal footing, all the more so has the principle of the absence of hierarchy between territorial communities has been confirmed. This level may become the backbone of a regional political structure once the French law as built a regional power in the same pattern as German länder; (iii) the urban level whether it be local councils or structures born from intermunicipal links.”

As Anderson puts it, the French administrative language of the European Union has its origins in the French administrative
register of the middle of the 20th century (it is also a unique contact situation in which translation plays a pivotal role). Anderson describes the current discourse of EU French from the perspective of phraseology and collocational patterning, and in particular in comparison with its French national counterpart: corpus methodology and an inclusive notion of phraseology (embracing typical formulae, “locutions”, and patterning around keywords) reveal subtleties and patterns. Tirard uses a comparative approach to explore privatization and its consequences on public law values, discussing the French model for protecting these values, which limits the scope of privatization and applies a legal regime within which public law norms play an active role (the French experience can enrich American debates on the subject).

Lavrijssen and de Visser write that national competition or regulatory authorities respectively have emerged as the main authorities in charge of the application and enforcement of the law: France operates a dual enforcement structure in competition law, comprising a government department (the DGCCRF) and an independent administrative authority (the Conseil de la Concurrence). French civil courts have pleine jurisdiction to review decisions (they review the entire case file de novo). Lavrijssen and de Visser classify the control carried out as regards decisions by the Conseil de la Concurrence and the ARCEP as intense (in certain cases where the court avails itself of réformation, as extremely intense). A case in which Lavrijssen and de Visser see an application of that approach is SA Lyonnaise des eaux. “The Conseil de la Concurrence had found the existence of a cartel amongst a number of water suppliers, based on inter alia the practice of the cartel members of participating in only a limited number of tenders per year so that members would never be in direct competition with each other for the same contract; and the practice of setting up ad hoc groups composed of several cartel members who would then submit a tender offer as a group rather than individually.”

Lavrijssen and de Visser observe that the differences between the winning and the second best offer were typically limited (there was competition between the undertakings active on the market as regards the great majority of contracts). The practice of submitting offers by ad hoc groups was inspired by the wish on the part of the individual undertakings to establish themselves on the market. Lavrijssen and de Visser argue that the intense control of administrative decisions comes to the fore in
the judgment by the *Conseil d'État* in the matter of *Scoot-France et Fonecta*: information services by telephone were offered by the operators of communications networks as well as by other providers. “The *Conseil d'État* first decided that the decision infringed the principle of equality, by treating differently undertakings that form the viewpoint of consumers offered the same service. The *Conseil d'État* secondly held that the ARCEP had misunderstood the objective of effective and loyal competition between operators of communications networks and other providers of information services by telephone. Since both the operators and the other providers were offering a service that was substitutable from a consumer perspective, they were accordingly active in the same relevant market.”

Cole and Jones examine the administrative reform process in France since the late 1980s: the key reforms undertaken have sought to delegate greater managerial autonomy to the ministerial field-service level. According to Cole and Jones, the capacity of the field services to adopt a proactive approach to management reform depended on five key variables: internal organizational dynamics; the attitude of the central services to meso-level autonomy; the degree of institutional receptivity to change; the type of service delivery; and the extent of penetration in local networks. Cole and Jones reject straightforward convergence to the New Policy Management norm: changes in public management norms require either endogenous discursive shifts or else need to be interpreted in terms of domestic registers that are acceptable or understandable to those charged with implementing reform.

Kuhlmann and Fedele observe that, in France, in the utility sector, municipal suppliers are almost everywhere in a minority position. Nearly all the firms with which French municipalities have contracts belong to the same big companies operating at national if not international level. In the field of social services, the delegation of service provision to external, non-public actors is gaining ground. Central government compensations are not planned to increase progressively with the numbers of recipients. “Taking into account that RMI-dependence is growing in most of the French Départements there will be an increasing gap between financial transfers from the State on the one hand and RMI-payments by the Départements on the other. Leaving aside here the general councils' claims of completely determining the amount of
RMI and thereby substituting uniform national legislation, the Départements and communes have pursued at least two strategies to cope with their new RMI-competencies. Kuhlmann and Fedele state that empirical evidence on effects of functional privatization and délégation on performance is limited. There seems to be a trend of “re-municipalization” in some French cities departing to some extent from the traditional model of délégation. Privatization and contracting out of local public services have caused losses in political control. “In France public services have been subject to contracting out and outsourcing since the 19th century. [...] Private or ‘associative’ suppliers have also often not well performed and failed citizens’ demands. In the city of Le Havre, where school canteens have been ‘delegated’ to an association, parents were not willing to accept increasing prices accompanied by a decreasing service quality. [...] Besides the widespread practice of concession and délégation, there is an increasing tendency of satellisation.”

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5. Ibid., p. 128.
8. Ibid., pp. 4–6.
ABSTRACT. Blache et al. present the Property Grammars formalism in which linguistic information corresponds to different kinds of constraints. Huffman offers an analysis of the French clitic object pronouns lui and le in the radically functional Columbia school framework, contrasting this framework with sentence-based treatments of case selection. Perrier models natural languages starting from linguistic knowledge and giving a central role to experimentation, expressing the linguistic knowledge by means of grammars and lexicons with the largest possible coverage.

Blache et al. argue in favor of a fully constraint-based approach in the perspective of grammar development: representing syntactic information by means of constraints makes it possible to include several parsers at the core of the development process. Blache et al.’s approach consists in using different tools, namely a POS-tagger, a shallow parser, for developing an electronic grammar for French taking into account various phenomena and different uses including spoken language syntactic turns. Using a fully constraint-based formalism for representing syntactic information offers several advantages that can have deep consequences in grammar development (it is possible to conceive a grammar development architecture starting from zero and taking advantage of evaluation tools). Blache et al. present the Property Grammars formalism in which linguistic information corresponds to different kinds of constraints: parsing comes to constraint satisfaction and the result of a parse corresponds to the state of the constraint system. “The fact that the set of properties describing a category forms a graph is a side effect. It indicates certain cohesion of the description coming from the fact that the description of the category is specified, at the difference of classical generative approaches, not in terms of relations between some constituents and a projection, but only in terms of relations between these constituents. A grammar is then formed by a set of such constraint graphs. The important point, especially in the perspective of grammar engineering, is that all constraints are at the same level and then independent from each other.”

Blache et al. state
that, in GP, describing a category consists in finding all the relevant constraints in the grammar and evaluating them: the parsing process consists in identifying the set of constraints that can be evaluated for the categories belonging to this set (any constraint belonging to a constraint graph, the evaluation process comes to activate one, or several, constraint graphs). All information is represented by constraints and all constraints are independent. A grammar has to be coherent, consistent and complete when using generative formalisms. “A non-deterministic deep parser can be used as a real grammar development platform. It makes it possible to obtain various results for any input, while entrusting to him either the totality of grammar or one of its subpart, and then being able for example to focus on a subset of properties (to precisely observe their operation, their weight and their incidence on the parse), or on a subset of categories (to focus on the results obtained, the number of non relevant parses, to observe if one can deduce a recurring error pattern and try to avoid it, or on the contrary a recurring satisfactory pattern), without taking into account the rest of the grammar.”

Huffman offers an analysis of the French clitic object pronouns lui and le in the radically functional Columbia school framework, contrasting this framework with sentence-based treatments of case selection: features of the sentence such as subject and object relations, normally taken as pretheoretical categories of observation about language, are in fact part of a theory of language which does not withstand empirical testing. The solution Huffman offers emerges from an innovative instrumental view of linguistic meaning: communicative output is determined only partially and indirectly by purely linguistic input, with extralinguistic knowledge and human inference bridging the gap. Huffman’s approach entails identification of the pragmatic factors influencing case selection and a reevaluation of thematic-role theory, and reveals the crucial impact of discourse on the structure as well as the functioning of grammar.

Perrier models natural languages starting from linguistic knowledge and giving a central role to experimentation, expressing the linguistic knowledge by means of grammars and lexicons with the largest possible coverage (grammars have to represent all common linguistic phenomena and lexicons have to include the most frequent words with their most frequent use). Perrier maintains that XMG provides a high level language for writing a
source grammar and a compiler which translates this grammar into an operational object grammar (the grammar is designed in such a way that it can be linked with a lexicon independent of the formalism, where entries appear as feature structures). Perrier writes that in a derivational view of the syntax of natural languages, the basic objects are trees and they are composed together in a more or less sophisticated way (a tree description can be viewed either as an under-specified tree, or as the specification of a tree family, each tree being a model of the specification). According to Perrier, a particular interaction grammar is defined by a finite set of elementary PTDs, which generates a tree language. “A tree belongs to the language if it is a model of a finite set of elementary PTDs with two properties: (i) It is saturated: every positive feature \( t \rightarrow v \) is matched with its dual feature \( t \leftarrow v \) in the model and vice versa. Moreover, every virtual feature has to find an actual corresponding feature in the model; (ii) It is minimal: the model has to add a minimum of information to the initial descriptions (it cannot add immediate dominance relations or features that do not exist in the initial descriptions).” Perrier contends that a tree description is a finite set of nodes structured by two kinds of relations: dominance and precedence. In the parsing of a sentence, it is possible to select the only PTDs that are anchored by words of the sentence. Perrier uses underspecified dominance to represent unbounded dependencies. The feature structures that can be associated with these relations allow the expression of constraints on these dependencies. The grammar is totally lexicalized (each elementary PTD of the grammar has a unique anchor node intended to be linked with a word of the language). “A grammar is organized as a class hierarchy by means of two composition operations: conjunction and disjunction. It is also structured according to several dimensions, which are present in all classes. Our grammar uses only two dimensions: the first one is the syntactic dimension, where objects are PTDs, and the second one is the dimension of the interface with the lexicon, where objects are feature structures. To define the conjunction of two classes one needs to specify the way of combining the components of each dimension: for the syntactic dimension, PTD union is performed; for the lexicon interface dimension, it is realized as unification between feature structures.”

Bès and Gardent explain that to account for the semi-free word order of French, Unification Categorial Grammar is exten-
ded in two ways: first, verbal valencies are contained in a set rather than in a list; second, type-raised NP’s are described as two-sided functors. The complicated pattern of French linearity phenomena can be treated in a framework closely related to UCG. The syntactic behavior of constituents is dissociated from surface ordering. Bès and Gardent observe that word order in French is characterized by three main facts: (i) the positioning (left or right) of a particular argument with respect to the verb is relatively free; (ii) there seems to be no clear regularities governing the relative ordering of a sequence of arguments; (iii) co-occurrence restrictions hold between constituents. On Bès and Gardent’s reading, a lexical NP can be subject or object: if it is subject and it is to the left of the verb, it cannot be immediately followed by a wh-constituent; if it is subject and it is placed to the right of the verb, it must be immediately adjacent to it. “The current grammar accounts for the core local linearity phenomena of French i.e., auxiliary and clitic order, clitic placement in simple and in complex verb phrases, clitic doubling and interrogative inversions. [...] Following GPSG, our formalism does not associate verb valencies with any intrinsic order. An interesting difference however is that LP statements are not used either. In French, clitic ordering shows that order constraints may hold between items belonging to different local trees.”

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2. Ibid., p. 128.
5. Ibid., p. 4.
ABSTRACT. As Kempen puts it, grammar instruction cannot restrict itself to conveying grammatical insights to the students. Perrier builds the grammar with the XMG tool, which allows grammars to be written with a high level of abstraction in a modular setting and to be compiled into low level grammars, usable by NLP systems. Blache et al. present an experiment based on a constraint-based linguistic formalism consisting in developing a broad-coverage grammar by means of corpus-based techniques.

Kempen claims that the problem of homophonous word-forms with syntax-sensitive spelling differences is widespread, witnessing inflectional forms such as aimer, aimez, aimé, aimée, aimés and aimée with identical pronunciation. Grammar checkers for arbitrary texts in French run the risk of basing spelling advice on incorrect syntactic analyses. Grammar rules such as those underlying the syntax-sensitive aspects of verb form spelling may be indispensable. Grammar rules couched in vaguely familiar jargon are hard to apply correctly in writing. Kempen proposes several ingredients for an improved grammar didactics that may help learners to gain a better understanding of the structure of words and sentences than is possible through current teaching methods: the ingredients presuppose interactive multimedia techniques for visualizing and manipulating the structure of words and sentences. Kempen maintains that the lexical frames get combined by an operation called unification: a root node may be merged with an identically labeled non-root node of another frame if their features are compatible. A more or less conventional syntactic tree is constructed from the unified lexical frames. “In order to enable talking about creatures of varying types, the teacher (with the graphical program following suit) gradually introduces the grammatical terms. The operational definitions of these concepts (that is, directions for locating concept instances in a sentence) can be explained and tried out in terms of graphical properties and manipulations. For instance, after the pupils have
learned to identify the finite verb of simple sentences, then the Subject and the Direct Object phrases can be located by following the tentacles of the verb creature.”

In order to convey the idea of lexical frames to fifth- and sixth-graders, Kempen proposes using the metaphor of family relationships: lexical frames become members of a family (depicted as some sort of phantasy creatures), and the grammatical relations between frames in a sentence correspond to kinship relations, to be visualized as a kind of family portrait with the members holding each other. As Kempen puts it, grammar instruction cannot restrict itself to conveying grammatical insights to the students. “An equally important goal is skill acquisition: students should reach a sufficiently high level of proficiency in applying the operational definitions of the grammatical concepts, e.g. in locating parts-of-speech and syntactic constituents of various types, in recognizing their morpho-syntactic properties, and in constructing utterances that instantiate such concepts. Any grammar curriculum should therefore provide extensive and attractive materials to exercise these skills. The second didactic asset offered by multimedia technology, in addition to visualization of knowledge domains, is interaction with objects in those domains. It opens up worlds of attractive games and exercises, whose motivating potential and exploratory and feedback opportunities have as yet hardly been exploited by grammar instruction methods.”

Perrier presents a large coverage French grammar written with the formalism of Interaction Grammars: the grammar is viewed as a constraint system, which is expressed through the notion of tree description, and the resource sensitivity of natural languages is used as a syntactic composition principle by means of a system of polarities. Perrier has designed a new formalism, Interaction Grammars (IG), the goal of which is to synthesize two key ideas, expressed in two kinds of formalisms up to now: using the resource sensitivity of natural languages as a principle of syntactic composition, which is a characteristic feature of Categorial Grammars (CG), and viewing grammars as constraint, which is a feature of unification grammars such as LFG or HPSG. Perrier distinguishes two levels in the grammar. The source grammar aims at representing linguistic generalizations and it is written by a human, while the object grammar is directly usable by a NLP system and results from the compilation of the first one. It is possible to build realistic grammatical resources, which integrate
a refined linguistic knowledge with a large coverage. IG is devoted to the syntax and semantics of natural languages and uses two notions: tree description and polarity. Perrier contends that dominance relations can be immediate or large, and that constraints can be put on intermediate nodes for large dominance relations. Nodes are labeled with features describing their morpho-syntactic properties. Each elementary PTD has a unique anchor, which is used for linking the description with a word of the language. “The set of PTDs being selected, the building of a saturated and minimal model is performed step by step by means of a merging operation between nodes, which is guided by one of the following constraints: (i) neutralize a positive feature with a negative feature having the same name and carrying a value unifiable with the value of the first feature; (ii) realize a virtual feature by combining it with an actual feature (a positive, negative or neutral feature) having the same name and carrying a value unifying with the value of the first feature.”

Perrier writes that, in French, negation can be expressed with the help of the particle ne paired with a specific determiner, pronoun or adverb: the position of the particle ne is fixed before an inflected verb but the second component of the pair, if it is a determiner like aucun or a pronoun like personne, can have a relatively free position in the sentence. In French, the position of adjuncts in the sentence is relatively free. According to Perrier, sometimes, introducing an additional level is justified linguistically, but in most cases it introduces artificial complexity and ambiguity. Perrier introduces virtual polarities: this allows a modifier to be added as a new daughter of the node that it modifies without changing the rest of the syntactic tree, in which the modified node is situated (this operation is called sister adjunction). Perrier builds the grammar with the XMG tool, which allows grammars to be written with a high level of abstraction in a modular setting and to be compiled into low level grammars, usable by NLP systems. “Each PTD is associated to a feature structure, which describes a syntactic frame corresponding to words able to anchor the PTD, the description being independent of the formalism. This feature structure constitutes the PTD interface with the lexicon. The set of features used in the interfaces differs from that used in PTDs because they do not play the same role: they do not aim at describing syntactic structures but they are used for describing the morpho-
Blache et al. present an outstanding experiment based on a constraint-based linguistic formalism consisting in developing a broad-coverage grammar by means of corpus-based techniques. Blache et al. parse previously tagged and disambiguated corpus by means of a deep non-deterministic parser, and interpret the results in order to identify syntactic phenomena beyond the scope of the grammar. Blache et al. present the $PG$ formalism, illustrating the fact that constraints constitute a radically different approach in the perspective of parsing unrestricted texts (in $PG$, a different kind of syntactic information corresponds to different kind of constraints). Even if we preserve a hierarchical representation of syntactic information, the notion of constituency does not constitute an explicit information. Activating a graph is simply the consequence of the evaluation of the constraint system. After evaluation, for each graph, Blache et al. obtain the set of constraints that are satisfied plus eventually the set of constraints that are violated. “One of the main differences between a fully constraint-based approach such as $PG$ and other classical generative techniques lies in the fact that there is no need to build a structure before being able to verify its properties. More precisely, generative method consists in expressing relations in terms of structures where $PG$ uses only relations between objects. […] The development of a broad-coverage grammar for French relies, within our framework, on several points: a basic corpus, a core grammar, and some tools (several parsers).” It is necessary within this grammar development framework to use a tool for comparing parsing results which is fast, complete and efficient.

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2. Ibid., pp. 10–11.
4. Ibid., p. 4.
ABSTRACT. Partee says that a grammar should be able to be cast in the following form: the syntax is an algebra, the semantics is an algebra, and there is a homomorphism mapping elements of the syntactic algebra onto elements of the semantic algebra. The Montague grammar is based on formal logic (especially lambda calculus and set theory), and makes use of the notions of intensional logic and type theory. Rorty claims that all human beings carry about a set of words which they employ to justify their actions, their beliefs and their lives.

Partee says that a grammar should be able to be cast in the following form: the syntax is an algebra, the semantics is an algebra, and there is a homomorphism mapping elements of the syntactic algebra onto elements of the semantic algebra. The richness of Montague’s logic is a crucial factor in the possibility of giving a compositional semantic interpretation to independently motivated syntactic structure. Montague analyzes intensions as functions from possible worlds to corresponding extensions: propositions as functions from possible worlds to truth values, individual concepts as functions from possible worlds to individuals, properties as functions from possible worlds to sets. Montague’s bottom-up syntax combines concatenation and transformation operations in single recursive grammatical rules, building well-formed expressions of all sorts of categories directly. Montague uses meaning postulates to distinguish entailments due to individual lexical items from entailments due to the semantics of a grammatical construction; the richness of Montague’s semantics lends itself to a monostratal syntax with a rich lexical component. Warren and Friedman describe how semantics can be used during parsing to reduce the combinatorial explosion of syntactic ambiguity in Montague grammar, and place semantic equivalence parsing in the context of the very general definition of an interpreted language as a homomorphism between syntactic and se-
Montague's use of variables allows complicated interactions between different variable-antecedent pairs. Each parse tree is translated by Montague's rules into a formula of intensional logic to which logical reductions are immediately applied; the trees produced by the parser are expressions in the disambiguated language, so scope is determined, pronoun antecedents are indicated, and each tree has a unique (unreduced) translation.

Bach claims that Chomsky's thesis is that English can be described as a formal system, while Montague's thesis is that English can be described as an interpreted formal system. The Montague grammar is based on formal logic (especially lambda calculus and set theory), and makes use of the notions of intensional logic and type theory. The introduction of truth-condition as the basic semantic property of a sentence by Montague contributed to the expansion of semantics research. There is no intrinsic difference between natural and formal languages. Natural language can be described in terms of a formal syntax and an associated compositional semantics. Each disambiguated syntactic expression denotes a function in a function space constructed over a set of entities. The use of IL as an intermediate form is dispensable and serves only to help explain the relationship between syntax and semantics. A logic combining possible worlds with higher-order logic provides a flexible and powerful tool for natural language semantics. A Montague grammar for a fragment of a language consists of a syntactic account of that fragment, which defines a set of syntactic structures showing how complex phrases are decomposed into components, and a semantic component that shows how a semantic value can be assigned to the structure given an assignment of values to the lexical items occurring in the structure. Fox and Lappin note that Montague defines intensions as functions from possible worlds to extensions in that world. Montague's version of IL is higher order, allowing quantification over entities and functions of any level.

Montague's semantic rules correspond to Hirst's semantic interpretation (the process of mapping from a syntactically analyzed sentence of natural language to a representation of its meaning). For Montague, semantic objects, the results of the semantic translation, are such things as individual concepts. Given a particular syntactic category, such as proper noun or adverb, Montague says that the meaning of a constituent of that category
was a semantic object of such and such a type. The syntactic rules and semantic rules are in one-to-one correspondence (each time a particular syntactic rule applies, so does the corresponding semantic rule). The meaning of the whole is a systematic function of the meaning of the parts. Hirst contends that Montague semantics as currently formulated is computationally impractical: it throws around huge sets, infinite objects, functions of functions, and piles of possible worlds with great abandon.  

Rorty claims that all human beings carry about a set of words which they employ to justify their actions, their beliefs and their lives. “These are the words in which we formulate praise of our friends and contempt for our enemies, our long-term projects. Our deepest self-doubts, our highest hopes. […] If doubt is cast on the worth of these words, their user has no non circular argumentative resource. Those words are as far as he can go with language; beyond them there is only helpless passivity or a resort to force.”  

If theories are held to be distinct from their linguistic formulations, then they themselves are incapable of being truth apt (only their linguistic descriptions can be true or false). Huffman shows that the correct categories are neither those of structural case nor those of lexical case, but rather, semantic ones: traditionally, anomalies in the selection of dative and accusative case in French, such as case government, use of the dative for possession and disadvantaging, its use in the faire-causative construction, etc. have been used to support the idea of an autonomous, non-functional central core of syntactic phenomena in language. Huffman proposes semantic constants for lui and le which render all their occurrences explicable in a straightforward way (the same functional perspective informs issues of cliticity and pronominalization as well). Blache et al. preserve throughout a detailed, step-by-step elaboration, a general point of view on the efficiency of the grammar, which is of primary importance (the provided results remain homogeneous).
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GOD AND RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE

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ABSTRACT. James says that a genuine first-hand religious experience is bound to be a heterodoxy to its witnesses, the prophet appearing as a mere lonely madman. Küng points out that God is not a supramundane being above the clouds, in the physical heaven, and is not an extra-mundane being, beyond the stars, in the metaphysical heaven. Paul writes that the church does not propose that science should become religion or religion, science.

Robinson claims that Jesus says nothing on any social question except divorce, and all ascriptions of any political doctrine to him are false. “He does not pronounce about war, capital punishment, gambling, justice, the administration of law, the distribution of goods, socialism, equality of income, equality of sex, equality of color, equality of opportunity, tyranny, freedom, slavery, self-determination, or contraception. There is nothing Christian about being for any of these things, nor about being against them, if we mean by ‘Christian’ what Jesus taught according to the synoptic gospels.”¹ Hartshorne holds that God contrasts with creatures, not as infinite with infinite, but as infinite-and-finite contrasts with the merely fragmentary and only surpassably excellent creatures: the divine finitude is all-encompassing (it is not, as ours is, only a fragment of reality).² Kieffer points out that we are in need of an ethic that can clarify moral dilemmas and resolve conflicts (we need to engage in ethical theorizing that is responsive to current needs). “Whatever is our role, concerned lay citizen, medical practitioner, scientific researcher, and patient – we need some principles to help us resolve the perplexing ethical problems that are thrust upon us in this rapidly advancing technological society. The thesis proposed was this: Humans develop their ethics by the method of public discussion leading to public acceptance of what appears to be right and good and a rejection of that which is judged wrong and bad. Further, our conception of which is ethical, right and good changes in the light of new knowledge and continuing debate.”³

James says that a genuine first-hand religious experience is bound to be a heterodoxy to its witnesses, the prophet appearing
as a mere lonely madman. “If his doctrine prove contagious enough to spread to others, it becomes a definite and labeled heresy. But if it then still prove contagious enough to triumph over persecution, it becomes itself an orthodoxy; and when a religion becomes an orthodoxy, its day of inwardness is over: the spring is dry; the faithful live at second hand exclusively and stone the prophets in their turn. The new church, in spite of whatever human goodness it may foster, can henceforth be counted on as a staunch ally in every attempt to stifle the spontaneous religious spirit, and to stop all later bubblings of the fountain from which in purer days it drew its own supply of inspiration.”

Fukuyama insists that the kind of moral autonomy that has traditionally been said to give us dignity is the freedom to accept or reject moral rules that come from sources higher than ourselves, “and not the freedom to make up those rules in the first place.”

Ruest remarks that God has created human beings as persons, and that he respects this dignity he has chosen to give them: He uses loving moral persuasion and leaves them the freedom of choice. “It appears that, in order to guard human freedom, evidence for creation has to be hidden in logical ambiguity. God has thrown the veil of stochastics over his footsteps. In this life, we ‘walk by faith, not by sight’.”

According to Cicero, true law is right reason in agreement with nature: it summons to duty by its commands, and averts from wrongdoing by its prohibitions, and it does not lay its commands or prohibitions upon good men in vain, though neither have any effect on the wicked. Cicero maintains that it is a sin to try to alter this law, nor is it allowable to attempt to repeal any part of it, and it is impossible to abolish it entirely. “We cannot be freed from its obligations by senate or people, and we need not look outside ourselves for an expounder or interpreter of it. And there will not be different laws at Rome and at Athens, or different laws now and in the future, but one eternal and unchangeable law will be valid for all nations and all times, and there will be one master and ruler, that is, God, over us all, for he is the author of this law, its promulgator, and its enforcing judge. Whoever is disobedient is fleeing from himself and denying his human nature, and by reason of this very fact he will suffer the worst penalties, even if he escapes what is commonly considered punishment.”

Schrödinger explains that living matter (while not eluding the “laws of physics” as established up to date) is likely to involve “other laws of physics”, which once they have been revealed will form just as integral a part of this
science as the former: from all we have learnt about the structure of living matter, we must be prepared to find it working in a manner that cannot be reduced to the ordinary laws of physics. “And that not on the ground that there is any ‘new force’ or what not, directing the behavior of the single atoms within a living organism, but because the construction is different from anything we have yet tested in the physical laboratory. [...] We must therefore not be discouraged by the difficulty of interpreting life by the ordinary laws of physics. For that is just what is to be expected from the knowledge we have gained of the structure of living matter. We must be prepared to find a new type of physical law prevailing in it.”

Hartshorne argues that for whereas we are left unaffected by the misery or joy of millions we do not know even the existence of, God has nowhere to hide himself from any sorrow or joy whatever, but must share in all the wealth and all the burden of the world. “The cross is a sublime and matchless symbol of this, partly nullified by theological efforts to restrict suffering and sympathy to God as incarnate.”

Ricoeur claims that the general tendency of literary and biblical studies since the mid-19th century has been to link the contents of literary works to the social conditions of the community in which these works were produced or to which they were directed. “To explain a text was essentially to consider it as the expression of certain socio-cultural needs and as a response to certain perplexities localized in time and space.”

Küng points out that God is not a supramundane being above the clouds, in the physical heaven, and is not an extramundane being, beyond the stars, in the metaphysical heaven. “God is in this world, and this world is in God. There must be a uniform understanding of reality. God is not only a (supreme) finite alongside finite things. He is in fact the infinite in the finite, transcendence in immanence, the absolute in the relative. It is precisely as the absolute that God can enter into a relationship with the world of man. [...] God is therefore the absolute who includes and creates relativity, who, precisely as free, makes possible and actualizes relationship: God as the absolute-relative, here-hereafter, transcendent-immanent, all-embracing and all-permeating most real reality in the heart of things, in man, in the history of mankind, in the world.”

Paul writes that the church does not propose that science should become religion or religion, science: unity always presupposes the diversity and the integrity of its elements: each of these members should become not less itself but
more itself in a dynamic interchange, for a unity in which one of the
elements is reduced to the other is destructive, false in its promises
of harmony and ruinous of the integrity of its components. “Both
religion and science must preserve their own autonomy and their
distinctiveness. Religion is not founded on science nor is science
an extension of religion. Each should possess its own principles, its
pattern of procedures, its diversities of interpretation and its own
conclusions. [...] While each can and should support the other as
distinct dimensions of a common human culture, neither ought to
assume that it forms a necessary premise for the other.”12

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ABSTRACT. Antioh Cantemir’s substantial effort is his Petrida, an unfinished epic glorifying the Emperor. His language seems antiquated to the modern reader: he stuck to the gallic system of rhyming, which was subsequently discarded. Antioh Cantemir’s poems are generally satires in the manner of Juvenal. Cornicello contends that the music of the young French composers was based on slow harmonic development, and was devoid of a prominent melody or a strong sense of pulse. Stern argues that the element of chance has become an accepted contemporary aesthetic, which has challenged musicians to reexamine and reevaluate the elements of music and musical sound.

Antioh Cantemir (1708-1744) gains the attention of the social reformers thanks to its satires in Boileau, plays a particularly important part in the standardization of the current language, and proposes, in particular, three distinct literary kinds. Antioche Cantemir is the craftsman of the creation of the Academy of Moscow. His work reflects the scope and purpose of Peter the Great’s European-style reforms, standing out as a contribution to the integration of Russian culture into the world circuit of Classicism.

Morgan claims that all this music, drawn from different popular, folk, ethnic and historical tradition, becomes part of a vast electronic network within which any given item necessarily loses something of its uniqueness and particularity. “As a fragment within a larger eclectic mix, it no longer has its own well-defined place or cultural function: it becomes just another component in the ubiquitous amalgam now commonly referred to as ‘world music.’ With so much music available, musical culture loses its traditional focus, becoming an eclectic synthesis, a re-
cycling of material drawn from a storehouse that is so large and flexible as to have no real shape of its own.”¹

Cornicello contends that the music of the young French composers was based on slow harmonic development, and was devoid of a prominent melody or a strong sense of pulse. The musical surface of a typical spectral work reveals occasional fragments of melody (the main focus is the overall timbre). A spectrum is often produced from an analysis of a particular note played on a specific instrument. The spectral processes can produce a motion from harmonic stasis to perturbation to stasis. Spectral music differs from much traditional music. “The composers often choose to modulate, by any number of means, to a different spectrum. The second spectrum may be from a different instrumental source, or it may be an electronically-produced sound. Furthermore, the new spectrum could contain a more ‘dissonant’ timbre if the spectrum is unrelated to a harmonic series. The composer is able to produce different types of spectra, some of which sound more ‘dissonant’ to him, while others sound more ‘consonant’.”² Cornicello maintains that the spectral composers often utilize musical gestures that reflect the harmonic characteristics. If a harmonic unit is discordant, the resulting section of music could sound agitated. The lack of “themes” or even “mottives” should not hinder the listener’s ability to decipher the spectral composer’s intentions. All of the composers involved with the early development of spectral music were well versed in the music of the past. “The musical syntax of formal articulations (arrivals, climaxes, and cadences) has always been present in their music. However, the fundamental nature of the musical materials changed. Spectral composers were fascinated with timbre. Gradually, timbre eclipsed melody as a primary musical element. The gradual emergence of the notion of timbre as a compositional determinant can be traced from the mid-19th century to more recent times. Timbre gained greater musical significance with the music of Debussy and Varèse and grew more prominent in the works of Ligeti and Scelsi.”³ Cornicello says that it is possible to trace the precursors of spectral music from the 19th-century pieces that focus sharply on timbral evolution. The Prelude to Das Rheingold is the opening of the entire Ring der Nibelungen cycle (its prolonged tonic is both functional and dramatic). Many 20th-century composers have used coloristic devices in their works. Debussy was concerned with harmony and melody, and was interested in tim-
bre as a compositional element. Timbre was employed to enrich the formal processes of his work. Debussy did raise timbre to a level more equal to the other elements of musical composition. “Debussy’s techniques did not stray too far from tonality. His music was always tonally centered, although he often utilized harmonic elements in an unusual fashion. For instance, dominant 7th chords (and half-diminished 7th chords) do not always ‘resolve’ in traditional ways. Rather than abandoning tonality, Debussy re-interpreted the tonal language to suit his own needs. The traditional view of Debussy’s music focuses predominantly on the pitch structure of the work. Although it is possible to analyze any of Debussy’s works through pitch structure, the results may prove less than conclusive.”

Antioh Cantemir’s substantial effort is his Petrida, an unfinished epic glorifying the Emperor. As a Russian envoy to London, Antioh Cantemir brought along the manuscript to Dimitrie Cantemir’s History of the Growth and Decay of the Ottoman Empire, and wrote the biography and bibliography of his father that accompanied the English 1756 edition. In Paris, Antioh Cantemir was a noted intellectual figure and close friend to Montesquieu and Voltaire. His language seems antiquated to the modern reader: he stuck to the gallic system of rhyming, which was subsequently discarded. Antioh Cantemir’s poems are generally satires in the manner of Juvenal (e.g., To His Own Mind: On Those Who Blame Education and On the Envy and Pride of Evil-Minded Courtiers). Antioh Cantemir translated de Fontenelle’s works into Russian, and produced a tract on old Russian versification and translated the poetry of Horace and Anacreon into Russian.

Stern argues that the element of chance has become an accepted contemporary aesthetic, which has challenged musicians to reexamine and reevaluate the elements of music and musical sound, while seeking procedures toward shaping this aural experience for artistic purposes. Stern develops a conceptual model for identifying, analyzing, and evaluating indeterminate elements and procedures used in composition. Schoenberg holds that the evaluation of tone color is in a much less cultivated, much less organized state than is the aesthetic evaluation of chords. “Nevertheless, we go right on boldly connecting the sounds with one another, contrasting them with one another, simply by feeling; and it has never yet occurred to anyone to require here of a theory that it should determine laws by which one may do that
sort of thing. Such just cannot be done at present.” On Schoenberg’s reading, pitch is tone color measured in one direction. Melodies are “patterns” of tone colors differentiated by pitch. Similar patterns can be devised according to true tone color. A melody is a progression whose coherence evokes an effect analogous to thought processes. Pitches in a melody create a certain effect in the listener because of their acoustical properties.

Sidnell contends that certain aural skills are developed through drill and regular classroom activities. “There is little evidence of transfer to the problems which confront the conductor.” Music educators suppose that aural-visual discrimination skills acquired in music theory classes transfer to other musical situations (Stuart). Brand and Burnsed maintain that the ability to detect music errors in instrumental performance may exist independently of other music abilities and “may not be acquired along with the development of other skills.” Cook states that deciding what music to listen to is a significant part of deciding and announcing to people not just who you “want to be” but who you are. “Music is a very small word to encompass something that takes as many forms as there are cultural or sub-cultural identities.”

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ABSTRACT. Link’s paper concerns the use of dance in the Act 3 finale of Mozart’s *Le nozze di Figaro*, starting from the problem articulated by Alan Tyson in his *Mozart: Studies of the Autograph Scores*. According to Waeber, in the early nineteenth century, the piano étude was conceived as an outgrowth of the eighteenth-century *exercice*, perpetuating the idea of mechanical virtuosity devoid of any poetic meaning. As Sheinbaum puts it, orchestral colour can be read as an important part, both literally and metaphorically, of Theodor W. Adorno’s approach to Mahler. Marston explores the metaphorical identification of the tonic key as ‘home’ in relation to the first movement of Schubert’s Piano sonata in Bb, D.960.

Link’s paper concerns the use of dance in the Act 3 finale of Mozart’s *Le nozze di Figaro*, starting from the problem articulated by Alan Tyson in his *Mozart: Studies of the Autograph Scores*. Tyson points out that the absence of the fandango from the Viennese musical sources is at odds with Da Ponte’s statement that the dance scene was restored at the emperor’s command. New evidence shows that the fandango was performed for the three performances that constituted a première at this time in Vienna and was then removed from the score. However, before its removal, the score with the fandango intact was copied for at least one other theatre, hence accounting for the two versions that circulated through Europe. Link considers the dramatic function of the fandango by exploring the nature of the dance itself and examining the stage directions in the autograph in combination with those in Beaumarchais’s play, several early librettos and editions, and the original first-desk first-violin part. ¹ Moseley’s comparison of the 1854 and 1891 versions of the Piano Trio in B, op. 8, explores how musical allusion can be interpreted to convey Johannes Brahms’s attitudes to critics, friends, other composers and his own past. The young Brahms’s attachment to E.T.A. Hoffmann’s literary alter ego Johannes Kreisler helps explain the extent to which the music of others makes itself heard in the first version of the trio. Changing standards of criticism affected the nature and scope of Brahms’s revision, which expunged perceived allusions; the older Brahms’s more detached compositional
approach shared elements with Heinrich Schenker's analytical perspective. There are also parallels between Brahms's excisions and the surgical innovations of his friend and musical ally Theodor Billroth. Both Brahms and Billroth were engaged with the removal of foreign bodies in order to preserve organic integrity, but traces of others—and of the past—persist throughout the revised trio.² According to Waeber, in the early nineteenth century, the piano étude was conceived as an outgrowth of the eighteenth-century exercice, perpetuating the idea of mechanical virtuosity devoid of any poetic meaning; but it was also shaped by the Romantic pièce de caractère. Drawing upon the context of Parisian musical life in the 1830s (notably the reception of Beethoven's Seventh Symphony), Waeber discusses Charles-Valentin Alkan's piano études Souvenirs: Trois morceaux dans le genre pathétique, op. 15 (Paris, 1837). This work shows how virtuoso idiomatic figures can act as genre markers, thereby allowing the encoding of a specific extramusical meaning. It further addresses the issue of the privileged understanding between the composer and his performer that goes back to eighteenth-century tradition.³ As Sheinbaum puts it, orchestral colour can be read as an important part, both literally and metaphorically, of Theodor W. Adorno's approach to Mahler. Adorno's examples of 'breakthrough', 'suspension' and 'fulfilment' show that timbre, traditionally considered largely irrelevant to music's deep structure, plays a significant role in his conception of Mahlerian form. For Adorno, these musical relationships resonated strongly with his post-Second World War concern for the plight of the outsider within the homogenizing bounds of modern society.⁴ Taking into account the sources now available at the Archivio Luigi Nono in Venice, Nielinger first looks at Nono's serial masterpiece Il canto sospeso (1955–6) in its historical context, both in Germany and in Italy. Having outlined the political circumstances and aesthetic premises, Nielinger provides a detailed analysis of the serial technique employed. Particular attention is paid to a technique of pitch permutation that explains the pitch structures of several movements, hitherto not fully understood. Each of the nine movements is examined in view of a better understanding of the work's expressive qualities and in order to show the underlying formal and compositional relationships.⁵ On Joncus's reading, Handel's music was a key source for Drury Lane entertainments from 1728 to 1745. Ballad-opera writers regularly deployed Handel tunes, ge-
nerating multiple performances of his music in low-style, native works that long preceded his oratorios. The soprano Kitty Clive, the biggest star of this genre, initially performed Handel airs both in ballad operas and as additional songs. From 1737, Handel compositions helped bolster Clive’s ‘high-style’ reputation, while Handel benefited from Clive’s audience-drawing power. In its politics, narratives and musical forms, the design of music Handel composed for Clive shows him adhering closely to the soprano’s already established star persona. Clarke claims that ‘lateness’ is a musicological concept relevant to Tippett’s oeuvre – if applied dialectically. His Triple Concerto (1978-9) is arguably the first work to reveal the ‘late’ trait of renewed lyricism and tonal transparency which together serve as an immanent critique of the fragmentation and dissonance of his second period (which began with King Priam). The co-presence of both sets of characteristics, whose synthesis is only partial, issues in a heterogeneity suggestive of a future social order in which the particular is not subsumed into the totality. This world-view sedimented in the musical structure constitutes a pluralism which invites comparison with, but may not be identical to, notions within postmodernism. Garratt claims that crucial to understanding the reception of Renaissance music in nineteenth-century Germany is an appreciation of the contradictory components of Romantic historicism. The tension between subjective and objective historicism fundamental to the historiographical reception of Renaissance music, epitomizing the interdependency of historical representation and modern reform. Protestant authors seeking to reform church music elevated two distinct repertoires – Renaissance Italian music and Lutheran Compositions from the Reformation era as ideal archetypes: these competing paradigms reflect significantly different historiographical and ideological trends. Garratt states that early romantic commentators, such as Hoffmann and Thibaut, elevated Palestrina as a universal model, constructing a golden age of Italian church music by analogy with earlier narraratives in art history; later historians, such as Winterfeld and Spitta, condemned the subjectivity of earlier reformers seeking instead to revivfy the objective foundations of Protestant church music. Garratt remarks that both approaches are united, however, by the use of deterministic modes of narrative emplotment. Marston explores the metaphorical identification of the tonic key as ‘home’ in relation to the first movement of Schubert’s
Piano sonata in Bb, D.960. Rejecting conventional readings whereby a ‘foreign’ or ‘alien’ element is ultimately assimilated into the ‘home’ sphere, it argues that in this movement Schubert succeeds in doing the reverse, rendering the tonic ‘unhomely’ (unheimlich; ‘uncanny’) at a critical moment in the recapitulation. Schubert’s practice in this instance is contrasted with that of Beethoven in selected middle-period works; and Schubert’s own fragmentary continuity draft for the movement, as well as songs from Die Winterreise and Schwanengesang, are brought to bear on the investigation of ‘home’ and ‘das Unheimliche’. Micznik presents an attempt to pin down the potential narrative qualities of instrumental, wordless music. Comparing as case-studies two pieces in sonata form—the first movements of Beethoven’s ‘Pastoral’ Symphony (as representative of Classical narrative possibilities) and of Mahler’s Ninth Symphony (as representative of its composer’s idiosyncratic treatment of those in the late nineteenth century) – Micznik proposes a ‘narrative’ analysis of their musical features, applying the notions of ‘story’, ‘discourse’ and other concepts from the literary theory of, for example, Genette, Prince and Barthes. An analysis at three semiotic levels (morphological, syntactic and semantic), corresponding to denotative/connotative levels of meaning, shows that Mahler’s materials qualify better as narrative ‘events’ on account of their greater number, their individuality and their rich semantic connotations. Through analysis of the ‘discursive techniques’ of the two pieces Micznik shows that a weaker degree of narrativity corresponds to music in which the developmental procedures are mostly based on tonal musical syntax (as in the Classical style), whereas a higher degree of narrativity corresponds to music in which, in addition to semantic transformations of the materials, discourse itself relies more on gestural semantic connotations (as in Mahler).
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AUTHENTIC INTERPRETATION
AND MUSICAL IMPRESSIONS

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ABSTRACT. Le Huray states that the search for an authentic interpretation is not the search for a single interpretive answer, but for a range of performance possibilities from which to make decisions. Elliott maintains that the keys to understanding the human valuing of music are likely to be found in “the nature of human consciousness” and the human tendencies that stem from it. Duffy thinks that music’s communicative potential is broader than mere word-painting. Johansen reports that performers can only understand what notational symbols mean if they understand what the music means first.

Davies holds that ontological contextualists acknowledge the socio-historical embeddedness of some of the features making up the work. “Musical works are prescribed, sound-event kinds, rather than kinds or patterns of action. The possibilities for musical works (not wholly reducible to their context) are malleable and have evolved through time.”¹ Regelski holds that the goods of music are rooted “in the situated and highly specific conditions of the here and now – to current life, the experienced quality of ‘good time’ between the recently remembered past and the avidly anticipated future.”² Le Huray states that the search for an authentic interpretation is not the search for a single interpretive answer, but for a range of performance possibilities from which to make decisions. “Authenticity is no dogma. There has never been, nor can there ever be, one way of interpreting a composition. Humility must be a vital ingredient of the modern performer’s equipment: the humility to read, to analyze and to listen, and the humility to modify accepted assumptions where necessary in order to transform the ‘timetable’ into a truly musical journey.”³ Hindemith recognizes the importance of metaphysical characteristics and their influence on the act of creation; it is the composer who is supposed to know about the intimate relation of musical causes and intellectual-emotional effects. “He must have, beyond all craftsmanship, an innate gift of measuring the relationship in manner and intensity of the two components of musical impressions. A certain divination is necessary to lift such an evaluating process beyond the primitive level of
materialistic calculation or simple empiricism. Recognizing such loftiness in a composer’s endeavors, we are readily inclined to attribute to him what seems to be the most characteristic quality of the composing mind which differentiates him from the sober, non-composing crowd: the possession of creative ideas, of musical inspiration.”

Davies contends that the totality of musical works from culture to culture and from time to time do not have any single ontological character. “Some musical works are thick with properties, others are thinner – some works include the performance means as part of their essential nature, and much more besides, whereas others are more or less pure sound structures.”

Elliott maintains that the keys to understanding the human valuing of music are likely to be found in “the nature of human consciousness” and the human tendencies that stem from it. “In attempting to explain its significance, we must not lose sight of what is most obvious and curious about music: that the actions of music making and music listening often give rise to experiences of positive or satisfying affect. Indeed, even a quick glance around the world is enough to show that while some people make music chiefly for money, status, and other tangible rewards, most do not. Most musicers and listeners find the actions of musicing and listening rewarding in themselves.”

Duffy thinks that music’s communicative potential is broader than mere word-painting; integration of sung text into the mix brings its own set of historical aesthetic and analytical baggage; there is no scholarly consensus as to how music can speak to an audience (linguistically or otherwise). “Because music’s primary goal is to reflect its subject (the text), analyses of meaning have historically used text to ascribe meaning to the music at issue. A question largely ignored, however, is the converse: can music ascribe new meaning to the text? In other words, can music speak to the text, not merely on a musical level, but on a textual plane?”

On Kramer’s reading, as one adopts an attitude of openness toward the music, the music opens to the possibilities of experience and expression; musical detail animates the details of which our lives are made (classical music makes this process its deepest concern); anyone can hear the force of vital proliferation in the Bach’s Suite for Unaccompanied Cello in G Major, “the energy of nature sounding and resounding in the elaboration of the common chords and their majestic final return. […] This is music of great lyric energy that combines the strength of the cello’s sonority with the fragility of
a solitary utterance. It flows continuously, connecting spacious arpeggios (chords played as if on a harp, one note at a time, in rising, falling, or wavelike patterns) with runs of increasing breadth and animation. The primary common chords, the tonic and dominant, evoke a sense of acoustic space that the music fills and fills until it brims over. Davies says that music, like human movement, can be spritely, dragging, energetic, lethargic, and so on. “If the notes of music can themselves be high or low, rushing forward or hanging back, tense and foreboding or relaxed and weightless, then music can be happy and sad independently of how its composer or the audience feels.”

Dodd remarks that the conception of musical works as continuants may take one or two forms, depending on how the ontological dependence of the supposed continuant on its embodiments is understood. “The first version views the ontological dependence of a musical work upon its embodiments to be that of constitution, perhaps drawing an analogy between works of music and Kaplan’s conception of words: utterances and inscriptions are stages of words, which are the continuants made up of these interpersonal stages; one might think of musical works similarly: namely, as historical individuals whose performances, playings, and other embodiments are their temporal parts.”

Dodd observes that those works of art that are concrete particulars can change; it does not come as news to be told that a sculpture can become more weather-beaten over time. But it is misguided “to suppose that admitting that sculptures and paintings are continuants puts pressure on us to regard works of music in the same way. No theoretical unity should be expected here because, while sculptures and paintings are physical particulars, works of music are not. Given that works of music fall into a distinct ontological category from sculptures and paintings, there is no reason to expect that they too should be continuants, especially as our original concern precisely consisted in wondering what change in an abstract entity could consist in.”

Johansen reports that performers can only understand what notational symbols mean if they understand what the music means first. “Archaeologists study fossils and artifacts in order to reconstruct the past because the past they seek to understand has largely disappeared. Music, however, is not a lost art that must be resuscitated by musical archaeologists. […] Our grasp of musical language may be more or less evolved, but if we are at least moderately well-educated, we will know how to express ourselves without making too many mistakes.”
emphasizes that in Western tonal music, individual pitches, chords, and keys are posited as conceptually distinct units of knowledge, that reflect levels of melodic, harmonic, and diatonic structure; knowledge of diatonic and harmonic structure influences performance as well; segmentation during performance planning is influenced by relationships among musical accent structures. “Both structural relations and the serial distance between sequence events influence the range over which performers can plan, presumably because of limitations on memory capacity. Supporting evidence is seen in eye-hand span tasks, in which pianists reproduced briefly presented musical sequences. The mean eye-hand span was 7–8 events beyond the location at which the notation disappeared, and it tended to extend only to phrase boundaries. However, eye-hand span measures may reflect effects of both memory capacity and anticipatory eye movements.”

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5. Davies, S., [1], p. 77.
11. Ibid., p. 348.
ABSTRACT. Montague Lavy maintains that emotional response to music can be intense and momentary; symbols are emotional by virtue of their place and function within a musical structure. Ockelford claims that the power of association can overwhelm a listener’s reaction to intramusical attributes that would otherwise occur. Palmer states that interpretation highlights particular emotional content of the music. Scruton states that sounds are not differentiated by their source.

Montague Lavy maintains that emotional response to music can be intense and momentary; symbols are emotional by virtue of their place and function within a musical structure; emotional responses evoked by extrinsic sources and those evoked by intrinsic sources are quite different phenomena. “If musicologically inspired research is ever simultaneously to form a satisfactory understanding of why certain musical parameters and the dynamics of musical structure appear to be sources of emotion, to resolve the difficulty of relating perception of musical expression to evocation of emotion, to address listener idiosyncrasy and to leave phenomenology behind, it will have to be situated within a model of emotional response to music at the heart of which is placed the listener.”

Ockelford claims that the power of association can overwhelm a listener’s reaction to intramusical attributes that would otherwise occur; the focus of the analysis may range from the micro-elements of a piece (such as a note or chord) to macro-considerations (such as the teleological impact of large-scale formal relationships); it is the capacity of content to function structurally, both within and between groups, that enables two events whose structure is different to be coherently linked. “Other factors pertaining to the cognitive environment of listeners include the aesthetic range of experiences they bring to bear; their knowledge of music, gained through previous hearings of the current piece and others; ‘extra-musical associations’ (connotations of non-musical entities or events established through previous experience); their music-processing abilities; attitudinal issues, such as values, beliefs, prefer-
rences and propensities; and their prevailing mood, which will pro-
vide the affective backdrop against which any emotions aroused by
the music will be superimposed as phasic perturbations. The ex-
ternal environment can influence aesthetic response in a number of
ways too. As Seaton puts it, the Rococo style describes music
that typically is light of texture and normally performed rather quick-
ly and eloquently; it often consists of a single melody that is ac-
companied sparsely by conservative, rhythmically-slow harmonies.
“The Galant style, whether in French or Italian manifestation, did
not, of course, satisfy the artistic inclinations of all musicians in the
first half of the 18th century. To those who sought depth of ex-
pression from music, it must have seemed particularly flimsy and
unfulfilling.” Davies asserts that we live in an age in which it is re-
garded both as offensive and as false to suggest there is not de-
corative equality among all kinds of music in their artistic value and
among all listeners in their understandings of music. “It seems also
to be widely held that understanding comes simply as a result of
one’s giving oneself over to the music (as if there must be some-
thing wrong with a work that does not appeal at first hearing). The
ideas that there are worthwhile degrees of musical understanding
that might be attained only through years of hard work and that
there are kinds of music that yield their richest rewards only to
listeners prepared to undertake it smack of an intellectual elitism
that has become unacceptable, not only in society at large but in
the universities. ‘Antidemocratic’ ideas are rejected not just for mu-
sic, of course, but across the social and political board, but the
case for musical ‘democracy’ is especially strong, since almost
everyone loves and enjoys some kind of music.”

Palmer states that interpretation highlights particular emo-
tional content of the music; musical experience enhances both per-
formers’ use of expression to emphasize interpretations and lis-
teners’ ability to identify interpretations and expressive aspects of
performance; planning and memory retrieval processes in music
performance reflect multi-dimensional relationships among melodic,
harmonic, and diatonic elements. “Theories of skilled performance
often assume that people prepare complex sequences for produc-
tion by partitioning them into shorter subsequences. Phrase struc-
ture is one feature that influences the partitioning of musical se-
quence; evidence from performance timing and errors suggests
that musical sequences are partitioned during planning into phrase
segments. Errors that replaced intended pitches in piano perfor-
mances were more likely to originate from the same phrase as the intended event than from different phrases. Schilling contrasts the inspiration of the instrumental composer with that of the performer or vocal composer. “The inspiration of the virtuoso and the vocal composer, in contrast to that of the true composer or the composer of pure instrumental music, has its basis simply in a strong stimulus which quickly and strongly seizes the powers of the imagination and has its origin solely in the greatness, the richness, or above all, the beauty of the object at hand.” Palmer states that music must have some purpose if the cost (time, physical and psychic energy) to produce the sounds is to be recovered. “Greek philosophers gave us the idea of pleasure, beauty and goodness. Pythagoras developed the idea of music as a physical manifestation of the harmony of the spheres. The Jews gave us a concept of music in service of a covenant with a monotheistic God. China, in the Tao, postulates that music is the harmony of the heavens and that right music on earth restores harmony to the human community. In sub-Saharan Africa, numerous stories exist that show music to be the enlivened spirit of the natural world.” Scruton states that sounds are not differentiated by their source: so long as two sounds sound the same, there is no essential difference between them, regardless of whether they share a common source. “This is an inevitable consequence of the logical properties of sounds.” Crutchfield remarks that “the greatest benefit of the close, narrow correspondence between contemporary composition and performing style (as we can still observe it in popular music, on historic recordings, in a very few elder statesmen among today’s artists, and in specialists centering their work in the music of today) is that the performer can be so confident in the basic grammar and syntax of his stylistic language that true improvisation, true spontaneity of utterance, becomes possible within it. If the thriving triangular relationship between composers, performers, and the public had not broken down, historically informed performance would be neither likely nor desirable today.”

Palmer claims that speaking, typing, and performing music are among the most complex forms of skilled serial action produced by human beings. “The control of complex, temporally structured behaviors such as speech production or music performance embodies two problems: the serial order of sequence elements, and their relative timing. The serial order problem arises from the fact that chain-like organization of behavior is inadequate to explain
certain serial order effects in sequence perception and production. For instance, strong constraints on the order of words within phrases and of phonemes within words must be met for speech to be acceptable.”10 Schulz writes that expressive performance consists in the complete representation of the character and expression of the work. “Both the whole and every individual part must be played with the tone, spirit, Affekt, and chiaroscuro that the composer conceived and put into the work. […] Every good composition has its own character, and its own spirit and expression, which it broadcasts throughout; the singer or player must transmit this so exactly in his performance that he plays as if from the soul of the composer.”11

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ABSTRACT. Schachter asserts that there is a gulf between musicians who find notes and the sounds they represent worthy objects of close study, and those who do not. Adorno notes that music resembles language in the sense that it is a temporal sequence of articulated sounds which are more than just sounds. Tarasti claims that when the work has been notated or its spatio-temporal-actorial manifestation has been fixed into act-signs or score, it must get a performer who re-modalizes it. Scruton discusses the question of the extent to which music-theoretical concepts inform the hearing of ordinary listeners.

Elder studies the performances of Gieseking, and notes his using of an evenness and lightness of touch. “The playing of a succession of descending melody notes or chords with the pedal down requires very careful shading. Each new note must be louder than, or drown out, the preceding notes. This effect is obtained by a very careful, unnoticeable crescendo. When holding the pedal through an ascending melodic line, the shading of the notes naturally is much simpler.” Carmen-Cohen says that non-Western cultures attach importance to the “function” of musical activity, to the musical instrument, and to the numerous connections between music and world around it; the expressive mode characterized by overall directionality and complexity reached its pinnacle in the classical sonata; African polyrhythmic music features great momentary complexity in the absence of any overall directionality or complexity. “In Western music the aspiration developed toward overall, complex organization of the work, in such a way as to bestow upon it a superstructure with interconnections at various levels from beginning to end, like a polished diamond cut off from its surroundings; in this context momentary occurrences also take on meaning within the superstructure (Schenkerian analysis points to some of these interconnections).” Tarasti remarks that the idea of a surface that is gradually generated from a deep structure is based on hierarchies, and thus on something static and architectonic. “Generative models can make explicit the ‘organic’ course of processes of meaning, but at the same time they contain an inorganic..."
and architectonic aspect, which is a strange principle when applied to phenomenal musical experience."³ da Motta holds that in most textbooks of musical composition, the concerto form is described as inferior, "because the preference for one or more instruments and the obligation to give the performer the opportunity to display his skillfulness hinders the composer from letting his art develop freely."⁴ Schachter asserts that there is a gulf between musicians who find notes and the sounds they represent worthy objects of close study, and those who do not. "Certainly there is more to music than structure, and that something more is also worthy of close study. But to deny the relevance of structure to the intellectual aspects of a composition or to its cultural context is ultimately to diminish one’s conception of music."⁵

Hargreaves et al. suggests that music can be used increasingly as a means by which we formulate and express our individual identities; musical behavior must be investigated in all of the social and cultural contexts in which it naturally occurs; the social functions of music subsume the cognitive and emotional functions in certain respects. “Parents reinforce the musical aspects of early vocalizations, and also sing songs and lullabies. Gradually, vocal/musical play gives rise to speech and words on the one hand, and to more specific musical activities such as imitation and improvising on the other, so that singing develops as another sphere of activity in its own right. Early musicality thus encapsulates the interaction between biological predispositions and the social world: the development of babies’ sense of their environment is inherently social.”⁶

Liszt asserts that what he undertook in the Berlioz’s Symphonie Fantastique, he was setting out to do for Beethoven. “Serious study of his works, a profound appreciation of their almost limitless beauties, and on the other hand the techniques I have become familiar with owing to my constant piano practice, have perhaps made me less incapable than others for this difficult task. […] The arrangements previously in use have now been rendered useless; they would be better called ‘derangements.’”⁷ Hindemith argues that it is not enough to use a harpsichord as continuo instrument. “We must string our string instruments differently; we must construct our wind instruments with the scalings of the time; and we must even recreate the relationship of choir pitch and chamber pitch in the tuning of our instruments.”⁸ Adorno notes that music resembles language in the sense that it is a temporal sequence of articulated sounds which are more than just sounds. “They say something,
often something human. The better the music, the more forcefully they say it. The succession of sounds is like logic: it can be right or wrong. But what has been said cannot be detached from the music. Music creates no semiotic system.\textsuperscript{9} Cohen explores the principles governing rules of musical style with respect to types of experiences derived from the different styles: the rules and experiences are related to each other on some universal level and the types of experiences reflect aesthetic ideals of extra-musical frameworks (culture, era, region, etc.).\textsuperscript{10}

Palmer highlights the perceptual consequences of music performance, including the successful communication of interpretations, resolution of structural ambiguities, and concordance with listeners' expectations.\textsuperscript{11} Tarasti claims that when the work has been notated or its spatio-temporal-actorial manifestation has been fixed into act-signs or score, it must get a performer who remodalizes it. “In the rules of fugue lied-like melodic turns are forbidden in its themes. However, as early when Mozart writes a fugue in the overture of Magic Flute fugue is conceived as more than mere technique: it represents the Sublime. The same in Handel fugue in F minor, at the end the fugue becomes melodic and thus suddenly opens a flash of the \textit{Moi} of the composer. Equally even Brahms, the classicist cannot avoid the temptation of the melodiousness at the closing fugue of his Handel variations.”\textsuperscript{12} Friskin instructs pianists to remember Bach’s own indicated wish for the development of a \textit{cantabile} style, thus prescribing a general singing legato, along with the addition of \textit{portato} for connected eighth notes in some passages.\textsuperscript{13} Turley holds that Mendelssohn was at once challenged and liberated by the dramatic possibilities of the concert aria. “The nature of the compositional genre requires a profound interpretation of the text and a musical setting that conveys it, since the aria is presented without staging, costumes, sets, or other actors. Since the text is rarely if ever presented as a part of a larger dramatic unit, whether by internal reference or introductory material, the poetry of the libretto used can be seen as significant only for its inherent merits in rhyme, meter, and colorful word usage.”\textsuperscript{14} Scruton discusses the question of the extent to which music-theoretical concepts inform the hearing of ordinary listeners. “There is a distinction between the event that is heard and \textit{the description under which} we hear it. […] Even though I do not hear the return to the tonic as \textit{a return to the tonic} there is a sense in which the description correctly identifies the content of my perception: it is a description of
Levinson points out that if music is roughly sounds made to be heard a certain way, or sounds having a certain aim or purpose, then “although music cannot exist outside the sphere of human intentionality, it is a mistake to think that this means that music is metaphysically of an order other than sound.”

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ABSTRACT. Pohle and Hittner claim that consumers are scrutinizing procurement and sourcing policies, are checking on trading practices product composition and lifecycle management, and are looking at the global impact of their choices across the entire supply chain; in today’s open environment, companies are finding it necessary to take the wraps off information they once considered private or proprietary; most companies are either simply confident of their ability to meet regulatory requirements or guessing at what customers expect. “Increasingly, the degree to which a company is willing and able to open itself to stakeholder scrutiny will be a make or break factor in achieving CSR objectives. In fact, the company that invites more eyes on its operations can preempt problems that would otherwise become very expensive to solve. Some companies are responding in innovative ways, for example by publishing their contract manufacturer lists online for all to examine and scrutinize.”

DTI-UK holds that CSR is about companies acting voluntarily to raise performance beyond minimum legal standards; CSR is about the behavior of private sector organizations and their contribution to sustainable development goals; closer links with consumers may lead to greater awareness of their needs, which could result in the firm becoming more com-
petitive in terms of product quality. “Differences in their scale, nature and spheres of operation will influence how different companies contribute to social and environmental goals and the competitiveness challenges they face.” Diviney and Lillywhite contend that CSR is a concept whereby companies voluntarily integrate social and environmental and governance practices into their business operations; Australia is lagging behind Europe and the US in developing a regulatory CSR framework for international supply chains (Australian companies can expect more US and EU retailers to require them to report on social and environmental performance); in the absence of binding regulations for international sourcing, the past decade has seen a proliferation of initiatives designed to guide the development of companies’ ethical strategies. According to Diviney and Lillywhite, the ILO Conventions set minimum standards for basic labor rights: freedom of association; the right to organize; collective bargaining; abolition of forced labor; and equality of opportunity and treatment. MSIs bring together stakeholders to address code monitoring and compliance. Business association or employer initiatives relating to monitoring or compliance. Unilateral initiatives include company codes formulated by individual companies or other entities without consultation with other stakeholders. “Communication strategies should be tailored to suit a creative industry largely consisting of small to medium enterprises. Industry events such as fashion weeks and trade fairs should be targeted, and educational institutions should prepare graduates to understand not only technical, design and business skills, but also labor rights in the industry and its global context. Government should support a strong CSR framework, to ensure companies can compete in the global marketplace, attract investment and create decent employment.”

Jørgensen et al. argue that the present system of implementation of codes of conduct is insufficient/inefficient in achieving further real and sustained improvements in social and environmental standards in global supply chains; real and sustained implementation of codes of conduct will help ensure an effective compliance regime which will contribute to improving the working conditions of laborers at the level of suppliers. Jørgensen et al. claim that the plethora of individual buyer CSR codes is now generating inefficiencies (they have emerged as a result of the overlap and repetition among buyers’ CSR programs) and confusion (it refers to supplier claims that the diversity of CSR requirements
among buyers serves as a barrier to entry to suppliers who do not know which route to follow to demonstrate their commitment; an increasing number of buyers are recognizing that traditional top-down CSR strategies are not achieving improved CSR implementation; there is insufficient understanding of the business benefits associated with making the required investments. Jørgensen et al. assert that confusion resulting from discrepancies and inconsistencies in the details of CSR implementation can undermine consistent CSR practice in the workplace. “Codes of conduct establishing guidelines for global supply chain partners of multinational enterprises have existed for approximately a decade, generally emerging as one response to concerns about social and environmental practices. During this time, the application of codes of conduct has contributed in varying degrees toward wider and deeper implementation of social (and to a lesser extent environmental) standards, mainly in developing countries.” Jørgensen et al. contend that whereas CSR implementation generally is seen as long term, business relationships often are short term, margins are small, and suppliers too small to take up CSR seriously; home governments may facilitate better social and environmental practices at the supplier level by means of linking CSR supply chain performance to public procurement purchasing criteria, export credits, and other international financing credits, and by explicitly addressing CSR issues in bilateral development assistance programs; civil society organizations can be pivotal in the process of strengthening implementation of CSR in global supply chains. NGOs could engage in public awareness campaigns to raise consumer interest in CSR issues, and could campaign to pressure governments, businesses, and other actors to play a role in strengthening the implementation of CSR. Jørgensen et al. say that it is possible that in some industry sectors, CSR combines with other buyer demands to the advantage of larger enterprises. Buyers are recognizing that traditional top-down CSR strategies are not achieving improved CSR implementation. A top-down policing approach to CSR compliance is insufficient or even inappropriate (a supplier who is only implementing CSR standards because of buyer insistence can find ways to evade compliance without too much fear of detection); many suppliers lack the management expertise to address challenges associated with bringing their workplace into compliance with CSR codes of conduct. “Trade unions have long argued that empowered workers are key
to ensuring implementation of CSR standards because of their continuous presence at the worksite and their stake in the outcome. Similar arguments have been made about local communities and environmental protection. A small number of buyers and suppliers are undertaking experiments to increase the involvement of workers in their CSR implementation strategies. Some focus on NGO-style participatory techniques as a means of improved communication.\textsuperscript{5}

Haden writes that emergy evaluation entails a systemic analysis of the relationships of a system’s web (through diagrams and the calculation of indices); in open systems, all ordered structures require a source of useable energy to maintain their order and to build structure; the development of information in the culture and ecological knowledge of humans is a part of the system’s structure and function. “The theoretical foundations of systems ecology and emergy analysis stem from the observation that both ecological systems and human social and economic systems are energetic systems that exhibit characteristic designs that reinforce energy use. Moreover, the dynamics of these systems can be measured and compared on an equal basis using energy metrics. Emergy is defined as the available energy of one kind previously used up directly and indirectly to make a service or product, usually quantified in solar energy equivalents. The unit used to express emergy values is the emjoule, and when using solar energy as gauge, the solar emjoule.”\textsuperscript{6}

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5. Ibid., pp. 58–59.
ABSTRACT. Diviney and Lillywhite write that state and federal governments and industry stakeholders should establish a multi-stakeholder platform to promote and implement the uptake of the global dimensions of CSR in the Australian garment sector. Jørgensen et al. point out that only suppliers can ensure the proper implementation of CSR practices in line with local law and international standards. According to DTI-UK, the Government has made a significant contribution to awareness and understanding of CSR and what it means for companies of different sizes, in different sectors and operating in different places.

Diviney and Lillywhite write that state and federal governments and industry stakeholders should establish a multi-stakeholder platform to promote and implement the uptake of the global dimensions of CSR in the Australian garment sector, and should monitor trends in the EU and US around voluntary and mandatory CSR practices and reporting and ensure that Australian companies and government implement best practice. Companies should develop and implement CSR strategies through consultation with individuals and organizations which represent both supplier and worker perspectives. “Consumer groups, individuals, unions and NGOs should raise consumer awareness about working conditions and ethical sourcing in the garment sector and present evidence of community concern to the industry, and should refine the process for handling breaches of the regulations about working conditions and provide clear information to all parties.”

Jørgensen et al. say that suppliers’ unwillingness to embrace CSR fully themselves can be seen as a response to the fact that the market does not yet send a consistent message about the importance of CSR. CSR compliance was driven by buyers as a response to their own buyers’ pressure. “Suppliers, buyers, and stakeholders alike believe that the business case for investing in CSR is not a simple one-size-fits-all question. Investing in certain elements of CSR does translate into (long-term) business benefits, whereas investments in other CSR aspects offer
a negative or at best a neutral return on investment. Suppliers did not see a direct link between CSR performance and obtaining or keeping contracts, except in a handful of cases in which buyers were genuinely involved with CSR practices of suppliers.” Jørgensen et al. point out that only suppliers can ensure the proper implementation of CSR practices in line with local law and international standards; buyers are acknowledging the need for new approaches to implementation of codes of conduct in order to secure real and sustainable CSR practices in their global supply chains; buyers can agree on viewing CSR as a noncompetitive aspect of business development, and can develop standards for CSR-sensitive procurement policies, including industry-wide training programs for procurement officers. “Host governments could provide financial resources to general awareness programs directed at suppliers as well as workers to inform these groups of their rights and obligations in the area of CSR. Such programs should be implemented by civil society organizations. Host governments could also include CSR considerations in public procurement purchasing criteria. Host governments should also work actively to strengthen local tripartite structures as a means to facilitate cooperation among the most fundamental stakeholders, namely the representatives of workers and businesses, as well as strengthen local dispute resolution mechanisms.” As Pohle and Hittner put it, corporate social responsibility (CSR) is no longer viewed as just a regulatory or discretionary cost, but an investment that brings financial returns. Their survey of 250 business leaders worldwide found that businesses are wasting no time in interpreting these implications and acting on them. “When companies talk about CSR, they tend to describe it in terms of philanthropy. Our survey, however, found that businesses have actually assimilated a much more strategic view; 68 percent are now utilizing CSR as an opportunity and a platform for growth. Based on our conversations with business leaders and our own survey of their actions and expectations, it appears incontrovertibly true that business executives are starting to see CSR as a sustainable growth strategy.”

According to DTI-UK, the Government has made a significant contribution to awareness and understanding of CSR and what it means for companies of different sizes, in different sectors and operating in different places. CSR is relevant to all companies, large and small, to those operating in national as well as
global markets, and to companies based in developing as well as developed countries. CSR has developed well beyond its philanthropic and community roots with a growing focus on the business case. “An increasing focus on the global reach of corporates and therefore the international dimension to CSR has sparked debate about the value and limits of CSR in dealing with many complex and sensitive issues associated with globalization. But responsible business practice or sustainability is commonly acknowledged by all sides as vital to ensuring globalization works for the poorest and as a means of bringing benefits to developing countries, for example, in capacity building through investment of capital, technology and skilled personnel. How business operates in the developing world and in conflict zones continues to come under scrutiny including the need for and value of a more regulatory approach.”

Diviney and Lillywhite find that the Australian garment industry has been slow to embrace both mandatory and voluntary mechanisms to protect workers in international and local manufacturing supply chains; companies could improve their CSR performance by consulting individuals and organizations representing both supplier and worker perspectives and by making public their CSR processes and results; through the progressive opening of markets to imports and the reduction of trade quotas and tariffs, a global business model has emerged. “Seven company and three business organization representatives commented that the regulations were too onerous and confusing, and five said that providing lists of contractors was manageable but working out how long garments would take to sew was not. Small company representatives thought that due to their small production runs they could not exert influence on their supply chains; and most noted how difficult it was to find a manufacturer for small runs, let alone to find an award-compliant manufacturer.”

Jenkins et al. say that several factors converged in the 1990s to increase pressure on companies to adopt and implement CSR practices, and in particular, voluntary codes of conduct: globalization of economic activity; the state’s decreasing role in regulating business behavior; the significance of brands and corporate reputation, making companies vulnerable to bad publicity; international dissemination of information about working conditions; the increasing number of NGO labor rights campaigns.

Jørgensen et al. address implementation of CSR practices at the level of first-tier suppliers in global supply chains. Sta-
keholders emphasize the need to make CSR more accessible to SMEs that have more limited capacities and narrower profit margins than other suppliers. The business model of the apparel sector, with short-term, shifting buyer-supplier relationships, was perceived as a major barrier to improved implementation of CSR practices. “At the macroeconomic level, some nations are reluctant to support CSR strongly for fear that this will adversely impact investment. For multinational enterprises, price pressure has grown more intense in recent years, notably in the apparel and agriculture industries, where prices consumers pay for some items have fallen in real terms. These price pressures are widely agreed to have been passed along to suppliers, many of whom are SMEs operating in developing economies, with little ability to control the ways that this occurs.”

Pohle and Hittner maintain that the more advanced view of CSR demands significant long-term commitment, and (re-)definition of corporate values (it can require wholesale changes to the ways companies operate); a company’s most valuable asset is its ability to convert brand power into customer buying decisions; most companies have limited the ways in which they directly interact with customers and other constituents on CSR issues. “When CSR strategies are effective, transparency goes hand-in-hand with stakeholder engagement – with two important caveats. First, you can’t call it transparency if you simply spew information out into the marketplace, or unleash what is effectively a data dump on your customers. It could even backfire. True communication requires not just context, but interaction among the parties giving and receiving information. Second, trying to engage stakeholders without full transparency is disingenuous at best.”

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3. Ibid., p. 54.

GLOBALIZATION, INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, AND NATURAL ECOSYSTEMS

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ABSTRACT. OECD maintains that state aid should be reduced as it can distort competition in the internal market. Blaich et al. affirm that networks strive to minimize costs, maximize utility and coordinate activities leading to that end. Grimm and Ried consider a region to be defined by a set of countries characterized by a high degree of homogeneity and exposed to similar shocks: fiscal policies within a specific region can be considered as being coordinated, as each region has to optimize a similar problem. Gurr et al. assert that within-crop habitat manipulation strategies such as cover crops and green mulches can act on pests directly, providing "bottom-up" control.

OECD maintains that state aid should be reduced as it can distort competition in the internal market; the EU grants extensive preferential access to less developed and African countries, and is a lead donor of aid for trade; the common agricultural policy has many objectives (including competitiveness of food production, protection of the environment, maintenance of the population in rural areas and underpinning farm incomes). "The relaunched Lisbon Strategy for Growth and Jobs provides an overarching framework that strives to keep up the pace of reforms, taking advantage of the current favorable economic circumstances and providing the conditions for stronger growth. Europe faces challenges from technological change, globalization and population ageing. Globalization brings opportunities for adaptable economies but punishes rigid ones, while ageing populations will put welfare systems under pressure. There are several ways the Union can help meet these challenges. A vibrant internal market is central to Europe's long-term prosperity. The services directive will help achieve this, but it is only a step towards liberalization and integration."¹ Natural ecosystems and human economic systems are open systems because they exchange both matter and energy with their surrounding environments.² Self-organization is a process of emergent order at the system level, generated by the non-linear interaction of the system components.³ Gurr et al. assert that within-crop habitat mani-
pulation strategies such as cover crops and green mulches can act on pests directly, providing “bottom-up” control; transnational corporations claim that carefully planned introduction of these crops should reduce crop losses due to weeds, insect pests, and pathogens; reductions in pesticide use will reduce the pesticide-induced mortality of natural enemies (an aspect of conservation biological control). “If GE crops are able to make crop production more efficient, the requirements of society for food and fibre will be met with a reduced need for an expansion of croplands into natural and semi-natural areas. This will increase scope to conserve, or reintroduce into farm landscapes, areas of non-crop vegetation. Such vegetation can have desirable consequences for pest management, value in wildlife conservation, as well as catchment stability, water purification, recreation and aesthetics. However, on farmlands where genetically engineered crops are grown there are likely to be at least some adverse effects for biodiversity and the use of this technology will, for the foreseeable future, remain controversial with consumers.”

Kuo claims that in order to reverse the trend of deteriorating ecological environment, Taiwan launched a movement to use ecotechnology to redirect construction: in addition to meeting function and safety requirements, all infrastructure constructions must minimize their impact on the ecology. Kuo uses two types of infrastructure construction (slope stabilization and debris flow mitigation, and river flow management) to illustrate how the ecotechnology principle was applied to infrastructure construction. Kuo reasons that these new constructions endure the test of typhoons and heavy rains and reduce natural disasters, that ecology recovers very well, and that the cost is lower than the conventional methods.

Gurr et al. emphasize that habitat manipulation aims to provide the natural enemies of pests with resources such as nectar, pollen, physical refugia, alternative prey, alternative hosts and lekking sites; indigenous and peasant farmers in the developing world have relied on biodiversity for agroecosystem function; biodiversity is a powerful tool for pest management, but is not consistently beneficial. “Alternative strategies that can readily be incorporated into conventional farming systems are important. […] It is practices such as these that are used in ecological engineering for pest management for this approach is inexorably entwined with the pragmatic use of biodiversity to perform the ecosystem service of pest suppression. Consequently, the pursuit of this practical outcome
(i.e. reduced crop losses) may simultaneously lead to other benefits such as wildlife conservation, conservation of pollinators, nitrogen fixation and so on." Pauwels and Ioniță explain that Romania’s patterns of FDI and foreign trade show a transition from a competitive advantage in the lower-end of the value chain towards services and higher value-added manufacturing sub-sectors; it is essential that Romania pursues an appropriate mix of policies (in particular a prudent fiscal policy), and takes measures that can help to keep wage developments in line with productivity growth; the largest single beneficiary in terms of FDI stocks remains the manufacturing sector (which held more than 1/3 of the inward investment positions in 2006). “Romania’s long standing ship-building tradition has allowed it to benefit from the increasing international demand for ships. Altogether, the share of transport equipment in total manufacturing exports increased to 13% in 2006, up from 7% in 2003. Although still at a distance from the EU-8 average of 18%, the Romanian economy is set to become a more important player in this field. In addition, knowledge transfers in this sector are relatively large. [...] In per capita terms, both FDI stocks and exports are still significantly below EU-8 averages, suggesting that ample room for catching-up remains.”

Blaich et al. affirm that networks strive to minimize costs, maximize utility and coordinate activities leading to that end; it is crucial to determine the type of actors interacting in the network; the importance of personnel and especially internal networks becomes apparent. “Coordination methods are shown within a domain which is based on two main criteria, the level of autonomy on the one hand and the level of commitment on the other. The level of commitment refers to the degree to which parties participating in the network coordinate and fix their behavioral patterns. A high level of commitment means that most areas of activity are constrained. The level of autonomy then specifies how much freedom the actors have at their disposal. These two factors determine the level of coordinating intensity of the network.” Grimm and Ried consider a region to be defined by a set of countries characterized by a high degree of homogeneity and exposed to similar shocks: fiscal policies within a specific region can be considered as being coordinated, as each region has to optimize a similar problem (one region could capture one specific country of interest, while the other region refers to the remainder of the monetary union). The terms of trade effect depends on the region’s size. The intensity of
trade inside the currency area is high enough for effects from outside the union to be neglected. “EMU national governments and the ECB have often disagreed about the appropriate strategy for their policies. Therefore, we deviate from the microeconomic model by presuming that the fiscal targets deviate from the socially optimal level. More specifically, for inflation and output we assume target levels that are both above the socially optimal levels. This may be justified by the fiscal policy makers’ desire to attain greater government size or their incentive to maximize reelection probability. To illustrate this, one can imagine that fiscal authorities are able to deceive their voters about the socially optimal targets, particularly during election campaigns.”

Economic theory implies that preferences and technology are invariant to the rule describing policy (decision rules describing private agents’ behavior are not).

REFERENCES

ABSTRACT. Power ethics brings with it an intensity of experience for any communicative action – be it informal, infra-national (that is, confined to national criteria, within the borders of a nation) or global. In an international community embarked on many transformative processes, the ethical landmark and the non-violent might doctrine are becoming compulsory prescriptions for the international behavior’s permanent improvement.

Within the most expressive stanzas of world politics, action and interaction have always represented the intricate elements of a motivational pattern for international actors. Sheer power seeking still remains the thrust, the key, genetic vision by which international relations are revealed, the notional postulate by which ‘powershifts are happening so quickly, that world leaders are completely caught unguarded by the events […] A powershift does not merely transfer power, it transforms it’¹.

With that end in view, a global actor is, first and foremost, an intrepid learner and an active participant in the world order, who has the undenying obligation of creating his own orbit and of consistently following it, redirecting it, understanding properly its requirements and of making sure that they are met (even if they are at variance with the orbits and requirements of other participants). A global actor is the depository of decision making, ‘an entity made up of individuals that is not fully subordinated to any other individual of the global system, and an effective power sharer, together with all other participants’².

While praising the advent of globalization (by gradually pointing out the cultural, social and technological interchange³), nowadays’ international system rests upon rather archaic grounds: power struggle and the subsequent controversies. Given that the twentieth century was a period of intense questioning of almost every political or ideological assumption, some questions still inflame many minds: Where does the authority of the government stop? Why should it stop? What is democracy? Are liberal democratic principles over-rated? Can a political moral choice backfire?
Is there really a backlash against socialist redefinition? Can socialist redefinition really happen? Is the stage of the ultimate inversion a gentlemen’s agreement or can it bring bigger audiences? Are already the warrior tunes of the fifth power cycle being replaced by the WWW? Is there such a thing as the demise of geopolitics or just a new global design? Can we act bipolar – as both Euro-Atlantic and Pacific supporters? Is power distribution in utter connection with asymmetrical development? Is the EU still an avanguardist ethics’ cultivator?

The international environment could never be captured by political analysts in an abeyant transition. Transition, by nature, is a fast pacer. Structural alterations are directional arrangements meant to empower international affairs and to consolidate the new world order.

Certainly, it is too far fetched to say that the new achromatism is either futile or positive. We cannot, however, deny the fact that achromatism exists. In the 21st century, political colours are rather fusty (holistically speaking, not nationally!), as opposed to the furtherance of the state – as the most important international actor. If empirical data prove that history exists – as a man-made commodity, created in the pursuit of much higher and nobler goals, achromatism is a leading historical argument. National interests and suverainty have taken precedence over political conflicting ideas. This bold diagnosis emerges from the fact that national vainglory continues to be a watchword of the global agenda in light of current menaces like terrorism and organized crime and also in light of the widespread importance of regional international organizations (like the EU).

Using soft power is a collateral suggestion, in stark agreement with national credos. Soft power has become an alternative politics of modern governments. Joseph Nye states a notably exhaustive thesis of the actual significance of soft power: ‘The ability to obtain what you wish for through the power of attraction/seduction, rather than by coercion and financial tributes’.

The use of soft power is much more than a rhythmic impression of the post-Cold War period; it can be described as an institutional factor or a constant exercise of foreign politics. For instance, in the ‘70s, China was an extreme example of economic alienation, but now stands for a classical example of socialist redefinition. China’s behavior as a soft power was the driving force behind new politics inter-dinamics between China and the wes-
tern civilization. As a result, the European Union became an adamant expression of a declared partner for stability and multi-polarity: ‘due to China’s capacity to use culture, political values and diplomacy as sources of mutual sympathy and of genuine influence, the United States of America may lose the strong monopoly in Asia’. Geo-strategically, China has become an economic frontrunner, with plenty of other aspects to entail besides the economic one. Another ideological nominator, the principle give and receive, is a secondary reality which China cannot abandon.

American neo-conservatism, in its purest form, is another self-propelling ingredient of soft power, thus rejecting any unnecessary radical action. Built upon realpolitik types of strategies, the USA started utilizing soft power as a means of counterbalancing fundamentalist visions, theories of conspiracy and security deficits. My Way became, therefore, more than a turncoat conceptual rival of the Soviet philosophy (the Brejnev doctrine). It was a tool, per se, that created a dazzling and a most popular immediacy around the world.

To reiterate Fukuyama’s analysis: history is not a progressive variable. History is not an evolitional mechanism, a comedy of sorts, the epitome of human dramas or the analogy of life itself. History is maximal. History is a disciplined anarchy – anarch as it is man-inspired and disciplined as it has an ancestral periodicity: ‘Anarchism is, in fact, the philosophy of a new social order based on liberty unrestricted by man-made law; the theory that all forms of government rest on violence, and are, therefore, wrong, harmful, as well as unnecessary’. Not surprisingly, history will continue acting like a disciplined anarchy in a majestic portrayal of a cross-national dialogue platform.

Every nation has plenty of stories to tell and plenty of imagination to go along with them. Rational decisions encompass, besides the degree of normative adaptability a less law-abiding parameter and, at the same time, a more discretionary one: imagination – imaginative official decisions. In foreign affairs and security aporia, imagination has to gain a greater amount of acceptance as ‘a choice of action is made among alternatives. Better choosing among the existing alternatives is one way to improve the results. Another way is to widen the range of alternatives to include new ones. An imaginative construction of a new alternative, heretofore not thought of, might be what makes the greatest improvement possible’. All the variations upon the progress
of civilization as we know it, perceive it and as rendered by the international arena’s perpetual dilemmas are out of reach if the pondering upon lacks imagination. Imagination is not about controlling hypotheses, but about channeling them.

*The manicheist scheme* – Good and Bad – no longer fits far more complex international paradigms. Is *liberal democracy* the last and the best resource humanity was able to find? What is next? Will it ever be a *next*, or Francis Fukuyama was right and we can proclaim *the end of history*? One has to admit that the diseases of the modern age were not as threatening a danger as they used to be. The concept of *man as man* is a modern prerequisite that can serve as a space locator and as a moral crusader in international affairs. World affairs are, without doubt, an abstract terminology, that, are, in a nutshell, umpired, implemented and delivered by humans. Power for what? The answer will be power to influence, to undercut opposition and to seek strong support and incentives.

**NOTES AND REFERENCES**


3. With the ultimate connotation of a concept certain to provoke a lively debate and to revolutionize societies by imposing order.

4. Ayn Rand’s *great finding*: ‘We are fast approaching the stage of the ultimate inversion: the stage where the government is free to do anything it pleases, while the citizens may act only by permission; which is the stage of the darkest period of human history’.


ABSTRACT. Grallo remarks that phenomena of question and insight may have an important role to play in the process of learning and in the emergence and refinement of knowledge. Rao holds that awareness of one’s own existence, thoughts and surroundings are important indicators of consciousness. Samuels writes that being a psychological primitive is an explanatory notion. Schweitzer claims that it is only in his struggle to become ethical that man comes to possess real value as a personality, and that under the influence of ethical convictions the various relations of human society are formed in such a way that individuals and people can develop in an ideal manner.

As Grallo puts it, a question is the formulation of a gap in our understanding, knowledge or practice (if pursued authentically, a question may guide an extended search): if the question is pursued it becomes an intention to fill the gap (the question becomes an expression of the desire to know). Grallo argues that within of questioning, authentic questions become operators, moving the process of learning forward: “public” pursuit involves asking questions of others (if questions are asked of others, that behavior may (not) be in accord with local cultural norms). Grallo holds that insights emerge as the solution to a problem, often formulated as a possible answer to a question: insights bring together a variety of otherwise disparate elements into a single coherent solution, answer or viewpoint. “Insight frequently gives rise to further questions. The pursuit of insights may also be conducted more or less privately or publicly. If insights are pursued in the company of others, that behavior may or may not be in accord with local cultural norms. As the intentions of the further questions change the inquirer’s viewpoint expands, becomes more comprehensive with further insights and summons forth differing levels of consciousness.”

Grallo remarks that phenomena of question and insight may have an important role to play in the process of learning and in the emergence and refinement of knowledge: many philosophers who claim to be examining knowledge and learning do not examine
the event of *insight* or the experience of having and pursuing *questions*. Grallo contends that while there are occasional studies of the cognitive process of *questioning* and its initial product the *question*, these topics have not become a widespread focus for systematic study in psychology, nor have they entered the major theories of learning or intelligence. “Students often experience difficulty in learning various disciplines. For example, prominent among the areas of study causing difficulty for high school and college students are the various branches of mathematics: for example algebra, calculus or statistics. Often what is lacking in the student is the occurrence of relevant *insights* into these fields. However, a study of the history of mathematics (as opposed to mathematics itself) often reveals that the mathematicians who invented fields such as algebra, or calculus or statistics were engaged in a quest to solve problems and to answer *questions* suggested by those problems.”

Grallo says that the neglect of *questioning* and associated *questions* constitutes an oversight of important anchors and contexts for grounding central insights: by neglecting the role of question and insight, teachers often leave the impression that their discipline is a collection of facts and propositions having no clear connection with the world or anything interesting in it. Grallo asserts that by neglecting question and insight, teachers model that these phenomena are unimportant, rather than being the very *operators* and *integrators* that are central to complex human problem solving and learning. “On these general topics of *questioning*, *question* and *insight* much remains to be done. For example, there is need for locating these cognitive processes in an explanatory context with other cognitive processes within an evidence-based *unified theory of problem solving* (UTPS). That theory will (1) include cognitive processes in their functional relations with one another, (2) map out distinct levels of consciousness, according to the general intention of the questions pursued, and (3) provide a taxonomy of interferences with learning and complex problem solving.”

Thomas emphasizes that professors carve their niches in the academic world by knowing more about their specialties than anyone else (and specialties divide into sub-specialties, and more sub-specialties). “Learning becomes incredibly fragmented in the process. The more fragmented the learning, the farther from a foundational center that can make orientation possible. Eventually, we are so far from the center that the center is no longer visible or even comprehensible.” Bohm and Hiley observe that each human
being similarly participates in an inseparable way in society and in
the planet as a whole: such participation goes on to a greater col-
lective mind, and perhaps ultimately to some yet more compre-
hensive mind in principle capable of going indefinitely beyond even
the human species as a whole. Schweitzer claims that it is only in
his struggle to become ethical that man comes to possess real
value as a personality, and that under the influence of ethical con-
victions the various relations of human society are formed in such a
way that individuals and people can develop in an ideal manner. “If
the ethical foundation is lacking, then civilization collapses, even
when in other directions creative and intellectual forces of the
strongest nature are at work.”

Rao points out that awareness of one’s own existence,
thoughts and surroundings are important indicators of conscious-
ness. Awareness and consciousness are not to be used inter-
changeably. Consciousness includes awareness of present and re-
membered sensory inputs, and is temporarily eclipsed under the
influence of general anaesthetics. Mind is some activity of the brain.
Ego is the subjective feeling of “I” as a distinct entity, that excludes
all else. “A person recovering from anaesthesia does not feel that
he is now a new person. Brief periods of unconsciousness do not
break its continuity. We propose to use Ego as a single word for
the long phrase ‘the persistent subjective feeling of I vs. all else’.
We use the upper case E in order to avoid Freudian and other
undesirable denotations. Ego involves the feeling of self-identity
based on memory and that is how it retains unity and continuity
through life. It is experienced by the mind but it is not mind itself.”

Rao argues that consciousness is the term most commonly used
as equivalent to Ego or to include Ego together with other psy-
chological aspects such as awareness, introspection and others:
Ego poses the real challenge before biologists, psychologists and
philosophers (if one attempts to understand one’s own Ego as-
suming that it is most easily accessible for analysis a strange phi-
losophical conundrum presents itself). “Once we accept that every
individual has a separate Ego which develops during one’s life and
ends with it, the problem solves itself more than half way through. It
is then possible to study objectively another individual’s Ego. After
all we find no special difficulty in explaining others’ respiration, or
blood circulation. Others’ distress, rage, confusion and such other
experiences are also quite comprehensible, though not as clearly
and fully as respiration. In a similar manner others’ Ego can in prin-

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Rao asserts that the essential feature of Ego is its role as a central coordinator of the organs of perception and the effector organs: if the residual subjective aspects are treated as the “hard” problem categorically different from the “easy” aspects and to be dealt with separately using a non-scientific method it will continue to remain “hard”. “All sense perceptions and any or all actions elicited by them are experienced by the central agency, viz., Ego. On perceiving an object or event (say a cat and its mewing) one can perform any of the several corresponding actions as directed or demanded by the context. Obviously the signals from each of the organs of perception are received in a centralized neural structure. Any of the corresponding actions as instructed or demanded by the context can be performed irrespective of which particular stimulus elicits them. Memory is obviously involved in this. Further, the mind also plays a role since not all responses elicited by the stimulus are simple reflexes.”

Samuels writes that being a psychological primitive is an explanatory notion. “To say that a cognitive structure S is primitive is to claim that, from the perspective of scientific psychology, S needs to be treated as one whose development has no explanation.”

REFERENCES

2. Ibid., p. 39.
3. Ibid., p. 40.
8. Ibid., p. 83.
9. Ibid., p. 86.
ABSTRACT. Reese claims that understanding journalism in an “era of globalization” means going beyond a general update of news systems and practices in various countries. Sassen puts it that we need to re-theorize digital space: the polarization between Internet romancers and the logic of business and markets is contributing to a parallel polarization in the discourse about digital space. Rossiter investigates the possibility of at once conceiving a processual theory for media studies whilst locating the emergent concept of process alongside a series of problems.

Reese claims that understanding journalism in an “era of globalization” means going beyond a general update of news systems and practices in various countries. Globalization brings the growing apprehension by its residents of the world as a single place: the more transparent framework of globalization as it relates to government and information yields a hopeful outlook for the future of journalism as a professional practice. Reese maintains that the reach, interconnectedness, and virtually real-time properties of a globalized media contribute to our experiencing the world as a whole. Journalism, as a practice and interpretive community, is adapting to this emerging global news arena. A cultural identification is emerging among those involved with this new global dimension. The emerging global news arena has both a spatial and temporal quality. “The spatial aspect is based on journalism’s connection with an audience that transcends national boundaries and geography; the temporal aspect refers to the simultaneity of its use. This synchronization and spatial reach of world communication is what makes a practical discursive space possible, with people regardless of location, brought more or less simultaneously into contact with a global agenda, which even if differing across national cultures is reinforced and aligned with respect to time and focus.”1 Reese argues that discourses of media critique will be strengthened that appeal to global publics horizontally. Old criticism of news “bias” will be superseded by new issues brought about by the growth of global news. Journalism must navigate between its “vertical” orientation aligned with its
host nation-state and a “horizontal” perspective (“a global outlook characterized by more cosmopolitan, pluralistic, and universal values that transcend narrow national frameworks”). Reese observes that the “national” perspective underlies other conventional analyses of “international” news, defined as the movement of media content from one country to another. A journalism shaped by globalization has changed its alignment to become more de-nationalized (the nation-state, or the local community, organizing principle no longer dominates). The very value of the global news brand is that there is a style of newsgathering worth replicating across many particularistic locations. “The United States is an important (some would say dominant) contributor to world culture in many areas, and it has been deeply involved in promoting American-style practices internationally, including journalism and an accompanying ‘free flow of information’ ideology. Globalization, however, does not just mean Americanization. Thus, press practice cannot be understood solely as a product of missionary work – or even as an imposition of command and control by media owners. […] Thus, this cultural shift in journalistic roles and norms is best understood within an evolving context of power relationships.”

As Castells puts it, outside the media sphere, “there is only political marginality.” Lovink contends that tactical media is about the art of getting access and about disappearing at the right moment. “Tactical media are overwhelmingly the media of campaigns rather than of broadly based social movements, and are rooted in local initiatives with their own agenda and vocabulary. […] Tactical media is a deliberately slippery term, a tool for creating ‘temporary consensus zones’ based on unexpected alliances. A temporary alliance of hackers, artists, critics, journalists and activists.” Massey and Haas assert that public journalism has not had substantial impact on the attitudes and behaviors of journalists and citizens: public journalism’s most important contribution may have been to ignite a discussion on the role and responsibility of journalism in a democratic society. Witt says that public journalism lives each day in stories filled with the voices of real people and breakout boxes telling readers how to get involved or learn more about the issues at hand, lives whenever an editor pushes a reporter for greater diversity in his sourcing, or to seek truths from the middle as well as the extremes, and lives
whenever media outlets open channels for readers and viewers to talk back to journalists.⁶

Among the key issues Sassen focuses on concerning the Internet are a) the confusion between privately owned digital networks and public digital space, b) the multiple meanings of commercialization of the Net, and c) the possibilities for regulating the Net. Sassen says that it is the enormous growth of private digital networks rather than the Internet, which is having the greater impact on national sovereignty: economic globalization and technology have brought with them significant transformations in the authority of national states. “Especially important here is the growth of new non-state centered governance mechanisms which have transformed the meaning of national territorial sovereignty independently from whatever impact the Internet has so far had, and further, the formation of partly digitalized global financial markets which can deploy considerable power against the will of national states.”⁷ Sassen holds that digital space has emerged as a major new theater for capital accumulation and the operations of global capital: the first phase of the Internet was confined largely to a community of insiders (scientists and select government agencies); the second phase of the Internet strengthened the democratic and open character of the Net and made it a space of distributed power that limits the possibilities of authoritarian and monopoly control; with the establishment of the WWW, the Net has entered a third phase, one characterized by broad-based attempts to commercialize it. Sassen puts it that we need to retheorize digital space: the polarization between Internet romancers and the logic of business and markets is contributing to a parallel polarization in the discourse about digital space. “While corporate forces have immense power in the shaping of digital networks, it is also a moment when we are seeing the emergence of a fairly broad-based civil society in electronic space, particularly in the Net, which signals the potential for further developing democratic features of the Net. […] The assumptions that run through much of the discourse of the Internet romancers veil the existence of new forms of concentrated power that may undermine the better features of the Internet; nor do these assumptions help us understand the limits of such new forms of concentrated power, an important political issue.”⁸

Engel and Murphy state that the Internet is dramatically redefining the nature of social relationships between nations “and
challenging cultural sovereignty by creating an increased sense of borderlessness.” The Internet combines within itself features of a newspaper, radio and television. Rossiter investigates the possibility of at once conceiving a processual theory for media studies whilst locating the emergent concept of process alongside a series of problems. The aesthetic dimension of new media resides in the processes that constitute the abstraction of the social: a processual aesthetics of media culture enables things not usually associated with each other to be brought together into a system of relations. According to Rossiter, the media sublime unravels the security presupposed by the political economy of empirical research on new media: a processual aesthetics of new media is related to and constituted within the time and space of the media event. Rossiter remarks that a processual media theory can enhance existing approaches within the field of new media studies. Processual media theory inquires into that which is otherwise rendered as invisible. The new media empirics has found itself enlisted in the mission of neoliberalism. A processual model of communications is useful in addressing the politics of information societies. Rossiter argues that an empirics of new media describes the various forms, objects, experiences and artworks that constitute new media: a non-reflexive and non-reflective new media empirics assumes that the various uses of new media forms define the horizon of intelligibility of new media. “In the case of new media empirics, which reproduces the methodological procedure of empiricism, a reflexive encounter with its techniques of operation would begin to take into account the plurality of forces, including those of institutional interests, which condition the formation of a practice, code or meaning. In doing so, the multidimensional pluralism that functions as empiricism’s constitutive outside would come to bear. Moreover, the politics that attends such an operation could be situated in an agonistic framework in which pluralistic discourses, practices, forces, and interests procure a legitimacy that is otherwise denigrated by empiricism’s claim to have abstracted the essence of the object from the real.” Rossiter contends that a processual aesthetics of new media goes beyond what is simply seen or represented on the screen. A processual aesthetics of media theory seeks to identify the various methods that typify empirical research on the internet. Socio-aesthetic experiences are not bound or contained by any particular communications medium or transport technology. A
processual media theory registers the ways in which communications media are bound in a system of relations. Time for new media empirics consists of the present, where things are manifest in concrete form. “The processual locates the temporal modes that operate within the information age. This is precisely why a processual model facilitates a political critique of network societies and information economies. Processes, after all, take time. That is, processes abstract time. A politics of legitimacy co extents with the instantiation of abstraction. […] Modalities of time are central to the constitutive framework within which politics happen. In the case of new media, a tension is played out across the temporal modes that distinguish new media forms and their concomitant uses and conditions of production.”

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2. Ibid., p. 245.
8. Ibid., p. 198.
12. Ibid., p. 172.
ABSTRACT. Altomonte and Pennings develop a simple test to assess whether horizontal spillover effects from multinational to domestic firms are endogenous to the market structure generated by the entry of the same multinationals. As Jain puts it, companies working to manage service as a strategic business unit need to align their service demand with the service resources at their disposal. Grimm and Ried investigate the implications for output, inflation, and various policy loss functions in a numerical analysis.

Altomonte and Pennings develop a simple test to assess whether horizontal spillover effects from multinational to domestic firms are endogenous to the market structure generated by the entry of the same multinationals. Altomonte and Pennings analyze the performance of a panel of 10,650 domestic and multinational firms operating in Romania in the period 1995–2001. Controlling for the simultaneity bias in productivity estimates through semi-parametric techniques, Altomonte and Pennings find that changes in domestic firms’ TFP are positively related to the first foreign investment in a specific industry and region, but get significantly weaker and become negative as the number of multinationals that enter in the considered industry/region increases.¹

NBR-NIS notes that turnover of foreign direct investment enterprises totaling EUR 74,309.9 million took 43.2 percent of turnover reported by Romanian enterprises; the activity of FDI enterprises as a whole has a favorable impact on Romania’s trade balance; from a territorial perspective, FDI went mainly to Bucharest–Ilfov region (64.3%). “At end-2006, by type of FDI, Greenfield investment was channeled primarily into manufacturing (13.4% of total FDI), particularly food, beverages and tobacco (3.3%), textiles, wearing apparel, leather products (1.8%), transport means (1.6%), oil processing (1.5%), woodworking (1.5%). Other sectors in which Greenfield investment held considerable weights were trade (11.1%), financial intermediation and insurance (8.5%), construction and real estate (4.6%).”²

As Jain puts it, companies working to manage service as a strategic business unit need to align their service demand with the service resources at their disposal; aligning service resources with
unplanned demand can force a company to fall back into tactical “firefighting” mode; service has operated as a discrete entity, separate and distinct from product engineering, design, and manufacturing. “Transforming post-sale service operation from a tactical cost center to a strategic profit center has a lot to do with creative and efficient business processes supported by technology. Mapping business processes to customer needs and expectations will enable a company to better position itself for long-term growth such as incorporating customer preference for a technician in the scheduling and routing process.”

According to Kaludis and Stine, IT costs can go unmanaged, but the costs will be high and are unlikely to meet significant institutional goals; cost issues and assessment of outcomes will challenge academic management structures; the deployment of information technologies will have a high impact on the institution. “For many institutions, a conservative approach to investment makes the most sense. For a few on the ‘bleeding edge’, costs will not be a primary consideration. For all others, management of costs, investments, assets, and relationships presents tremendous challenge and opportunities, the level of which depends on institutional goals, competition, and strategic agendas. Cost management is an active process, certainly not integrated into the current practices of many institutions, and best not left to chance.”

Grimm and Ried investigate the implications for output, inflation, and various policy loss functions in a numerical analysis, and show that the ranking of the scenarios is relatively robust across different degrees of heterogeneity. Grimm and Ried consider a general-equilibrium monetary model with monopolistic distortions and staggered prices. “In the economy, households derive utility from consumption and from holding real money balances. Each household, henceforth referred to as ‘producer-consumer’, produces a specific good and consumes a bundle of goods. There exists a continuum of consumption goods over the unit interval which are imperfect substitutes.”

Goodwin writes that macroeconomic theory does not distinguish between final and intermediate goals, and fails to take account of the implications of hedonic psychology for a theory of economic well-being. The rate of economic growth needs to be compared to the rate at which ecosystems can adapt to large scale changes. Increased consumption and economic growth are both best understood as intermediate goals. An economic theory that takes security as a goal would adapt more quickly to novel stresses.
and dangers. Economic growth has much to contribute when a population is living below a level of basic needs satisfaction, but less to contribute to the happiness aspect of well-being above that level. “All of the following characteristics will need to be altered if macro theory is to play a useful role in explaining national and global economic realities, and in supporting policies that lead to increased human well-being: (i) The theory does not address openly several essential questions: Is macroeconomic theory intended to explain and also to guide the macroeconomic system? If so, to what end? What directions of change, or what preferred state of the economy, are implied in the understandings and the guidance afforded by macroeconomic theory? (ii) Standard macro theory pays too little attention to problems that cannot or will not be resolved through markets. (iii) It assumes that a single macroeconomic theory can apply to all situations, ignoring the increasingly critical differences between understandings, goals and policies appropriate to developed vs. developing countries. (iv) It ignores issues concerning the total scale of human economic activity, and the speed of change.” Taylor and Mathers outline recent examples of labor movement renewal in Europe in the context of European integration and globalization; the prospects for successful renewal involves linking workplace mobilization and organization with wider popular struggles to form a movement against the new regionalized forms of corporate and state power; the EU provides key insights into the possibilities and dangers that regional integration has for the labor movement. “The current of opposition in Europe highlighted the possibility of a radical social movement unionism that linked rank-and-file activists and workers across national boundaries, and with activists from a range of other struggles in a concerted struggle against the effects of neo-liberal restructuring. The oppositional networks attempted to mobilize rank-and-file activists around a campaign that linked quantifiable demands around an effective transnational mobilization.” There are significant structural power asymmetries, placing especially transnational capital in a privileged position. Blyth maintains that all neo-liberal restructuring projects are based on two core assumptions: (i) the belief that inflation is a greater threat to the general welfare than unemployment, and (ii) the belief that phenomena such as unemployment and inflation are due to the interventions of the state into an otherwise naturally self-equilibrating economy.
Leblond holds that private economic interests’ initial support for integration does not always result in integration actually taking place; private economic interests can slow down or prevent integration from progressing forward; in many policy areas where these exists European legislation the degree of integration may be more formal than substantial. “The Commission will not be successful in pushing through a given legislation at the EP and the Council if it does not have the support of economic interests. The challenge for the Commission is to maintain the original support from a large majority of economic interests as the uncertainty regarding the costs and benefits of integration disappears. [...] Accounting standards in the EU vary considerably: those of France and Germany are devised mainly for tax purposes while those in the United Kingdom and the Netherlands focus on the needs of investors.”

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ABSTRACT. Reichenbach writes that the physical object cannot be determined by axioms and definitions: it is a thing of the real world, not an object of the logical world of mathematics. Preece and Stoddart claim that self-assembly deals with the construction of discrete molecular and supramolecular assemblies that have programmed into them a way by which the architecture and function can be controlled. Gooding provides an account of how visual models mediate between the interpretation of source data and the explanation of such data.

Reichenbach writes that the physical object cannot be determined by axioms and definitions: it is a thing of the real world, not an object of the logical world of mathematics. "Offhand it looks as if the method of representing physical events by mathematical equations is the same as that of mathematics. Physics has developed the method of defining one magnitude in terms of others by relating them to more and more general magnitudes and by ultimately arriving at 'axioms', that is, the fundamental equations of physics. Yet what is obtained in this fashion is just a system of mathematical relations. What is lacking in such system is a statement regarding the significance of physics, the assertion that the system of equations is true for reality."¹ If two sets of points are given, we establish a correspondence between them by coordinating to every point of one set a point of the other set. "For this purpose, the elements of each set must be defined; that is, for each element there must exist another definition in addition to that which determines the coordination to the other set. Such definitions are lacking on one side of the coordination dealing with the cognition of reality. Although the equations, that is, the conceptual side of the coordination, are uniquely defined, the 'real' is not."²

Brading and Landry take mathematical structuralism to be the following philosophical position: the subject matter of mathematics is structured systems and their morphology, so that mathema-
matical “objects” are “positions in structured systems”; a mathematical theory, while framed by its axioms, can be characterized by its models; the kinds of objects that the theory talks about can be presented by their being positions in models that have the same kind of structure. In mathematics the kinds of objects that the theory talks about are presented via the shared structure holding between the mathematical models. “We are presented with three options in accounting for applicability in terms of shared structure: (i) from a methodological stance, we may forgo talk of the structure of the phenomena and simply begin with structured data, that is, with data models; (ii) from an empirical stance we may say that what structures the phenomena into data models is the high level theory; and finally, (iii) from a realist stance we may say that what structures the phenomena is the world.” What Brading and Landry call minimal structuralism is committed to the claim that the kinds of objects that a theory talks about are presented through the shared structure of its theoretical models and that the theory applies to the phenomena just in case the theoretical models and the data models share the same kind of structure. Structural realism is committed to the claim that the kinds of objects presented by Brading and Landry’s theory accurately represent the structure of particular objects of which “the world” is claimed to consist. Ontological structural realism asserts that the particular objects in the world have no properties beyond those that make them instances of certain structural kinds (all there is is structure). In adopting a methodological stance, Brading and Landry forgo talk of “the structure of the phenomena” and begin with data models: their theoretical models are appropriately structured and shared structure is what does the work connecting their data models up through the hierarchy to the theoretical models. Brading and Landry suggest the methodological strategy of seeking out, exploring, and exploiting the notion of the appropriate kind of shared structure, both up and down the hierarchy, and sideways across different and successive theories. Below the level of data models Brading and Landry require more than comparisons of shared structure between models to relate the levels of the hierarchy to one another. “In recognition of this we separate the scientific structuralist’s challenge of establishing a theory-world connection into two components: (a) to give an account of applicability in terms of the shared structure between models of the theory and data models wherein models of the theory present the
kinds of objects that the data models are intended to talk about so that their ‘objects’ have the same kind of structure, and (b) to give an account of representation in terms of the shared structure between data models and the phenomena so that the phenomena that the theory is about are appropriately structured.”

Preece and Stoddart claim that self-assembly deals with the construction of discrete molecular and supramolecular assemblies that have programmed into them a way by which the architecture and function can be controlled, and that self-organization deals with bringing together identical (supra) molecular assemblies to produce large highly ordered polymolecular arrays that generally act in a cooperative manner. “Self-organization can be thought of as ‘polymerization’ via noncovalent bonding interactions, resulting in well-defined nanoscale architectures. Such systems include liquid crystals, monolayers at interfaces, Langmuir-Blodgett films, vesicles, and micells.”

van Fraassen and Sigman maintain that representation of an object involves producing another object which is intentionally related to the first “by a certain coding convention which determines what counts as similar in the right way.”

Schrödinger writes that as our mental eye penetrates into smaller and smaller distances and shorter and shorter times, “we find nature behaving so entirely differently from what we observe in visible and palpable bodies of our surroundings that no model shaped after our large-scale experiences can ever be true.”

Gooding provides an account of how visual models mediate between the interpretation of source data and the explanation of such data, and considers how this relates to the distributed cognitive systems model of knowledge production. According to Gooding, there are three ways in which a knowledge-bearing representation is distributed: (i) its construction and use by people involve devices or machines, so it is distributed between minds and machines; (ii) it is a hybrid, mental-material object used to enable visual-tactile thinking or to guide some procedure, as in performing a mathematical operation; (iii) it represents knowledge that is produced and held in many different ways and at different levels of relationship. Gooding affirms that the distributed character of visualizations makes a point of contact between studies of visualization and the study of cognitive systems. “Many cases of cognition in science depend crucially on being embodied and networked and so involve physical and so-
cial processes ‘outside’ the brain and body. What any individual scientist imagines, thinks, or believes that she knows has importance and is interesting only insofar as it draws on and contributes to a larger, collective enterprise. The common currency of that enterprise (discourse, images, arguments, articles, software, technologies, mathematical procedures) is external and is distributed." Cognition observed in everyday practices is distributed mind, body, activity, and culturally organized settings which include other actors. Shepard is interested in the evolved structure of our cognitive systems and argues that some pervasive feature of the environments in which animals (including human beings) live will have been internalized. There is an internalized principle of object conservation. Shepard takes the group machinery as given and postulates its use to predict possible coincidences in experience.

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2. Ibid., p. 37.
PARTICIPATORY JOURNALISM
AND MASS MEDIA NEWS CONTENT

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ABSTRACT. Payne claims that a concatenated set of structural and social forces contribute to homogenization of mass media news content. Braman observes that events are predictable and yield a limited, predetermined set of outcomes. Bird does not see tabloid consumption as essentially subversive or transgressive, and does not see enjoyment of tabloid-style news as a symptom of mindlessness. According to Bowman and Willis, participatory journalism arises from the result of many simultaneous, distributed conversations.

Payne claims that a concatenated set of structural and social forces contribute to homogenization of mass media news content, and that the homogenization naturalizes a distorted reality by foregrounding myths and narratives serving elite interests. The media agenda is the product of shared ideological commitments of economic elites. Where the media agenda emerges as a homogenized news product, it becomes the public agenda. News works to justify an existing social structure characterized by inequitable distribution of life chances, extols the probity of the elite, and offers exculpatory rationalizations. “Economic influences have resulted in 97 percent of US daily newspapers operating as local monopolies, with almost half owned by a group or chain. The trend, perhaps, began with the ascension of the New York Times in 1967 to de facto monopoly status, and has accelerated since. Among the consequences of consolidation is a restrictive influence on the number and diversity of permissible news subjects. News organizations routinely use media channels to press corporate agendas consistent with a pro-business, market economy ideology, diminishing the plurality of perspectives available to the public.” Keleman and Smith contend that through control and management of the stimuli and proliferation of images, “individuals may be more able to protect themselves from a real world that has become increasingly dangerous and difficult to manage.” Appadurai points out that even when long-standing identities have been forgotten or buried, “the combination of migration
and mass mediation assures their reconstruction on a new scale and at larger levels.” Kittler claims that the media continuum is partially connected media links. One medium’s content is always other media: film and radio constitute the content of television; records and tapes the content of radio; silent films and audiotape that cinema; text, telephone, and telegram that of the semi-media monopoly of the postal system. Schneider states that the materiality of virtual resistance exists in an interactivity, “a communication between activists who are connected to each other, who not only take part but also organize.”

Rodriguez notes that citizens’ media is a concept which accounts “for the processes of empowerment, conscientisation and fragmentation of power that result when men, women and children gain access to and reclaim their own media.” Eksterowicz says that, for Dewey, the newspaper is a good educator of the public and a good participative vehicle for the public. “Newspapers help form the public, help the public understand its connection to decisions and their outcomes, and then help the public act on such understandings.” Adam claims that an education for a life as a journalist calls for an immersion in news judgment, the development of university-based skills in evidence gathering and fact assessment, formation in the best literary and/or visual methods of representation, and an understanding of how to apply the forms of understanding born in the academy to the problems of the here and now. Braman states that explanations of new journalism may be grouped into four perspectives: (i) new journalism is the appropriate genre to describe a reality that won’t hold its shape; (ii) the rise of new journalism is due to class-based motives; (iii) new journalism is a response to new mass communication technologies; (iv) new journalism is just a way of grouping together a lot of good writers who happened to come along at the same time. On Braman’s reading, happenings become events when they are useful to a locus of consciousness. Selection of sources of information deemed worthy of attention determines which of the myriad details of daily sensory input are to be considered facts. Space bounds the environmental dimensions of what is interpreted by a locus of consciousness as fact. The events that news facts describe are subject to effective intervention. Context describes the shape of the environment in which facts are found. Facts for public loci of consciousness are determined by procedures that depend upon organizational descrip-
tions of reality – these facts are sharply limned, categorizable, and easily processed. “Fact is a powerful boundary-defining technique for public loci of consciousness, for its own narrative expression, objective journalism, plays several key roles in sustenance of those bureaucracies themselves. [...] The procedures of objectivity are believed to steer a newspaper clear of libel while meeting its metabolic needs for consumption and digestion of set quantities of material regularly, continuously, and in a timely manner.”

Braman observes that events are predictable and yield a limited, predetermined set of outcomes. Reports from a public locus of consciousness claim to be context-free. The procedures used by new journalists are idiosyncratic in detail from person to person. Events become newsworthy when they have an impact upon the reporting locus of consciousness. The news lies in how the facts relate to each other. “Individual loci of consciousness of this era insist that the facts they report are true. But for individual loci of consciousness, ethical responsibility is defined as explicit recognition of the reporter’s role in the shaping of reported facts, both as an actor in the reality being described, and as selector and framer of what is being communicated. [...] New journalists work out of the human need to make sense out of the rush of experience, and to describe a world to which as a writer he or she can testify.”

Bird argues that in the United States, the term “tabloid” commonly refers to weekly supermarket tabloids (they cover only personality-driven feature stories). The huge success of the supermarket tabloids has had a significant effect on the U.S. news market. In the field of television news the issue of tabloidisation is loudly debated. The success of the TV versions of supermarket tabloids was made possible by audience demand, and by changing technological and regulatory conditions. Local news evolved into a popular hybrid of traditional hard news and gossipy chat. Bird does not see tabloid consumption as essentially subversive or transgressive, and does not see enjoyment of tabloid-style news as a symptom of mindlessness. “Journalism’s emphasis on the personal, the sensational and the dramatic is, of course, not new. Street literature, ballads, and oral gossip and rumour have all contributed to the development of news as we know it. Critics have been pontificating about the salacious excesses of newspapers for generations; even mainstream news has always been torn between what practitioners see as a duty to inform, and their
need to entertain and engage their audience. The human interest story in itself is not to so much a symptom of tabloidisation, which is better characterized as the triumph of the human interest story as the central component of news.”\textsuperscript{11} Bird maintains that journalism critics tend to define news in terms of how effective the texts of news stories are at conveying information about the world to readers and viewers (readers consume news in order to learn facts about the world around them and be informed). The cultural pressure to be informed is felt less and less today. Local news anchors are encouraged to display visual aids whenever possible. Tabloid TV shows have developed the art of the re-enactment, or dramatization, in which actual events are recreated by actors for the cameras. “A thing that makes stories memorable, and thus worth paying attention to, is the vivid verbal or visual image. Television news has always had the advantage of the visual image, and has long been criticized for misusing or sensationalizing it, as was print journalism before it. The debate over what images are appropriate continues, but one often-cited symptom of tabloidization is the way the image has crowded out rational analysis. For television, the existence of an image will actually determine whether a story is used or not, especially on that most ratings-driven genre, local news, which is watched by far more Americans than national news.”\textsuperscript{12} 

According to Bowman and Willis, participatory journalism arises from the result of many simultaneous, distributed conversations “that either blossom or quickly atrophy in the Web’s social network.”\textsuperscript{13} According to Campbell, experiments in public journalism aim to treat citizens as experts in their own lives and aspirations, to treat citizens as political actors who create public knowledge by deliberating together, and to create new forms of storytelling and reporting to enrich information.\textsuperscript{14} Carey contends that the public is not part of the working culture of a journalist. “Someone is out there, undefined, someone who shows up in a letter to the editor, who may even call once or twice, but is not the vivid, continuous, understandable presence that the client is to the other professions.”\textsuperscript{15} Wilson claims that accuracy ought not be an editorial issue, because it is a fundamental value, “deserving to be unquestioned and always applied as rigorously as reporters and editors can apply it.”\textsuperscript{16}
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10. Ibid., p. 80.


12. Ibid., p. 42.


ABSTRACT. Bigus and Zimmermann analyze auditors' market shares and concentration in Germany on the basis of audit fees, which have been subject to disclosure since 2005. Kwaku Asare et al. examine internal auditors' fraud risk decisions in response to variations in audit committee quality and management performance incentives. Chong and Pflugrath investigate the impact of three different audit report formats on shareholders' and auditors' perceptions. Li et al. document a continuous relation between audit firm size and the issuing of modified opinions in China using a panel data set of audit firms and listed firms from 2001 to 2003.

Bigus and Zimmermann analyze auditors' market shares and concentration in Germany on the basis of audit fees, which have been subject to disclosure since 2005. They have at their disposal the data from 175 audits (including three joint audits) and 40 audit firms. These data show that the Big4 obtained 87% of the total audit fees and 90% of the total fees in the period under investigation. PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC) is the market leader, based on both the total fees and the audit fees. KPMG earns the most in the sub-market for tax consultancy. The non-audit fees amount to 41.9% of the total fees. Audit firms specialize in certain industries or stock market segments. Market concentration increases over time. Bigus and Zimmermann hold that, at present, concentration seems to be higher in Switzerland, although it is lower in the United States of America and the United Kingdom. Kwaku Asare et al. examine internal auditors' fraud risk decisions in response to variations in audit committee quality and management performance incentives. Using an experimental approach, Kwaku Asare et al. find that internal auditors serving in a either a self-assessment role or a due diligence role were sensitive to variations in management performance incentives, linked these variations to fraud risk assessments and altered their audit plans accordingly. With respect to audit committee quality, internal auditors in both roles were sensitive to variations in quality, but the
responses to quality variations depended on whether they were in a due diligence or self-assessment role. With respect to the former, they linked the variation in quality to fraud risk, but did not alter the scope of their planned audit effort. With respect to the latter, they neither linked the variations in quality to fraud risk nor to planned scope. Lee and Walker note that US and international policy setters recently called for auditors to be alert for anomalous interviewee behaviors that may indicate deception. In this call, they included verbal behaviors, such as implausibility and inconsistency, as suggested indicators. Lee and Walker’s study empirically identifies the perceived verbal and physical interviewee behaviors that influence auditors’ deception detection judgments. Perceptions of informativeness and body movement were found to increase auditors’ suspicion of interviewees. More body movement is a false deception indicator; that deceivers typically manifest less body movement when lying. Entry-level accountants use anxiety-related behaviors for deception detection, whereas experienced auditors do not.

Chong and Pflugrath investigate the impact of three different audit report formats on shareholders’ and auditors’ perceptions. The formats are derived from the Guidance Note Report to Australian Standard AUS702 which aims to improve communications between auditors and shareholders. Formats include an expanded report, a 'plain language' expanded report with the audit opinion at the end, and a 'plain language' expanded report with the audit opinion at the start. A questionnaire research instrument was mailed to shareholders and auditors. In general, the audit report formats did not reduce the expectations gap between shareholders and auditors. A greater number of significant differences between shareholders’ and auditors’ perceptions were evident for the expanded format (vis-à-vis the AUS 702 short format), while fewer significant differences existed for the 'plain language' expanded report with the audit opinion at the start. Green says that auditor specialisation through training and experience in one main industry improves auditor judgements. Green examines incremental gains in auditor performance by specialist auditors over auditors with some industry experience (non-specialists) when both groups complete all stages of an analytical procedures task within the same industry. The results of a controlled experiment where both specialists and non-specialists had equivalent general and task-specific experience reveal that, while specialists do not
exhibit superior performance in the initial hypothesis generation stage, differences do manifest in later stages. Compared to non-specialists, specialists had a more focused and efficient information search, were more able to generate the correct cause during the task, and identified the correct cause more often.\(^5\) Bewley et al. remark that the Enron/Andersen scandal provides a unique opportunity to examine the role of signaling in auditor choice. Many clients dismissed Andersen quickly after Enron declared bankruptcy – in some cases even before a replacement auditor was engaged – and lawsuits against the audit firm were mounted. However, many clients did not dismiss Andersen until its auditing practice was shut down by the court. Bewley et al. investigate why some clients did not make a quick auditor switch, that is: was the timing of the switch a signal? Their predictions are based on the theory that those that switched early (compared to those that switched late) were sending a signal that they were high-quality financial reporters. Bewley et al. test a sample of 711 companies from the final portfolio of Andersen auditees. Consistent with their hypotheses, Bewley et al. find that subsequent to the change of auditors, management of those companies that dismissed earlier was more likely to initiate the restatement of their financial statements than those that dismissed later. It appears as though the early switchers were attempting to distance themselves from Andersen and the financial reporting used with Andersen. In contrast, those clients that dismissed Andersen later had more restatements imposed on them than those that dismissed earlier, suggesting that their financial statements were of lower quality.\(^6\)

Li et al. document a continuous relation between audit firm size and the issuing of modified opinions in China using a panel data set of audit firms and listed firms from 2001 to 2003. The relation is robust after controlling for a set of confounding factors and dealing with endogeneity issues. It is also robust when Li et al. exclude audit firms involving foreign partners or private client firms from their sample. Li et al.’s results indicate that the audit firm size effect suggested in other studies is applicable to audit markets that have not yet been dominated by a few very large audit firms as well as audit markets where client firms are partially state-owned entities.\(^7\) Bonsón-Ponte et al. set out to analyse the factors that determine delays in the signing of audit reports. The delays are measured as a function of the number of days that elapse from the closure of the accounting period until
the date when the audit report is signed. Bonsón-Ponte et al.'s study has been conducted in Spain, on 105 companies of the Spanish continuous market, from 2002 to 2005. The results obtained utilizing panel data methodology demonstrate that the two factors characterizing the companies that present less audit delay are: classification to sectors that are subject to regulatory pressure, such as the financial and energy sectors; and the size of company relative to its sector. Variables such as audit firm, qualifications or regulatory change show no significant relationship with audit delay in the Spanish context. ⁸

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ABSTRACT. PCAOB argues that the auditor should assess the competence and objectivity of the persons whose work the auditor plans to use to determine the extent to which the auditor may use their work. INTOSAI asserts that internal control systems should be monitored to assess the quality of the system’s performance over time. Ojo explores the roles of external auditors and international accounting bodies in financial regulation and supervision. Iwasaki examines a variety of factors as to why Russian stock companies select to become closed JSCs, and deal with the relationship between the corporate forms and internal organizational structures.

According to Sullivan & Cromwell LLP, differences between the SEC’s proposed interpretive guidance and its final guidance fall generally in five broad areas: better alignment of SEC interpretive guidance with PCAOB auditing standard; role of entity-level controls; self-assessment/ongoing monitoring activities; risks of fraud; indicators of a material weakness. “While the SEC and PCAOB have made it clear that the changes are intended to reduce the expense and effort of the Section 404 internal control process, the extent to which new efficiencies will be achieved will largely depend on the implementation decisions made by issuers and their audit firms in applying these changes. As a result, the effect of the changes will likely not be known until next year at the earliest. Also, larger companies, which have been through several Section 404 audit processes, may find it more difficult to scale back assessment and audit processes that have already been implemented. Therefore, these changes may result in fewer efficiencies for larger companies than for smaller companies or newly public companies that have not yet been through the internal control audit process.”¹ PCAOB argues that the auditor should assess the competence and objectivity of the persons whose work the auditor plans to use to determine the extent to which the auditor may use their work; the extent to which the auditor may use
the work of others in an audit of internal control depends on the risk associated with the control being tested (as the risk associated with a control increases, the need for the auditor to perform his or her own work on the control increases). “The auditor should use a top-down approach to the audit of internal control over financial reporting to select the controls to test. A top-down approach begins at the financial statement level and with the auditor’s understanding of the overall risks to internal control over financial reporting. The auditor then focuses on entity-level controls and works down to significant accounts and disclosures and their relevant assertions.”

PCAOB argues that the evidence provided by the auditor’s tests of the effectiveness of controls depends upon the mix of the nature, timing, and extent of the auditor’s procedures; the nature of the tests of effectiveness that will provide competent evidence depends (to a large degree) on the nature of the control to be tested, including whether the operation of the control results in documentary evidence of its operation. “When evaluating the severity of a deficiency, or combination of deficiencies, the auditor also determine the level of detail and degree of assurance that would satisfy prudent officials in the conduct of their own affairs that they have reasonable assurance that transactions are recorded as necessary to permit the preparation of financial statements in conformity with generally accepted accounting principles. If the auditor determines that a deficiency, or combination of deficiencies, might prevent prudent officials in the conduct of their own affairs from concluding that they have reasonable assurance that transactions are recorded as necessary to permit the preparation of financial statements in conformity with generally accepted accounting principles, then the auditor should treat the deficiency, or combination of deficiencies, as an indicator of a material weakness.”

INTOSAI asserts that internal control systems should be monitored to assess the quality of the system’s performance over time; specific separate evaluations cover the evaluation of the effectiveness of the internal control system and ensure that internal control achieves the desired results based on predefined methods and procedures. “Monitoring internal control should include policies and procedures aimed at ensuring the findings of audits and other reviews are adequately and promptly resolved. Managers are to (1) promptly evaluate findings from audits and other reviews, including those showing deficiencies and recommendations reported by au-
ditors and others who evaluate agencies’ operations, (2) determine proper actions in response to findings and recommendations from audits and reviews, and (3) complete, within established time frames, all actions that correct or otherwise resolve the matters brought to their attention.”

PCAOB explains that the auditor’s objective in an audit of internal control over financial reporting is to express an opinion on the effectiveness of the company’s internal control over financial reporting; a direct relationship exists between the degree of risk that a material weakness could exist in a particular area of the company’s internal control over financial reporting and the amount of audit attention that should be devoted to that area. “The auditor should not use the work of persons who have a low degree of objectivity, regardless of their level of competence. Likewise, the auditor should not use the work of persons who have a low level of competence regardless of their degree of objectivity. Personnel whose core function is to serve as a testing or compliance authority at the company, such as internal auditors, normally are expected to have greater competence and objectivity in performing the type of work that will be useful to the auditor.”

Tan and Jamal observe that when accounting discretion is reduced, managers may invest less in assets with variable returns, and more in assets with stable returns, in order to reduce their need for accounting adjustments; the level of accounting discretion available to managers depends on the precision of rules in accounting standards and the intervention by auditors in the financial reporting process. “Regulators should consider the impact of changes in accounting regulation on a firm’s investment decisions. A significant reduction in accounting discretion to prevent earnings management may encourage managers to manipulate operational variables to achieve their objectives. This form of manipulation is likely to have more severe consequences for firms and ultimately, the economy. A reduction of R&D to meet a short-term earnings target, for instance, may lower the long-term earning potential of a firm.”

Ojo explores the roles of external auditors and international accounting bodies in financial regulation and supervision; the auditor provides independent verification on the financial statements of a company and as a result the audit loses its value when such independence which gives credibility to the financial statements is undermined; the necessity for objectivity arises due to the fact that many important issues involved in the preparation of financial statements do not relate to questions of fact but rather to
questions of judgement. “Thirty years ago, financial markets were more distinguishable: there was clearer distinction between commercial banks and securities firms. There was also a further distinction between institutions which catered for wholesale customers like merchant banks and those which catered for retail markets like commercial banks. Supervision focused then on the activities of the commercial banks rather than securities firms. As deregulation has opened up financial markets to competition from both domestic and foreign institutions, such previous distinctions have become blurred. Deregulation has also promoted the cross-border flow of capital and attracted investors to seek rewards in overseas markets.”

Watts and Zimmerman utilize size to proxy for a firm’s political sensitivity and thus the incentive of managers to select income-decreasing accounting choices. Healy and Wahlen hold that earnings management occurs when managers use judgement in financial reporting and in structuring transactions “to alter financial reports to either mislead some stakeholders about the underlying economic performance of the company or to influence contractual outcomes that depend on reported accounting numbers.”

Iwasaki examines a variety of factors as to why Russian stock companies select to become closed JSCs, and deal with the relationship between the corporate forms and internal organizational structures, as well as with the impact of these institutional couplings on organizational behavior, including corporate performance. “Unlike open JSCs, whose shares issued at the time of formation may be allocated to their promoters and to the general public (i.e., establishment with outside offering), closed JSCs are required to issue their shares only to their promoters and the other investors specified in advance. Even after incorporation, closed JSCs are not allowed to offer new shares to the general public, although they may issue corporate bonds other than convertible bonds on the securities market as a means of raising funds from outside sources.”

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FDI AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE SERVICES

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ABSTRACT. Pauwels and Ioniță remark that companies from all over the world are now producing vehicles and/or spare parts in Romania. Gavin says that inflation targeting has worked because central banks do not try to control inflation directly. Christopherson argues that Wal-Mart was an excellent candidate to demonstrate the gains to be achieved by trade liberalization. Kaludis and Stine argue that institution-wide goals for the instructional use of information technologies need to serve as a benchmark against which to test plans and activities.

Pauwels and Ioniță remark that companies from all over the world are now producing vehicles and/or spare parts in Romania; Romania is gradually making the transition from low-wage competition towards higher value-added sectors; foreign investors were attracted by Romania’s relatively low unit labor cost, proximity to the euro area, sound macro-economic fundamental and its increasing domestic market potential. “A growing area of concern is that wage developments have cut-stripped productivity growth in the last two years. This has led to a sharp appreciation of the real effective exchange rate, adversely affecting Romania’s international competitiveness. Finally, the economy is showing clear signs of overheating, with a high and widening current account deficit (projected at close to 14% of GDP in 2007), growing labor shortages, strong wage growth and rapid increases in household borrowing. The depreciation of the Leu and other supply-side factors, against the backdrop of strong domestic demand dynamics and non-restrictive fiscal and public wage policies have triggered a sudden increase in inflation since August 2007.”

Kaludis and Stine argue that institution-wide goals for the instructional use of information technologies need to serve as a benchmark against which to test plans and activities; the instructional applications of IT will inevitably require the expenditure of funds; investment funds can be generated from many sources (including fund raising, capital funding, debt, or operating funds after fixed costs have been met). “Strategic asset management takes a broader view of the assets of the institution than that found in financial statements. For example, intellectual property generated and owned or licensed by an insti-
tution has substantial potential value. Many institutions have developed technology transfer operations to deal with the potential value of inventions, patents, and licenses in the institution. By more systematically applying underutilized assets, particularly those with high development and depreciation costs, institutions can better manage the cost of information technology.\(^2\) Gavin says that inflation targeting has worked because central banks do not try to control inflation directly (they enlist cooperating expectations); inflation targeting works because central banks operate with interest rate targets. Monetary quantity targeting destabilizes inflation in the short run. If the central bank uses an interest rate target in a credible inflation targeting regime, then the money supply will be free to adjust to economic shocks. Gavin argues that a central bank following a nominal interest rate target for monetary policy generates a highly variable money growth rate in comparison with the inflation rate. “To understand why inflation targeting works so well, it is useful to think about monetary policy as having two uncorrelated, but not independent, instruments. One is the long-term price objective, and the other is the short-term liquidity position. The two are not independent because, in the long run, the accumulation of reserves growth from setting short-run liquidity positions (from open market operations) must be consistent with the long-term price objective. But the two can be uncorrelated in the short run, just as tax receipts and government spending appear to be uncorrelated over short time horizons.”\(^3\)

Dür discusses three factors that support the influence rather than the luck conjecture: economic interests’ excellent access to decision-makers, their self-evaluation as being influential and the lack of a plausible alternative explanation for the finding of close parallels between the EU’s negotiating position and interest group demands; economic interests often adopt rather than influence the position of decision-makers (they have specific preferences concerning trade policy, independent from societal demands); the EU chose trade liberalization because societal interests pushed for it. “Several existing accounts of the making of EU trade policy stress the relatively large independence of decision-makers from societal interests. The argument is that delegation of trade authority from the national to the European level insulated policy-makers from protectionist interests. This insulation explains the shift from protectionism to liberalization witnessed since the 1960s, as policy-makers could implement ‘good’ economic policies in the absence of
societal pressures. [...] Even in situations in which EU governments have to find issue linkages to come to an agreement, the resulting trade policies tend to be tailor-made to avoid the imposition of concentrated costs on constituencies in any member country. European trade policies are more in line with the preferences of concentrated interests than those of diffuse interests. If firms realize that they have to interact with government repeatedly, their rational response may be to establish a special relationship with decision-makers. Christopherson argues that Wal-Mart was an excellent candidate to demonstrate the gains to be achieved by trade liberalization; Wal-Mart’s strategy for entering new international markets has been to assume a cost leadership position and to capture a significant portion of market share; Wal-Mart’s ability to assume a cost leadership position depends on control of supplier firms in national markets as well as in international supply chains. “In the case of Wal-Mart’s operations in the USA, the firm has been able to shed the costs of continual experimentation (in geographic location and labor allocation) to increase profits, and, in the long-term, the scale of its operations. These costs do not disappear but are redistributed, including to the public sector. In the USA, the regulatory environment supports and even tacitly encourages this cost shifting. In Germany, by contrast, the regulatory environment makes the redistribution of social costs associated with experimentation to increase profits (and expansion) difficult and expensive.”

Haden writes that the emergy value of a product is the amount of energy that has been used up in its creation; emergy analysis is a measure of value of the work of humans and nature on a common basis using energy as measure; emergy analysis is a quantification of the work previously performed to create that good or service. “Those storages of previous environmental work, such as hydrocarbon fossil fuels, that are easy to obtain and utilize, generally have a large net yield of emergy, and can therefore power a large number of work processes in addition to the work performed in accessing the emergy storage itself. With regard to agriculture, and other production processes that run partially on contemporary sunlight, it must be noted that there are thermodynamic limits to the ability of these systems to provide (em)power in excess of the emergy invested in the process itself. This is an important fact to bear in mind when attempting to understand the potential of ecological and agroecological systems to power economic processes.”

WIIW holds that the FDI inflow in Central, East and South-
east Europe reached a new high in 2005, EUR 55 billion, 18% more than in the previous year; FDI into Southeast European countries was EUR 10.4 billion in 2005, 2% lower than the historic peak of 2004; the European CIS countries received more than EUR 18 billion in FDI inflows (an increase of 31%). “What were the factors driving the increase of FDI inflows in 2005? As usual, several host- and home-country factors were simultaneously at work. As to the home-country factors, a modest recovery in the world economy, an improving financial position of transnational corporations and an upward trend in global FDI all played an important role. When large international investors are in a better financial situation than before and the stock exchanges are booming, investments abroad pick up. As to the host-country perspective, there has been a general increase in attractiveness for foreign investors due to rapid economic growth, EU integration and stepped-up privatization efforts.”

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QUALITY SYSTEMS AND SERVICES IN FRUIT AND VEGETABLE PRODUCTION

INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND THE COMMON MARKET ORGANIZATION OF THE EUROPEAN UNION

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ABSTRACT. Dür writes that the collusive delegation argument postulates that politicians consciously designed the EU's institutional framework to minimize the influence of societal interests. Bieler points out that globalization is an exogenous structural impact to which actors can merely respond. Humphrey provides a critical analysis of the transformation of retailing in developing countries and its consequences for small farmers. Haden remarks that as the process of industrialization has run its course over the 20th century, the relative importance of agriculture as an economic activity and a means of cultural sustenance for nations has declined dramatically.

Gioè argues that previous attempts to promote supply management in the past have failed because of lack of political will at the international level, different economic interests of developing countries and free-riders who do not take part in the supply management scheme; when the model is applied globally in a demand-constrained world, there is a danger of an outcome in which all countries try to grow on the backs of demand expansion in other countries; diversification of production in the agriculture sector can be a viable solution for both volatility and decline of commodity prices. “Diversifying into different productions seems to be the best way to reduce in the long-run the dependence on agricultural commodities and the associated vulnerability to negative price declines. Three diversification routes are available to developing countries: horizontal diversification into alternative crops; vertical diversification into agricultural products and processes aimed at capturing a higher proportion of the value chain; and, diversification into non-agricultural activities that exploit comparative advantage (such as manufactures and services).”1 Smallholders are being squeezed out of export production because of the difficulty of ensuring compliance with food safety and quality requirements imposed by supermarkets and other buyers.2 The role of agriculture in modern industrial society must be understood within the context
of humanity’s long journey in learning how to harness and utilize different forms of energy. ³ Haden remarks that as the process of industrialization has run its course over the 20th century, the relative importance of agriculture as an economic activity and a means of cultural sustenance for nations has declined dramatically; ecological sustainability is a function of the dependence of a system on renewable emergy, the degree to which the system depends on imported emergy, and the overall load that the system places on the environment; because agricultural systems are coupled to renewable emergy flows that are limited in the amount of work processes that they can power. “Agriculture is the primary means through which human societies access ecological systems. However, it is now obvious that the magnitude of the ecological resources appropriated by humans from the planet’s natural systems, through agriculture and other means, cannot be maintained at current levels without substantial repercussions. […] During the past two centuries, anthropogenic impacts on ecosystems have become sufficiently severe that many individual ecosystems and even entire ecological regions are exhibiting signs of stress, with many at risk of collapse. While agriculture is humanity’s most basic, and arguably its most important, means of biological and cultural sustenance, it is also the primary activity through which we have made our most distinct, lasting and increasingly grave alterations of the planet’s terrestrial and aquatic environments.”⁴

Haden remarks that coherent explanations for the rural to urban shift at the scale of regions (as well as globally) may be best formulated within the context of the changes in the energy and resource use dynamics that have accompanied this shift; emergy analysis is an example of a conceptual framework, with a corresponding methodology, that has emerged from ecosystem science; agricultural systems are open in many respects with natural energies and materials of anthropogenic origin flowing across their boundaries from multiple spatial and temporal scales. “The export of entropy across a system’s boundary is also a precondition of open systems. As agricultural systems import goods and services to maintain their organizational structure and function, they export entropy – degraded energy not capable of further work – across the boundaries of every component subsystem and across the boundary of the system as a whole. […] Because agricultural production requires that work be performed by soil organisms, plants, animals, people, and machines as well as by the larger biosphere processes
driven by solar energy such as wind and rain, entropy is a continuous and necessary by-product of all processes underway in agricultural production systems. Dür writes that the collusive delegation argument postulates that politicians consciously designed the EU's institutional framework to minimize the influence of societal interests; the EU's institutional framework for trade policy-making runs counter to the collusive delegation argument; the European Commission has an incentive to listen to economic interests (rather than having its proposals rejected by the Council of Ministers). “Delegation may enhance governments’ ability to give in to special interests. Loosely applying a principal-agent framework, the more informed the electorate is, the more difficult the government will find it to engage in actions that run counter to the preferences of voters. The loss in transparency resulting from delegation should inhibit voters’ monitoring of policy decisions more than any other interests. Less scrutiny by voters should allow politicians to impose policies that are even more in line with special interest group demands than before. Delegation may hence boost the power of economic interests by giving politicians more leeway from electoral demands.”

Bieler points out that globalization is an exogenous structural impact to which actors can merely respond: it enables with transnational forces playing an active role; trade unions’ positions reflect to some extent the interests of employers in their sectors; social forces of labor are of a national and transnational nature and may operate at the national and international level. “While the positions on EMU taken by Swedish unions showed a similar split between national and transnational production sectors as in Britain, the attitudes towards co-operation at the European level by transnational sector unions were markedly different. National sector unions, as in Britain, were skeptical about the possibilities of European co-operation. The Union of Commercial Employees could not make out any substantial, concrete results of the Social Dimension. More international co-operation was necessary, it was argued, but only in order to strengthen trade unions at the local and national level, since change had always come from below. Due to the different national labor legislations, tax systems and social insurance systems, the co-ordination of bargaining at the European level would be impossible.” Humphrey provides a critical analysis of the transformation of retailing in developing countries and its consequences for small farmers; supermarket sourcing strategies have a more direct impact on producers in the fresh food sector than is the case
for processed food, where the effects are mediated by the sourcing strategies of food processors; large supermarket chains in Latin America are engaged in intense competition with other retailing formats, both traditional and non-traditional. “The weakness of the larger-format retail outlets in the sale of fresh food can be attributed to both demand and supply factors. On the demand side, these items may need to be purchased more frequently, and so the issue of transport costs and accessibility weighs more heavily with poorer consumers. On the supply side, large formats are able to use their buying power and supply chain efficiencies to offer many non-food and processed food products at prices cheaper than can be obtained in traditional retailing outlets.” Kosson claims that since accession of Poland to European Union (EU) in 2004 vegetables and fruit produced in Poland and intended for fresh market supply or for export have to meet the EU quality requirements and food safety legislation.

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5. Ibid., pp. 13–14.
ABSTRACT. The main purpose of Grimm and Ried's numerical approach is to rank the different scenarios of strategic behavior of monetary and fiscal policies for the losses they induce. According to Höpner and Schäfer, institutions are the instruments with which society governs the economic behavior of its constituencies. Humphrey holds that the globalization of retailing is having a profound impact on market structures in developing countries. Chari and Kehoe maintain that once the nominal wages are set, the monetary authority will deviate.

The main purpose of Grimm and Ried's numerical approach is to rank the different scenarios of strategic behavior of monetary and fiscal policies for the losses they induce. Grimm and Ried distinguish three approaches: (i) evaluation of the loss functions referring to the policy exercised by the fiscal and monetary authorities; (ii) evaluation of the region-specific loss functions; and (iii) evaluation of social welfare. “Fiscal policies aim at higher inflation and higher output than the central bank, which targets socially optimal levels. Due to the low relative weight on output stabilization the central bank reacts strongly to offset inflation deviating from the socially optimum level. Fiscal policies themselves engage in a trade-off between inflation and output when fixing their own policy decisions. An expansionary fiscal policy pushes output above the socially optimal level by granting subsidies in order to lower production costs. Thus it decreases inflation at the same time. Accordingly, output is higher than natural output and lower than the desired fiscal targets.”

Lacher holds that the exclusive territoriality of capitalist political space derives not from the inner nature of capital, “but from the way in which capitalism came to be born into a pre-existing system of territorial states.” According to Höpner and Schäfer, institutions are the instruments with which society governs the economic behavior of its constituencies; governments cannot specify all possible contingencies in advance (they put supranational actors in charge of monitoring and enforcing their agreement); neo-functionalist arguments are too narrowly focused
on the question of more or less integration. “After having largely completed the Internal Market for products, European economic integration has entered a post-Ricardian phase. Attempts to liberalize services, takeover practices and company law differ in their potential consequences from product market integration. Now the Court and the Commission directly target member states’ institutions and aim at transforming them, even in situations in which no other country’s economic activities are involved at all. European-level actors have extended the interpretations of the ‘four freedoms’ to an extent that it becomes increasingly questionable whether the wordings and spirit of the treaties provide (input) legitimacy for the respective liberalization measures.”

Brady et al. hold that economic globalization has increased, especially among the affluent democracies (affluent democracies have experienced a substantial increase in economic globalization); the consequences of globalization for affluent democracies reflect a host of distinct commonalities that are often absent in developing countries; increasing globalization is occurring and is reaching levels not seen since the early 20th century. “Globalization can be conceptualized as a multidimensional process of international network formation. The network metaphor clarifies the concept of globalization by highlighting both the nodes (e.g., people, organizations, and states) and the relations (e.g., trade, investment, organization membership, consumption, and migration) that are central to the globalization process. Thinking about globalization as multidimensional network formation helps differentiate the multiple levels of analysis inherent in the process: globalization involves the local, regional, national, and international levels of social life.”

Humphrey holds that the globalization of retailing is having a profound impact on market structures in developing countries; the expansion of modern retailing formats in developing countries has potentially important consequences for economic development and poverty reduction strategies in these countries; the potential impact of the “supermarket revolution” on farmers supplying the domestic market is very large. “The broad concern with African development and the centrality of rural development for reducing poverty, combined with the failure of Africa to gain from the green revolution, has led to initiatives to increase agricultural productivity in the Continent. Market linkages and a market orientation are essential components of any program to enhance farm productivity. Increasing output will not lead to increasing incomes unless the products
meet the needs of marketing channels. This means not only having the right product, but delivering it with the bundle of attributes and information required by the market.\(^5\) When nominal goods prices are sticky, the adjustment of the nominal exchange rate allows for the necessary relative price adjustment to a country-specific shock.\(^6\) The monetary policy of the G-7 countries is driven more by the anticipated future than by the actual lagged outcomes.\(^7\) Kaludis and Stine write that it is critical to draw the distinction between the management of *expenditures* and the management of *costs*; as a utility type of expense, management of the costs depend heavily on institutional policy and plans for provision and expansion of the utility; the basic approach to controlling costs is to *limit access to the utility*. “If one assumes that personal computers and the Internet are transformational, even ‘disruptive’ technologies, then, for many institutions, a substantial part of the technology infrastructure has become a ‘utility’ much like electricity and the heating plant, some portion of which can be capitalized while others are an ongoing operating expense. These infrastructure costs include the development of campus networks and the provision of minimally configured personal computers, network connections, and e-mail technology with appropriate network servers.”\(^8\)

Chari and Kehoe maintain that once the nominal wages are set, the monetary authority will deviate and generate inflation in order to raise output; the key influence on investment decisions that determine the capital stock in the future is the after-tax return expected in the future; the capital stock is smaller than it would be under commitment, and both output and welfare are correspondingly lower than they would be under commitment. “A standard argument against commitment and for discretion is that specifying all the possible contingencies in a rule made under commitment is extremely difficult, and discretion helps policymakers respond to unspecified and unforeseen emergencies. This argument is less convincing than it may seem. Every proponent of rule-based policy recognizes the necessity of escape clauses in the event of unforeseen emergencies or extremely unlikely events. These escape clauses will reintroduce a time inconsistency problem, but in a more limited form.”\(^9\) Machinea et al. write that a decisive factor in a country’s or region’s economic and productive development is the availability, capability and quality of its economic agents; transnational corporations play an important role through their linkages with the local business system and with governments (they under-
take large investments and create the conditions for leading companies to become global players); the key to overall economic development is the level of productivity and the speed with which it rises. “The determinants of collective learning are still little understood, but they include the intensity and quality of interaction between actors and their environment. A company learns by interacting with customers or consumers, competitors and suppliers, and similar organizations and institutions. This interaction is moulded by the characteristics and dynamic of the market, the regulatory environment, the business climate, public signals (relative prices and incentives), the institutional context and the degree of linkage with and participation in the international economy. The nature and speed of change in business and technology entail not only increases in short-term competitive pressure, but also a latent and persistent future tension.”

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ABSTRACT. Goodwin remarks that one of the most striking aspects of the macroeconomic and macrosocial differences between First and Third World countries lies in the area of demographics. Amoroso holds that the policies for market liberalization belong to the process of economic marginalization. Hirst and Thompson argue that nation-states are not being overwhelmed and that the future of extended multilateral governance does not look promising. According to Machinea et al., in countries and regions with more homogeneous levels of education and culture and less fragmented or rigidly stratified social structures, there is greater scope for an entrepreneurial career.

Goodwin remarks that one of the most striking aspects of the macroeconomic and macrosocial differences between First and Third World countries lies in the area of demographics; the developing countries are in need of more investment than they can attract; the market solution is debated on a variety of well-being grounds which require more attention in economic theory. “Macroeconomic theory could benefit from comparing the rate of economic growth to the rate at which ecosystems can adapt – for example, forest and ocean ecosystems, as well as the global climate. Large scale changes that are likely to arrive in a few decades may not be more important than those that will take hundreds of years to play out, but issues on such different time scales require different kinds of understanding and response. As with the issues of biodiversity, cultural survival, and potentially massive human conflict that arise in connection with the scale of the economy, the rate of change is most obviously critical in dealing with irreversibilities.”¹ Hirst and Thompson argue that nation-states are not being overwhelmed and that the future of extended multilateral governance does not look promising. “In a turbulent physical and international environment the nation-state may become more salient as a means of protection against global forces beyond supranational governance.”² According to Amin, establishing a link between globalization and inequality is fraught with difficulty (because of how globalization is defined and how in-
equality is measured, and because the entanglements between globalization forces and “domestic” trends are not that easy to separate out); contemporary processes of globalization have been accompanied by a rise in global inequality and vulnerability; the global economy can be harnessed, tamed, and controlled around a global regulatory meta-narrative. “The growing concern over the spatial and social inequalities associated with market fundamentalism, the Washington Consensus and the unchecked activities of the transnational business elite, has stimulated wide ranging debate on the nature of world reforms necessary to tackle these inequalities. A range of new meta-narratives of regulation, of possible order are emerging as alternatives to neo-liberal regulation.” As asset quality falls, capitalization must increase to maintain deposits constant. Duarte documents inflation differentials among member countries of the EMU as big as 4 percentage points.

Amoroso holds that the policies for market liberalization belong to the process of economic marginalization; the strategies and policies are tools to achieve global market dominance; the identification of the reasons behind variations and contradictions makes possible a more articulated analysis and interpretation of the character of the present stage in international economic relations. “Two previous imperialist powers, but also at the present two society organizations grounded on very different inspirations and aspirations. The US melting pot of people and tradition aspires to a ‘virtual’ way of life and organization. A multitude of individuals trying to add to a world without borders, a citizenship without obligations. The polycentric European tradition founded on well established and territorialized communities and organizations, considering diversities, identities and belonging to families and communities as basic values, engaged in the difficult task of rethinking the sustainability of its welfare societies in the context of the world shared prosperity.” Metzler writes that considering the low price elasticities which have been found in most empirical studies of demand, “it seems probable that depreciation, in the short run, cannot improve a country’s trade balance unless the inelastic demand for imports is matched by a corresponding inelastic supply of exports. Even in this case the elasticity of the trade balance will probably be small, and a substantial movement of exchange rates may therefore be required to eliminate rather modest deficits.” For a class of economies consistent with the growth facts on the absence of long-term trends in the ratio of output to real
balances, a nominal interest rate close to zero is optimal. When monetary policy is tightened and reserves are restricted, large banks can find alternative sources of funding more easily and cheaply than small ones.

Amoroso points out that the IMF is the institution that most successfully has been able to combine the objectives of economic marginalization and political destabilization by the implementation of its policies for structural adjustments; the WTO represents the danger of the triad’s economic penetration into the production systems in different countries; the WTO proposes measures that contradict the idea that unilateral measures should be avoided. “The new issues on the WTO’s agenda are those trying to limit or abolish the possibilities for national governments to protect or support local producers and contractors. This takes place in the form of the new regulations on investment policies, competition policies, and government procurement policies imposing the clause of ‘national treatment’ in favor of the TNCs. Furthermore, by new regulations in matters related to labor and environmental clauses in WTO agreements, new barriers to the entry of developing country imports are created.” According to Machinea et al., in countries and regions with more homogeneous levels of education and culture and less fragmented or rigidly stratified social structures, there is greater scope for an entrepreneurial career; the policies designed in the region’s countries in the 1990s to support small and medium-sized enterprises make up a complex landscape; the substance of small business support policies has tended to become standardized (it usually includes export promotion, technology take-up and training). “Although initiatives may be of good quality and withstand cost-benefit analysis, the coverage of SME support instruments is far from being sufficient to have an appreciable impact on the economy as a whole. In both large and small countries, the number of companies that can be helped in this way is only a small percentage of the total. For this reason, more and more effort has been put into finding ways of dealing with groups of companies rather than isolated units. In many small countries, the institutional or financial capacity of governments to administer services of this type is not sufficient to ensure the provision of good quality services.” Emergence of a derivatives market has two opposing effects on the net risk position of a bank: it lowers the risk because of improved risk sharing opportunities and it may raise bank exposure because of an increase in risk taking. The lowest income
countries have a higher incidence of shocks than other developing countries and tend to suffer larger damages when shocks occur.¹³ Gürkaynak et al. use interest rates on indexed and comparable non-indexed bonds to show that macroeconomic news affects the expected inflation premium in long-term U.S. interest rates.¹⁴

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10. Amoroso, B., [5], p. 6.
ABSTRACT. Gavin affirms that the official adoption of an inflation target communicates information about policymaker’s inflation objective, and the interest rate rule transmits all money demand shocks into the money supply. Sousa and Zaghini assume the global liquidity aggregate to react in the same quarter to shocks on real income, the price index and the short-term interest rate. Amin observes that the new social democratic narrative assumes that a new global regulatory regime will be able to tackle the abuses of an unregulated capitalism without the need to alter its fundamentals.

Gavin affirms that the official adoption of an inflation target communicates information about policymaker’s inflation objective, and the interest rate rule transmits all money demand shocks into the money supply; the role of policy objectives is to eliminate the distortions caused by departures from the assumptions of a perfect world underlying monetary policy analysis; following inflation targeting strategies has led central banks to coordinate in ways that approximate good policies. “A credible price stability objective affects the environment in which short-run policy is made. It changes the environment in two important ways. First, it eliminates an important source of indeterminacy in economic models. Whether it does so in the actual economy is a debatable issue, but there is no doubt that, in models, leaving the long-run price objective uncertain increases the likelihood of asset pricing bubbles and self-fulfilling prophesies of deflation. Second, a credible long-run policy objective creates flexibility for pursuing alternative short-run goals.”

According to Kaludis and Stine, information technology-enabled improvements are potentially available at many levels and parts of the institution; some institutions have made their reputation on course delivery mechanisms that do not allow economies of scale essential to manage technology costs; many new kinds of proactive management decisions may more effectively manage costs. “Institutions allowing ‘producers’ rather than ‘customers’ to determine programming, particularly within the
distance and off-campus learning program, will not be able to manage costs. Institutions that do not seek to deal with economies-of-scale issues and build scaleable, replicable technology uses will find escalating costs. Institutions that are not able to deal with issues like the continuing debate over the ownership of intellectual property for courses and courseware will be left with high costs and low returns on investment. Blaich et al. argue that, from a network perspective, distinct competencies of the network partners need to be combined to produce a complex service; the knowledge of all network partners must be identified in order to combine it to a desired result; the transfer of knowledge bears the risk for the individual network partner to lose distinctive competencies to other network partners. “The systematization is extended through the use of service complexity, rather than individualization, because the first includes the second and is of particular interest for knowledge intensive services. The complexity of a service should not be understood in the sense of the ‘normal’ complexity of problems or structures. Complexity refers far more ‘purely’ to that quality of systems in which a large number of different circumstances can be assumed within a given time span, which renders more difficult their understanding and management. A large number of possible circumstances lead to manifold and relatively unpredictable, uncertain behavioral possibilities.”

Sousa and Zaghini assume the global liquidity aggregate to react in the same quarter to shocks on real income, the price index and the short-term interest rate; real GDP decreases at impact but then tends to recover to its initial level and global liquidity quickly drops after an increase in short-term rates and the effect is long-lasting; an exogenous increase in commodity prices temporarily decreases global output (in the long-run, output returns to the initial level). “An increase in the global monetary aggregate has a positive impact on real GDP in the short-run that disappears in the medium- to long-run. As for prices, the effect is negligible in the first 6 quarters, but soon after becomes significantly positive and permanent. […] The forecast error variance decomposition shows that the contribution of unexpected shocks to short-term rates is rather limited in the short-run but it quickly increases over time. […] Even though output itself and prices explain always the vast majority of the fluctuations at any horizon, the role of global liquidity and that of commodities price contribute significantly from the second year onwards.”

Amin observes that
the new social democratic narrative assumes that a new global regulatory regime will be able to tackle the abuses of an unregulated capitalism without the need to alter its fundamentals; the performance of globalization is about the constant renegotiation of what counts as the economic; a new global regime of governance is unlikely to possess the coherence of a machinic order. “The institutional and spatial fecundity is no Hayekian utopia or dystopia, for at least two reasons. First, there is no inverted macro-micro dynamic, where the powers of the micro have replaced the powers of the macro. I reject this dualism and its imputed hierarchy of influence and regulatory significance, in preference of a level plane made up of all kinds of hybrid. Second, my interpretation comes with an understanding of order as the product of dissonance and reconciliation between institutionalized practices of various sorts.”

Goodwin points out that existing macroeconomic theory does not deal adequately with normative issues, focuses excessively on market solutions, assumes that a single macroeconomic theory can apply to all situations, and ignores issues concerning the scale of economic activity and the speed of change.

Tadesse investigates the consequence in terms of bank performance and crisis probability of banking system transparency, with a focus on the component of transparency that is attributable to regulated disclosure. The impacts of regulated disclosure on banking system stability are intricately complex. “On the one hand, the informational asymmetry and the positive externality explanations of regulated disclosure predict that disclosure and the consequent transparency enhances banking system stability by enabling market participants to better assess bank risk and performance. This is the ‘Transparency-Stability’ view. On the other hand, regulated disclosure could exasperate banking system instability by creating negative informational externalities. This is what I call the ‘Transparency-Fragility’ view.”

Goodfriend argues that the equilibrium real interest rate clears the economy-wide credit market by making the representative household neither a borrower nor a lender (the equilibrium real interest rate clears the economy-wide goods market by inducing the representative household to spend its current income exactly); markup variability is central to fluctuations in inflation and employment in the benchmark NNS model; costly for a firm producing a differentiated product determines the price that maximizes its profits at each point in time. “Management must prioritize pricing decisions relative to other
pressing concerns, so pricing decisions get the attention of management only every so often. Hence, a firm considers whether to change its product price only when demand or cost conditions are expected to move the actual markup significantly and persistently away from the profit maximizing markup. For instance, if higher nominal wages $W$, or lower productivity $a$ were expected to compress the markup significantly and persistently, then it would be in the firm’s interest to consider raising its product price to restore the profit maximizing markup. Feenstra says that established members of the EU are concerned with the pressure on wages and employment that might result from immigration from countries with much lower wages; a shift of activities from one country to the other can increase the relative demand for skilled labor in both countries. “The fall in relative employment is due to the outsourcing of service tasks from U.S. manufacturing. To the extent that the back-office jobs being outsourced from manufacturing use the lower-paid non-production workers, then the offshoring of those jobs could very well raise the average wage among nonproduction workers.”

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ABSTRACT. PCAOB state that the effective internal control over financial reporting provides reasonable assurance regarding the reliability of financial reporting and the preparation of financial statements for external purposes. Iwasaki says that the organizational advantages of a closed JSC as an “institutional defense barrier” become trivial for group companies. Burchell et al. argue that, in wider social practice, accounting innovations satisfy more general searches for the extension of calculative practice which are embodied within the societies of which organizations are a part.

PCAOB states that the effective internal control over financial reporting provides reasonable assurance regarding the reliability of financial reporting and the preparation of financial statements for external purposes; the audit of internal control over financial reporting should be integrated with the audit of the financial statements (the objectives of the audits are not identical, however, and the auditor must plan and perform the work to achieve the objectives of both audits). “The size and complexity of the company, its business processes, and business units, may affect the way in which the company achieves many of its control objectives. The size and complexity of the company also might affect the risks of misstatement and the controls necessary to address those risks. Scaling is most effective as a natural extension of the risk-based approach and applicable to the audits of all companies. Accordingly, a smaller, less complex company, or even a larger, less complex company might achieve its control objectives differently than a more complex company.”

PCAOB claims that the auditor should properly plan the audit of internal control over financial reporting and properly supervise any assistants; the complexity of the organization, business unit, or process, will play an important role in the auditor’s risk assessment and the determination of the necessary procedures; the auditor must test
those entity-level controls that are important to the auditor’s conclusion about whether the company has effective internal control over financial reporting. “A smaller, less complex company might achieve its control objectives in a different manner from a larger, more complex organization. For example, a smaller, less complex company might have fewer employees in the accounting function, limiting opportunities to segregate duties and leading the company to implement alternative controls to achieve its control objectives. In such circumstances, the auditor should evaluate whether those alternative controls are effective.”

Sullivan & Cromwell LLP holds that in the case of a financial reporting element that has a relatively high risk characteristic but the associated control has a very low risk of failure, the required level of evidence may be lower; where the operation of a control is complex or requires judgment at the individual location, the ICFR risk would be higher, and more evidence would be required regarding the control’s operation at the individual location. “In determining how and to what extent an auditor can use knowledge gained in prior years’ audits, the auditor should consider (1) the nature, timing and extent of procedures performed in previous audits; (2) the results of the previous years’ testing of the relevant control; and (3) whether there have been changes in the relevant control or the process in which it operates since the previous audit.”

PCAOB notices that because of its importance to effective internal control over financial reporting, the auditor must evaluate the control environment at the company; to identify significant accounts and disclosures and their relevant assertions, the auditor should evaluate the qualitative and quantitative risk factors related to the financial statement line items and disclosures. “Although the auditor must obtain evidence about the effectiveness of controls for each relevant assertion, the auditor is not responsible for obtaining sufficient evidence to support an opinion about the effectiveness of each individual control. Rather, the auditor’s objective is to express an opinion on the company’s internal control over financial reporting overall. This allows the auditor to vary evidence obtained regarding the effectiveness of individual controls selected for testing based on the risk associated with the individual control.”

Ojo points out that following the collapse of Enron, a lot of comparisons were drawn between the principles based approach which exists in the UK and the US rules-based approach; many of the differences between the UK
and US practices resulted directly from the changes driven by major corporate collapses of the 80s and early 90s; the UK government has been criticized for failing to give more protection to audit stakeholders as the regulating accounting bodies often campaign to demand liability and other concessions for auditing firms. “More work is needed to ensure that the role of the external auditor is better defined and that the possibility of unwarranted liabilities and risks are avoided. The growth of financial conglomerates and globalization of capital markets has highlighted the need for a clearly defined role for auditing as a vehicle towards providing credibility to financial statements. In order to define this role clearly, International Standards on Auditing have been developed by International Federation of Accountants. The International Accounting Standards Board is also working towards providing clearer accounting standards towards the harmonization of standards around the world. This should help avoid corporate failures which arise as a result of improper application and treatment of accounting standards.”

When ownership is diffuse, managers exercise considerable discretion over the choice of accounting methods. Iwasaki says that the organizational advantages of a closed JSC as an “institutional defense barrier” become trivial for group companies; the presence of outside shareholders diminishes the probability that an investment-target firm will become a closed JSC; Russian managers place more importance on maintaining effective control of their company than on obtaining capital gains by having stock in their companies. “Choosing which corporate form to take has an important strategic meaning for a JSC with regard to defining its organizational openness and balancing the power between its managers and shareholders; however, this is not the only step required. Its objective is fulfilled when the company has finalized its internal organizational structure by, for example, drawing up a corporate charter and electing the corporate bodies required by law.” Investors underestimate the persistence of cash flows and overestimate the persistence of accruals; a trading strategy with a long position in low-accrual firms and a short position in high-accrual firms generates significant abnormal stock returns in the subsequent two years.

Patton and Littleton attempt to weave together the fundamental ideas of accounting rather than to state standards as such; the intention has been “to build a framework within which a subsequent statement of corporate accounting standards could
be erected."\textsuperscript{9} Patton and Littleton claim that a formulated standard may not always conform with generally accepted practice. "The latter is like a statistical mean in the midst of surrounding data; the former may often be a guide to the gradual improvement of corporation accounting practices and a gauge against which to measure variations."\textsuperscript{10} Corporation reports should rest upon the assumption that a fiduciary management "is reporting to absentee investors who have no independent means of learning how their representatives are discharging their stewardship."\textsuperscript{11} The separation of management and control poses great challenges on the survival and evolution of modern corporation and relative legal settings, of which accounting regulation is one important branch.\textsuperscript{12} Burchell et al. argue that, in wider social practice, accounting innovations satisfy more general searches for the extension of calculative practice which are embodied within the societies of which organizations are a part. "Accounting change increasingly emanates from the interplay between a series of institutions which claim a broader social significance. Often operating at a distance from at arenas in which their innovations function, those regulatory bodies, professional institutes, formal representatives of social interests and agencies of the state which increasingly shape the accounting domain are open to a very different array of social, political and economic pressures than those which directly impact on the business corporation."\textsuperscript{13}

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2. Ibid., p. 411.
4. PCAOB, [2], p. 412.
10. Ibid., p. 6.
11. Ibid., p. 97.
ABSTRACT. Lage examined whether having a strong ethnic identity plays a protective role against juvenile delinquency and sexual offending behavior. Dünkel and Smit consider the impact that constitutional law can have on penal policy through an analysis of current developments in the law governing youth prisons in Germany. Windzio points out that juvenile offenders who have been sent to prison for the first time must arrange their everyday social interactions with inmates and prison staff.

Lage examined whether having a strong ethnic identity plays a protective role against juvenile delinquency and sexual offending behavior; the link between having witnessed domestic violence, having been physically abused, and having experienced both types of maltreatment and subsequent juvenile delinquent and sexual offending behavior; and, the link between parental support and attachment versus alienation, inconsistency in parenting, and communication patterns and subsequent juvenile delinquent and juvenile sexually aggressive behaviors. Paper and pencil surveys were collected from 332 sexual abusers and 170 non-sexually offending youth at 6 residential facilities in a Midwestern state. Participants responded to questions regarding traumatic experiences in their childhood, delinquent acts committed, sexually offending behavior, importance of ethnic identity, violence witnessed, perceived attachment to mother and father, parental inconsistency and warmth, and communication patterns with parents. Results indicated that race was associated with group, with a majority of the sexual offenders reporting as White (72%) versus a minority of the non-sex offenders reporting as White (27.8%) and that for the sexual abusers, feeling close to other members of one’s race is associated with less severe sexual crimes and fewer reported victims. Sexual abusers reported witnessing more violence and experiencing more forms of maltreatment. Both exposure to domestic violence and having been physically abused were related to various delinquent behaviors for non-sex offenders and to delinquent and sexually abusive behaviors for sexual abusers. There was no difference between re-
ported communication patterns with parents, but juvenile sexual offenders reported less attachment and warmth, more feelings of alienation, and more inconsistency in parenting than did non-sexually offending youth.\(^1\) Huang examines the null hypothesis of Granger no-causality between labor force participation (LFP) and juvenile delinquency in Taiwan. Huang uses official time-series data provided by the Government of Taiwan. After estimating both a four- and five-variable VAR system, one that substitutes both male and female LFP rates for the aggregate LFP rate, the primary findings of Huang’s study reveal the following: The higher the past juvenile crime rate, the lower the future aggregate and female LFP rate will be. In addition, the higher the past male LFP rate, the higher the future juvenile crime rate will be. These findings are quite robust in terms of different lag-length structures.\(^2\)

Yancy contends that society long has been concerned about the behavior of its youth. Today, because of the easy accessibility of more dangerous drugs, more lethal weapons, and automotive transportation, this concern is greater. In 1989 there were 1,744,818 arrests among those under 18 years and 585,521 arrests in the age group under 15 years. Although the overall arrest rate for males has increased only 5\% over the past 10 years, violent crimes such as murder and rape have increased significantly (>60\% and >27\%, respectively). Further, motor vehicle thefts have increased even more (72\%). The overall arrest rate for females under 18 years of age has increased 13\%, with aggravated assault and motor vehicle theft (>69\% and 54\%, respectively) chiefly responsible for the increase. These figures would be even more staggering if they included youth who commit delinquent acts but do not come into contact with legal authorities. Not only do pediatricians, because of their relationship with youth and their families, have an opportunity to affect those factors that may lead to delinquent behavior, but they have an obligation to provide for the medical and mental health needs of these youth.\(^3\)

Lane examines the relationships between the age at which female juvenile offenders receive their first sentencing and individual risk factors, family risk factors, and race. The individual risk factors include dropping out of school, physical abuse, sexual abuse, prostitution, substance abuse, gang involvement, poverty, pregnancy, and the existence of co-defendants. The family risk factors include parents’ marital status, familial criminal activity, education level of parents, and receipt of public assistance. The
results showed individual risk factors to have a statistically significant relationship with the dependent variable, age at first sentencing. Family risk factors did not have a statistically significant relationship to the dependent variable. Socio-demographic risk factors were found to be statistically significant only indirectly, through the individual risk factor scale.  

Ajzenstadt says that, between 1948 and 1970, Israeli society witnessed a proliferation of discourses on juvenile delinquency, adopting a critical, historically informed approach. Ajzenstadt shows that debates on juvenile delinquency and juvenile justice, as well as the inclusionary or exclusionary policies they promoted, were grounded within the project of nation building and interwoven in broader attempts to reshape the social and moral order of the new society. Reflecting an emerging conception of a "normal insider" citizen, a norm against which all individuals were measured, the discourse on juvenile delinquency created a hierarchy of "others." As Ajzenstadt puts it, middle-class juvenile delinquents were seen, in spite of their criminal acts, as deserving members of the new community. Delinquency in was attributed to their lack of readiness to participate in the socio-cultural milieu, something to be treated by re-socialization. Arab delinquents were considered aliens and received limited services and treatment. Discourse analysis techniques indicate that this structuring of delinquent groups by class, ethnicity and nationality was part of a broader definition of the ideal moral traits of the Israeli citizen.  

Curry and Corral-Camacho use a random sample of Texas felony drug offenders sentenced during the height of the US War on Drugs, and show main and conditional effects of race/ethnicity, gender and age on sentence severity. The probability of receiving prison time was greater and sentences were longer for African Americans, African American males and African American males ages 22—30. The likelihood of going to prison was also higher for Hispanic males, and Hispanic males ages 31—40, but no differences were observed for sentence length. Young minority males will pay a penalty cost at sentencing, and comport with recent research on drug sentences and the conditional effects of race/ethnicity, gender and age on sentencing.  

Dünkel and Smit consider the impact that constitutional law can have on penal policy through an analysis of current developments in the law governing youth prisons in Germany. Dünkel and Smit’s study sketches the emergence of constitutional
guidelines for the development of German prison law generally and then pays close attention to a recent decision of the German Federal Constitutional Court on the constitutionality of current provisions on the implementation of youth imprisonment. Dünkel and Smit outline the implications of the judgment of the Court for future German legislation in this area. The legislator is expected to place on international minimum standards and to the role research on treatment plays in setting limits to legislative discretion. Dünkel and Smit consider the wider implications for penal policy of combining a formal rule that constitutionally guaranteed rights of prisoners can only be restricted by primary legislation, with substantive constitutional requirements for the objectives of penal legislation and for how these objectives should be met. Such a rule is potentially applicable not only in Germany but also in other countries with similar constitutional traditions. Inderbitzin focuses on attempts within a juvenile correctional facility to 'normalize' adolescent inmates and to deflate or redirect their goals and aspirations. Many young offenders have been socialized to fully embrace the 'American Dream'. For the teenage boys in this study, the American Dream was about the attainment of wealth and masculine prestige. Lacking legitimate opportunities to attain wealth through conforming means, most turned to criminal enterprises, leading to their incarceration. Inderbitzin writes that juvenile correctional facilities are one of the last bastions of the 'old penology' and one latent task of such institutions is to level the aspirations of young inmates so that they will face fewer anomic conditions when released back into the community. Drawing on ethnographic research of a cottage for violent offenders at one state's maximum-security juvenile training school, Inderbitzin demonstrates how cottage staff members play a central role in modeling conforming behaviors, strategies and attitudes for their institutional 'sons', encouraging the boys to 'aim low' and adopt aspirations and goals more in line with the opportunities available to them in the community. Windzio points out that juvenile offenders who have been sent to prison for the first time must arrange their everyday social interactions with inmates and prison staff. Under the assumption that social integration is a basic need, negative subjective experience with interactions inside of prison is an important aspect of pains of imprisonment. On Windzio’s reading, this experience could have a deterrent effect on committing crime after release from first imprisonment. In addition, a deterrent effect
could occur if inmates suffered from deprivation of contact with persons outside of prison. Prisoners who keep their distance from other inmates might suffer, because the basic social need of interaction is not satisfied. Windzio remarks that there seems to be a deterrent effect of suffering from deprivation of contacts with persons outside. In addition, the more prisoners isolate themselves from other inmates, the lower the rate of recidivism is. The higher the fear of other inmates, the higher the rate of recidivism.\(^9\) Halsey draws on selected narratives of young men in secure care in order to build a picture of the subjective experience(s) of conditional release and (reasons for) reincarceration. From these narratives, Halsey then moves to explore three issues bearing upon the nature of conditional release, and, more specifically, which contribute to the extremely high rates of return to custody. These themes have to do with: first, the preponderance of a deficit model of juvenile behaviour; second, the steadfast belief in the ontology of the modern subject; and, third, evidence which shows juveniles' increasing willingness to turn down the opportunity to commence conditional release.\(^10\)

REFERENCES


ABSTRACT. Ross et al. review and describe prison climate measurement studies. Frost holds that, over the past few decades, scholars of punishment and social control have increasingly lamented the punitive turn in criminal justice policy. Fitzgibbon contributes to an examination of the effects of the transition toward risk analysis on the work of practitioners within the criminal justice system, in particular the probation service of England and Wales. Demker et al. state that Sweden is often portrayed as a hold out from ‘penal populism’, with a comparatively non-punitive population that prefers preventive and non-custodial sanctions to imprisonment.

Pager writes that in recent years, worsening economic conditions have led to growing tensions between native-born French and a rising tide of immigrants, largely from North Africa and other parts of the developing world. The French criminal justice system has responded to perceived levels of social disorder and delinquency in these ethnic neighborhoods by increasing police surveillance, widening court jurisdiction, and imposing harsher penalties for offenders. In part as a result, France’s foreign and immigrant residents, who comprise only about six percent of the population overall, now represent nearly thirty percent of the French prison population. Though the rise in reported crime has no doubt influenced recent trends in crime control, there is reason to believe that the formal orientation toward crime control is more than simply a function of crime itself. Little attention has been given, however, to the broader social and political context in which crime control strategies are developed. Pager conducts a comparative analysis of punishment regimes across local jurisdictions in order to assess the relationship between concentrations of national minorities and the institutional response to crime. By exploiting geographic variation in the concentration of national and ethnic minorities across France, Pager finds strong associations between increasing population heterogeneity and the functioning of the local criminal justice apparatus.1 Robinson notes that, in a number of recent analyses, rehabilita-
tion has been portrayed as a casualty of processes of penal transformation, coming to be frequently characterized as 'dead' or 'irrelevant'. Robinson takes issue with such a characterization in the specific penal context of England & Wales, and seeks to explain why rehabilitation is currently enjoying a renewed legitimacy. Rehabilitation, in this jurisdiction, has adapted and survived into the 21st century by transforming and re-marketing itself in important ways. Central to this transformative process has been a successful appeal to three dominant 'late modern' penal narratives: utilitarian, managerial and expressive. In the contemporary (Anglo-Welsh) penal context, rehabilitation enjoys legitimacy to the extent that it is compatible with each of these narratives.2 Ross et al. review and describe prison climate measurement studies. Ross et al. compare the factor patterns and stability from three domains of the Prison Social Climate survey (PSC) (Environmental quality of life; Personal well-being; and Safety and security). Stability was compared using randomly split halves of inmate responses from 10 selected US federal prison samples (n = 950): there were no significant differences. Factor patterns on the same instrument were compared between the US sample and an English purposive sample (n = 186) of inmates. There were no significant differences between US and English factor patterns, although at a slightly lower level of factor constraint. According to Ross et al., factors as factor-scored according to the US factor pattern showed significant differences between the USA and England on the Environmental quality of life scales and the Personal well-being scales, and significant differences on only two of six of the Safety and security dimensions. Data suggest that the PSC is stable within the US sample, and is also stable in its factor pattern between the US and English samples. Prison climate, as measured by the three domains of the PSC selected, appears a stable measure across similar western penal systems and inmate cultures.3 Frost holds that, over the past few decades, scholars of punishment and social control have increasingly lamented the punitive turn in criminal justice policy. The perpetually growing size of prison populations has typically been portrayed as the end result of an increasingly punitive criminal justice response. Although many recognize that the size of prison populations ultimately depends upon both the flow into and out of prisons, the vast majority of empirical work has relied on imprisonment rates, based on one-day counts of prison populations, as the dependent
variable indicative of increasing punitiveness in imprisonment. Frost explores state-level variations in imprisonment rates and in the determinants of those rates (admissions and length of stay). State punitiveness rankings shift substantially depending on the measure of punitiveness. The use of imprisonment rates as the sole measure of punitiveness masks substantial state-level variations across the functional determinants of those rates. Social scientists studying punitiveness theoretically or empirically should distinguish the propensity to imprison from penal intensity. Demker et al. state that Sweden is often portrayed as a hold out from ‘penal populism’, with a comparatively non-punitive population that prefers preventive and non-custodial sanctions to imprisonment. But while the Swedish public is still less punitive than many others, there is evidence that it has become more punitive, and less content with Swedish penal practice, over time. Trying to add to the understanding of the causes of toughening penal attitudes, Demker et al. proceed to investigate the importance of media consumption for Swedish penal attitudes, and find a correlation between tabloid consumption and punitiveness.

Tränkle demonstrates that German and French Victim—Offender Mediation schemes (VOM), in contrary to mainstream opinion, do not seem to work but face enormous problems, which prevent the procedure from putting into practice its intended aims. Tränkle evaluates the interaction process between participants and mediators from a micro-sociological point of view. Based on that evaluation, VOM is not able to put into practice its specific modus operandi within the framework of a penal procedure. Malsch discusses the criminalization of stalking, the reasons for stalking being criminalized and the sanctions that are imposed in stalking cases and the development process of the Dutch anti-stalking law. Malsch presents the findings from an empirical analysis of 77 stalking cases tried by Dutch courts, discusses the way in which stalking occurs, and takes into account defendants’ and victims’ backgrounds. Malsch considers early interventions against stalkers, made possible by the new law. These may be even more important than punishing the offender. O'Sullivan and O'Donnell maintain that in Ireland, until recently, a range of institutions other than prisons was utilized to confine those deemed to be deviant: rather than becoming more punitive (if this is estimated by the number of individuals coercively confined) the country has become considerably less so over the past 50 years. In
1951, despite high emigration providing a safety valve, more than 1 percent of the population was behind closed doors in prisons, borstal, reformatory and industrial schools, psychiatric institutions (as involuntary patients) and homes for unmarried mothers. This was eight times higher than in 2002.\textsuperscript{8}

Fitzgibbon contributes to an examination of the effects of the transition toward risk analysis on the work of practitioners within the criminal justice system, in particular the probation service of England and Wales. Fitzgibbon focuses on the impact on practice and interventions in the shift from traditional casework methods to risk assessment and some of the contradictions and problems this raises. On the basis of a small pilot study, Fitzgibbon highlights two issues: first, whether the successful application of risk assessment systems presupposes the very casework skills which these systems were designed to replace; second, whether deskilled practitioners working under increasing resource constraints tend to inflate the levels of risk presented by clients and mis-refer them to inappropriate cognitive therapy programmes, with the ultimate result that clients needlessly end up in custody.\textsuperscript{9}

Player The Government published a separate strategy for women offenders and established the Women’s Offending Reduction Programme to co-ordinate cross-government initiatives that target women’s offending and the criminogenic factors that underpin it. In order for preventive strategies to be taken forward the reduction of women’s imprisonment has been identified as a priority. Yet the Government has presided over a period of unprecedented growth in the female prison population and its criminal justice policies convey contradictory messages about the use of custody for women. The future capacity of the female estate has been expanded by the commissioning of two new women’s prisons and the sentencing reforms contained in the Criminal Justice Act 2003 fail to apply a brake on the courts’ increasing use of imprisonment. This article examines the ways in which the new legislation fails the test of ‘joined-up’ government by undermining its own strategy for female offenders and exposing larger numbers of women to the risk of imprisonment.\textsuperscript{10}
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ABSTRACT. Tränkle deals with Victim-Offender Mediation (VOM) in Germany and France, which is a form of Restorative Justice (RJ). Dubber holds that punishment requires a political justification: as the most severe form of state coercion, punishment poses the most serious challenge to the legitimacy of the state. Dünkel and Smit state that in most jurisdictions penal policy makers are aware that they operate within constitutional constraints and take them into account when developing new laws.

Dubber holds that punishment requires a political justification: as the most severe form of state coercion, punishment poses the most serious challenge to the legitimacy of the state. Criminal law treats its objects as persons characterized by the capacity for autonomy. Federal penal law is the only truly “American” penal law there is. Federal penal law lacks a comprehensive penal code while insisting on being entirely statutory. “The United States as a whole claims a common heritage of political principles, a national rhetoric of rights and legitimacy, that makes a common, American, discourse about the legitimacy of punishment possible. Codes and doctrines may differ from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, but at a higher level of abstraction the requirements of political legitimacy do not. In the end, Texas criminal law and California criminal law and New York criminal law and Iowa criminal law all must comply with the principle of autonomy.” Dubber claims that international comparative analysis among penal systems that are similar in the relevant sense may unearth doctrines at various levels of generality in another penal system that manifest the principle of autonomy. The penal power of the state in American legal discourse remains rooted in its police power. The power to threaten and inflict punitive pain is the indispensable, most visible, and most dramatic manifestation of the state’s quasi-patriarchal power to police. U.S. penal practice is a manifestation of police power, a system for the disposition of disobedients and threats to the public welfare that is not governed by principles of legitimacy. “The paradigmatic crime in the Police Model of pena-
lity is offense against the state: crime manifests disobedience of a state command and therefore constitutes an offense against the state’s sovereignty. Punishment manifests the state’s superior power over the offender and reasserts its sovereignty. As a manifestation of sovereignty, punishment is entirely discretionary, as is its quantity and quality. The state is not obligated to pursue offenses, nor to punish them in a particular manner. It is up to the state to determine whether, and how, to respond to a challenge of its sovereignty.”

Dünkel and Smit state that in most jurisdictions penal policy makers are aware that they operate within constitutional constraints and take them into account when developing new laws. Dünkel and Smit describe the development of the law relating to the implementation of imprisonment since this increased the prospects of success of the application. The significance of the judgment of the FCC goes beyond the question of the need for regulation of youth imprisonment. “The emphasis that the FCC placed on international human rights standards was subtle, for, although it held that they were not strictly binding, it put indirect pressure on the State to follow them. [...] The effect of the judgment of the Court will be to give much greater value to the ‘soft law’ rules and recommendations of these two bodies. The significance of international instruments of the Council of Europe and of the United Nations, and the Court’s interpretation of the significance of failure to comply with them as an indicator that constitutional requirements for the implementation of youth imprisonment are not being met, has potentially far-reaching consequences for the forthcoming legislation.” As Dünkel and Smit put it, juveniles should have the same safeguards as adult prisoners and there should be further facilities made available to them. All prison accommodation must meet standards of human dignity and protect the privacy of prisoners, whether adults or juveniles. Opening imprisonment and assisting preparation for release facilitate the development of social skills, contributing to the reduction of recidivism. “While one cannot isolate the potential of specific forms of relaxation of the prison regime to reduce recidivism, implementation of the prison regime in a way that emphasizes the transition to life on the outside with a range of strategies, including prison furloughs, to enable prisoners to cope with social pressures, is doubtless far more likely to support resocialization than simply releasing someone directly from a closed prison. Al-
though it is hard to prove causal explanations for the empirically demonstrated lower recidivism rates for adults released from open prisons, the evidence suggests that open prisons have an enhanced recidivism-reducing effect when their programmes consider further principles of effective treatment for prisoners.4

Dubber contends that the victim plays a role in every aspect of American penal law, from the general and special part of substantive criminal law to the imposition of penal norms in the criminal process. Victim participation has been said to contribute to the offender’s rehabilitative treatment. Actual attempts at rehabilitative treatment proved unsuccessful. Prisons were viewed as perpetuating a myth of reformation. “Retributivism made room for victims insofar as its assessment of desert turned in part on the harm inflicted by the defendant’s conduct not only in the abstract, i.e., in the definition of the offense, but also in the particular case, provided the offender displayed an attitude toward the harm that would permit the assignment of blame. The victim’s role in retributivism, however, was not uncontested.”5 On Dubber’s reading, it is the injury to a fellow community member by an outsider that triggers the penal impulse. The victim is entitled to an unrestrained manifestation of her pain and confusion. The victims’ rights movement has failed to produce a considered account of the proper community basis for identificatory penal judgment. Capital cases involve the expansion of the emphatic community from the victim’s family to that of the larger community represented by the jury. The identification with the victim at the expense of identifying with the offender provides an additional benefit to the onlooker. “Once the offender is excluded from the realm of identification, the question ‘how could someone like us have done something like this’ no longer arises. To the extent curiosity survives, it does not concern the offender’s behavior, but the victim’s suffering. Making room for victims thus often amounts to facilitating the search for an answer to the altogether different, passive, question ‘how could something like this have happened to someone like us.’ The offender and her behavior remains significant only insofar as it can help answer this elusive question, most obviously in the case of victim-offender meetings after conviction.”6

Tränkle deals with Victim-Offender Mediation (VOM) in Germany and France, which is a form of Restorative Justice (RJ). There might appear to be problems which contradict the aims and
working principles of the procedure, and the legal rights of the participants (even if an agreement has been reached). VOM is not able to put into practice its specific modus operandi in the framework of a penal procedure. The penal law dominates the procedure and impedes the interaction process. Tränkle reports the results of a qualitative study which evaluated the interaction process between participants and mediators and which is based on German and French case studies. Tränkle describes the methodological design of the study and gives an overview of the legal and organizational framework of VOM in Germany and France. The institutions face similar problems depending on their organizational proximity to the prosecution authorities, not their nationality. Based on tape recordings from mediation sessions, Tränkle analysed how the interaction order is structured. In the framework of a mediation, there are three parties and the mediator is supposed to be neutral vis-à-vis both parties. “VOM in Germany and France have some basic structural elements in common; they differ only slightly in their way of institutionalization. For a start, the legal framework is that of penal law; this means that the prosecution authorities initiate and oversee the VOM process and take a final decision. In France, all VOM cases are pre-sentence since only prosecutors are entitled to divert cases onto mediation. In Germany, a case can be diverted at any stage of the penal procedure.”

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2. Ibid., p. 2604.
4. Ibid., p. 361.
6. Ibid., p. 9.
ABSTRACT. Dubber provides a systematic overview of the victims’ role throughout the entirety of penal law. Dubber says that an inquiry into the legitimacy of American penal law would not set its sights quite as high as the discovery of a universal grammar of criminal law. Dubber develops a new code-based, comparative, and comprehensive program for American penal law. The discipline of American penal law must come to see itself as part and parcel of its subject (the praxis of American penal law).

Dubber provides a systematic overview of the victims’ role throughout the entirety of penal law. Peno-correctional treatment turns on the offender’s criminal pathology. Retributivism viewed punishment as the vindication of a general penal norm. The victims’ rights movement can be thought of as the manifestation of a communal self-protective reflex or impulse. “The inclusionary-exclusionary nature of the victims’ rights movement becomes most obvious in capital cases. Here identification with the victim is said not only to permit but to require differentiation from the offender. By declaring the offender an outsider so alien to the community that identification is simply impossible for lack of even the most basic similarity, the community purges itself of deviant elements and thereby heals itself as it salves the victim’s pain.”

Dubber contends that American criminal law has frowned upon the so-called passive personality theory of jurisdiction. Victim consent is generally considered a justification for nominally criminal conduct. The victim impacts the law of punishment upon conviction (i.e., the law of sentencing). “The victim figures in the special part of American criminal law at various levels. Traditionally, the bulk of the special part has concerned itself with protecting the interests of personal victims in their life, liberty, and property. More recently, however, so-called ‘victimless’ crimes have begun to challenge traditional personal crimes for dominance both in the books and in action. At the same time as the assignment of criminal liability to non-personal entities emerged as an acceptable regulatory tool, personal victims were replaced by other, more amorphous, ‘interests’.” On Dubber’s reading, loitering statutes...
have been struck down on constitutional vagueness grounds by federal and state courts throughout the country for two decades. Victim characteristics play a central role in the distinction between non-capital and capital murder. Victims play important roles throughout the criminal process, where penal provisions of substantive criminal law are applied in particular cases. Victims retain several avenues to challenge a prosecutor’s decision not to prosecute. Most American prosecutors’ offices are run by elected officials. “American law similarly places limits on the appointment of private persons, including victims’ attorneys, as special prosecutors. For instance, it was held to violate the defendant’s right to due process when the victim’s counsel was appointed to conduct criminal contempt proceedings to enforce a court order prohibiting infringement of the victim’s trademark. In general, in considering whether to permit private prosecution of a case, courts consider the severity of the offense and the public prosecutor’s consent.”

Dubber says that an inquiry into the legitimacy of American penal law would not set its sights quite as high as the discovery of a universal grammar of criminal law. Strict liability combines with respondeat superior to generate criminal liability from supervisory position. Offenders are integrated into penal institutions ranging from the benevolent to the malevolent. The theory of punishment must justify more than the mere threat of punishment for this or that conduct. “Meeting the challenge of punishment in ‘a free society’ requires testing the legitimacy of the imposition of (legislatively defined) penal norms in our court rooms, court building hallways, and prosecutors’ offices, through prosecutors, judges, and (in the rarest of cases) juries. Most important, legitimating punishment means legitimating the infliction of punishment in carceral settings (in prisons, on gurneys, in gas chambers, on death rows, in Special Housing Units, ‘boot camps’) and noncarceral ones (parole and probation supervision, collateral penalties, forfeiture, fines, compensation, restitution, fees) alike.”

Dubber affirms that if one grounds crime and punishment in autonomy, the outlines of an autonomist system of penal law emerge. Penal law serves to protect the autonomy of potential victims and to vindicate the autonomy of actual victims through the threat, imposition, and infliction of punishment. In substantive criminal law, the principle of autonomy informs both the general principles of criminal liability applicable to all offenses and the specific criminal offenses that define the scope of criminal law. The actus
reus requirement stands on its own, deriving its strength from the commitment to respecting the offender’s capacity for autonomy. The act is the manifestation of a person’s external exercise of her capacity for autonomy. “To punish someone for a status, rather than an act, is to treat her as less than a person. It is to treat her as a thing, a nonhuman animal, or a natural phenomenon, each of which is incapable of acting in the sense of engaging in voluntary behavior. Only in the case of a person is there a sharp line between status and act, between being and doing, as only the person can choose to act independently of (and inconsistently with) her status. A ‘felon’, for instance, may decide to refrain from criminal activity, just as a ‘vagrant’ may decide to settle down.”

Dubber holds that there are the rights of passive autonomy, which preserve one’s freedom not to participate in the proceedings against oneself. The principle of autonomy must be applied to the law of punishment execution (prison law). Capital punishment is so patently inconsistent with the law’s function of preserving and respecting the autonomy of persons as to be illegitimate per se, and it treats the offender as a nonperson, and it deprives her of whatever personhood she might be able to claim. “Many aspects of modern prison management, including the warehousing of inmates, the failure to provide basic means of subsistence combined with the denial of opportunities for self-support implicit in the very notion of total carceral isolation, the commission of, and acquiescence in, physical and psychological abuse by guards and fellow inmates, and the wholesale disenfranchisement of offenders during and after their confinement, are inconsistent with the view of offenders as persons equipped with a capacity for autonomy.”

Dubber develops a new code-based, comparative, and comprehensive program for American penal law. The discipline of American penal law must come to see itself as part and parcel of its subject (the praxis of American penal law). American penal law has the least to say about the very issues that matter most in penal lawmaking (the proper role of penal law in public policy, and the proper scope and definition of offenses within that role. The legitimacy of the most facially illegitimate of state practices (punishment) can be achieved and preserved if the integrative potential of penal law is realized and fulfilled. “The age of the common penal law is over. Penal law now is made in codes by legislators, not in court opinions by judges. To deserve a say in penal legis-
lation, American penal law scholars must become experts in penal legislation. And to have the ear of legislators, American penal law scholars must address legislators, not judges. The reform of American penal law will require a sustained effort to reshape the attitudes of all those who affect and operate the various aspects of the penal system. To influence the praxis of its subject matter, the discipline of American penal law must make a place for itself in this effort." Dubber claims that criminal procedure must be wrested from the titillating context of constitutional jurisprudence. “Prison law” excludes a large part of the praxis of punishment infliction. A class on penal law must have something to do with the praxis of penal law. “The analytic aspect of penal law scholarship, long neglected, attains greater significance every day as modern penal law continues to expand. Today the mere assembly of a list of all criminal offenses in a given jurisdiction, not to mention the entire United States, would constitute a major scholarly contribution. Contemporary penal law scholars simply do not know enough about the positive penal law to warrant special consideration in the making of penal law. The doctrinal expertise of today’s penal law scholars tends to be of little if any practical relevance.” As Dubber puts it, the critical analysis of penal law cannot occur in a vacuum: a full account of penal law must integrate itself into a wider account of state governance (and of law in particular). Penal law must be distinguished from other legal modes of governance (including both so-called public and private law).

REFERENCES

2. Ibid., p. 12.
3. Ibid., p. 19.
5. Ibid., p. 2609.
6. Ibid., p. 2612.
8. Ibid., p. 59.